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In the history of the philosophy of seventeenth century England, 
empiricism overshadows idealism, and the theological treatment of the 
thought of "old priest and new presbyter" is given preference. The 
Cambridge Platonists have been woefUlly neglected by philosophers and 
theologians alike. In this study we are primarily concerned with 
the rational theology of Benjamin Whichcote and his thought as 
reflected in the writings of his disciples and successors. It is 
natural that since he is the father of the Platonists, any thorough 
treatment of his life and thought will cast light upon the entire 
movement and its collective influence. 
Our purpose in this study is to bring Whichcote from a place of 
relative obscurity to a point of observation where the real man and 
his thought may be seen and examined. This being the burden of this 
study, the obvious place to begin is with the man himself. The clue 
to Whichcote's influence is to be found in his contemporary setting. 
A critical examination of his posthumous writings are in order since 
some works ascribed to him are spurious. 
Standing as he does at the head of a movement, it is essential 
to find Whichcote's place in the history of thought. He was not a 
systematic philosopher or theologian, but this does not minimise the 
pervasive influence of his thought upon his disciples and successors. 
He is a rational theologian who recognises truth from all spheres, but 
his intention is an apology for the Christian faith. 
ii. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
BENJAMIN WHICHCOTE: A MAN OF GOOD NATURE 
Part I 
The Man and his Milieu 
Benjamin Whichcote was born on 4th May, 16091 , into an "ancient 
and honourable family". 2 His father was Christopher Whichcote, 
probably a "Squire", and his mother Elizabeth, daughter of Edward 
Fox of Greet in the county of Salop. He came from a very large 
1Basic sources of Whichcote 's biography are: ( 1) D. N. B. XXI, 
lff. (art. by Mullinger); \2) Salter, Preface to Letters; (3) 
Tillotson, Funeral Sermon; \4) Mayor, Cambridge, pp.297ff.; (5) 
A. c., Pt.I, Vol.IV, 382; and (6) Burnet, History of My Own Time, 
I. Burnet should be regarded as a memoir writer rather than an 
accurate historian. See Lodge, History of England, VIII, 477. 
In the 17th Century, funeral sermons were considered valuable 
biographical documents; hence our frequent use of Tillotson'a 
sermon. See Richardson, English Preachers, p.96. The material 
concerning Whichcote' s life is not abundant. See Keenwood, The 
Emmanuel Platonists, p.iii. Whichcote's name is spelt in various 
ways, i.e. Whichcot, Whichcott, Whichcote, Whitchcote, etc. See 
Haywood and Wright, Transactions, II, 563f., 593t., 619. Cf. 
St. Lawrence, Minutes of Vestry, 1669-1720, folios 115, 122, 129 and 
156. The present writer prefers the "Whichcote" spelling. There 
is disagreement on his date of birth. 11th March, 1609, is held by 
Salter, ~·, p.xvi, and Tillotson, Ibid., p.21; while 4tb May, 
1609, is held by Mullinger, Ibid., p.1 and A. c., Loe. cit. Tbe 
present writer accepts 4th May, 1609, as the more historically 
reliable. 
2 Salter, Ibid. , p. xvi. 
1. 
2. 
family of five girls and seven boya. 1 Unfortunately, nothing is 
2 known of our author before he was seventeen. 
On the 25th October, 1626, he was admitted pensioner at 
Emmanuel College, Cambridge, on which occasion his name in the 
entry in the register is spelt "Whitchcote". 3 His college tutor 
was Anthony Tuckney, a divine whose career was subsequently inter-
woven with his own. Says Tuckney, "From your first coming to 
Cambridge I loved you: as finding you studious and pious, and very 
loving and observant of me 0 • 4 In 1629-30 he graduated B. A. and in 
1633 he became M.A., in which year he was elected fellow of his 
college. When his tutor Thomas Hill left the University the 
following year, Whichcote became tutor. The Cambridge tutors 
acted as guide, philosopher and friend to their pupils and had 
special influence over their religious opinions. SUch an office 
1awen and Blakeway, Shrewsbury, II, 436; I, 408 (Note 7). 
Whichcote's brother, Sir Jeremy, baronet of Hendon, Middlesex, 
barrister-at-law, and solicitor-general to the Elector Palatine, 
was the author's youngest brother. His brother Christopher was 
a Spanish merchant, residing in London. His brother Samuel and 
his sisters Anne and Catharine all made "good marriages". In 
1637, his niece Mary was married to Dr. Worthington by Whicbcote 
and Cudworth attended the wedding. Cf. Worthington, Diary (Crossley's 
note), I, 87ff., 274. In addition to what has been said concerning 
Sir Jeremy, he was Justice of Peace, Deputy Lieutenant and Colonel 
of the militia for the County of Middlesex, and held the wardenship 
of the Fleet during the reign of Charles II. 
2powicke, The Cambridge Platonists, p.51. Cf. Tulloch, 
Rational Theology, II, 47. 
3n.N.B. XXI, 1. 4Letters, p.36. 
3. 
Whichcote magnii'ied. 1 He was an excellent tutor and instructor of 
youth; a great encourager and kind director of young divines; "a 
candid hearer of sermons and his judgment was highly reverenced, 
though there was no fear of his censure", as a "critic he was humble 
and kind". 2 Among his students who afterwards attained distinction 
3 were John Smith, John Worthington, John Wallis and Samuel Cradock. 
John Smith is said to have "lived on Whichcote". This phrase has 
financial as well as mental and spiritual implications, as is 
apparent when one reads the Discourses of Smith, who became a student 
at Emmanuel College, Cambridge, in 1636 while Whichcote was a fellow 
and tutor of the same college. 4 
Wbichcote was ordained by John Williams, bishop of Lincoln, on 
5th March, 1636, "both deacon and priest", "which irregularity", says 
Salter, "I know not how to account for in a prelate so obnoxious to 
the ruling power both in Church and State". 5 In the same year he 
was appointed Sunday afternoon lecturer at Trinity Church, Cambridge, 
where he served for nearly twenty years. About this time he was 
appointed one of the University preachers and in 1640 he became 
Bachelor of Divinity. In 1641 bis candidature for the divinity 
1George, Men of La ti tud e, p. 70f. 
2Tillotson, op. cit., pp.22, 33; Cf. Salter, op. cit., p.xvii; 
Shuchburgh, Emmanuel College, p.81. 
3salter, Loe. cit. 4smith, Discourses (1859 ed.), pp.vi,xvf. 
5salter, op. cit., p.xvii. 
4. 
chair at Gresham College was defeated by Thomas Horton. In 1643 
the Master and Fellows of Emmanuel presented him with the living of 
North Cadbury in Somersetshire. There be married Rebecca, widow of 
Matthew Cradock, governor of Massachusetts, and retired to Cadbury. 1 
Nothing is known of the influence of his wife upon his career. 
In 1644, ':Vhichcote was summoned back to Cambridge by the Earl of 
2 
Manchester and the Parliamentary Commissioners, as Provost of King's. 
This post had been held for many years by Dr. Samuel Collins, the 
Regius Professor of Divinity, whom Whichcote respected greatly, and 
Whichcote was reluctant to accept the position from which Collins bad 
been dismissed. It was only after careful thought and considerable 
pressure that he consented to do so, and he provided for Collins a 
portion of the stipend of the provostship. The arguments pro and £.QB 
by which he ultimately arrived at the conclusion that he should accept 
the post were written down. His acceptance was out of a sense of 
duty and was to the credit not only of King's, but to the University 
1n.N.B., XXI, 2; Cf. Salter, op. cit., p.xviii. Salter assumes 
Whichcote 1 s marriage, but does not know to whom. The account of his 
marriage to Rebecca Glover of st. Swithins, widow, 26th April, 1649, 
in A.C., Loe. cit., is dubious both as to date and marriage partner. 
Tulloch in the first part of his work, op. cit., II, accepts Salter's 
agnostic view, but later in the same volume (p.431) refers to a letter 
from H. A. Miles, which gives definite information on this subject. 
Whichcote married Rebecca, widow of Matthew Cradock, a wealthy London 
merchant and first governor of Massachusetts Bay. In 1650 Whichcote 
petitioned the general court of Massachusetts for the payment of a 
sum of money due her former husband. The court voted that one 
thousand acres of land be given Dr. Whichcote and bis wife Rebecca. 
2Fu11er, The University of Cambridge, pp.233ff. Here is given 
an account of conditions at Cambridge in the early 1640's. 
5. 
1 and the Church of England. Someone else with Whic~ote's standing 
would have been difficult to find. 
" ••.•• One, whose Capacity should have been so indisputable, his 
Reputation for Piety Learning Prudence and Temper so established, 
his Interest and Credit with those in Authority so very 
considerable, and his Fortune so independent: by all which in 
conjunction our Author was enabled to do so much more Service 
than any other man; without stooping to anything unworthy of 
his Character. 11 2 
Mullinger agrees as he says: 
"In the midst of all the bitterness of feeling and deep 
depression, the influence of Whichcote stands out in bright 
relief."3 
The tendering of the Covenant had a marked effect upon the 
University. A Committee was appointed for the purpose of expelling 
those who refused the Covenant, and a subsequent Committee instructed 
to enforce its _a.cceptance upon those who should be elected to fill 
the vacancies. The newcomers were required to sign a certificate 
pledging their loyalty before admission. It attests to the profound 
respect which his character inspired that Wbichcote appears to have 
been admitted to bis post without taking the Covenant. On the other 
hand, an example of the detrimental effects of this action may be 
seen in the experience of Collins. But Whichcote's generosity, 
1salter, op. cit., pp.xviiif. Cf. Haywood and Wright, King's 
College, p.290. See Harley MS, 7045, p.474 for pros and cons of bis 
decision. Concerning his appointment, see Shuchburgh, op. cit., p.81. 
For a character sketch of Collins, see Masson, The Life of Milton, I, 
92f. Cf. Harley MS, 7034, p.229 a.nd 7038, pp.17, 213~ 
2 Salter, Ibid., p.xix. 
3Mullinger, The Univer§ity of Cambridge, III, 296. 
6. 
combined with the slender stipend Collins continued to receive as 
Regius Professor of Divinity, enabled him to pass the remainder of 
his life in comfort. The influence of Whichcote may be discerned in 
the fact that at King's only five fellows were ejected and only one 
sequestration was made, besides that of Collins'. books. Whichcote 
also came to the rescue of Robert Heath, whose sequestered property 
was restored after his ejection in 1644. 1 
When Whichcote became Provost, Tuckney was made Master of 
Emmanuel, Arrowsmith of St. John's and Hill of Trinity. These 
four were friends and all but Whichcote had met at the Westminster 
Assembly. Among this group Whichcote was the only one to re:fu.se 
the Covenant. The youngest of this group, he had broken away from 
the narrow and dogmatic principles of his education. His advocacy of 
freer and more liberal opinions led to some disagreement between 
Whichcote and his three friends which finally broke out in a frank 
discussion between Whichcote and Tuclmey. 2 
Among the above mentioned friends of Whichcote, Tuckney is the 
one most closely associated with an understanding of his life and 
1Ibid., pp.296f., 288; Cf. Tillotson, .2E!.. cit., pp.22ff. A 
good example of Whichcote's moderation is seen in his support of 
Barrow for Greek Professor. Barrow was a Royalist, refused both 
the Covenant and Engagement and was suspected of Arminianism; See 
Allen, Skeleton Collegii Regalia Cantab, III, 1439. Dyer suggests 
that Whichcote most probably took the Covenant. Thia I reject for 
lack of evidence. See Dyer, The University of Cambridge, p.335. 
Cf. Masson, op. cit., pp.94f., See also, Infra, Ch.III. 
2salter, op. cit., pp.xxf. 
7. 
thought. Tuckney was born in 1599 at Kirton in Lincolnshire. At 
fourteen he entered Emmanuel College, Cambridge. He took his 
first degree at seventeen, and became fellow three years later. He 
proceeded to M.A. in 1620 and was for a time in the Earl of Manchester's 
family before he came back to live in the college, where he became an 
eminent tutor. He continued as tutor until receiving his B.D. in 
1627. 
town. 
He went to Boston as an assistant to John Cotton, Vicar of the 
Cotton, a resolute Nonconformist, soon left for New England, 
and Tuckney, who was now married, became Vicar and remained in this 
posi~ion until the Restoration. When Parliament convened an Assembly 
of Divines, he was nominated from the county of Lincoln. Tuckney 
took his family with him and never returned to Boston to live. He 
was "highly considered" by the Assembly and obtained a London pariah. 
Manchester appointed him as Master of Emmanuel in 1645, but he did 
not reside in Cambridge until three years later when he became Vice-
Chancellor of the University. He served in that office with credit 
and received the D.D. degree the next year, as did Arrowsmith and 
Whichcote. Later, Tuckney became Master of St. John's and Regius 
Professor of Divinity. However, he was "civilly turn'd out" of both 
latter positions for his nonconformity at the Restoration.
1 
In 1649 Whichcote resigned his Somerset living which was 
presented in 1650 to Ralph Cudworth, now Master of Clare Hall. 
1Ibid., pp.i-vi; Cf. Calamy, The NonconformistSMemorial (ed. 
Palmer, 2nd ed.), I, 264ff.; Dyer, op. cit., 354f.; Shuchburgh, 
op. cit., p.79. 
a. 
Whichcote was soon afterwards presented by King's to the living of 
Milton at Cambridgeshire, which he held the remainder of his life. 
There were some difficulties at the Restoration concerning his 
Milton charge which will be discussed later in this chapter. In 
November, 1650, he was elected Vice-Chancellor of the University. 
He sought to preserve a spirit 01· 11 sober piety" and "rational 
religion" in the University and town or Cambridge; in opposition 
to the "fanatic enthusiasmtt then prevalent. This seems to have 
been the motive for his Sunday afternoon lectures at Trinity Church. 
Another course 01· lectures was given on Wednesdays at the same church 
and was served by the very best preachers, fellows of various 
colleges and others, all probably friends of Whichcote. 
His efforts and influence resulted in the "great talents and 
excellent performances of many eminent divines after the Restoration", 
most of whom were educated at Cambridge and were "formed if not 
actually brought up by him". As an official of the University, he 
maintained a truly Christian temper and made worthy use of the 
influence he had with those in authority, while Tuckney, Arrowsmith 
and others were apprehensive of a total destruction threatening the 
seats of learning. His generosity to Collins and other ejected 
members of the society increased his influence. Ee bad "too noble 
and great a spirit to serve a party and was never so attached to any 
as not to see, own and wish to serve real merit; wherever it was 
to be found". In spite of his dii'ferences with Tuckney, he 
contributed his vote to "raise" Tuckney to the Divinity Chair. 1 
In 1654, on the occasion of peace with Holland, Wbichcote 
contributed to the volume of verses, Oliva Pacis, composed by 
members of the University to celebrate the event and dedicated 
to Cromwell. In December, 1655, he was invited by Cromwell to 
advise him, in conjunction with Cudworth, Tuckney and others, on 
the question of toleration for the Jews. In 1658 he wrote a copy 
of Latin verses upon the death of Oliver Cromwell. In 1659 
together with Cudworth, Tuckney and other Cambridge divines, he 
supported 1v1attbew Poole's scheme for the maintaining of students of 
"choice ability at the University and principally in order to the 
ministry". 2 
The University of Cambridge shared in the political and 
religious conflicts of the period leading up to the Restoration. 
There was the abrupt dismissal of scores of fellows and masters by 
first Puritan and then Royalist officers from 1644-1660; the 
military situation at Cambridge during the Civil War; the occasional 
wanton destruction of college property; and the inevitable relaxation 
of both rules and routine. 3 Following on all this, a fUrther blow 
1Ibid., pp.xxivf.; Cf. George, op. cit. According to George, 
the fears of the other University officials were well founded. 
2n.N.B., XXI, 2f. For an account of Cromwell's Conference 
concerning the Jews, see Worthington, op. cit. (Crossley's note), I, 
78. Whichcote's poem at the death of Cromwell is found in his 
Works, I, iii. Concerning his support of Poole's education scheme, 
see Poole, Autobiography of Matthew Robinson led. Mayor), p.193. 
3M. P. ( 1929-30), XXVII, 35; Cf. Cooper, Annals, III, 423. 
10. 
fell upon the University and especially upon some of its ot•ficiala 
at the Restoration. In 1660, a message was sent from the King to 
the Vice-Chancellor of the University of Cambridge as follows: 
"To observe all the directions given by his father end 
grandfather especially obedience to the governors and restraint 
of all letters in Cambridge without due order, also to call in 
all licences granted since 1643 and have the persons licenced 
put to the vote of the present University and choose others in 
the place 01· those rejected. nl 
In the same spirit a royal letter was sent to tbe Vice-Provost 
and Fellows o:f King's College, afrecting Whichcote directly: 
" ••••• Whereas, the provost of our colledge called King's 
Colledge, became void by the death of Dr. Collins ••••• 
we have appointed for the supply thereof ••••• Dr. ~ames 
Fleetwood, one of our chaplains in ordinary ••••• " 
On the basis of the King's letter, Fleetwood petitioned the King 
for the appointment in July, 1660.3 The King's letter was written 
the previous month, 22nd June, 1660. Fleetwood ignored Whichcote as 
Provost, thus his letter was followed by a protest from Whichcote and 
supporters. The request of the latter was that Whichcote "be confirmed 
in the place of Provost". The response o:t the King was that Whichcote 
continue as Provost until further orders, "notwithstanding his previous 
letter to elect Fleetwood, which they could not do statutably, there 
being no voidance fif'teen days previous". Barlow, the Vice-Provost, 
and twenty-two Fellows signed a statement in favour of Whichcote's 
1cooper, Ibid., p.431. 
2Haywood and Wright, Ancient Laws, p.293 (Harley. MS.7045t p.473). 




Whicooote sought the a id or Lord Lauderdale to intercede ror 
him before the King, which Lauderdale did. The King beard the 
appeal "graciously" and afterwards spoke to the Lord Chamberlain, 
Chancellor of the University, about Whichcote's .,concerns". Thus, 
Lauderdale, together with the Lord Chamberlain, were oft he opinion 
ths.t Wbichcote's position was secure. Lauderdale concludes that 
"there is no need to make a particular application", and promises 
2 
that "I shall not :faile to watch all opportunities to serve you". 
Wbichcote's position was not secure, ~·or :b1 leetwood was determined 
to be Provost o:r King's. Fleetwood requested that the Vice-Provost 
and Fellows or King's accept him as Provost. He based his request 
upon the King's original letter and considered himse11· as duly 
elect ea. He had taken the oath of office, received the statute 
book, seals and keys or orrice, but had been opposed by the 
"pretended" Provost and a rew younger Fellows. He insisted that 
the King be informed that "Dr. Whichcote is incapable by statute 
of the Provostship of King's College having never been a Fellow, 
that of the seventy Fellows 01· King's College, o~ly thirty, twenty-
two or whom are juniors, signed bis certiricate, and the others 
refused and resolved against him, Dr. Whic~ote having never been 
1 Ibid. , p. 432. 
2Haywood and Wright, op. cit. , p. 287f. tHarley MS. , Loe. cit.) 
For Whichcote's letter to Lauderdale, see L.P. (May-December, 1660), II, 
folio 9. Date 01· letter is 12th June, 1660. Ci'. Austen-Leigh, 
King's College, p.137. 
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elected, but put upon them by a private committee ••••• ul 
Whichcote urged that the appointment be lert with the King and 
remarked tbat others who were not F'ellows or King's had held this 
office, further pointing out tbat be bad accepted it unwillingly and 
bad given up a valuable living to do so. 2 One of tbe senior 
Fellows, Dr. William Godman, highly commended Whicbcote's life and 
work at King's. Although admitting that Whicbcote was statutably 
incapable or· the appointment, be insisted that \Vhicbcote's "great 
learning, prudence and civility" ma.de him worthy. Godman added that 
Whicbcote had been an "encourager 01· learning and virtue end bad 
never persecuted any upon dirference or opinion". 3 There was 
another letter rrom Dr. Richard Love, Master of Corpus Christi College, 
Cambridge, attesting to the life and work of Wbic'tcote. Love wrote: 
ttBy these I testi1·y that Benjamin Wbichcote, who for 
fifteen years ba.tb been tbe Provost or King's College in 
Cambridge, is a worthy and learned person, or exemplary 
sobriety and gravity, prudent in government, and hath been 
carerull 01· the good of tbe college sundry ways, as well in 
regard to revenues tbereo1·, as of persons belonging thereto. 
So that tbe College beth always thrived under his government 
above former ages. I further testify that the said Dr. bath 
as head or the University, been exceedingly usefull and belp-
full to tbe management 01· our public af'rairs, for the sarety 
1cooper, Loe. cit. 
2Haywood and Wright, op. cit., p~.288fr. (Harley MS., op. cit., 
pp.473f. ). Here is recorded various reasons why Whichcote's party 
felt be should be c on1·1rmed as Provost, ·together with W.hicbcote 'a 
own reasons i'or accepting and holding the post :f'rom the time or his 
appointment. 
3Haywood and Wright, Ibid., pp.292r. (Harley MS. Ibid., p.475) 
Gedman was Dean or Divinity at King's. 
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of the whole body in times of greatest danger. Lastly, I 
testify that he hath always been highly ready and industrious 
to relieve all such deserving persons as were either in 
trouble or danger for their duty and loyalty to the King's 
Majesty, many particulars in which I am able to alledge out 
of my experiences."1 
On 11th July, 1660, Fleetwood with Fellows, Scholars and servants 
of King's College went to the Provost's lodgings. They found some 
of Whichcote' s servants there who refused them entrance. Once 
again, Fleetwood asserted that he was Provost by "royal command". 
He insisted that Whichcote's "contempt" should be punished. Further 
he accused Whichcote of turning Collins out of the same office and of 
failing to observe the College Statutes, by not filling the "singing 
men and choristers' places, etc." Thus, on 16th July, 1660, 
Fleetwood wrote the King's secretary, Nie holas, tl;lat "he was received 
at King's College but shut out of the Provost lodgings by order of 
Whichcote, whom he allowed to continue there as a matter of convenience". 
He urged the King to rule on this matter. 2 
Neither the merits of Whichcote's life and work, nor the inter-
cession of' Lauderdale could save him from ejection. 3 In the opinion 
of Charles II, his were all negative virtues. Fleetwood, on the other 
hand, was an army chaplain exerting considerable influence upon the 
soldiery. Further, the King's personal feeling was that Whichcote's 
1Ibid., p. 291 (Harley MS.. Loe. cit.) 
2cooper, Loe. cit. 
3Auaten-Leigb, op. cit., p.137. 
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conduct seemed to have been designed to vindicate the legality of hia 
position rather than to maintain himself in office. Whichcote now 
saw clearly t~ situation which faced him. There was no necessity for 
further intervention from without. His protest made, he retired from 
his post at King's. 1 
As we observe this struggle between Whichcote and Fleetwood, 
it is worthwhile to make certain observations. First, Whichcote 
and Fleetwood were arguing at cross-purposes. Whichcote held that 
his position was official, while Fleetwood completely ignored his 
authority. Second, there is the possibili_ty that many who supported 
Fleetwood were misguided by his appeal to the statutes and "group-
loyalty". Godman's statement is a good example. It is obvious 
that Fleetwood's real motive is primarily selfish. Third, without 
the pressure from Fleetwood, it is a reasonable probability that 
Whichcote would have been confirmed in office. Fourth, however 
much we may admire the "sweet-temper" or good-nature" of Whichcote, 
we cannot but wonder if his final stand at the Provost's lodge was 
not an indication of a callousness in his nature. Finally, we must 
remember that the available evidence is not sUfficiently conclusive to 
condemn either man, especially in view of the "evil days 11 in which 
they lived. The controversy also brings out a valuable summary of 
Whichcote's contribution to the life of the University. 
As far as his ejection is concerned, Whichcote merely shared the 
~ullinger, _o_p_. __ c_i_t., pp.567ff.; Cf. Masson, op. cit., VI, 306f. 
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fate of most University officials appointed by the Puritans, but by 
the testimonials of influential friends, by the recommendation of his 
own life and work, and by his conformity to the Act of Uniformity, he 
was restored to "court favour". 
1 and preacher was yet to come. 
Thus his eminence as a city _pastor 
Whichcote's connection with Cambridge, however, did not end with 
his ejection 1·rom ~he Provostship of King's. His successor, Fleetwood, 
and Fellows agreed that Whichcote should retain the Rectorship of 
Mil ton. The question arises as to whether this "preferment" can be 
attributed to the generosity of Fleetwood or to the many Fellows of 
King's who loved Whichcote and desired that he should be provided for 
and who had consented to his ejection only out of loyalty to the 
2 statutes of the founder of the College. The latter reason seems to 
be most probable. Accordingly a letter was sent to Whichcote promising 
re-appointment to the living of Milton if he would resign. From tbis 
letter, it appears that it was necessary for Whichcote to resign and be 
re-appointed by the College that the College might retain the right to 
present this rectory. We may summarise the matter as follows: 
t1) To make the presentation official under the new administration 
of State and University, he was presented by Matthew, Bishop of Ely, 
1 -
D.N.B., XXI, 3. For a description of the Act of Uniformity, 
see Haywood and Wright, Transactions, II, 555. 
2L.P., Loe. cit. Here Whichcote states that many of the fellows 
preferred him to Fleetwood, but they wished to follow the statutes, viz. 
that a Kingsman must always be Provost, although in the history of the 
College this rule had not always been followed. 
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for the College, on 13th November, 1660; 
( 2) Since the "cure" had lapsed for the King, on 10th December, 
1660, he was also presented by Matthew t•or the Crown; and, 
(3) Upon his resignation by the request of tbe College (30th November, 
1661), he was finally instituted Rector of Milton, 20th November, 1661 
by King's College. 1 Though Whichcote's future was more distinguished 
by his London ministry, yet it is to be remembered that be remained 
2 
Rector of Milton until his death. 
On 8th November, 1662, he became minister of St. Anne's 
Blackfriars, London. 3 Concerning this appointment, Salter says: 
~aywood and Wright, Ancient Laws, p.294f. (Harley MS., 7045, 
p.476). See also Allen, op. cit., pp.1432f. 
21 received the following information from a list of incumbents 
and a brief history on the wall by the main entrance to All Saints 
Church, Milton. The history of this church goes back to about 970 A.D. 
when it was perhaps connected to the Monastery of Ely. The church is 
in the Diocese of Ely. The Parish bad from its early beginnings a 
Rector, who received the greater tithes and bad to ~eep the Chancel in 
repair, and also Vicars. In some parishes a monastery owned the 
tithes and appointed a deputy or vicar to act as Parish Priest. In 
these parishes the clergyman is still called vicar. But in Milton, 
the Rector as well as the Vicar was clergyman and often lived in th3 
parish, sometimes only one of them. The altar rails were given by 
a Provost of King's College together with Fellows. Collins served 
as Rector f'rom 1638 until his death and Whichcote was· his successor. 
The historical value of this account is slight, but we are introduced 
to the rectory of Milton and Whichcote's ability to carry on work 
elsewhere in the meantime is explained. A list of the vicars serving 
with Whichcote is also given. 
3Allen, Loe. cit. St. Anne's is now joined with St. Andrew-
by-tbe-Wardrobe. The building was destroyed by 1~ire bombs in 
World War II. 
17. 
"Though removed, he was not disgraced or frowned upon ••••• 
He was on the contrary only called up from the comparative 
obscurity of a University life to a higher and more conspicuous 
station; from a place where he had done much service to one 
where there was still much to be done; by men like him. "1 
When St. Anne's burned down in the Great Fire of 1666, he 
retired to Milton and resided there for several years. There "he 
preached constantly, and relieved the poor, and had children taught 
to reade at his own charge; and made up differences among neighbours". 2 
In 1668, Whichcote's friend Wilkins was appointed Bishop of 
Chester, thereby vacating the vicarage of St. Lawrence Jewry, to 
3 
w~ioh by the interest of Wilkins, Whichcote was appointed. This 
church, however, had to be rebuilt, and during the work, which 
occupied some seven years, he preached regularly to the Corporation 
at Guildhall Chapel. 4 Tillotson says: 
"· •••• During the building or it upon the invitation of the 
Court of Aldermen in the mayoralty of Sir William Turner, he 
preached before the Honcmable Auditory at Guild Hall every 
1Salter, op. cit., p.xxvf. 
2Tillotson, op. cit., p.25. 
an account of the Great Fire, see 
1931), p.198f. 
3n. N. B. , Loe. cit. 
Cf. Cole, MS. 5810, p.182. For 
Baxter, Autobiography (ed. Thomas, 
4rillotson, Ibid. Again St. Lawrence has been destroyed by 
1'ire, by fire bombs in World War II. Fortunately, the records o:f 
St. Anne's and St. Lawrence are safe in the Guildhall Library. We 
have made use 01· the following: St. Anne's, Marriage Register, 
1562-1726, Burial Register, 1566-1700 and Baptism Register, 1560-
1700; St. Lawrence, Loe. cit. There is little valuable information 
in these records. They do attest to the period of Whichcote's tenure 
~s minister and of course his official signature is affixed to the 
important transactions or these parishes. 
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Sunday in the afternoon, with g-reat acceptance and approbation 
for about the space of seven years." 
And when St. Lawrence was rebuilt, 
"he bestowed his pains here twice a week, where he bad tbe 
general love and respect o~ his Parish; and very considerable 
and judicious Auditory, though not very numerousi by reason of 
the weakness of his voice in his declining Age." 
In a letter to Sancroft, December, 1670, Whichcote gives an 
account of his services both to literature and to the Church. In 
1674, along with Tillotson and Stillingfleet, he co-operated with 
certain non-con1·ormists in furthering Thomas Gouge' s efforts to 
extend education in Wales. 
continued until his death. 2 
Wbichcote's work at St. Lawrence Jewry 
Whichcote died in Cambridge in 1683, when he had gone to visit 
Cudworth. Like Socrates, he seemed pleased to leave the body for 
"that happy state to which I am gofng". He was calm and serene durini 
his illness. Following prayers for the "visitation of the sick" and 
Holy Communion, his last words were: "The Lord ful1'il all his 
declarations and promises and pardon all my weaknesses and imperfections~0 
Tillotson adds: 
"He disclaimed all merit in himself; and declared that 
whatever he was, he was through the grace and goodness of God 
in Jesus Christ. He expressed likewise great dislike of the 
Principles of Separation: and said he was the more desirous 
to receive the Sacrament that he might declare his :Lull 
1Tillotson, Ibid. 
2n.N.B., Loe. Cit. 
3.rillotson, Ibid. , pp. 28:r. 
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Communion with the Church of Christ all the world over. He 
disclaimed Popery as well as things of near affinity with it, 
superstition and the usurpation upon the consciences of men. 
He thanked God that he had no pain in his body, nor disquiet in 
bis spirit."1 
He was interred in St. Lawrence Jewry, where his :funeral sermon 
was preached by Tillotson on 24th May, 1683. He left bequests to 
the University Library and also to King's and Emmanuel Colleges, at 
which last society he bad t·ounded before his death, scholarships to 
the value of one thousand pounds "bearing the name of William Larkins, 
who making him his executor entrusted him with the said summe to 
dispose of to pious users at his own discretion". He left no 
children; his executors were his two nephews, the sons of Sir Jeremy 
Whicbcote. 2 
According to Shuchburgh, it was by preaching and by personal 
intercourse with pupils and friends that Whichcote's great work was 
done and his extraordinary influence at Cambridge, and int he Church, 
. d 3 was exercise • He was a thinker rather than a scholar, a teacher 
1Ibid. Ct. Aphorisms, 293, 198, 939. 
2n.N.B., Loe. cit. Cf. St. Lawrence, Loe. cit. In the minutes 
of May, 1683, an account of' his a ea th is given. There are portraits 
of Whichcote in the Provost's Lodge at King's and in a Chapel window 
at Emmanuel. In my opinion the better of the two portraits is at 
Emmanuel. Westcott considered the latter most "characteristic". 
D.N.B., Ibid. er. Shuchburghl op. cit., p.81. His epitaph is 
recorded in Harley MS., 7034, p.332. A detailed account of the 
charitable bestowal 01· his weal th at his death is recorded by 
Tillotson, op. cit., pp.26f. His benevolent spirit was reflected 
by his relations, of "blood" and "intellectual" kinship. The present 
rector of Mil ton informed me that he left several acres or "cbari table 
land" to be cul ti veted by the poor. 
3shuchburgh, Ibid., p.81f. 
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not through books only, but by personal experience. By his example, 
the University and especially its younger members were deeply 
. d 1 impresse • All that we know of Whichcote's life goes to show that 
his practice did not fell short 01· his principles. Even those who 
differed from him loved and trusted him. 2 Within bis own College, he 
encouraged classical studies. 3 Burnet says: 
"· •••• He set his young students much on the reading of' the 
ancient philosophers, chiefly Plato, Tully and Plotin, and in 
considering the Christian doctrine sent f'rom God, both to 
elevate and sweeten nature, in which he was a great example, 
as well as a wise and kind instructor.4 
What of' his effectiveness as a preacher? Locke in a letter 
to Richard King, highly commended his preacbing. 5 While I am 
aware tbat a philosopher even of Locke's standing is not necessarily 
an able judge o:r preaching, it appears tbat be is in the position 
to estimate the "thought-value" of a sermon. A similar estimation 
of his sermons is made by Shaftesbury who describes Wbicbcote as a 
"preacher 01· good-nature". There seems to be no doubt that his 
sermons challenged tbe minds of bis hearers; for tbougb be preached 
without full notes, he did not preach "without study". 6 
1Raven, John Rax, p.37. 
2Austen-Leigh, op. cit., p.137. er. Thompson, Cambridge, p.114. 
3Ibid., pp.134f. er. Letters, pp.38ff'. 
4Burnet, ~cit., p.340. er. Masson, ou. cit., III, 75. 
5salter, Testimonies, p.xxxiv. 
6Mitchell, English Pulpit Oratory, p.23. 
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There a.ppea rs to be no doubt that the great instrument or Whichcote' s 
influence was the pulpit, both in Cambridge and in London; for he 
1 possessed remarkable power as a preacher. He was the great 
University preacher of the Commonwealth; and to his Sunday afternoon 
sermons, probably more than to any single means of influence, is the 
progress of the new movement which he :rounded to be attributed. Both 
by his own language and that of his opponents, it is clear that he aimed 
by his sermons to give a new tone to contemporary thought - to turn 
men's minds away from polemical argumentation to the great moral and 
spiritual realities lying at the basis 01· all religion. 2 It seems 
appropriate to conclude that in Whichcote as a preacher we find a strong 
personali.ty, a capable and learned person, but also one who is the very 
incarnation of his message - a real "communication of truth through 
personality". Perhaps, then, the dynamic personality of the preacher 
coupled with the thoughtfulness of his message will serve as a partial 
explanation of Whichcote's amazing power as a preacher. Thus, 
Tillotson says: 
" •••.. Besides his care of the college, he had a very great 
in1·1uence upon the University in general. Every Lord's day in 
the afternoon, for almost twenty years together, he preached at 
Trinity Church, where he had a great number not only of the 
young Schoiars, but those 01· great standing and best repute for 
learning in the University his constant and attentive auditours. 
And in those wild and unsettled times contributed more to the 
1·orming 01· the Stud en ts o:t· the University to a sober sense of 
Religion than any man in that Age."3 
1Tulloch, op. cit., II, 84. 2Ibid., p.85; Cf. Letters, p.108. 
~illotson, op. cit., p.24. er. Mullinger, op. cit., p.590; 
Works, III, ix. 
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Finally, we consider the secret of his personal influence. 
We must recognise the remarkable influence of Whicbcote as a teacher, 
thinker and preacher. He was also a good pastor and University 
administrator. He combined considerable social influence with 
personal popularity. He had a "reputation for sound judgment and 
a discernment unrivalled in the University". 1 He was a man whose 
work was his life. Whichcote echoed and answered the cogito ergo sum 
of Descartes by the words, "I act, therefore I am. " 2 
The question now arises as to why Whichcote is scarcely known 
in the history of' English thought. Little is understood either 
of his character or writings; yet he was among the most influential 
preachers and theologians or his age. He was held in high esteem 
by eminent statesmen or· his day and be, probably more than any other 
Cambridge teacher, impressed his mode 01· thought upon his colleagues 
and upon the rising generation of students. In a true sense be may be 
said to have founded the new school o:E philosophical theology known 
as Cambridge Platonism, although it is chie:fly known through t be more 
elaborate writings or others. The influence or his mind and 
personality exceeded his own literary productiveness. Even Tuckney 
felt that Whichcote had a party behind him and that his teaching 
was representative. He spoke not merely for bimsel~, but for others 
1Hullinger, op. cit. , p. 289f. 
2westcott, Religious Thought in the West, pp.362-366. er. Works, 
II, 61, ~4. 
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1 or whom be was the reputed leader. 
It is di1Ticult to say what gives a man a position ot.· leadership 
in such a learned circle as a University. The greatest ability 
and the most proround learning may not suffice. Distinction as a 
writer has often no e:r1·ect. Whichcote had "a certain attractiveness 
and glow of feeling, a persuasive enthusiasm, an aptness to teach, 
that goes right to the heart of the young". This constitutes a 
power more effective than mere literary and intellectual capacity. 
Thus in Wbichcote, it is easy to see from elements, at once, of 
"intellectual strength and moral beauty", what gave him the role of 
"leader of r.iinds" and such unusual influence at Cambridge. He was 
"well-born" and appears to have been wealthy throughout his life, and 
this, no doubt, helped his influence. 2 Perhaps his ability to see 
good in men and hope for their recovery drew many to him, as did tbe 
dignity and impressive nature of his "bearing e.nd conversation". 
3 
There appear to have been few in Whichcote's time of greater celebrity 
than our author. 4 He is presented by his contemporaries as a man of 
exceptionally "sweet temper and restrained judgment" and one wbo 
exerted great influence upon the religious thought of his time.5 
To sum up our estimation of Whichcote's influence, let us observe 
that he maintained his independence and position under Puritan 
1 Tulloch, op. cit., pp.45f., 83. 
2 
Ibid., pp.83f., 92f. --
3whewell, Lecture, p.69. 4nyer, op. cit., p.355. 
5Higham, Faith of Our Fathers, pp.188f. 
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domination, and was sympathetic ana helpf'ul to the persecuted. He 
was above partisanship, and untouched by changing fortunes. For 
almost half a century, under three evil regimes, he preached without 
molestation. He was silenced neither by the Puritans and the Army in 
the day of their power, nor by the Anglicans and King in the day of 
too irs, "his light shone steady, while others were flickering and 
1 
snuffed"· Burnet has well said: 
"Whichcote was a man of rare temper, very mild and obliging. 
He had great credit with some that had been eminent in the late 
times, but made all the use he could of it to protect good men of 
all persuasions. He was much for liberty of conscience and being 
disgusted with the dry and systematical way of those times, he 
studied to raise those who conversed with him to a nobler set of 
thoughts, and to consider religion as a seed of deiform nature. "2 
It is hoped that this study of the life and work of Whichcote will 
enable the reader to view his thought with greater appreciation. 
Part II 
Whichcote's Writings 
At this point, we are only concerned with an examination of the 
sources of Whichcote's thought. The fact that all his publications 
are posthumous and that the authorship of some books attributed to him 
is doubtful, demands 01· us a more critical examination than is usually 
1George, op. cit., pp.73ff. 
2Burnet, op. cit., p.349. Cf. Tillotson, op. cit., pp.31ff.; 
Westcott, op. cit., pp.375f. 
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necessary. His writings deserve to be remembered for the teachings 
which they embody, for their style, and most of all, for the revelation 
which they give of Whicbcote's character. 1 
Mullinger has given a comprehensive list of works attributed to 
Whichcote. They are: \1) Select Notions, 1685; \2) A Treatise 
of Devotion, 1697; \3) Select Sermons, edited by Shaftesbury, 1698; 
(4) Several Discourses \Jeffery), 1701; \5) The Malignity of Popery, 
1717; \6) The Works, 1751; and \7) Moral and Religious Aphorisms, 
1753. 2 For our convenience we may list the writings of our author 
under four headings, namely: { 1) Aphorisms; \ 2) Letters; \ 3) Sermons; 
(4) Miscellaneous Works. 
Salter's examination of the Aphorisms is invaluable. He tells 
us that the collector and publisher of Jeffery's works found among 
them these aphorisms as an anonymous book, but was later informed 
\Salter does not say by whom) that these aphorisms were composed by 
Whichcote and that Jeffery had copied them from Whichcote's writings. 
In this manner Jeffery collected nearly five thousand aphorisms. He 
published a thousand of them in 1703. In this edition Jeffery prefixed 
a preface and added a prayer. Salter revised this collection, preserving 
the best of the former publication. Later he found another collection 
more emphatic and more fully expressed. He sought to take out the 
1campagnac, The Cambridge Platonists, p.xi. 
2n.N.B., Loe. cit. The above does not include all publications 
attributed to Whichcote. Others will come forth in the discussion to 
follow. 
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repetitions, by the use of five hundred aphorisms from the new 
collection and the best from Jeffer.y's selection. Thus Salter 
brought one thousand two hundred of them together for his publication 
in 1753. He tells us that he "selected only those tba.t stood out 
as being superb". Jeffery transcribed the aphorisms from his collection 
but be was not always accurate. As a result there are some twenty or 
thirty repetitions either in the same words or with alight variations. 
Salter attempted a more accurate publication of the aphorisms but 
reminds us of the "tediousness of the task of treating more than one 
thousand independent sentences with exactness and precision". He 
regrets that our author's original papers are not available; for his 
appeal to Mr. Benjamin Whichcote, nephew of Dr. Whicbcote, who bad 
inberi tea his uncle's manuscripts and others or the r·amily, had proved 
fruitless. 1 The Aphorisms seem to represent the many favourite 
notions of Wbichcote but as used in various contexts. :B1or instance, 
they are to be found scattered throughout his sermons. Thus a reader 
who is anxious to get a brief but representative understanding of his 
thought might pursue an investigation of this work. According to 
Inge, this book was popular in the eighteenth century. He asserts 
that there is no reason why it should not be popular in the present 
1salter, Preface to Aphorisms, pp.ixf., xixff., xxvi. The 
following editions of the Aphorisms· are available: (1) Jeffery's, 
1703; (2) Sal~er's, 1753; (3) Christian Tract Society, No.XXVII, 
Vol.III, 1821; and (4) Inge's, 1930. Salter's edition will be 
used in this study. The preface to these various editions is a 
good index to the thought of the Aphorisms. 
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century; "for there a.re few writers from wbom such an anthology of 
wit and wisdom could be put together". 1 
We turn now to an examination of the Letters. There is no 
question as to the genuineness of these letters which passed between 
Whichcote and Tuckney. Letters one, three, five and seven were 
written by Tuckney, while the remainder of the eight letters are by 
. 2 Wbichcote. The original transcripts of the letters, in Wbichcote's 
own band, were part of the collection entrusted to Jeffery. 
Whichcote's handwriting was poor. Further, he seems to have had 
"an eagerness end enthusiasm, but always under the command of reason 
which made him neglect his style in pursuit of an argument". Salter 
concludes that Whichcote did not always write accurately neither did 
Jeffery al ways read "exactly". The copy of the letters used by 
Salter was taken by one of Whichcote's brothers and corrected by 
Jeffery. Salter attempts to be faithful to the copy in hand and 
to make no unnecessary variations. He merely takes the passages 
written by the first writers in the margin into the text and "encloses 
them in brackets". 3 
These letters are valuable to an understanding of Whicbcote's 
thought, especially his reaction to Puritanism. Perhaps most 
1 Inge, Preface to Aphorisms, p.iii. 
~Vhile Salter's edition, 1753, will be used primarily 
the original Letters are in Sloane MS. 2903-25, pp.88ff. 
"Philosophical and Theological Reflections", the substance 
contained in the Letters, is in Sloane MS. 2716-4 tn.p. ). 
Infra, Ch. III. 
3Salter, Preface to Letters, pp.xxxviff. 
in this study, 
Similarly, 
of which is 
See also 
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important, these letters "teach us by the example of these two 
learned and good men" how to live in friendship and love in spite 
of differences. 1 
We turn now to an examination of Whichcote's sermons. These 
give the most comprehensive statement of' his thought. They are 
nearly all we have to attest to the power of his preaching, as well 
as to the "novelty and force" with which he preached. 2 According to 
Salter, Whichcote never wrote his sermons in full and usually preached 
from short notes or headings, which be filled in while speaking. 3 
Because of his great reputation as a preacher, "many persons of varied 
opinions" transcribed his messages into writing as he delivered them. 
Thus soon after bis death several sermons were "sent forth in his name 
by persons of different characters for different motives". In 1697 
there appeared in his name a Treatise on Devotion. This must be the 
work mentioned by Shaftesbury as being unworthy of Whicbcote. 4 This 
work has disappeared and warrants no fUrther consideration from us. 5 
The work Select Notions is still available and will receive special 
consideration later. 6 The :Malignity of Popery is included in the 
1Ibid. , pp. xxxixf. 2 Tulloch, c. R. , Oct. , 1871, p. 318. 
3see Tuckney's Second Letter (ed. Salter). Cf'. Richardson, 
op. cit., pp.71, 81f.; Mitchell, op. cit., pp.30-37. 
4select Sermons, 1698, p.xvi. 
5Tulloch, ~cit., p.323. Cf'. D.N.B., Loe. cit. 
6A copy of this work is in the (B.M. ). It is interesting that 
the following are agreed upon its non-existence: Salter, op. cit., 
p.xxxiii; Tulloch, ibid.· 
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1 
Works. The various publications of Whicbcote's sermons are as 
follows: (1) Select Sermons, 1698 and Twelve Sermons (2nd ed. of the 
former), 1721, edited by the Third Earl of Shaftesbury, and Select 
Sermons, 1742, edited by Principal Wishart; \2) Several Sermons, 
(3 Vols.), 1701-3, edited by Jeffery, and a fourth volume, 1707, 
edited by Samuel Clarke; and \3) The Works, l4 Vols.), 1751, by an 
unknown editor. 
According to Salter there is some confusion concerning tbe 
preface generally attributed to Shaftesbury. Salter says: 
" ••••• In a copy now before me, which was Dr. Jeffery's, that 
Dr. bas written in the title page; that Mr. Wm. Stephens, 
Rector of Sutton in Surrey, was the publisher. The accounts 
are easily reconciled; this gentleman did most likely revise 
the discourses; at the request and under the request of the 
learned Nobleman."2 
It is obvious that Salter had no knowledge of the 1721 edition 
of the Twelve Sermons. Thus he moves at once to a consideration of 
the 1742 edition published by Wishart. The latter published his 
edition because the first edition was "out of print s.nd scarce". 
Wishart remarks that Shaftesbury "providentially met with" the 
manuscript; and was so impressed that "he revised it, put it to 
3 press, and wrote the preface". Shaftesbury claims no such stroke 
of good fortune, but says that be "searched officiously after" these 
1 Works, I, 160ff. 
2salter, op. cit., p.xv. 
3Ibid., pp.xvf. Cf. Select Sermons {Wishart), p.xviii. 
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sermons. 1 We shall never know exactly bow Shaftesbury arrived at 
his collection. It is noteworthy that Jeffery apparently had no 
knowledge of Shaftesbury's first edition.2 We may observe that the 
Twelve Sermons, as edited by Shaftesbury and Wishart, were divided 
into two groups of six each. Six sermons were on the foundations 
of natural and revealed religion and the proofs of Christianity, 
while six were on religious and moral subjects. 
later included in the Works. 
These sermons were 
The collection of Wbichcote's writings entrusted to Jeffery 
consisted of many papers in Whicbcote's own band, besides what bad 
been "digested in some form or another". Jeffery had also a number 
of sermons transcribed from the spoken words of Whichcote by the 
Smith who said he "lived on Whichcote". Though Jeffery was assured 
of the genuineness of these sermons, he felt unauthorised to print 
any of them. Accordingly, he was displeased when Samuel Clarke 
published a fourth volume in 1707. Salter considered Jeffery too 
cautious since Clarke was not under the same obligation as himself. 
Salter confesses to possessing two collections of the sort that 
Jeffery would perhaps re:f'use to publish - one containing twenty-four 
sermons on a passage in Philippians; the other, thirty-six, on a 
text in Jeremiah. From the former of these, Clarke selected the 
first thirteen sermons of his volume, from the latter three sermons 
1Ibid., p.xvi. Cf. Select Sermons tShaftesbury), p.ii. 
2Ibid. , pp. xvif • 
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and the remaining ten sermons from a source unknown to Salter, on a 
verse or two of the Fifth Psalm. The above facts attest to 
Jeffery's faithfUlness to his trust and explain the difference 
between his three volumes and whatever else may bear the name of 
Whicbcote. 1 It is valuable that three out of four volumes 
included in the Works were compiled by one so faithfUl to his trust 
and who had at his disposal many of Whicbcote's own notes. 2 One 
can appreciate Jeffery's caution, but when the fourth volume of our 
author's sermons has been studied, one is grateful for Clarke's 
addition. 
Four volumes of Whichcote's sermons, known as the Works, were 
published in Aberdeen in 1751. This appears to be the most 
popular and accessible edition of Whichcote's sermons. One wonders 
if Wishart's introduction of our author's sermons to Scotland in 
Edinburgh in 1742, to the "ministers and students of divinity", led 
1sa1ter, Preface to Aphorisms, pp.xviiif. 
2Ibid., pp.xviff. Jeffery was entrusted with this responsibility 
to prevent publications which might misrepresent and dishonour the 
memory of Whichcote. Mr. Benjamin Whichcote, nephew of Dr. Whichcote, 
who bad inherited his uncle's papers, turned them over to Jeffery. 
This was done with the knowledge that Jeffery "had the highest veneration 
for the deceased author" and every talent necessary to "qualify him to 
be a diligent, fai thfUl and judi.cious editor". In the second volume 
of his edition of Whichcote's Several Sermons, Jeffery requested 
anyone possessing any of Whichcote's writings to turn them over to him. 
See Several Sermons, 1702, II, iv. In the first volume, Ibid., I, iii, 
he confirms his endeavour to be faithf'u.l to his trust. Salter regrets 
that he has failed to find f'urtber original sources of Whichcote's 
writing, but resolves to make fUll use of the available material. 
See Salter, Ibid., pp.xxvif. 
32. 
up to this publication. Unfortunately, the editor's name is unknown. 
He makes use of Shaftesbury's preface in the 1698 edition and merely 
adds a brief editor's note. According to the editor of the Works, be 
compared all available publications of Whichcote's sermons with a view 
. 1 
to presenting a complete edition. A carefUl check of all editions 
of Wbichcote's sermons reveals that all of his available tgenuine) 
sermons are included in the Works. To this day, there appears to 
have been no improvement upon this massive publication of the sermons. 2 
Since Whicbcote's sermons were published after bis death, it 
is impossible to give an exact date 01· their composition. However, 
it is possible to decide approximately whether they were written in 
his early ministry or during his more mature years by the "internal 
evidence" of the thought contained in them. Mitchell estimates that 
the first edition of Whichcote's sermons published by Shaftesbury were 
written during Whicbcote's London ministry, when he had learned that 
citations would no longer be acceptable. However, since they were 
published posthumously, we have no way of !mowing what amount of such 
quotations would have been restored or inserted had Whichcote 
3 
published them himself. There are only a few sermons that come to 
1works, III, xf. It is noteworthy that Salter reveals no 
knowledge of this publication in 1751, in his edition of the Aphorisms 
and Letters in 1753. 
2see Preface of' Shaftesbury, Jef~,y and Wishart for critic al 
introduction to Whichcote's sermons. 
3Mitchell, op. cit., p.285f. 
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us with definite dates. Two examples are: (1) A sermon preached in 
the New Chapel, 7th December, 1668, and ( 2) A sermon preached before 
the House of Commons, 4th February, 1673. 
1 
But for most of his 
sermons there is insufficient evidence to attempt a definite dating 
for them. 
However, though there is a lack of information concerning the 
sermons, they attain considerable excellence. It is plain that the 
notes from which the sermons were printed must have been fairly full, 
and that their printed form does not radically injure the preacher's 
style. From them we see that Whichcote's manner was uniform. His 
plainness and directness may represent the transition from the style 
of the Puritans to that of the more pictorial and poetical of the 
Platonists. He appears to have belonged to the tradition of preachers 
who used a straight-forward or malleable prose. 2 Though the material 
he left to the future is fragmentary and partly confused, it is not 
difficult to gain a clear view of his opinions from it. His frequent 
repetitions, bis bright epigrams, his earnest simplicity, bring his 
main thoughts vividly before the reader. When he spoke from the 
pulpit he appears to have laid aside the technical ~arms of expression 
which on other occasions provoked criticism. 
3 
His sermons are 
amongst the "most thoughtful" in the English language, not only for 
lworks, I, 56ff., 119ff. 
2Mitcbell, Ibid., pp.285ff., 312. 
3westcott, op. cit., p.370. 
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his own, but for all time. 1 
Before concluding this chapter, it is necessary to deal with 
a few miscellaneous works ascribed to our author. There are 
the prayers: (1) The Prayer at the end of the Works, and (2) 
A Prayer for Morning and Evening at the end of Salter's edition of 
the Aphorisms. Whichcote wrote some Latin verses upon the death of 
Cromwell in 1658. 2 In this poem Whichcote laments the death of the 
Lord Protector and rejoices at the succession of Richard. Most of 
the poem is a forthright denunciation of popery. Though this poem 
is insufficient evidence to indicate the political views of Whicbcote, 
it is reasonable to assume that he was impressed by Cromwell's 
"moderate" policy. Finally, we come to the "problem book" of all 
the extant writings ascribed to our author. The Select Notions 
contains a hundred pages of notes on five texts of Scripture and 
twenty-eight pages of what the editor calls Apostolic Apothegms. 
It is valuable in that it was published in 1685, only two years after 
Whichcote 'a death. Its entire authenticity is however in doubt. 
editor who calls himself Philanthropus was according to his own 
statement a "pupil and particular friend" of Whichcote who had known 
him at Emmanuel. He desired to publish Whichcote's thoughts during 
his lifetime, but was refUsed that :privilege. This editor was 
determined, however, that, if he survived Whichcote, he wou.ld "exert 
1Tulloch, Rational Theology, II, 46. 
2w ks I ... or , , 111. 
The 
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what I thought fit of those Instructions and Notions which I received 
from him". He waited two years for more "learned" persons to 
publish Whichcote's notions, but saw that no publication was forth-
coming. He therefore presented these Notions in Whichcote's honour. 1 
There appears to be no reason to question the editor's sincerity; but 
whether he really presents Whichcote's thought is another matter. 
Concerning the texts of the discourses, it is found that 
discourses 1, 2 and 4 of the Select Notions are identical with texts 
of sermons in the Works as follows: Works, III, LLI; II, XX.XIV, 
XX.XV, and XXV, respectively. But though the texts are the same, the 
treatment is entirely different. Int he first discourse on truth, 
many ideas compare favourably with Whichcote's but the style is found 
nowhere in his genuine works. Further the development of the notion 
and the form of argumentation is foreign to their supposed author. 
The second discourse reveals a noteworthy variation f'rom Whichcote's 
doctrine of salvation. It is fundamentally Puritan int bought and 
imagery. Some insights of' our author appear scattered here and 
there. 2 The third discourse is an intermingling of legal and moral 
righteousness in a style and "temper" unusual f'or Whichcote. But 
here appears a possibility of a "stage" in the thought-development of 
our author. When the writer rises to the level of Whichcote's 
notions of the "light of God's own candle set up within", he immediately 
1select Notions, pp.i-iii. 
2Ibid. , pp. 28ff. 
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lapses into Puritan dogma. 1 The fourth discourse presents "reasons 
for error in human judgment", which appear more typical of Whichcote. 
But the statement of the doctrine of the Fall has no resemblance. 
Later in the same discourse, he approaches Whichcote's tolerant spirit 
as he speaks of the mere essentials of Christian communion. 2 The 
fifth discourse comes closest to the philosophical insights of Whicbcote, 
but even here the language is not typical. 3 Finally, there are the 
concise and wise statements at the end of the work, which remind us of 
Whichcote's Aphorisms. Some few of these appear to reflect precisely 
what Whichcote says elsewhere, but there are also many statements 
. 4 "unworthy" of him. 
From our examination of Select Notions, we arrive at three 
probable conclusions. First, they may have been the views of 
5 
Whichcote in early life. This view would explain the confUsion of 
Puritan notions with flashes of the philosophical approach to religion. 
It would thereby be assumed that Whichcote, while at Emmanuel, as tutor, 
uttered the notions, but only as he sought fUller expression and 
understanding which developed into what we lrn.ow as his mature thought. 
That would mean that be had not as yet made a radical break with his 
Puritan background. We know from Tuckney that this is possible; 
he says of Whichcote that when he first came to Cambridge, he was 
1rbid., pp.54ff., 62. 
3Ibid. , PP• 85ff. 
2 
Ibid., pp.66ff., 80ff. 
4Ib id. , pp. 83ff. 
5salter, Preface to Aphorisms, p.xii. 
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"somewhat cloudie and obscure" in his expressions. Later, according 
to his former tutor, he studied and taught so much philosophy, that 
1 
ever since he had been cast in "that mould" in words and notions. 
Yet, even though Whichcote' s "open break" with Puritanism did not 
come until 1651, he confesses that he had held the views for at least 
2 
seven years. Second, there is the possibility that the editor of 
Select Notions had known Whichcote in his youth and bad studied under 
him, but had not "kept pace" with the developing thought of Whichcote. 
If his intentions were wholesome, this appears to be a probable 
explanation. On this basis he would be blameworthy for his misrepres-
entation of our author. And, third, there is the alternative view 
that the editor wished to publish his own notions, while making full 
use of the influence of Whichcote before it waned by the passing of 
time; hence, this publication just two years a~er his death. We 
conclude that the evidence does not admit Select Notions as a 
representation of the best and most mature thought of Whicbcote. 
What is best in our author's thought is said better in his authenticated 
work. 
In this chapter, we have presented the important facts of 
Wbichcote's life and work. We have sought to give some explanation 
for bis unusual personal influence. Finally, we have looked 
critically at the writings which bear his name and attempted to select 
1 Letters, pp.36ff. 
2 Infra, Ch. III. 
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the authentic and most representative works as a basis for fUture 
discussion of his thought. 
closes this chapter: 
Tullocb's observation appropriately 
"It is strange that he should have been so little lal.own 
and studied; but the obscurity which has overtaken him is 
not without some relation to his very greatness, and the 
silent way in which he passed out of sight after the Restoration 
after be had done bis work at Cambridge ••••• He was careless of 
bis own name ••••• He possessed the highest magnanimity of all -
a magnanimity extremely rare - of forgetting himself in the 
cause which he loved, and rejoicing that others entered into 
the results for which he laboured. It is all the more 
necessary, therefore, that we should endeavour to do some 
degree of justice to bis name and opinions - to bring before 
us as complete an image as we can 01· the man and bis academic 
and theological activity. Standing as he does at the fountain-
head of our school of thinkers, it is especially important to 
catch the spirit of his teaching, and to present it in its 
historical and intellectual relations. n1 
1Tulloch, Rational Theology, II, 46. 
CHAPTER TWO 
FROM ATHENS TO CAMBRIDGE 
The thought of Plato is closely allied at some points with that 
of bis predecessors. Socrates was convinced that the True and the 
Good are to be seen through the eyes of the soul, when the soul has 
been set free from the pressure of desire. He held that existence, 
or reality is one in the Good; that the unity of the Good is all-
present in this multiform world - itself the ever-changing child of 
the eternal and temporal, though the mists of the temporal hide the 
eternal from mortal eyes: that to Im.ow and love the good, are the 
keys to happiness: and therefore it is better for a man to suffer 
and be punished by men and gods 1·or the evil that may be in him, than 
to escape punishment and gain sensual desire. This brief analysis of 
Socratic thought exhibits some of the concepts found in Plato. 1 
Though Whichcote was impressed by the thought of Socrates, especially 
his views on the nature and destiny of the human soul, it was the 
2 personal example of the man that moved him most. From Plato himself 
1cr. Introductions to Taylor, Plato, and Urwick, The Message of 
Plato. 
2whichcote, Works, II, 110f., 122, 353; III, 255. The relation 
of Whicbcote to his rollowers is remarkably similar to tba.t of Socrates 
to Plato and others. In both cases the personal element is most 
important; for though neither man published anything, yet their thought. 
survives through their successors, by virtue of the force of their 
personal example. The self-control of each through life and their 
calmness in the face of death, are similar. See Plato, Apology. 
Cf. Tillotson, Funeral Sermon, pp.28f. . Particulars or classical 
sources used in this study will be found in the bibliography. English 




and from Aristotle's commentary, the influence 01· other predecessors 
can be seen: Heraclitus)the Eleatics, Protagoras and other Sophists, 
and later by Anaxagoras, the Phytbagoreans, and otbers. 1 While 
Socrates, being a Sophist, had mainly concerned himselr with man, his 
moral and religious life, Plato was concerned with all Reality. In 
Plato Greek philosophy reached its highest expression up to this time, 
and his main addition to Greek speculation was his doctrine of Ideas 
whereby he sought to comprehend "all time and all existence". 
Ideas are for Plato the Genii of the general notions, exempt from 
all space limitation, capable of' motion, possessed of life and 
intelligence. They are eternal realities belonging to the world of 
real being, but the Ideas are not all on the same level. They have 
2 
their various ranks, the highest being the Idea 01· the Good. The 
Idea is not the essence immanent in the various similar individual 
objects as such, but rather the essence conceived as perfect in its 
kind, immutable, unique and independent. To express the relation of 
individuals to their corresponding ideas, Plato employs the terms 
11 participation" and "imitation". He wavers between these two terms 
without making bis position clear. It is obvious, however, that 
1c1·. Plato, Cratylus, 402 A; Aristotle,~ i, Y87a. The 
following works are suggested for a 1·u11er analysis or t be thought o:f 
Plato's predecessors. Crozier, Intellectual Development, I, 49-51; 
Elsee, Nee-Platonism, pp.23-27; Collingwood, Idea or Nature, Pt.I, 
pp.29-40; Erdman, A History or Philosophy, (Eng. tr.), I, 64f.; 
Windelband, History or Ancient Philosophy", \Eng. tr.), p.175; Burnet, 
Early Greek Philosophy. 
2Plato, Rep. vi, 508c. 
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Plato is asserting that an Idea, though existing independently, has 
also a certain community with other Ideas and is in some sense present 
in them. But the specit'ic nature of this community Plato has 
neglected to define precisely. 1 Perhaps this dependent-independent-
It is relationship may best be described as one of interdependence. 
interesting that when Whichcote a~propriates the Platonic terms 
"participation" and "imitation" in his description of the divine life, 
he does ao in the same obscure manner as Plato. 
The highest Idea, the Good, is the cause of being and cognition. 
Plato seems to identify the Good with supreme Deity. Good is exalted 
above Being, thus making clear the ethical character of his doctrine 
of Ideas. The Good may be considered as an Idea quite as universal 
as Being, since everything in so far as it is existent is necessarily 
good. The highest Good is not pleasure or knowledge alone but the 
2 greatest possible likeness to God, as the absolutely good. The 
universe in which we live falls short of the pe·rfections of the world 
of Ideas. It has been created by a good God in order to express his 
goodness, but fashioned as it ia out· of indeterminate matter, it does 
not adequately fulfil that purpose. The universe is pervaded by 
soul, the soul of the universe and of the individual forms a link 
between the world of phenomena and Ideas. Because the Creator is 
incapable of imperfection, he creates the lesser deities and points out 
1Plato, Tim. 28A; Cf. ~· 211B; Phaedo 100D; Rep. X, 596C-598. 
2Plato, Theaetetus, 176a, b. 
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to them the need of mortal creatures. They proceed to create the 
bodies, while he creates the souls which are to be assigned to mortal 
bodies as needed. The soul, therefore, is divine in origin and nature: 
it exists before the body es well as after it. 1 Whichcote's general 
indebtedness to Plato appears obvious. 
Aristotle is valuable to our purpose not only for his trans-
mission of Plato's thought with his modifications and his contribution 
to Nee-Platonism through Plotinus and others, but mainly because of 
his direct influence upon Whichcote. Our author quotes more 
frequently from Aristotle than from Plato in a direct sense, though 
his indebtedness to Platonism is greater. However, Whicbcote is 
obviously impressed by Aristotle's moral theory and has great admiration 
. 
for the man himself as shown by his frequent use of the appellation 
2 
"the Philosopher" or "the great Philosopher" as be refers to Aristotle. 
Whichcote appears to ba.ve Aristotle in mind when he speaks of God as a 
"superior and intelligent Agent113 ; of "necessities and impossibilities 11 4; 
of the self-improvement of "powers and faculties"5; of personal virtue 
and integrity6; of "prudence" as the orienting virtue7 ; of intrinsic 
lrrim. 29D; Cf. Rep.X, 617E; Phaedo, 78f., 105d; Laws X. 
2whichcote, op. cit., I, 334 passim. 
3 
Whichcote, Ibid. , III, 187; Cf. Meta, ii, 8. 
4Ibid. , I, 334; Cf. Aristotle, Rhet. i, 4. 
5Ibid. , pp.314f.; Cf. Rhet. i, 9. 
6Ibid. , II, 141; Cf. Aristotle, ~· i, 1• ' 
Rhet. iii, 11. 
7 Ibid. , p.51; er. Ibid. , IV, 297; Eth. vi, 13. 
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and instrumental gooas1 ; of equity as the truest justice2 ; and the 
superiority of practical knowledge to mere speculative knowledge. 3 
It appears safe to say that Whichcote was further influenced by 
Aristotle as interpreted by the Neo-Platonists and the Schoolmen. 4 
Stoicism made its impact upon Whichcote mainly through Cicero 
usually referred to by Whichcote as Tully. Cicero expounds a doctrine 
of innate ideas. In order to be able to judge between conflicting 
opinions, man must already have a yardstick on which to base his 
judgment, and in this the most important factors are the inner, 
immediate certainty, the natural consciousness of truth and innate 
knowledge. The consciousness of right is planted in man by nature; 
not until later is formed a desire for evil, which has darkened this 
original consciousness of right. Not only the moral characteristic 
but the moral, basic terms themselves are innate, even if they must be 
developed by ourselves. Together with reason man has in him that 
which drives him into moral unity with others, and into the search 
for truth. On account of the divinely related nature of the soul, the 
consciousness of God is immediately given with self-consciousness. 
Man has only to remember his own origin to be led to his Creator. 
Nature itself teaches us God's existence, because that to which all 
1Ibid., p.391; Cf. Rhet. i, 6. 
2Ibid. , IV, 18. 
3Ibid., pp.288f.; Cf. Ibid., I, 178, 304; IV, 72 passim. 
4ne Pauley, The Candle of the Lord, pp. 35f. 
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agree must always be valid as an expression of nature. The 
conception of the immortality of the soul and the freedom oft he will 
are also innate. 1 When Whicbcote speaks of piety2 ; of the 
existence of God
3
; of the immortality of the soul4 ; of man as 
fallen5 ; of goodness as natural ror man6; of the Right and the Just 
7 as determined by Nature and Reason ; of the agreement of God's power 
with His goodness8 , be is repeating much he has derived from Cicero. 
It is little wonder that Whichcote describes Tully as "a better 
divine than some who pretend to be Christians and yet deny reason". 9 
There was a new stream of speculation which had begun to 
exercise a considerable influence upon the general current of men's 
thought a~ this point in history. The Alexandrian Jews entered 
readily into the intellectual life of Alexandria. They welcomed 
1Egg-Olofsson, on. cit., pp.22-24. 
2whichcote, Ibid., II, 52; Cf. Ibid., IV, 299. 
3~., III, 143; Cf. Cicero, De Natura Deorum, ii, 6, 7. 
4Ibid., II, 122. 
5Ibid., 159; Cf. Cicero, Letters to Atticus, ii, Ep.i. 
6
Ibid., p.64; Cf. Ibid., III, 259. According to Whichcote, 
Aristotle observes that man is a "mild and gentle creature". See 
I, 168. Cf. Aristotle, Eth. ii, 7, 10; iv, 5. 
7Ibid., IV, 10. 
8Ibid., p.426; Cf. Ibid., II, 159 passim. 
9Ibid., III, 167. Whichcote observes that Seneca speaks of man's 
soul as a "blast of God's mouth". See II, 43. Cf. Seneca, ~.31 and 
93. Whicbcote refers to Seneca elsewhere. Cf. IV, 18f., 312f. passim. 
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Greek philosophy as a further revelation in the light of which the 
records of the Old Testament received a deeper meaning. In particular 
the personifications of the Word and Wisdom of God, which bad been 
described with gradually increasing clarity by the writers of some of 
the later books of the Old Testament, now found a counterpart in the 
conceptions of Plato and the other Greek philosophers. Jewish 
writers added to the purely ethical monotheism of their own religion 
these new ideas, and this gave rise to the Jewish-Alexandrian school, 
of which Philo was the most distinguished representative. 1 However, 
it is the view of the present writer that Whichcote is more indebted 
to Jewish wisdom literature directly and to the Johannine and Pauline 
syntheses of Jewish, Hellenic (Platonic-Stoic), and primitive Christian 
strands than to the Philonic synthesis. 2 This position will be 
pursued fUrther in Chapter Nine, but it is important to remember that 
Whichcote's favourite text which became the maxim of Cambridge Platonism 
is from the Book of Proverbs. 3 Whichcote seems to support our view 
by his insistence that John did not derive his views from the Platonists 
1Elsee, op. cit., pp.32fr. Though the tendency to compare Plato 
and Moses, Socrates and Christ, is native to Nee-Platonism in Christian 
history (even among the Cambridge Platonists, i.e. More and Cudworth), 
Whichcote is cautious at this point. Therefore, it appears unnecessary 
to go into Philo' s system whic b contributed much of' this "allegorising" 
tendency to Christianity. Cf. Ueberweg, op. cit., pp.2241f'; Crozier, 
op. cit., I, 70, 450; Biggs, The Christian Platonists, p.32; Taylor, 
Selected Works or Plotinus, p.xvii. 
2 C. K. Barrett, The Gospel According to John, p.129. 
3Prov. xx, 27. 
1 but from another source. 
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Whichcote was obv-iously influenced by the Christian Platonists 
of Alexandria. To make this assertion is not to ignore the 
contribution or Justin Martyr and others like him, who reacted 
against the Gnostic heresy, and sought a truer union or Christianity 
and philosopby. 2 The most outstanding exponents of the Christian 
Alexandrian school were Clement and Origen, and or the two, Origen 
is the most representative. 3 Origen's treatment of such subjects 
1Whichcote, op. cit., II, 173. 
2ueberweg, A History of Philosophy (Eng. tr.), I, 313. It is 
Ueberweg's opinion that the influence or Plato upon the Church Fathers 
is often overrated. Of much greater consequence, he insists, was the 
direct influence which Platonism (and Stoicism), in their Jewiah-
Alexandrian form, and in their combination and blending with Jewish 
ideas, exerted in shaping the doctrine contained in the New Testament 
writings of Paul and the Fourth Gospel, and so, in consequence of the 
canonical importance of these writings, in determining the creed of 
all Christendom. Subsequently, the ideas thus introduced into 
Christianity, having become common Christian property, served as points 
of union and departure for further studies. Cf. Gilson, History of 
Christian Philosophy, pp.93f.; Elsee, op. cit., p.138; Inge, The 
Philosophy of Plotinus, II, 227. When Whichcote attempts to distinguish 
between eternal rights and lesser or changeable rights, he quotes from 
Justin Martyr. See, IV, 108. Our author opposed the Gnostic tendency 
in his day just as vigorously as Martyr did in his with similar weapons. 
Cf. II, 319; III, 126; IV, 344f. 
3E1see, op. cit., pp.41ff.; Cf. Bigg, The Christian Platonists, 
pp.11-14; Inge, op. cit., I, 99. Clement held the Platonic maxim, 
that "nothing is to be believed which is unworthy of God". This 
maxim makes reason tbe judge of revelation. Cf. Bigg, Ibid., pp.76-126; 
Inge, Ibid., p.101; Egg-Olofsson gives a valuable account of Clement's 
views of Law and Philosophy as preparatory to the "perfect revelation 
in the Incarnate Word". Further, Clement's contribution to the notion 
of the relation of the Logos to human reason as well as the means 
whereby man is led to moral perfection by the Logos is set forth. 
See, Inner Light, pp.37ff. Cf. Whicbcote, Ibid., II, 316. 
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ae God, the world and rational creatures in his chief work, On First 
Principles, points toward Whichcote's treatment of the same subjects. 1 
Further, his views concerning Christian tolerance2 ; the role of 
reason in the comprehension of religious knowledge 3 ; "divine likeness" 
as a prerequisite for revelation4 ; punishment for sin as remedial and 
the present as a "probation-state" 5 ; and the authority of Scripture~ 
are remarkably similar to Whicbcote's views on the seme subjects. 
Thus to Origen the end of philosophy is truth in all spheres; truth 
apprehended in its highest unity. The name of Christianity is truth 
and Christianity is the fulfilment of philosophy. Human wisdom is 
the school of the soul, while Divine Wisdom is the end. Faith, 
Knowledge, Wisdom - that is the order or spiritual growth. 7 From 
this brief sketch the relation of the Christian Platonists of Alexandria 
to those at Cambridge seems unmistakeable. 
Nee-Platonism is in fUll bloom in the philosophy of Plotinua. 
A representative sketch of his massive system seems necessary in 
view of bis impact upon all Nee-Platonism from his time and in view 
1origen, De Prine. i, 3, 8; ii, 9, 6; iii, 6, 1. 
2Ibid., iii, 10-15; Cf. Whicbcote, Ibid., II, 25. 
3c. Cele. vii, 43. 
4rbid. , iv, 30; v, 43; vi, 2. 
5ne Prine. ii, 1, 2, 10; Cf. c. Cels. iv, 99; Whichcote, IV, 15f. 
6westcott, Religious Thoughts in the West, p.236. 
7 c. Cels. vi, 13. 
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of the charge that Whichcote and his disciples made no distinction 
between Plato and Plotinus. We observe that Plotinus agrees with 
Plato in the doctrine of "sensibles" and "intelligibles" and 
intermediate or physical natures. But he differs with Plato 
radically when he teaches that the One or God, which with Plato was 
the highest of Ideas is elevated above the sphere of Ideas. Ideas, 
to which Plato conceived independent existence, are conceived by 
Plotinus as emanations from the One, the Sensibles being the last in 
the series of emanations. He differs from Plato, further, in teaching 
that the Ideas are in the Nous, while Plato in the Timaeus, wavering 
between the tendency to poetic personification and dogmatic doctrinalism, 
styles the Ideas gods and the highest Idea the Idea of the Good, the 
highest God. 1 It is easier to say what Ideas meant to Plotinus than 
to Plato. To Plotinus all the thoughts or spirit are ideas. Spirit 
embraces all Ideas, as the whole its parts. Each idea is spirit, 
and Spirit is the totality of Ideas. The Kingdom of Ideas is the 
true reality. 2 Though Whichcote mentions Plotinua only once by name 
together with Trismegistus, this reference is of the utmost importance. 3 
Plotinus here witnesses to Whichcote'a concept of God creating man as 
a middle-being between divine and mortal nature, with the freedom to 
1Ueberweg, op. cit., pp.240f.; Cf. Plotinus, Enneads, ii, 4. 
2Enneads, vi, 5, 6; Inge, op. cit., I, 49, 56; Windelband, 
op. cit., p.370. 
3Whichcote, Ibid., II, 160. 
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move up or down. By motion downwards we lose ourselves, but by 
motion upwards we find our f'ulfilment and true happiness. In 
speaking of na.tural and revealed truths, Whichcote refers to them 
as the first and second "emanation", respectively, and even his 
conception of the mediation of Christ is cast in the mould of 
Plotinian metaphysics. 1 
Hereafter we shall be directly concerned with the parallel 
development of Platonism and Christianity. It is to this tradition 
that Whicbcote belongs rather than to any purely philosophical 
tradition. When we think of the Christian-Platonic tradition as 
it existed in the Middle Ages we recall such noteworthy names as 
Gregory of Nyssa2 , Augustine, Dionysius3 , Erigena4 , Anselm5, 
lsee In:rra, Cha. IV, VI. When Whicbcote refers to the Platonists 
it is logical to suppose that he includes in this general appellation 
Plotinus and Neo-Platonism since his time as well as the similar trend 
of thought from Plato's time. c1·. Whichcote, II, 172:f.; 177, 187f., 
300ff.; III, 103ff.; 120f:f.; IV, 70f., 31Y passim. 
2 Gilson, op. cit., pp.57-59. Here is a valuable summary of Gregory 
of Nyssa's thought. 
3westcott, _o_p_._c_i_t., pp.156-191. This is a good e.ppraisal of 
Dionysius' thought. Cf. Ueberweg, op. cit., pp.3501'f. Boethius 
deserves mentioning as an exponent of the same tradition. See Gilson, 
op. cit., pp.101ff. 
4A. c. McGi:ffert, A History or Christian Thought, II, 172, 178f. 
Cf. Ueberweg, o~. cjt., pp.358f., 360, 363. See also Aristotle, Meta., 
xii. 7; Augustine, De Civ. Dei v. 9; Erdman, op. cit., pp.293ff. 
5Anselm, Cur Deus Homo?, esp. Bk.II. There appears to be an 
atfinity between Anselm's theory of atonement and Wbic~ote's, but this 
will be e~amined later. See Infra, Ch.VI. It is valuable to compare 
Anselm's thought with Augustine's to see how they are related. Cf. 
Anselm, Monol. i. 17, 18ff., 29ff., 67-77 with Augustine, De Civ. Dei, 
xii. 25. 
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Cusa1 , and others2• Of this group, Augustine is the most valuable 
for our purpose. The religious philosophy to which be was converted 
wa.s the Platonism of Plotinus with the Incarnation added. 3 
Augustine's doctrine of knowledge is interwoven with the meta-
physics of light. The symbolism of light is already used in the 
possibility and truth of the knowledge of the senses, in that he 
postulates two kinds of light, a bodily one that our eyes observe, 
and a ligbt with the assistance of which our eyes gaze upon the 
physical light. The one is an object perceived, the other a means 
of knowledge. The ability to perceive is thus a light of purely 
spiritual nature, derived from the soul. All ideas are already 
to be found in the soul. Augustine's doctrine of knowledge culminates 
in his theory of illumination. Since men are capable of comprehending 
eternal, necessary and unchangeable truths, although they themselves 
1cassirer, The Platonic Renaissance in England (tr. Pettegrove), 
pp.13ff., 32, 103f. Cassirer does not hesitate to use the thought 
of Cusa in relation to that of Wbichcote, Smith and others, of the same 
school. For a brief synopsis of Cusa's thought see Gilson, op. cit., 
pp.534ff. 
2Gilson, Ibid., pp.139f., 150ff. Here our attention is called to 
a Platonic movement whose centre was the school of Chartes in the 
twelfth century under a leader by the name of Cbartes. This school 
is known mainly through John of Salisbury. See also, Ibid., pp.431-37, 
where the same author speaks of what he calls "philosophical 
Augustinianism" kept intact by Albert the Great and his favourite 
pupil, Ulrich of Strasburg. 
3 
Augustine, £2B!. vii, 9; Cf. Whichcote, III, 25. Here Whichcote 
asserts that Augustine found the beginning of the first chapter of Jobn 
among the Platonists. However, this is but a half-truth since he fails 
to tell us what Augustine certainly did not find, viz., the all-
important doctrines of Incarnation and Atonement. Cf. Aug., De Civ. Dei, 
viii, 4, 5, 12; ix-xii. 
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are temporal, accidental and changeable, and since God alone is 
eternal, necessary and unchangeable, so do we comprehend such truths 
in immediate contact with God. In Augustine the Platonic Ideas 
become God's thoughts and man acquires knowledge of them through the 
Augustinian reminiscence, the deepening of the conscience in which 
reason becomes conscious of God's presence. 1 This illumination 
doctrine of Augustine has never disappeared from the Christian 
tradition. 
To Augustine the Incarnation is central. The Logos in Augustine 
corresponds to Nous in Plotinus. The Logos is eternal as God, is 
His son, born of God, of the same being, itself God, participating in 
God's unchangeableness. The world has been created through the 
Logos which, also, as a life-giving principle sustains the world even 
if the latter has not accepted it. The Logos is the light of men, 
for men's souls are not the light itself.
2 
Accordingly, Augustine 
sees as the greatest mistake in Neo-Platonism, its ignorance of the 
Incarnation, of "Logos debasement" tbrough which men are saved by 
3 
humility and faith. Even Augustine's doctrine of illumination 
is bound up with his concept of the Son as the Logos. 
" •••.• When anything concerning wisdom is declared or narrated in 
the Scriptures, whether as itself speaking, or where anything is 
said of it, the Son chiefly is intimated to us. And by the 
1Aug., Trin. viii. 2, 3, 4, 6, 8, 9; ix., xiii-xv. 
2 Ib"d . . 3 __L• , Vl.1. • 
3ne Civ. Dei, xi-xiv. 
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example of Him who is the image of God, let us also not depart 
from God since we also are the image of God; not indeed that 
which is equal to Him, since we are made so by the Father through 
the Son and not born of the F'ather, as that is. And we are so, 
because we are enlightened with light; but that is so, because 
it is the light that enlightens; and which, therefore being 
without pattern, is to us a pattern."1 
Augustine's teaching was perpetuated by a long series of followers, 
and it was not until the thirteenth century that Aristotelianism as 
interpreted by Aquinas, became the official system of the Church and 
.displaced its rivals. Even so, the Nee-Platonic tradition lingered 
in the schools of Europe, and especially Italy, to emerge once more 
in :tUll life, in the fi:rteenth century. 2 Thus, the tribute of 
Windelband to Augustine is significant. 
"The two great streams of theosophy which burst forth 
from Alexandria, on the one hand, into Christian theology, 
on the other, into Nee-Platonism, were not long separate from 
each other. Although Neo-Platonism was destroyed by scholastic-
ism, it sent its thought through a thousand channels into the 
orthodox as well as the heterodox development of Christian 
thought after Origen. Both systems of thought found their 
perfect reconciliation in an original thinker, who was the 
philosopher of Christianity - Augustine. The doctrine of 
Augustine ••••• was much more than a receptacle for the confluent 
streams of Hellenic-Roman philosophy. It was rather a 
living fountain of the thought of the future. His was an 
1Trin. v11. 3, 5. Whichcote quotes Augustine a number of times. 
See Works, I, 175f. where he refers to Aug., ~· 50, and 68, 159; 
I, 178, concerning the interpretation of Scripture; II, 396, 
concerning Augustine's conversion tRom. 13:13, Conf. viii. 12); 
III, 420, concerning sobriety and Augustine is described as a 
"great :rather" (Cf. IV, 423); II, 350, _concerning Augustine's 
assertion that if we take away the grace and goodness of God we 
render Him im~otent to do us good, and we remove human freedom as 
well as God's power to command. Cf. III, 315f. Whichcote's concept 
of happiness is from Aug. Cf. Conf. i. 1 and Works IV, 31. 
2Robb, Nee-Platonism of the Italian Renaissance, pp.17f. 
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initiating rather than a consummating work, and therefore he 
does not belong to the history of ancient philosophy."1 
It appears more appropriate to speak of the "Neo-Platonism" of 
the Italian Renaissance than of its "Platonism". Neo-Platonism is 
less misleading when applied to the teaching of the Platonic Academy 
of Florence in the latter part of the fifteenth century. For the 
earlier Italian humanists Plato was more venerated than understood. 
Petrarch and his immediate successors knew little or no Greek, so 
that their ideas of Platonism were pieced together from Latin authors 
and from dialogues then existing in Latin. Only three of Plato's 
works were available, Timaeus, Meno and Phaedo in translations. As 
the fifteenth century advanced Greek scholarship advanced. However, 
it was not easy for scholars at this time to form a clear estimate of 
Greek thought in view of their many preconceptions. At first their 
interest in Plato was mainly literary, and there was no comman'.iing 
philosophic intellect among them. In spite of this, many treatises 
on moral philosophy during this first period of humanism reveal, if 
1Windelband, op. cit., p.383. While the present writer is 
aware that another great contribution of Augustine, viz., his doctrine 
of Predestination, baa bad tremendous consequences in the history of 
religious thought, it has been omitted here. The reason seems to be 
a logical one, viz., the positive, direct and constructive contribution 
of Augustine to Whicbcote's thought appears to be bis Christian 
Platonic synthesis. However, the Predestination doctrine of Augustine, 
culminating in Puritanism in the seventeenth century England is a 
definite negative influence upon Whic~ote. But it seems sufficient 
to consider this latter influence of Augustine when we come to an 
examination of Whichcote's reaction to Puritanism; for it is the 
Puritan version of Augustine's doctrine or Predestination, rather than 
the doctrine directly, that arrects Whichcote. See Infra, Ch.III. 
Cf. Cassirer, op. cit., pp.86f. 
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not a deep understanding of Plato, a distinct Platonic colour. 1 
Plato becomes for Petrarch and bis followers a "symbol and 
rallying cry". Others of the same tradition with original suggestions 
before Ficino were: Coluccio, Salutati, Valla, Alberti, Bessarion, 
Pletho, Isidore 01· Salonika, and George of Trebizond. 
Mirandola was one of Ficino's most notable disciples. 
Picodella 
However, the 
main representative in the Italian Renaissance of Platonism was 
Ficino himself. 2 
Ficino merits our attention for various reasons. As a translator 
and commentator of Plato he represents one of the most important epochs 
in the history of Platonism: as leader of the Platonic Academy in 
Florence, he occupies a central position in the history of Renaissance 
civilisation. Continuing the work or e·arlier humanists, he was the 
first who gave the work a philosophical significance. Absorbing 
a vast body of ideas rrom ancient, early Christian and mediaeval 
sources, he was able to incorporate them into a comprehensive system 
ot Christian Platonism which displays many original and important 
characteristics of its own. Both as an original thinker and as a 
transmitter of' earlier ideas, he exercised a widespread and powerful 
influence on subsequent generations, and traces of bis influence are 
found in many philosophers, theologians, moralists, poets and artists 
1Robb, op. cit., pp.11f. 
2Ibid., pp.12, 18ff.; 35, 41, 46-52, 60-63. Cf. Kristeller, 
The Philosophy of Marsilio Ficino, p.7. 
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of the later Renaissance in many European countries. 1 
According to Ficino, God transcends our faculties, but He is 
none the less part of them, the part by which the identification of the 
human mind with the divine is accomplished. The Absolute is within 
us, and God became man in order that man might become God. 2 Ficino 
is torn between the idea of the Absolute as utterly unknowable, and 
that of the Absolute latent in every soul and created in it anew with 
each increase of spirituality and true knowledge. This uncertainty 
has given rise to most of the contradictions that have been noted in 
his work; and it is mainly in an attempt to resolve it that he 
elaborated his theory of love by which the human soul gives itself 
to God, and becomes assimilated to Him. Man can give himself in 
love to God, because God created him out of love and loved him first. 
The affection of God and man is mutual and reciprocal like that of 
parent and child. Man's love is spontaneous and voluntary, and yet 
it is a response to something that is at once the utmost goal of 
desire and a presence at the root of his being, deeper t ban all 
1Kristeller, Ibid., p.viii. Elsewhere Kristeller states that 
through his translations and commentaries, Ficino did for Plato, 
Plotinus and other ancient philosophers what the humanists did for 
the ancient Greek orators, poets and historians. Ibid., p.11. 
Cf. Robb, op. cit., pp.85f. Kristeller adds that Ficino combines 
mediaeval .Aristotelianism and the Christian-Platonism of the Church 
Fathers and Augustine. Ficino is also in direct contact with Plato 
and the ancient Neo-Platonists. Ibid., pp.3-16, 23f., 28ff.; Cf. 
Festugiere, La Philosophie de l'Am~de Marsile Ficin, pp.63ff. 
2 Robb, op. cit., p.67. 
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conscious life. 1 
Since the natural appetite, Appetitus Naturalis, toward God, 
in:f'used in us by God, cannot be in vain, the minds of men are 
eternal so that some time they may reach the eternal and divine 
good by nature. The rational soul is placed on the borderline 
between temporal and eternal things. Thus being placed midway, 
it bas rational forces and actions ascending toward the eternal and 
2 
also descending toward the temporal. 
"Wherefore by a natural instinct he [maaj ascends to things 
above, and descends to those beneath. And while he ascends he 
discards not the lower, and while be descends be discards not 
the higher. For i~' be relinquish either he will lapse to the 
opposite extreme, nei tber will be be the true bond 01· the 
eternal world."3 
However, the mind of man seeks God always and in everything, 
and cannot be satisfied till it finds Him. It is natural for man 
to desire perfect goodness and felicity or a god-like life. Man 
has not only the desire but the capacity to lmow and possess the 
forms of all things including the Summum Bonum. His mind cannot be 
satisfied with the finite because it contains a ray of the divine 
light. 
1Ibid., pp.68ff. Cf. Festigi'ere, op. cit., pp.24. 
2Kristeller, op. cit., pp.178, 197f., 305; Cf. Cassirer, 
Kristeller, Randall, et al, The Renaissance Philosophy of Man. 
3Ficino, Theologia Platonica, Bk.III, Ch.II (tr. Robb, op. cit., 
p.87). Cf. Pico, de Hominis Dignitate (1486), from his Opero I, p.313, 
{ 1572), (tr. Robb, Loe. cit. ). 
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"When our mind is illuminated by the ray o:t· God, it thinks 
in Him the concepts of all things whose source is God and which 
are God, Himself', and therefore [the min4] thinks through the 
light of God and lmows only the divine light itself. But it 
seems to know different Ideas and concepts of things emanating 
from there."1 
He continues: 
"[Go«i] illuminates each man who enters this world in such 
a way that anybody thinks in God and through Him whatever he 
thinks, though dark minds may not comprehend Him, because they 
do not recognise that they see all things through Him."2 
Unity, truth and goodness form a single stable reality that 
underlies this unstable and inconsistent world and all knowledge is 
a return toward a single source. 
"If there1·ore in the one living body of the world there is 
everywhere a single life ••••• much more is there e single good 
which is present everywhere, even beyond the war ld. "3 
Grace is the pervading expression of the divine in the world; 
therefore, all religions contain some good, though Christianity which 
alone is founded on the sole virtue of God is supreme among them. 4 
The doctrine o:r the place of the soul in the Universe provides 
Ficino with an opportunity to justiry the Christian dogma of the 
Incarnation in a new and special manner. In his opinion Christ is 
not only the Mediator between God end men but also the Mediator 
between the Creator and the creation as a whole. Because of this 
1Kristeller, op. cit., p.253. 
2Ibid. Cf. lJn.1:9); Aug., Trin. vii, 3, 5. 
3Picino, Theologia Platonica, Bk.I, Ch.VI., p.91 ltr. Robb, 
op. cit. , p. 86. ) 
4Robb, op. cit., pp.63-74; Cf. Ficino, Ibid. 
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universal connection the Word of God was forced to choose man himself 
for His instrument as the universal link between all things. Ficino 
asserts that the work of God is perfect in every way, therefore the 
created Being bad to be at some time connected with the Creator. 
Thus in Christ the union of' God and man, Creator and creation, 
Infinite and finite, is accomplished; in Him may be sought the unity 
1 and harmony that the world of appearance seems to deny. 
With Ficino there is no radical distinction between rational and 
religious activity. 2 The relationship he indicates between Platonism 
and Christianity is most valuable for our purpose. Ficino's view 
was that though Platonic philosophy has its own authority and 
tradition, it is in no way opposed to the Christian doctrine and 
tradition. More than any other system, it is able to give Christian 
doctrine a philosophical con1·irmation. The Platonic doctrine is a 
religious philosophy. It guarantees the accord between philosophy 
and religion, and may therefore be called "theology" as the title of 
bis chief work the Theologia Platonica indicates. As to the intimate 
affinity of Platonism with the Mosaic and Christian doctrines, Ficino 
quotes Numenius and Augus·tine again and again,. even writing small 
tracts to prove the agreement between the Socratic and the Christian 
conduct 01· li1·e, and between the Mosaic and Platonic doctrines. He 
considers "religious philosophers" ·such as Pythagoras, Socrates, and 
1Kriateller, op. cit., pp.405f. 
2Robb, op. cit., p.63. 
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Plato precursors of Christianity and allows them a share in eternal 
salvation, along with the prophets in the Old Testament. He assigns 
to Platonic philosophy the task of furthering religion and bringing 
. 1 
men back to Christian faith. 
t•we must not think (he wri tea to Johannes Pannonius) that the 
subtle and philosophical minds of' men can ever be gradually enticed 
and led to the perfect religion by any lure other than a philo-
sophical one. For subtle minds trust themselves only to reason, 
and if they receive religion from a religious philosopher, at once 
and of their own volition they recognise religion in general and 
from there more readily to the best species of religion included 
in that genus. u2 
Elsewhere he says: 
"What was Christ but, as it were, a living book of moral, 
nay of divine philosophy~ and the very divine idea of virtue made 
manifest to human eyes."" 
Ficino 's influence survived his death and the dissolution 01· his 
Academy. His works were reprinted and studied throughout t he sixteenth 
century. His concept or natural religion may well have had some 
bearing on the theological discussion or· the period of the Reformation. 
In England, Colet shows traces of Fic'ino' s Platonism and the Cambridge 
Platonists carry on the philosophical tradition of the Florentines. 4 
Florentine Plstonism freed English thought of the narrowness and 
1Kristeller, op. cit., pp.28f., 322f. 
2Ibid., p.28. 
3Ficino, De Christiana Religione, Ch.XXIII, p.25 {tr. Robb, 
op. cit., p.86). 
4Kristeller, on. cit., p.19. Cf. art. by Stewart in E. R. E. , III, 
168; Preserved Smith, History of' Modern Culture, p.181; McGiffert, 
op. cit., pp.379f. 
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fetters of ecclesiastical tradition by confronting it with the 
question or the universal grounds of the a priori of religion. The 
Platonic concept of apriority became the instrument with which 
Wbicbcote and his followers attacked the whole intellectual world, and 
sought to undermine on the one hand the central position of English 
empiricism and on the other the views of the orthodox church system 
1 and various religious sects. 
About three hundred years after Erigena, the English Schoolmen 
who studied Aristotle in Latin, appear in history as opponents of 
Aquinas. Dun Scotus and William Ockham can hardly be claimed as 
Platonists, but Roger Bacon, who read Greek, was a genuine humanist. 
After Ockham, there was a gap and we may pass at once to the 
Renaissance proper, which reached England in the time of Colet and 
Erasmus. The flame which they kindled in England was lighted in 
Italy, where Linacre visited the Platonic Academy at Florence. At 
.Cambridge the study of Greek was promoted by the teaching of Erasmus 
in 1512-13. Three or four years later Ascham found undergraduates 
2 reading Aristotle and Plato under John Clerke, the new Greek professor. 
The earliest signs of contacts with Italian culture to be 
detected at Cambridge appear about 1478, with the presence of an 
Italian Franciscan, Lorenzo Traversagni. His treatise in 1478 called 
Rhetorica was constructed on new lines and was obviously inspired by 
1caasirer, op. cit., p.24. Cf. Festugi~re, op. cit., pp.40ff. 
2Inge, Platonic Tradition in England, p.36. Cf. Lewis Einstein, 
The Italian Renaissance in England, pp.42ff. 
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classical models: it shows a strong Ciceronian influence, together 
with a certain independence of the mediaeval scboolmen. 1 Another 
figure of note is John Doget, a Cambridge scholar who had studied in 
Italy. He may be considered important among early English humanists, 
chiefly because he was an average scholar, and as such was more 
representative of contemporary culture than humanists endowed with 
brilliant gifts and more under the influence of Italians. It is 
appa.rent from the state of Cambridge scholarship at the close of 
Edward !V's reign that the University was beginning to break away 
from the mediaeval view of the humanities. Although this was due 
mainly to practical considerations, the superiority of modern Latinity 
over the earlier style was recognised. But Cambridge at this point 
accepted only the "surface" of humanism and for a deeper grasp of 
2 humanism we must look to the sixteenth century. A sound knowiedge 
of Greek enabled some or the most lively and inquisitive minds to 
study the Greek philosophies. 
By the mid-sixteenth century no English edition of Plato or 
Plotinus had yet appeared, but all Plato's works had been issued in 
Venice in 1522, in Basle in 1534, in Paris in 1578 and by Ficino 
(with Porphyry's life) in Florence in 1492. Remembering that the 
circulation of books in the universities of Europe was as a rule 
1R. Weiss, Humanism in England, pp.162f. 
2Ibid., pp.163-167. Doget became Provost of King's College in 
1499. Among other things, he studied Platonic writings diligently 
and produced a commentary on the Pbaedo. · 
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rapid, we may assume that copies of these or some of them would be 
accessible at one or more of the Cambridge colleges; and thus the 
Platonic fire could be kindled, or if kindled already, could be kept 
burning. 1 
Erasmus was a figure of great significance and wide influence as 
a representative of humanism. He is especially valuable for our 
purpose since he visited England and taught at Cambridge University. 2 
He is a well-known representative of the "rational Christian spirittt 
before the Reformation. 3 He was at once a great scholar and literary 
artist. Erasmus was also a religious man with a deep concern for 
the religious conditions in his day. He set forth clearly and in great 
detail the nature of true piety and showed how it is to be attained: 
be insisted that no man can live the Christian life by his own strength, 
· 1F. J. Powicke, The Cambridge Platonists, pp.12f. According to 
this author, Andrew Downes (1549?-1628) was Greek Professor at 
Cambridge until 1625 after serving seventeen years as professor. 
However, upon his enquiry at Emmanuel College, Queen's College and the 
University Library, Cambridge, he discovered no evidence that they 
possessed any copy of the editions of Plato or Plotinus at the period 
in question. He concludes that there must have been some private 
copies. However, Weiss, op. cit.,pp.163ff., reports that John Doget, 
Provost of King's College, Cambridge, from 1499, found several books 
on the subject in King's Library, among which were: Decembrio's trans-
lation of the Republic and Bruni's latinised Phaedrus together with other 
modern translations of Plato's works. It is interesting that this 
Provost of King's, Whichcote's predecessor in the same position, should 
have attempted, though uncritically, to enlist Plato as an apologist for 
Christianity. 
2McGiffert, op. cit., pp.381ff.; Cf. w. E. Campbell, Erasmus, 
Tyndale and More, pp.32, 41ff., 56, 58• Fuller, History of the 
University of Cambridge (new ed., 1840~, pp.130ff. 
3Tulloch, Rational Theology, I, 2. 
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he must exert himself to the utmost, must have courage and confidence, 
must be ever watchful and persistent in resisting the devil, but 
even so be cannot overcome evil and live as he ought without divine 
help. He emphasised the dignity of man, but only ror the purpose 
of bringing out clearly the unworthiness of vice and uncleanness. 
He based man's dignity not on what he was himself, but on what be 
owed God who created him and bought him with a great price, who 
created the world for his sake, who made him as a son of God, an heir 
of immortality, a member of Christ and of the Church, his body a 
temple of the Holy Spirit and his mind the image and secret habitation 
of Deity. 1 
The "new learning", which was expressed by Erasmus, spread to 
Germany and the Low Countries, to Italy and to England. In addition 
to Erasmus, Wessel, Reuchlin, Staupitz and the Florentines showed the 
influence of the New Learning on the Continent together with Colet, 
Thomas More, Tyndale and others in England. The spirit of this 
movement was to harmonise Christianity and natural truth - to interpret 
the Scripture like other books; to simplify Christian Doctrine to the 
limits of the Apostolic Creed; to put the Bible before everything, and 
to be content with simple truths evidently set forth in it as necessary 
to salvation. It aimed at spiritual enlightenment rather than 
dogmatic change.2 Accordingly, in England, with the opening of the 
1McGiffert, op. cit., p.389. 
2Tulloch, op. cit., I, 2f. 
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sixteenth century, there was a genuine and decided awakening in 
religious life, a new tone of religious thought, and a desire to 
renovate the Church, and deliver theology and the study of the 
Scriptures from the bondage of scholasticism. Colet and Tyndale 
are the most conspicuous representatives of this early movement. 
Colet actively co-operated with Erasmus in the promotion of the "new 
learningn while Tyndale carried it on in his devoted labours in the 
English translation of the Scriptures. The spirit of this movement 
was at once rational and evangelical: Colet and Tyndale both loved 
truth, but had at the same time a vital power and a divine faith to 
move them. 1 
Turning to Whichcote and his disciples, one remembers that they 
dealt with questions which affect the very conception and structure of 
the modern mind. They stand between the philosophical Italian and 
English Renaissance and the general history of eighteenth century 
thought. Their thought is an integrating factor and an important 
stage in the growth of modern· thought. The view of Plato we find in 
the Cambridge Platonists, beginning with Whichcote, is that of the 
Florentines. Ficino's views seemed authentic and exemplary to them. 
They added no essentially new feature to this picture, nor did they 
have the courage and capacity for historical criticism. Plato is for 
them the living proof that true philosophy is never opposed to genuine 
1Ibid., p.38. For an account of the influence of Ficino and 
Erasmus upon Colet together with his fresh approach to Scriptural 
exegesis, see cassirer, op. cit., pp.12ff• 
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Christianity. On the other hand there is something new and different 
in English humanism which comes out in Whichcote and his school. 
Even though humanism in England has its roots in Continental and 
especially Italian humanism, it exhibits basic differences. Italian 
humanism at first sought to make peace with religion; but this was 
mainly for the purpose of increasing its influence over the Church. 
In the meantime, there was a growing estrangement between the interest 
of humanism and religion in Italy. Thus the great Italian humanists, 
like Lorenzo Valla, looked upon the traditional objects of religious 
faith With a cool and deliberate scepticism. They were free from the 
bondage of dogma and were seeking freedom from the Christian ethic 
and way of life. Fortunately in England, humanism takes the opposite 
course. It is as critical of the scholastic system, but is never 
a~ti-religious. The English humanists were anxious to further the 
interpretation of the sources of Christianity. 
1 
But as we shall see, Whicbcote is also faced with the aftermath 
of the Reformation. The voice of Erasmus would never have moved 
Europe as Luther did. It needed the cry of an evangelist rather than 
the inquiry of a biblical critic and rational theologian to spark the 
Reformation. Lutheran theology hardened into dogmatism. Calvinism 
was dogmatic from the beginning. Calvin adopted the same great lines 
of Augustinianism which Luther used without question. He was 
systematic in his treatment of theology. But this very dogmatism of 
1cassirer, op. cit., pp.7ff. 
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Calvin prepared the way for a reaction by a series of rational theologians· 
anticipating in many ways the position to be held by the Cambridge 
Platonists. 1 It is my view that the reactions of the Socinian and 
Arminian systems to the dogmatic position of the Reformers paved the way 
for the liberal and rational tendencies of the later theologians. 
Socinianism entered England by way of Holland and influenced 
the Oxford rational theologians, i.e. Falkland, Hales and Cbillingwortb 
as well as the Cambridge Platonists. Whic~ote, the leader of the 
latter group, takes his place among Christian humanists. How far he 
was influenced by Socinus is in question. But there is no doubt that 
the Cambridge Platonists belong to the liberalising progressive 
theological forces of their day. In this sense they may be closely 
related to the side of the Socinian movement that stood for the principle 
of reason and tolerance in religion. However, the evidence is too 
slender to suppose that they were_greatly influenced by Socinian theology. 
From the sources it is difficult to say just how much Whichcote derived 
from Socinius and from more contemporary writers, viz. Hooker, Hales, 
2 Chillingworth and Taylor. 
Arminianism seems to have begun in England after the visit of 
Grotius in 1613. By 1625 Arminianism had become extremely inf'luential· 
lrrulloch, op. cit., I, 4-9; Cf. A. F. Mitchell, Minutes, pp.xviff. 
2H. J.MacLacblan, Socinianism, pp.4fr., 30ff., 97, 63ff., 98ff. 
Socinius' doctrine of the Unipersonality of God and the humanity of 
Christ is foreign to Whichcote. See Ibid., p.13. 
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1 in England. In the pre-Cartesian period Grotius together with 
Lord Herbert of Cherbury appear to have been among the first to· 
introduce in England the notion of "innate ideas". Grotius' influence 
in England was extensive. Lord Herbert was especially influential 
among the liberals in the church. Grotius asserted that the law of 
nature originated ex principius homini internis, and that the 
certainty of the principles within man were such that no fUrther 
assurance, not even in the form of divine revelation, could strengthen 
them. Lord Herbert spoke of the human mind as a closed book in which 
much truth was already stored, even if the stimulus of sense-
experience is needed to open the book and make the truth apparent, 
and be spoke of certain "common notions" which be.ve their existence 
in reason itself. Both, like Whicbcote, were concerned with 
religious and ecclesiastical matters, and their "comm.on notions" or 
0 internal principles". These were devised to furnish a ground of 
certainty on which all contending parties in the church might unite. 2 
When Tuckney came to Cambridge as Vice-Chancellor in 1648, he 
was shocked at the reaction against Calvinism there. He found men. 
wbo refused to receive the Gospel according to Geneva without question, 
but insisted upon submitting all to the bar of reason. The most 
influential of these men was Whichcote. Was be an Arminian? There 
1A. W. Harrison, Arminianism, p.122. Cf. Powicke, John Norris, 
p.129. Here Whichcote is said to have denied any indebtedness to the 
Dutch Arminians. 
2F.R., Vol.XXXV, \1~26), pp.571f.; Cf. J. Seth, English 
PbilosOj?hers, pp.89f. 
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seems to be no conclusive answer to this question. However, it 
appears safe to assume that indirectly the Arminian spirit helped to 
shape his ideas, but that he arrived at his conclusions independently.1 
Under Elizabeth the leaders of the Church of England set out 
upon a Via Media determined to avoid equally the Romanists and the 
Genevans. 2 The theologian who gave force to this general position 
was Richard Hooker. Hooker gives to theological controversies of 
his time a rational and philosophic interpretation which in turn 
gives new meaning and illumination to the whole sphere of theology. 
He began his analysis of the primary and essential principles of all 
government. He said that divine laws are our only immutable guides 
in the ordering of the Church. Laws are not divine merely because 
they are found in the Scripture, but all law, as an expression of the 
original law, or reason, of the universe, is divine. Whether the 
law is revealed in Scripture, or in the rational constitution of human 
nature, makes no difference. Its sacredness is the same, as springing 
out of the same 1·ountain of all light and order. Acco;r(iing to this 
idea the Church of England, in preserving the Catholic hierarchy of· 
offices was defensible, not merely because it was there and there was 
1Harrison, op. cit., pp.166, 168f.; Cf. Ibid., pp.131, 141f., 153, 
147, 176. See also Tulloch, op. cit., pp.25ff. See Harrison, op. cit., 
pp.141ff. Here is an account of the English reaction to Arminian ideas. 
It is important to note that John Goodwin, a vigorous Arminian, dedicated 
bis book Redemption Redeemed to Whichcote and others at Cambridge. It is 
of some interest that Henry More should compare the views of Grotius 
with those or Joseph Mead, see, Grand Mystery of Godliness, ~1660), Bk.V, 
Cb. XVI , pp. 182ff. 
2 J. R. H. Moorman, A History of the Church of England, p.202. 
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nothing in Scripture against it, but because it was in itself a fair, 
seemly and rational order of government. It based itself on the 
divine reason, expressed in the rational consciousness, and sanctioned 
both by the national sentiment and the course of Catholic history. 
It was conformable to Scripture and the Christian reason, and bad its 
origin directly in the growth and advance of reason. It was a 
spiritual order, capable of diverse forms, and tolerantly comprehensive 
of all Christian gifts and activities. 1 
According to Hooker, order is divine and discipline is needed 
everywhere, but there is no necessity that it be everywhere the same. 
He does not defend any particular order, but begins with a general 
dissertation on the nature of law. The Church is left in possession 
of rational freedom. It is guided by public reason. The 
Scriptures which contain the supernatural light presupposes in the 
main the existence of a natural light. Hooker, in a general sense, 
with many qualifications may be considered as a Rationalist against 
the Scripturalist. He vindicated the use of reason with certain 
limits. The supernatural light presupposes the natural. Scripture 
comes to help in the further enlightenment of reason. It is by 
reason we know the Scriptures to be the word of God. This is the 
one thing we cannot know by the Scriptures themselves, so that 
reason is the instrument of faith. When we speak to men of God we 
1Tulloch, op. cit., pp.51f.; II, pp.82f. Cf. John Hunt, 
Religious Thought in England, I, 57. 
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suppose them in possession of a faculty to understand and to judge 
something of what we shall tell them. Hooker defended reason and the 
light of nature as able to teach us our duty, but not to lead us to 
salvation. 1 It is a brief step from Hooker to Whichcote concerning 
the role of reason and natural light. 2 
In the age following Hooker, or during the reigns of the first 
two Stuarts, James I and Charles I, the Church of England lost much 
of its original breadth and catholicity. Anglo-Catholic theology 
marks the decay of the more genuine catholic spirit which united the 
Church of the English Reformation to the other Reformed Churches. 
As a definite system, however, it did not emerge till the seventeenth 
century; and Anglo-Catholics, as a party, have no right to claim the 
inheritance of the Church of England. 3 The original advocates of 
the Church of England via media fought their battle with weapons of 
reason and fair Scriptural enquiry. They had no exclusive theory of 
divine right, and their sacredotalism was not dogmatic. But now 
Anglo-Catholicism allied itself with Arminianism and hardened into a 
1Hunt, op. cit., pp.58ff. One of the limits Hooker puts on 
reason appears to be his assertion that private reason should not 
depart from the decisions of public reason; for this departure leads 
to confusion. We are not to consider our yes as good as the nay of 
all learned men in the world. We should not despise the judgment of 
grave and learned men. However, we are not to be tied to --authority 
when there is reason to the contrary. Cf. Hooker, Ecc. Pol. Bks.I, II, 
in Works (1851). 
2cassirer, op. cit., pp.35f. 
3Tulloch, op. cit., pp.54ff. 
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dogmatic position. They attacked Calvinism on the grounds of its 
inconsistency with the ancient decrees of the Councils and writings 
of the Fathers. While accepting the basis of faith in the Holy 
Scripture, they resolved to take the Bible as God gave it and allow 
:fi'Ull weight to the interpretation of ancient Catholic authority. 
They met the claim of the Divine Right for the Presbyterian polity 
by claiming a Divine Right for Episcopacy and by emphasising the 
doctrine of Apostolic Succession. They asserted against the 
individualism of Puritan theology and worship, the reality of 
Sacramental grace, of the power of Absolution, of the authoritative 
ritual of the Church. Of this school Andrews was the chief theologian 
and Laud was the great champion in action. Unfortunately, Anglo-
Catholicism entered into alliance with the Stuarts and so with the 
policy of royal absolutism and the Divine Right of Kings. Thus the 
Anglo-Catholics believed that this alliance would act as a break-water 
against the waves of revolution and a means of enforcing their views 
on Church Order and Ritual. They threw themselves unreservedly in 
the cause of advancing despotism. But this proved a fatal mistake. 
With the sudden collapse of the Royal Absolutism their power also 
fell. The Calvinistic or Puritan Party, powerful especially in t!E 
middle classes and in the House of Commons, formed a bolder and 
happier alliance with the defenders of political liberty and triumphed 
over the High Church School, with a triumph which seemed permanent and 
complete. 1 
1A. Barry, Masters of English Theology, pp.xff. For a :fuller 
discussion on the struggle of Anglo-Catholics with the Puritans, and the 
subsequent triumph of Puritanism, see Tulloch, op. cit., pp.57ff. See 
also Infra, Ch.III. 
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One of the most striking features of the Commonwealth period was 
the luxuriant growth of new sects. The various names given these 
sects do not represent sects in t~e modern sense of independent, 
organised, ecclesiastical systems. Seventeenth century writers often 
spoke of a sect where we should speak of a party or a school of 
thought. Pelagians, Arminians, Arians, Antinomians, Millenarians, 
and Latitudinarians were severally to be found in more than one of the 
various churches. 1 Richard Baxter describes five religious sects in 
2 
a stricter sense, viz., the Vanists, Seekers, Quakers and Bohemists. 
At 1any rate, it was against similar religious divisions with their 
enthusiasm and superstition that Whichcote protested. 
Whichcote reacted against Romanism on two main grounds: (1) Its 
claim to infallibili.ty and general intolerance, and (2) Its Scholastic 
position. The very activity of tne Roman Catholics at this time 
served to quicken in England a new type of thought. The Roman 
Church had never lost the hope of winning back the English crown and 
people to its old Catholic allegiance. Encouraged by the success of 
the Jesuits on the Continent, and well informed of the prevalent 
religious divisions in England, it posed itself as the remedy for the 
distractions of controversy by the claim to infallible authority. 3 
1c. E. Whiting, Studies in English Puritanism, pp.233f. Ch.VI, 
pp.233-322 of this book contains a :f'ull description of the minor sects 
from 1660 to 1688. 
2 Baxter, . Autobi.~graph,y (ed. Thomas, 1931), pp.72ff. 
3Tulloch, op. cit., pp.64, 74. Cf. Smith, Q.12• cit., p.461. 
A. Galton's The English Roman Catholics is a valuable analysis of this 
subject. See Ibid., pp.104ff., 118f., 121, 124. 
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Whichcote's reaction to the intolerant and dogmatic attitude of 
Popery may be easily understood; for it was a challenge to his 
moderate presuppositions of faith and practice. The other point of 
divergence between Whichcote and the Romanists had to do with the 
general Scholastic position. In this he shared the general spirit 
of the time. There was a demand for a new type of philosophic 
learning that would furnish Protestantism with the same intellectual 
support that Scholasticism had given Catholic doctrine. The danger 
in Aristotelian thought was twofold: first, the definition of all 
being in terms of matter and form, or potentiality and actuality, wiped 
out the clear distinction between corporeal and incorporeal substance; 
second, matter as potentiality, assumed too large a place since out of 
it all other being proceeded by the unfolding of its infinite 
potentiality. Further much of the Scholastic terminology seemed 
useless. The result of this attitude toward Aristotelian thought was 
that Whichcote turned elsewhere for conceptions to develop his thought 
in accordance with the doctrine of two substances. The acceptance and 
application of Platonic and Nee-Platonic conceptions appear for him a 
logical step. It is to be remembered that though Whichcote adheres 
to the doctrine of two distinct substances, bis real interest lies in 
the divine creative purpose, and the soul's capacity to share in the 
knowledge of that purpose, and thus participate in the divine life 
until it finally returns to God. 1 
1J. J. De Boer, The Theory of Knowledge of the Cambridge Platonists, 
pp. 9f. Though De Boer is only concerned with Smith, Cudworth a.nd Culver-
wel, I would maintain that his position is applicable to Whichcote also, 
though the reaction may have been stronger in these other writers. 
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The Reformation and the scientific movement were two aspects of 
the historical revolt which was the dominant intellectual movement of 
the later Renaissance. The appeal to the origins of Christianity, 
and Francis Bacon's appeal to efficient causes as against final 
causes, were two aspects of one movement. The seventeenth century 
inherited a ferment of ideas from the revolt of the sixteenth century 
and in it were developed systems of thought touching every aspect or 
human life. This century provided intellectual genius adequate for 
the greatness of its occasion; it was crowded with new innovations of 
thought. 1 Bacon, Hobbes and Descartes are noteworthy representatives 
of the genius of the seventeenth century. It is difficult to say how 
far Whic~ote was influenced by Bacon ana Descartes, but the negative 
influence of Hobbes appears more evident. Bacon's Novum Organum 
was published in 1620 but his philosophy did not reach the University 
or make any notable impression there for many years and Descartes' 
2 influence belongs primarily to the second half of the century. The 
fecundity of Cartesianism manifested itself in England chiefly through 
the part pla.yed by it in the formation of the intellectual system of 
3 
Locke. It appears that Whichcote had his position well established 
1A. N. Whitehead, Science and the Modern World, pp.11, 55ff. Cf. 
Hearnshaw, Social and Political Ideas, p.32. 
2G. P. R. Fawson, The Cambridge Platonists, p.19. 
3cambridge Modern History, IV, pp.781f., 791f., 799. Cf. J. H. B. 
Masterman, The Age of Milton, pp.221f.; Egg-Olofsson, op. cit., pp.43f.; 
Muirhead, The Platonic Tradition, pp.25f.; P.R., Loe. cit. 
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before the impact of Cartesianism was fUlly felt in England. Yet it 
is possible that he bad a casual knowledge of the thought of Descartes. 
The impact of Descartes appears more in the later Cambridge men, 
especially Henry More. There ·seems to be no doubt that Hobbes sparked 
a negative reaction among the Cambridge Platonists. It was inevitable 
that the radical speculation of Hobbes, alike in the spheres of meta-
physics and of politics, should provoke a reaction, and that such a 
spiritually minded man as Whichcote~should rally to the defence of 
higher and more spiritual aspects of human life. 1 
We turn now to a more positive influence upon Whichcote and 
his followers; viz., a band of scholars who bad assembled at Lord 
Falkland's before the Civil War to consider the problems of theology 
and philosophy in a spirit of freedom. The most outstanding of this 
group were Falkland, Hales and Chillingworth. We shall present 
Chillingworth as a suitable representative of this group. The Religion 
of Protestants is his great work summing up his thought. He raises the 
question of the grounds of religious certitude, the basis of faith, or 
the arbiter of religious opinion. His opponent is a Romanist called 
Knott. Both Chillingworth and Knott accepted the fact of revelation 
and the necessity of the divine spirit. 
the medium and the interpreting spirit. 
They differed concerning 
To Chillingworth, Scripture 
1seth, op. cit., p.79. Cf. Re'°mu~at, Histoire de la PhilosoJ?hie, 
II, p.11; Burnet, History of My Own Time, I, 340f.; M. H. Carre, 
Phases of Thought in England, p.262; L. A. Selby-Bigge, The British 
Moralists, II, pp.286ff.; c. M. H. IV, 291; J.B. Mullinger, History 
of Cambridge University, p.110. 
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and reason were the twofold source of truth, the one external, the 
other internal. The Gospel contains all truth possible and desirable 
among Christians. Beyond these facts - of which the Apostle's Creed 
is the summary, the Christian has latitude. Christianity is belief 
in Christ - the great facts of Christ's life and death for man's 
salvation - without a Sacramentarian or a Calvinistic or an Arminian 
theory of the mode in which this salvation is made effectual to man. 
Chillingworth recognises the authority of God in religion, and no 
other. This authority is addressed in Scripture to the individual 
reason and conscience. No other authority has a binding effect over 
the Christian conscience. 1 
Jeremy Taylor and Edward Stillingfleet belong to the liberal 
movement of the seventeenth century in so far as they contributed by 
distinct and important works to its advancement. Yet neither their 
reputation nor the prevailing character of their theology bas identified 
them with it. Taylor's Lib.erty of Propbes~ing is among the most 
remarkable works of the century. Stillingfleet's Irenicum is of less 
significance. Yet it marks the height to which the liberal church-
manship of this period had risen before the reaction set in at the 
Restoration. Taylor's work appeared in 1647, ten years after 
Chillingworth's Religion of Protestants, Stillingfleet's work in 165Y, 
1Tulloch, op. cit., pp.343ff. Cf. pp.281, 288ff., 305, 318, 
330ff. Volume I of Tulloch's work is a valuable analysis of the 
thought of Falkland, Hales, Chillingworth and other forerunners of 
the Cambridge Platonists. 
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on the eve of the Restora.tion. For our purpose, it will be 
sufficient to consider Taylor's Liber1y of Prophesying. According 
to Taylor, faith is a simple personal acceptance of Jesus Christ and 
Him crucified. Profession of faith in the Apostle's Creed is the 
sole essential of salvation and Christian communion. Episcopacy is 
divinely sanctioned and appears to have been committed to the apostles 
by Christ Himself. But it is not the essence, ease of the Church; it 
only implies the well-being, bene esse of the Church. All necessary 
articles of faith are clearly and plainly set down in Scripture. 
When the meaning of Scripture is uncertain, we have no means of 
determining its infallibility. No one is entitled to dictate to 
another as to what he shall accept as the meaning of Scripture. 
Reason and private judgment must be the last authority of every man 
in face of Scripture. Divine revelation in Scripture is the ultimate 
source of religious truth, but the question remains as to the inter-
pretation of revelation. Thus reason is the interpreter of revelation. 
In the process of the interpretation of revelation a man follows his 
own reason, guided not only by natural arguments, but by divine 
revelation and other good means. 1 
direction of Whichcote's position. 
Taylor's work points in the 
1Tullocb, Ibid., pp.343ff., 379-408. Cf. John Hunt, op. cit., 
I, 340f. For a comparative study of the thought of Whichcote and 
Taylor, see De Pauley, op. cit., pp.41ff. Stillingfleet's contribution 
to liberal thought appears more important when considered in the context 
of Latitudinarian thought, which follows the Cambridge Platonists School 
in the seventeenth century rational tradition. See Cragg, From 
Puritanism to the Age of Reason, pp.61ff. 
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In this chapter, it has been our purpose to trace the 
development of the Platonic tradition from its original source up 
to the time of Cambridge Platonism. Though to the present writer 
there appears to be sufficient evidence to assume Whichcote's 
indebtedness to this historical development of Platonic influence in 
religious thought, no conclusions are yet drawn as to the degree of 
1 
the influence upon him from this source. lturther, it appears that 
a number of ideas and conditions since the Renaissance have culminated 
in bis thought. The seventeenth century itself was rich in thought, 
scienti:t·ic, philosophical, and religious, and much of the thought of 
Whichcote can be understood only in this context. The immediate 
religious cause which started this new school was the reaction to 
Puri tan dogma. We have omitted a consideration of Puritan thought 
and activity in the present chapter to give full scope to our 
discussion both concerning Whichcote's Puritan background and reaction 
to this school of thought, in the following chapter. 
1 Cf. Infra, Ch.IX. 
CHAPTER THREE 
CONTROVERSY WITH A PURITAN 
The history of English Puritanism is the history both of a 
theological movement and of a greet national struggle. No one 
can understand ·the sources of the mixed civilisation of England 
without studying the great Puritanical movement of the seventeenth 
century. Britain was the national soil in which the seeds of the 
Reformation were destined to take the deepest and most enduring 
root. England could boast neither of a Luther nor a Calvin, but 
the spiritual impulses out of which the movement grew, and which 
constituted its rea.l life and strength, found in Anglo-Saxon character 
their most congenial seat, their highest affinities, their most solid 
nutriment. Slowly and under many hindr·ances, they spread, unaided 
by the powerful influence or any great teacher, but sinking always 
more deeply and gaining a firmer hold on the thought and faith of 
Englishmen.1 
During the time of Elizabeth, Puritanism did not want to over-
throw the Church as the Romanists did but to transform it according to 
their own ideas of what the church should be. They could not be 
prevented from ·holding positions of power and responsibility in the 
Church. To them the Church that Elizabeth had established was tainted 
1Tulloch, English Puritanism, pp.1f. Cf •. Ibid., pp. 5ff., where 
the author asserts that the connection between Puritanism and Calvinism 
was at first more of an ecclesiastical than a doctrinal sympathy. 
Puritanism began with contention between rival bishops. 
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with Romanism and untrue to Scripture. The motive power behind the 
Puritans was Geneva and it was the Calvinistic system that they wanted 
to introduce in England. Thus when James VI of Scotland became 
James I of England, at the beginning of the seventeenth century, the 
Puritans expected sympathy from him in view of his coming from a 
Presbyterian country. They were soon disappointed with the new King, 
who immediately allied himself closely with the Anglo-Catholics. He 
was followed by Charles I, who believed strongly in the Divine Right 
of Kings and sought to enforce it. But by taking this position be 
was out of sympathy with his most progressive subjects and by his 
alliance with Laud and the Anglo~atholics he was opposed to the 
Puritans. The new century was an age of revolt against absolutism 
in England and elsewhere. Charles ignored this and refused his 
subjects a voice in the policy of the country. 1 
This condition led to the Puritan revolt in the 1640's. On 
12th June, 1643, Parliament issued an ordinance commanding that an 
assembly of divines should be convened at Westminster, 1st July, 1644. 
The purpose was to alter the establishment. However, the resolution 
to abolish prelatical government as soon as possible did not go far 
enough to extinguish episcopal rule, but left no doubt in the minds 
of the legislators that an end must be put to the ancient hierarchy. 
Ecclesiastical government was to be settled so as to be most agreeable 
~ioorman, A Histor of the Church of En land, pp.208, 221ff., 226. 
Cf. English Literature 1600-1660 art. by Bush , pp.6ff.; Hearnshaw, 
Social and Political Ideas, pp.34f. 
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to God's word, and adapted to procure and preserve the peace of the 
Church at home and to promote nearer agreement with other reformed 
communions abroad. The New League and Covenant of 1643 differed 
from former ones by the addition of an express resolve to extirpate 
prelacy as well as popery. The Covenant prepared in Scotland, having 
been adopted in England, the two countries entered into a treaty 
29th November, 1643. The Covenant took the form of a compromise 
and at the same time was meant to declare truth and to accomplish 
union. However, it received different explanation from different 
persons. It was used variously by Presbyterians, Independents and 
Cavaliers. Hence, in spite of Presbyterian activity and Parliamentary 
orders, great numbers refUsed and evaded the test. 1 In fact, while 
Tuckney was one of the Westminster divines, Whichcote was absent from 
the Assembly and refused to take the Covenant. 
When Parliament exercised supreme power in the 1640's, only 
persons sympathetic with Puritan ideas received university appointmm.ts. 
To confirm this one need only observe the men appointed along with 
Whichcote in 1644. Hill, Master of Trinity, and Arrowsmith, Master 
of St. John's, were both old-fashioned Puritans and decidedly 
Presbyterian. Tuclmey, another of the Presbyterians, was Master of 
Emmanue1. 2 Emmanuel College was founded in 1584 as a Puritan College. 
This shows the determination of the Puritans not to desert the university 
1stoughton, History of Religion in England, I, 267, 289ff., 219f. 
2Ibid., II, 260f. Cf. Ibid., I, 485. 
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but to propagate their views. 1 The Puritan approach to preaching is 
part of the raison d'etre of Emmanuel College. Puritan preaching was 
called "spiritual" in contradistinction to the "witty" preaching of 
tbe more conservative Churchmen. Thus Emmanuel College where 
Wbichcote studied, taught and became fellow and where Tuckney was at 
various times student, tutor, fellow and master, was founded by Sir 
2 
Walter Mildmay to encourage the Puritan type of preaching. 
Taking all facts into consideration, it seems safe to suppose 
tbat Whicbcote developed in a distinctly Puritan environment. He 
most probably came from a Puritan home, his parents in turn sending 
him to Emmanuel College, "the nursery" or "the cradle" of Puritanism 
to be "established in the faith". Further, the fact that he was 
trained at Emmanuel College most probably explains his appointment 
as Provost of King's by a Puritan Parliament and his retention in 
this position in spite of his refusal to take the Covenant. It is 
significant that the greatest reaction against the dogmatism and 
intolerance of Puritanism came from within their own ranks and mainly 
from men trained at Emmanuel, the Puritan College. Thus, the law of 
reaction was at work, "for the stringency of Puritan and Calvinistic 
1Mu.llinger, A History of the University of Cambridge, pp.130ff. 
Cf. Overton, William Law, p.412. 
2Haller, The Rise of Puritanism, pp.19ff. The difference 
between witty and spiritual preaching, between the "Wisdom of Words" 
and the "Word o:t· Wisdom" marked the difference between Anglican and 
Puritan preaching. The Puritans professed to disapprove the citation 
of human authors and to depend solely upon Scripture. See Ibid., p.23. 
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rule tended to create its own exception", and to drive men of 
"independent and antipathetic temper" into revolt. This "citadel 
of Puritanism and Calvinism became ••••• the cradle of a movement 
animated by the spirit of Plato and devoted to the golden mean in 
every sphere of thought and life". 1 A casual acquaintance with 
Whichcote indicates why he rejected the Puritan position. He says: 
"Every one do rest in his teacher a while ••••• but yet let 
him not depend upon his teacher more than he needs must, nor 
longer than need require; for you ought not to think that you 
must be in the state of a learner all the days of your life. 
A child must believe what is told him at first, that this letter 
is so called, and that two letters put together spell so much; 
but after a while he comes to see reason thereof as well as his 
teacher ••••• He is a very unhappy man that hath lived twenty, 
thirty or forty years in the world, and hath never done that which 
is the peculiar and proper action of human nature, that is, to use 
reason, understanding and judgment; but lived all the days of his 
life ••••• below his kind; having not put forth any of those a§ts 
which do most properly belong unto him, as a rational being." 
The central dogma of Puritanism as applied to the life of the 
men of the seventeenth century was that of an all embracing determinism, 
theologically formulated as the doctrine of predestination. It 
postulates an absolute human depravity and a purely arbitrary human 
redemption. 3 Thus the Westminster Confession states that God ordained 
from eternity whatever comes to pass. Yet He is not the author of 
sin, nor is violence offered to the will by creatures, nor is the 
liberty of contingency of second causes taken away but rather established. 
1Powicke, The Cambridge Platonists, p.3. 
2works, I, 155f. Cf. Ibid., IV, p.337, I, p.156f. 
3 Haller, op. cit., pp.83f. 
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God knows what may or can come to pass upon all supposed conditions; 
yet He has not decreed anything because He foresaw it as future, or 
that which would come to pass upon such conditions. Accordingly, 
by the decree of God some men and angels are predestined unto 
everlasting life, and others foreordained to everlasting death. 
The number of those predestined or !"oreordained is permanently fixed. 
Those of mankind that are predestined unto life, "God, before the 
foundation of the world was laid, according to bis eternal and 
immutable purpose, and the secret counsel and good pleasure of his 
will, hath chosen in Christ unto everlasting glory". This has been 
done, "out of his mere free grace and love, without any foresight 
of taith or good works, or perseverance in either of them, or any 
other thing in the creature". There are no "conditions or causes 
in creatures moving God to his decree; all is to be attributed to 
His glorious grae:e". 
Further, as God has appointed the elect to glory, so He bas 
:foreordained the necessary means, "wherefore those elected are 
redeemed by Christ; are 'efrectually called' to faith in Christ by 
His Spirit working in them". They are justified, adopted, sanctified, 
and kept by His power through faith unto salvation. Thus only the 
"elect" are saved. From the rest of mankind, "God was pleased to 
withhold His mercy; for the glory of His sovereign power over His 
oreaturesu. He rejected them, dishonouring them with wrath for their 
sin "to the praise of His justice". According to the Puritans such 
a doctrine was "to afford matter of praise, reverence and admiration 
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of God, and or humility, diligence, and abundant consolation to all 
that sincerely obey the Gospel. 1 
The Puri tan doctrine was Calvinism with a difference. 
Calvinism was not so readily accepted in England as in Geneva, 
Scotland or Massachusetts. Thus Calvinism in England did not 
lead to a swift reconstruction of the Church but to the creation 
of a literature which expressed a way of life that eventually 
transcended all ecclesiastical and even religious bounds. Thus 
the Puritans set forth the doctrine of predestination in terms 
calculated to appeal to the English populace. English Puritanism 
may be called Calvinistic chiefly as a matter of historical reference. 
The Puritans though Calvinist in varying degrees, referred as often 
to Augustine as to Calvin and were reluctant to quote too frequently 
any merely human authorities whatsoever. However, Calvin's positive, 
clear, dogmatic intelligence was very suggestive. His most important 
effect upon them was to send them back to their Bibles. Thus there 
was more of Paul than Calvin in Puritan thought. They followed Paul 
in their teaching of the spiritual condition of the disinherited, 
aggrieved or oppressed. Thereby they attacked the special privileges, 
the vested interests, and class prejudices of the existing order. The 
spiritual equalitarianism of Paul was implicit in Puritan preaching. 
It seized the imagination of ordinary men. It created discontent 
1Mitchell, Minutes, pp.iiff.; Cf. Hunt, Religious Thought in 





among all those who had reason to be dissatisfied with the Stuart 
regime, and this became the central theme of revolutionary 
Puri tani am. Thus the doctrine of predestination appears to have 
been the rationalised statement of this sentiment toward equality. 
It appeared as "a clear dogma answering with irrefutable logic to 
men's emotional need for something by which to be convinced". 
Accordingly, a favourite theme of Puritan preaching was equality for 
all men - "that God before whom all men are levelled is sure in bis 
own time to uplift the low and humble the great". 1 
The Scripture was the basis of the Confession of the Westminster 
Assembly and recourse to it proved vital in their discussion. It 
was not the desire of the framers of the Confession to go beyond their 
predecessors in rigour and they took special pains: {1) to avoid 
mixing up the questions of the canonicity of particular books with 
the question of their authorship, where any doubt at all existed on 
the latter point; t2) to lea~e open all reasonable questions as to 
the mode and degree of inspiration which could consistently be left 
open by those who accepted the Scriptures as the infallible rule of 
faith and duty; {3) to refrain from claiming for the text such absolute 
purity and for the Hebrew vowel points such antiquity as was claimed 
in the Swiss Formula Concordia, while asserting that the originals of 
Scripture are, after the lapse of ages, still pure and perfect for 
all those purposes for which they were given; and (4) to declare 
1Haller, op. cit., pp.84ff. 
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that the sense of Scripture in any particular place is not manifold, 
but one, and so raise an earnest protest against the system of 
"spiritualising" the text which had been over-emphasised by some of 
the most eminent Fathers and mystics. 1 
The Westminster Assembly took the position, that "the light 
of nature" is just enough to leave men "inexcusable" for their sins, 
but not enough to give them the lmowledge of God, and His will which 
is necessary to salvation. The light of nature may do men great 
harm, but it can do them no good. Thus what God wishes us to know 
is wholly committed to writing. The Holy Scriptures are given by 
inspiration and they come to us, not by the testimony of any man or 
church, but depend wholly upon God, and must be received as the word 
of God. Our assurance of its infallible truth and divine authority 
is from the inward work of the Holy Spirit. The work of the Spirit 
is now limited to giving a saving understanding of what is revealed 
in Scripture. The Scripture, in the original Hebrew and Greek, was 
immediately inspired by God, and by His care and providence kept pure 
in all ages. The Holy Spirit speaking in Scripture is the supreme 
judge; and the infallible rule of interpretation is to interpret 
Scripture by Scripture. 2 
In view of the fact that Tuckney represented the spirit of the 
~itchell, op. cit., pp.xlixff. 
2Hunt, op. cit., pp.199f. Cf. Brown, The English Puritans, 
pp.154f.; Cragg, From Puritanism to the Age of Reason, pp.36ff. 
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Westminster Assembly, there is little wonder that he should disagree 
with Whichcote concerning the basis of religious authority. We have 
seen that Whichcote was probably a Puritan in background, training, 
temper s.nd intensity of conviction but not in sympathy with prevailing 
Puritan theology. He read Calvin and Beza, but his t bought did not 
move in their direction. Instead of beginning with the inscrutable 
will of God, he began with the fUndamental nature of man. His 
interest was psychological more than theological. He asserted that 
nothing is more intrinsically rational than religion. 1 Further, 
Whichcote could not accept the intolerance of Puritan theology. 
Puritan theology in the seventeenth century was both intolerant and 
highly theoretical. It could admit no rival; it was impatient of 
the least variation from the language of orthodoxy. It emphasised 
all the transcendent and divine aspects of Christian truth, rendering 
them into theories highly definite and consistent, but in their very 
consistency disregara1·u1 of moral facts and the complexities of 
practical life. Thus Whichcote and others with a reflective and 
tolerant mind looked on the one hand at this compactness of doctrinal 
divinity and on the other, at the state of the religious world and the 
Church around them. They sought a more excellent way and concluded 
that reason and morality are essentials of religion. They sought 
to soften down instead 01· sharpening doctrinal distinctions, to bring 
out points of agreement instead of differences in religious opinions. 
1Jones, Spiritual Re1·ormers, pp. 290f. 
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They tried to find a common centre of thought and action in certain 
universal principles of religious sentiment rather than in the more 
abstruse conclusions of polemical theology. They became ecclesiastics 
against the theological dogmatism and narrowness of their time. 1 
Stoughton makes the following observation concerning Wbicbcote and 
followers: 
"It is curious to find such men in the very heart of the 
Puritan age. They were founders of a new order of religious thought, 
new at least to the mental habits in general of the period. They 
did not assail Puritanism, nor assume an attitude of opposition to 
other good men of any class, they preferred to build up rather than 
to tear down, to heal rather than to wound; but their sympathies 
did not run in Puritan lines. They appreciated the piety of many 
contemporaries at Cambridge and lived with them upon terms of 
rriendship, but for their own part, they held broader views of 
theology than their brethren. Their interest in the study of 
Plato and Plotinus, and their elevation of what is moral over wbat 
is merely intellectual, gave to their method of inquiry, and to the 
conclusions which they reached, a certain cast, which plainly 
distinguished them from the kind of teaching found in the Westminster 
Confession, and in the standard works of Puritan divines. n2 
1Tulloch, op. cit., II, 12f. 
2stoughton, op. cit., II, 266f. Cf. Mitchell, op. cit., pp.xliif. 
Here it is stated that Chillingworth was not at the Assembly. Neither 
were Wbichcote or Cudworth; but they were held in "high esteem" by its 
members and were considered worthy of appointment in the University of 
Cambridge. Tuclrn.ey, Hill and Arrowsmith were members of the Assembly. 
Tuckney was on the First Committee; Hill and Arrowsmith on the Second 
Committee. Arrowsmith appeared on a Committee to join the Commissioners 
of the Church of Scotland to formulate a joint Confession of Faith. 
Tuckney's name was later added to the latter Committee. See Ibid., 
lxxxiiff. Much of the theology of the Confession was accepted just as 
Tuckney produced it, but there is much "unworthy" of him. Though he 
accepted the basic thought of the Assembly, he rejected plans to enforce 
it upon others. This moderate view held by Tuckney may partly explain 
bis continued friendship with Whichcote after their controversy. See 
Calamy, The Nonconformist's Memorial {ed. Palmer, 2nd ed., 1802), I, 
264fr. 
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We turn now to Whichcote's letters of controversy. They are 
valuable in that they state frankly the reaction that he took to the 
Puritan view. It is to Cradock, at that time a fellow of Emmanuel, 
that we owe the beginning of this valua.ble correspondence. In these 
letters we find the "germ" of Cambridge Platon~sm. Cradock became 
aware of the fact that certain seniors including Tuckney were giving 
unfavourable criticism of Whichcote's views. He ventured to suggest 
that his would-be critics were not dealing fairly with Whichcote by 
criticising him behind his back and that they should put their points 
of opposition clearly and frankly to Whichcote himself. But since 
Whichcote was at this time Provost of King's College and Vice-Chancellor 
of the University, there were few who felt willing and entitled to 
attack his views. But eventually Tuckney, Master of Emmanuel and 
formerly Whichcote's tutor, accepted the challenge of expressing his 
concern and opposition to the views of Whichcote, as a personal friend 
of long standing. Whichcote delivered on Sunday, 7th September, 1651, 
a Commencement Sermon which set off the series of letters between 
1 himself and Tuclmey. Tuckney's initial letter and Whichcote's 
reply introduce the controversy. Thus Tuckney begins: 
" ••.•• Out of that ancient and still continued love and respect 
I bear you, to crave leave to tell you; that my heart hath 
bin much exercised about you: and that, especially since your 
being Vice-Chancellor, I have seldom hear'd you preach; but 
that something hath bin delivered by you, and that authoritatively, 
and with the big words, sometimes of 'divinest reason', and 
sometimes of 'more than mathematical demonstration'; that hath 
1Whichcote, Letters, p.1f. 
of Whichcote, Ibid., p.1 (n. ). 




very much grieved me; and I believe, others with me: and 
yesterday, as much as any time I pass-by many thi~gs in your 
sermon; and crave leave to note three or foure." 
Tuckney proceeds to present his criticisms under four main 
headings, as follows 2 : 
(1) The notion that all differences between good men may not 
be determined by Scripture was considered by him as "unsafe and 
unsound". 
(2) Whichcote had insisted that one should be confined to 
passages of Scripture in which all parties agree. Thus there would 
be more peace in·Christendom, if fallible men would not press their 
disagreements. Tuckney considered this position "more dangerous" 
since Papists, Arians, Socinians and all sorts of heretics could be 
accepted as long as there is Scriptural agreement. According to 
Tuckney, this is not the kind of peace that "Christ purchased by 
bis blood 11 • 
(3) The advice which Whichcote gives that men have the liberty 
to interpret Scripture. According to Tuckney, this would take away 
the peace that Wbichcote has suggested. The principle of the 
libertas prophetandi would lead to even greater division and intoler-
ance in Christendom. 
And (4) Whichcote had suggested that reconciliation does not work 
on God but on us. Tuclmey asserts this as "divinity his heart 
riseth up against". What does Whichcote mean? Does be mean that 
1 Letters, p. 2. 2Ibid. , pp. 2ff. 
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God overlooks sin so as to be reconciled to those that remain in 
sin. Or, does he mean that God's reconciliation is from something 
in us and not from His free Grace? 
Thus Tuckney states his disagreement and expresses his concern 
for Whichcote's own position. He desires to keep youth from being 
tainted and Whichcote's reputation from being marred and in order 
that "his friends may not be grieved". 1 
In our treatment of the controversy we shall be concerned 
primarily with a clear statement of the issues involved, and a 
critical appraisal of them. Further we believe that the controversy· 
first reveals Whichcote's thought, and marks the real beginning of 
the movement lalown as Cambridge Platonism. 2 It is not easy to fix 
upon a neat outline for our discussion since the criticisms set forth 
by Tuckney involve various related ideas of Whichcote. But it seems 
clear that certain concepts are of fundamental importance for both 
men. Thus we shall concern ourselves with the following: (1) The 
1Ibid., pp. ; Cf. Ibid., pp.36ff. Whichcote's version of his 
Commencement Sermon is as follows: (1) All truly good men substantially 
agree in all things saving; (2) Some things wherein we differ, may be 
determined by Scripture, but not all; (3) The Proposal for peace; 
(4) The Proposal for progress and growth in knowledge; and (5) 
Reconciliation. We find here the justification for the assumption 
that he usually preached by outline. See Ibid., pp.llff. Tuckney 
certainly based his criticisms upon Whichcote's outline, though there 
is the possibility that be did not grasp his fUll meaning. 
2There are other detailed discussions of the controversy to be 
found in Tulloch, Rational Theologz, II, 49ff.; Powicke, The 
Cambridge Platonists, pp.54ff.; De Pauley, The Candle of the Lord, 
pp. 28ff. 
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problem of religious authority; (2) Christian tolerance; and (3) 
the Doctrine of Reconciliation. 
The problem of religious authority deserves first place in our 
discussion because it affects in a profound way all that is to 
follow. According to Tuckney, Scripture is the only rule of faith 
and for this reason its testimony is unquestionable. Divine truth 
is given explicitly in the Scriptures and it is "made Divine by the 
simple fact of being there". Of course, he did not exclude reason 
entirely. But its place was strictly subordinate. Faith takes 
the lead and accepts completely what Scripture lays down. She then 
calls upon reason to collect and compare its statements; to arrange 
them in due order; to deduce logical consequences; to clear up 
apparent contradictions; and to weave the whole into a system. 
Here the function of reason ends: to sit in judgment on the substance 
of what Scripture lays down is beyond her province. Thus, when 
faith acts, reason acts also; yet this is not to resolve faith into 
reason. But be is insistent upon the fact that men need an infallible 
authority and this is Scripture. Even if our reason cannot judge, 
1 
Scripture is to be believed and obeyed. 
Wbicbcote's position seems to be just the reverse. Reason, he 
said, may and must come first, then faith. The reason of a man's 
mind must be satisfied for no one can think against it. Faith, 
when it is more than credulity, is an intelligent act. Faith follows 
1 Cf. Letters, pp.21ff. 
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reason - is simply Reason herself, yielding assent to the evidence 
Which her own authority has made clear. 1 The reader should bear in 
mind rrom the outset that both men recognise reason as important but 
it appears that reason has become too important in Whichcote's thought 
for Tuckney's satisfaction. 
At this point we should perhaps give some attention to Whichcote's 
assertion that his position was not new. The emphasis of Luther 
upon the right of private judgment shows the truth of this assertion. 
When Luther was at the supreme moment of his life, when retraction 
or death seemed the alternative, his plea was that what is contrary to 
reason is contrary to God. But Luther, and still more his successors, 
grew doubtful of this principle. Its seeming abuse led them to 
denounce its very use. Later he speaks of faith as strangling reason. 2 
The reaction against reason grew. Credo guia impossible became a 
favourite motto and the result was to present the whole matter of Faith 
as a tissue of Mysteries. In particular, Calvinism was the result -
not the Calvinism of Calvin so much as that of his rigorous disciples 
who shaped it into the dominant creed. But let reason come to its 
own again and this creed with a great deal besides would topple to 
the ground; and Tuckney knew this well. It is true that the Reformation 
on its intellectual side was but an aspect of the Renaissance, and we 
1Wbichcote, Works, III, 163. For a detailed treatment of our 
author's view of reason, see Infra, Ch.IV. 
2Beard's Hibbert Lectures (1883), p.163 (cited by Powicke, op. cit., 
pp.59-61). 
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have seen how Whichcote was directly influenced by the Renaissance. 
It would appear that the attitude of both men in this controversy goes 
back to the Renaissance-Reformation period, Whichcote being more 
directly under the influence of the Renaissance on its intellectual 
side1 and Tuckn.ey more under the impact of the line of development 
resulting from a reaction to reason through the Reformers. So 
important is their difference as to the nature and importance of 
reason that it will be necessary to return to this theme often for 
it is the key to an understanding o!' the entire controversy. 
Scripture is an authority for both men, but here also their 
differences are outstanding. The important role Whichcote assigns 
reason naturally makes him more critical than Tuckney even in his use 
of Scripture. Thus it was consistent with his general attitude 
towards Scripture for Whichcote to suggest that all differences between 
Christians may not be determined by Scripture and for this reason 
they should hold to passages of agreement, since there is substantial 
1Gilson, Reason and Revelation in the Middle Ages, Ch. III, pp. 691·f. 
De Pauley has observed that the thought or Calvin and Whichcote stem 
from a single source - from the Alexandrian tradition and Augustinian 
theology, but their reactions have been different. See, De Pauley, 
op. cit. , pp. 231f!'. Similarly, Tuclmey and Whichcote have a common 
background and ror this reason there is at once continuity and dis-
continuity to be observed in a comparative study of their thought. 
The general attitude of the debasement of reason to make way for raith 
has often occurred in the history of thought, and Tuclmey is not alone 
in his general position. Cf. Tertullian, "On Prescription Against 
Hereticsil: Ch.VII; in The Ante-Nicene Fathers (1887), Vol.III, p.246. 
Tertullian epigram: credo quia absurdum marks this general attitude 
from his time. See also Kierkegaard, Concluding Unscientific Postscript 
(tr. Swenson and Lowrie), 1941, pp.188f. 
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agreement "in all things". 1 On the o tbe r hand , Tuckney who 
considers Scripture as bis only religious authority rinds Wbichcote's 
position extremely disturbing. He argues that interpretations of 
Scripture by councils e.nd synods and the commentaries and creeds 
resulting thererrom, are not additions or alterations of Scripture 
and tbese are necessary because of the imperfections of our under-
standing. Tuckney accepts orthodox explications of Scripture (to 
Scripture). This p.osi ti on is natural in view 01· his role in the 
Westminster Assembly. This also explains his fear that Whicbcote 
had read too much Arminian literature, for he had understood him to 
imply that be would accept the minimum in Scripture of "those things 
saving 11 and discount the use of confessions of faith and catechisms 
which explain them. At first it would appear that Tuckney wishes to 
have things both ways, but to him Scripture is to be interpreted by 
Scripture. It is difficult to see bow even this could be done with-
out the use of reason, but it would be counter to Tucl-rn.ey's purpose 
to admit it. 
Whicbcote agrees that matters or faith are matters of divine 
revelation. But to him, the first task is to prove the divine 
authority of Scripture since Scripture is not to be produced as a 
witness for its own truth. He would accept the same aids to an 
understanding of Scripture as Tuckney, but even these must be examined 
lLetters, pp.11ff., 21ff.; Cf. John Milton, De Doctrina Christiana 
(tr. Sumner), 1825, pp.469f. 
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by reason in view of disagreements. Finally, whether one relies 
upon Scripture itself or upon councils, confessions, and the like, 
the individual must reserve the right to judge for himself. To 
Whicbcote Tuclmey had actually weakened his position by bringing into 
the discussion these extra-biblical "explications", for the Scriptures 
1 themselves are more authoritative than these. It is Wbicbcote's 
belief that if a man bas good intentions as he studies the Scriptures, 
he will not miss "anything saving". Fundamentals are so clear that 
there is little danger of good men differing about them. If a man is 
satisfied on fundamentals, be should appreciate discussion with those 
who differ. This is healthy, for it leads to a re-examination of 
2 one's own thought. The obvious advantage of Wbicbcote's more 
liberal view is tba.t it gives greater freedom for discussion and the 
development of a fuller rational understanding of one's 1'aitb. Here 
Wbichcote recaptures the spirit of Christian-Platonism and one recalls 
the "faith seeking to know" of Augustine and the Credo ut intelligum 
of Anselm. 3 This leads us logically into our next consideration, 
what is described as the Liber.ta·s Propbetandi, which we have subsumed 
4 
under the general heading of Christian tolerance. 
Powicke bas singled out Whicbcote from among the Cambridge 
1Ibid., pp.42ff., 49ff. 
2Ibid., pp.52, 55. 
3G·l ·t· Ch I 1 son , op. c i • , • • 
4For a detailed discussion on this subject, see Infra, Ch.VIII. 
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Platonists as being conspicuous for bis Christian tolerance. 1 
Whicbcote has asserted in his Commencement Sermon that men have the 
2 liberty to use reason as a criterion of faith. He bas also 
asserted t bat a· Christian, "after application to God, and a diligent 
use o:t· means to find out truth might decide upon what, as a result of 
his s.earch, he finds cause to believe and to venture bis soul". 3 
Now, according to Tuckney, Wbichcote places too much stress on 
Tbeologia Naturalis, and exalts the natural reason above "the purely 
supernatural and evangelical". He quoted too often Proverbs 20:27, 
and misunderstood Romans, Chapters one and two. 4 Further, there is 
the danger that such liberty suggested by Whichcote might lead to 
various unwholesome divisions among Christians. Tuckney points to 
Socinians, Arminians and the many Sects as ample justirication for 
. 5 
bis concern. 
At this point Wbichcote finds it necessary to state more clearly 
1Powicke, op. cit., p.50. 2Letters, pp.3-4. 3Ibid., p.13. 
4Ibid., p.20. This controversy reminds us of a recent contro-
versy between Brunner and Barth where Brunner conceives a relation 
between nature and grace as the basis of a theologia naturalis, but 
Barth's reply to his proposition is an unqualified "No!". Brunner's 
view concerning a "general revelation" in Nature and a "special" 
revelation in Christ is similar to Wbichcote' s scheme of "truths of 
first-inscriution" and "truths of after-revelation". On the other 
hand, there is much in common between the approach of Barth and that 
of Tuckney on the same subject. In both cases the two modern thinkers 
are 1'ar in advance of these seventeenth century thinkers. Our only 
purpose here is to indicate tendencies. Cf. Brunner, Natural Theology, 
(tr. Frankel, into. John Baillie), 1946. 
5Ibid. , PP• 29ff • 
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his general position. Religion itself is the truest and highest 
reason. In the nature of things, there is necessity and contingency, 
tbe latter is determined by God out of His power, but the former is 
eternally fixed. Then, there is that which is declared by God. Tbe 
first is in ratione rei; the second in materia libertatis et bene-
placi ti Dei; e.nd the third is materia f'idei. Scripture is knowable 
and does not stand only upon the foundation of revelation. Natural 
light a.nd conscience also condemn iniquity, and give testimony to 
righteousness. Calvin himself acknowledged that faith agrees with 
reason, that the principle of reason does not destroy the knowledge 
of God. Materia theologia natural.!§_ is demonstrable by reason; and 
materia ridei sacris litteris contenta est summe credibilis is satis-
factory to reason. Thus "unbiased reason, not in compromise wi tb 
sense, not engaged in worldly design" is valid. Meanwhile, one should 
receive "what God speaks of Himsel1', of His own affairs as acts of His 
infinite wisdom and power"; 1·or what God speaks transcends our 
rational understanding. 
and not irrational. 1 
But such "transcendency" is supra-rational 
" ••••. Reason is so far rrom doing disservice to Christian faith, 
that it fits men to receive it ••••• Therefore the use of reason in 
matters of religion is so far from doing any harm to religion, from 
being prejudicial to any articles of faith, that it is the proper 
'preparatory' for men to look to God; and taking up the Bible, and 
finding that God is in Christ reconciling the world to himself; 
reason saith, I did expect it, I did believe such a thing from tbe 
first and chiefest good; and now I am assured of it by the gospel. n2 
1Ibid., pp.44!'f. Cr. Calvin, Institutes l1611), II, ii, 12, 26; 
I, xv, 6; III, xxv, 2 passim. 
~ffhicbcote, Works, III, 184. 
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The common end which both Whichcote and Tuckney have in view is 
peace in Christendom, but the manner 01' attaining this peace is 
conceived differently by each man. It was Whichcote's belief that 
Tuckney had confused the use of reason with the principle of reason. 
And while he was willing to concede the possibility of the misuse 
of reason, he would not denounce the principle. 
1 Vfhichcote, in the hand of' God is His "candle". 
Reason, says 
Further, Whichcote 
is prepared to recognise all truth, both natural and revealed. The 
University is the place where truth should be sought wherever it may 
lead. The foundations of.· truths necessary to salvation are so 
"immoveably" laid by God and the light of them is so "full and 
clear" that no "ingenuous and teachable mind" can be mistaken about 
them. Truth is of' God, "He is the Superintendent over truth in 
2 
the world". It is consistent with his broad outlook to study 
philosophy. This does not in any way affect his love or Scripture 
and though he must admit that the philosophers are good as far as they 
go, yet in Christ we have a "fuller light". This, however, does not 
make them enemies of the Gospel; on the contrary, at times their 
insights challenge the Christian to live up to his profession of 
faith in Christ. 3 
1 Letters, pp.49, 113. 
2Ibid., pp.56ff. Cf. Whichcote, Works, IV, 340. 
3Ibid., pp.60ff. He says: "In some Philosophers especially Plato 
and hi SScollers •.••. I find many excellent and di vine expressions." 
See "Philosophical and Theological Reflections", Sloane MS, 2716 - 4. 
Calvin, op. cit., I, V. 10; II, ii, 3; III, xxv, 2 Eassim. 
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"Natural light and conscience condemn iniquity and give 
testimony to the ways of righteousness. Christianity is beyond 
all control of human Reason, for truth delivered by God concerning 
Salvation by Christ is aimiable, gratef'ul, acceptable by mind and 
understanding and such as speaks itself from God and to this 
purpose human reason was made use of, as a Receiver, discoverer, 
a principle to be mistrusted and taught not as a.n author or 
inventer or controller of what God speaks, divine truth always 
carries its own evidence so that the mind receiving it is 
illuminated, edified and satisfied. ;,I receive the Christian 
Revelation in a way of ••••• Choyce, I myself am taken with it as 
a welcome guest, it is not forced upon me but I let it in. Yet 
so as taught of God I see Reason to embrace it; I have no Reison 
against it, but rather the highest and purest Reason for it." 
Whichcote appears to anticipate the conclusions of Brunner who 
asserts that: 
"Revelation is only a stumbling-block to that reason which 
proclaims itself as a final court of appeal even before God. 
Hence the stumbling-block is not so much to reason itself, as to 
the arrogance of reason, our self-sufficiency in virtue of reason. 112 
One would think that Whichcote's apparent subordination of reason 
to revelation would have satisfied Tuckney, but obviously it did not. 
Tuckney agrees that faith is the act of an intelligent and rational 
creature and thus understanding and reason are necessary. But this 
has little to do with bringing peace into Christendom; for the most 
divisive doctrines are, in fact, those which are beyond the grasp of 
reason. For instance a "trinity-in-unity" is revealed in Scripture as 
a divine truth as also are the "divine decrees" and these must be 
"bumbl,y believed" since "reason's judging" of them is inadequate. 3 
l"Philosophical and Theological Reflections", Loe. cit. 





It seems that both men agree that materia fidei is not contrary to 
reason, but their attitudes toward supra-rational matters are 
different. Tuclmey insists that those matters of the Christian faith 
which are beyond the comprehension of reason must be believed as 
firmly as those within its grasp. 1 On the other hand, Whichcote 
offers reason even as the receiver of revelation and this he believes 
is in the interest of de certitudine et dignitate Christianae religionis. 
But to Tuckney this dignitas et certitude is more demonstrable by 
Scripture than by reason. Scripture should be distinguished from 
what is properly called Christian religion, as that which contains it 
and may be therefore considered as the full proof of Christianity. 
There is much good matter in heathen writings, Tuckney agrees, but 
these cannot be compared with Scripture which is confirmed by miracles 
and other divine testimonies. Thus the truth of the Christian 
religion is not by reason, but by the divine authority of Scripture 
2 
and this testimony is to be received by faith. 
To Tuckney, Whichcote's insistence upon reason as a religious 
authority explained much of the confusion in the University. 3 It 
is his desire rather to be called a Calvinist than a Socinian or 
Arminian. Because of Vlhichcote's emphasis on reason the unwholesome 
1Ibid. , pp. 68f. 
2rbid., pp.70ff. Cf. Pascal, Pensees (tr. Stewart), 1947, 
"Apology", Pen. 236. 
3Ibid. , PP• 70ff • 
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views of Chillingworth and Hooker are reflected in his thought. 1 
In his zeal for liberty of comprehension of truth, Tuckney believes 
Whichcote, though an honest seeker of the truth, to actually cast his 
lot with the Socinians and Arminians who hold the same principle. 
Further, there is the danger that Whichcote's position is most likely 
to harm the "yonge auditors". 2 Divinity students should be so fully 
occupied "seeking to understand revealed truth still hidden, that they 
should desire no sue h liberty". That is, they should have no longing, 
"· •••• for the liberty of opposing, or doubtfully disputing ••••• 
much more without a Cartesian E. rro )C ~ supposing them for errours, 
or not established truths; till I come de novo without anie 
prepossession of them~ shall study and reason my selfe into a 
beliefe of them ••••• " 
Whichcote assures Tuckney that it is with the many divisions 
among Christians in mind tha't he offers reason as a religious 
authority and as the :principle of the "liberty of interpretation". 
1~., pp.79f. Cf. Supra, Ch.II. 
2Ibid., p.85. Cf. Ibid., p.94. 
3Ibid., pp.86f. If Whichcote were under the full impact of the 
thought of Descartes, especially his concept of "initial doubt" perhaps 
,Tuckney's fears would be justified. However, there is insufficient 
evidence to take Tuckney seriously here. Even Henry More~who 
corresponded with Descartes and who was at first an enthusiastic 
disciple of the Frenchman, soon discovered the disharmony between the 
fundamental presuppositions of Descartes and those of the movement to 
which he and Whichcote belonged. Thus it appears that here as at many 
other points, Tuck:ney uses the method of over-statement to attempt to 
bring his former pupil back to the Puritan fold. This is my view 
notwithstanding De Pauley's attempt to quote iaolated passages from 
Whichcote's writings to establish a direct and significant connection 
between Whichcote and Descartes. See De Pauley, op. cit., pp.4ff. 
Cf. Descartes, Discourse on Method,{4th ed~, 1~70, Pt.III, pp.65ff. 
See also Supra, Ch.II. 
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He believes that truths of "high importance" are of clearest "evidence 
and assurance" - knowable. 1 There is no opposition between the 
rational and the spiritual; for the spiritual is most rational. 
However, there is a distinction between the rational and the 
"conceited, impotent, af:rected canting" that makes no impression upon 
the understanding nor the inner life. So that the real threat to 
faith, es Which.cote sees it, is not reason but passion end excess 
enthusiasm in religion, since where the Spirit is truly present, 
there is the highest and purest reason to "satisfie, convince, command 
the minde". The Spirit is present when things are most clearly 
understood. In the Bible, the prophets and apostles as well as our 
Lord, present their message rationally, so that matters of "pure 
revelation" are also rational. Only reason reaches the mind and 
that does not afrect and command the heart, "which does not satisfy 
and con vine e the mind". To admit reason its proper role under the 
guidance of God's Spirit is not to deny God. On the contrary, to 
nullify man would be to dishonour Goa. 2 Whichcote asserts that true 
faith may be known by our best use of reason. Arthur E. Murphy has 
put this view in a modern context: 
"What we need now ••••. is the wisdom to find a 1·ai th that 
can maintain itself in practice and in the open, as the spokesman 
for a good that is in fact what it purports to be and can perform 
what it promises, and what its disciples profess. For the 




powers, those of rational discrimination and comprehensive 
understanding not least among them. While, therefore, we 
shall welcome any aid that faith can bring to reason, we 
shall have to ask1tbat faith to identify itself and present its credentials." 
Whichcote makes it clear that he is as much concerned about peace 
among Christians as Tuckney could possibly be and he believes this 
principle or liberty of interpretation is the only means to arrest 
the growth of religious sects so prevalent. Recently, Paul Tillich 
has agreed with Whic~ote in substance as he insists that no foundation 
will last unless the existential reason bas sincerely seen and 
surrendered to all available knowledge. 
"If rational truth, with its contributions to the different 
realms of lmowledge, is excluded,
2
Christian faith necessarily 
becomes sectarian and exclusive." 
On the other hand, Whichcote believes that the use of Scripture 
alone as a religious authority encourages religious intolerance. 
Matters of faith are clearly stated in Scripture, but the problem 
arises because some try to "determine beyond Scripture" and then 
impose their conclusions on others. These have "enlarged Di vini tie" 
but have "lessened Chari tie, and multi plied Divisions". Thus it is 
·for God to maintain truth, and for us to preserve charity. 3 
1Murpby The Use of Reason, p.12 (quoted by Ferre, Faith and 
Reason, p. 23 ). 
2Tillich, The Christian Answer, p.33 (quoted by Ferre, Ibid., p.206. ). 
3Letters, p.118. Whichcote has taken the oi':fensi ve at this point 
and he is a1armingly close to the real facts concerning Tuckney's part 
in the Westminster Assembly, the :formulation of its Confession and its 
attempt to impose conformity upon others. Elsewhere in the controversy 
Tuckney bad apparently anticipated this attack by stating that he voted 
against "tendering" the Covenant. Cf. Ibid. , p. 76. 
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" ••••• Persons valuable for their love and des ire of truth, 
differing from us, generallie meane better than our prejudice, 
occasioned upon this difference, admits us to conceeve them; 
for I make account, that Scripture is so cleare and satisfactorie, 
in matters of weight ••••• that none but they, who unworthie practise 
and design upon truth; can be mistaken: and these in religion 
are not considerable; as being under the power of' it, but serving 
ends: but, sure enough where the love of truth rules in the hearte, 
the Light of truth will guide the minde. I believe it is not to 
be found in Scripture, or otherwise, that honestie, uprightness, 
integritie, are in conjunction with haeresie: and the Scripture 
way is, to rectifie simple misapprehensions with tenderness. 
Indeed that principle, of Scripture's perfection sufficiencie and 
perspicuitie, inclines me to think, that they, who fUllie come 
up to Scripture: and set themselves with ingenuitie to find out 
the sense; seeking to God, to guide them; being not under the 
power 01· any lust, or corruption, or worldlie interest; will not 
substantiallie differ, in their resolved judgments about verie 
materiall things; as you seem to suppose."1 
It is obvious that Whichcote is reacting, et once against the 
dogmatism of Puritan scripturalism and the intolerance which followed 
in its wake, and against the sectarianism resulting f'rom excessive 
enthusiasm in religion. By asserting reason as a religious authority 
Blfd by exalting the principle of "liberty of interpretation" he 
believed both of these unwholesome tendencies could be checked. While 
Tuckney appears more moderate than many of the Westminster divines, 
both in the spirit or his discussion with Whichcote and his reluctance 
to force his views on others, be nevertheless was much closer to the 
principle of the Reformers, sola scriEtura - sola gratia and was 
convinced that his 1·riend and 1·ormer pupil was headed for great danger. 
It is not for us to pronounce either man as being right or wrong, but 
to use history as a standard of judgment is instructive. Within the 
1rbid. , p. 119; Cf. Whic hco te, WorkS, IV, 340. 
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historical setting of seventeenth century England, the progress of the 
immediate future belonged to Whichcote's view. Whichcote's thought 
and that or his disciples accelerated the growth of toleration in 
Church and State. On the other hand, when we go into the eighteenth 
century, the Age of Reason, it is obvious that this tendency toward 
a moral, rational and liberal approach to religious comprehension 
gets out of control. This rationalism which Whichcote attempts to 
root securely in Scripture and to use as the receiver of revelation, 
loses its balance and separates itself i'rom the source that gives it 
life. But consequences and ideas always have a tendency to change 
as they move through time and for this reason the rationalism of the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries does not invalidate the original 
intention of Whichcote. He bad clearly left the door open for further 
developments of thought, and to any illumination of reason by means of 
revelation. For him reason may point beyond itselr, that is to say, 
truth may go beyond right reason even while using it as fully as 
possible both critically and creatively. 1 
The final issue in the controversy which we propose to treat 
concerns reconciliation. According to Tuckney, Whichcote bad proposed 
the notion of "inherent" righteousness instead of the Puritan notion 
of "imputed" righteousness. Vlhichcote had asserted "that Christ does 
not save us, by only doing 1·or us, without us". There must be 
repentance before forgiveness of sins. Christ is to be acknowledged 
1 "' Ferre, op. cit., pp.22ff. 
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as a principle of grace in us as well as an Advocate for us. 
According to Whichcote, Scripture presents Christ to us under a 
two-fold notion: t1) He is to be felt in us, as the new man in 
contradiction to the old man; as a divine nature to replace the 
degenerate and apostate nature; and as .a principle of heavenly life 
contrary to the life of sin: t2) He is to be believed by us, as a 
sacrifice for the expiation and atonement for sin; as an Advocate 
and means of reconciliation between God and men. Christ performs 
both of these offices at once, for reconciliation between God and 
man involves both. 
becoming god-like. 
There can be no reconciliation without our 
God is supreme good and before we become reconciled 
to Him, we must surrender to the rules of goodness. God is pleased 
only in so far as goodness takes place in us. Whichcote makes it 
clear that he does not oppose ".free grace" but wishes to take 
precautions against those who would turn the grace of God into 
wantonness. The true notion of salvation is a Saviour to give 
repentance and forgiveness. Some look.upon salvation "as a thing 
at a distance from them ••••• exemption from punishment; freedom from 
enemies abroad; but it is the mending of our natures, the sat·ety of 
our persons, our health and strength within". There is in this view 
no attempt to leave out the Author of our salvation. "Our good 
state and condition with God; the work of grace and ravour towards 
us; our being restored to righteousness, goodness and truth, all 
indicate our reconciliation to God by Christ and that the Kingdom 
Of God is within us. ul 
1Letters, pp.13-16; Cr. "Reflections", Loe. cit. 
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Whicbcote's view of reconciliation appears unsatisractory to 
Tuclmey. The former bas denied Christ's working upon God in our 
reconciliation. Whichcote had asserted "that Christ is held out 
to us in the Gospel as first felt in us, as the new man; before 
he is believed on by us, as sacrifice and advocate". Tuckney 
asks, does this mean that When God works we are aware of what He 
brings to pass in us, before we are brought to the assurance of 
our peace and pardon by the work of the Spirit? Does Whichcote 
mean by belief, faith's reliance and dependence upon Christ's 
mercy? 11· he implies the latter meaning, Tuckney would agree 
that many sinners have believed in Christ as a sacririce and 
advocate before they have felt the new man in themselves. 
Certainly repentance is before forgiveness. But it is necessary 
to add "that God, not only in His eternal election has before 
purposed, and by the death of His Son after, purchased our reconciliation: 
but even in the execution of that purpose, and the application of that 
purpose, He is before us; and is setting out first that happier 
meeting of our fuller reconciliation". It is not contrary to God's 
goodness, "freely to justify the ungodly". 1 
Tuckney wishes to know the source of Whichcote' s notion "that 
God's work within us precedes his work about us". 2 Was it from a 
pagan source? Tuckney would admit that there are some "excellent 
and divine expressions" in "Plato and his scholars", but cautions 
1Ibid., pp.32ff. 2Ibid. , pp. 34f. 
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against too much admiration 1·or Plato. 1 Whicbcote bad gone too 
f'ar in advancing the "power of nature in morals" and had given 
reason too much authority in the "mysteries" of 1·aith. Whichcote 
seldom mentioned heart and will. The "decrees of God" were 
questioned because they could not be comprehended by reason •• Thus 
Vfhichcote had even considered some philosophers and heathen "fairer 
candidates of heaven than the scriptures seeme to allowe" and because 
of their virtues had preferred them before Christians, who were 
overtaken with weaknesses. According to Tuckney, this is a kind of 
"moral divinity" with only a little of Christ added. It is "a 
Platonic faith which unites to God - an inherent righteousness which 
takes no account of imputed righteousness". As a result God and 
2 Christ become only a "notion and speculation". 
Whichcote replies that truth declared by God, concerning our 
relief by Christ is "amiable, grateful and acceptable to mind and 
understanding"~ the truth of salvation is satisfactory to the mind; 
the Holy Spirit contributes to the mind's assurance and satisraction; 
the Christian religion is received in a way of illumination, a!'fection 
4 
and choice. Thus bis emphasis upon reason merely strengthens his 
1Ibid.' p.38. 
2Ibid., pp.38f. Tuckney accuses Whichcote of uttering Latin 
sentences-and axioms in logic, philosophy, law and divinity of his 
own making. Cf. Ibid., pp.35, 96. 
3Ibid. , "PP• 47f. 
4Ibid., p.49. 
111. 
belief in the saving work of' God in Christ. The beginnings of 
grace are wrought in us berore God actually justifies sinners. He 
never leaves God out of bis scheme and always gives him his principle 
place. God is his all and there is nothing more real in his 
experience than his dependence upon God. Christ enables us to 
repent, but repentance is truly an act. God does not repent in us, 
but works repentance in us. 1 
Tuclmey is still unsatisfied concerning Whicbcote' s exaltation 
of the philosophers. Philosophers are seldom mentioned in the 
Scripture as the "wise men of the heathen" or "with approbation and 
honour", but generally with "dislike and contempt". ~rheref ore we 
should follow the scriptural pattern and speak more of' their "darlmess, 
ignorance and their refusal to come to Christ" than in "admiration 
of' their advancement, knowledge and virtue, which at best were but 
dim and dead, while not enlightened and enlivened" by Christ. 
Wbichcote had insisted that they were good as far as they bad gone, 
but Tuckney considered the few he bad read as uscattering a great 
deale of what is bad, with what is good in tbemu. Further, Wbichcote 
felt that they were "never enemies of' the truth of t be gospel". 
Tuclmey replies that the earl:y Christian found them "amongst the chief 
and most subtle enemies they had to resist". 2 Our Saviour did not 
come to destroy the moral law; and therefore he could not be against 
moral duties. His stress upon inward grace and outward obedience was 
1rbid., pp.57ff. 2Ibid. , pp. 92f. 
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great, but it all comes by free justification and by the imputation 
of Christ's righteousness rather than by an_y inherent righteousness 
and holiness. He that has faith working by love cannot but join love 
with faith; but love cannot be above faith in this life, this can 
happen only in the next world. Faith is above reason,and is the 
condition of the covenant of grace. Tuckney would lay stress upon 
the impotency of nature rather than its strength. 1 
Whichcote answers that God consults not with us, but with His 
own wisdom and goodness for the remedy of our sins: "yet God 
proposeth, with respect to our understandings, viz. what they can 
receive and are able to bear. What he proposes, viz. expiation of 
sin, in the blood of Christ and our reformation by Him into his 
divine spirit a~e things grateful to the mind and expected by the 
mind 11 • 2 He is convinced and clear concerning our acceptance by God, 
in and through Christ. He is surprised that Tuclmey should balance 
knowledge against goodness; that he should insist upon Christ less 
as a principle of divine nature in us than as a sacrifice for us. It 
is easy to say that Christ died for one. 11 Self-flattery 11 may say this 
as well as faith. The greatest sinner can say this even if his whole 
self rises up against self-surrender to the will of God and the 
"transformation of himself into the spirit, image and nature of Christ". 
And :rurther, "there is no real affirmation unless confirmed by the 
transformation of life". 
3 If Christ be "more known and freely 
1Ibid. , PP• 95ff. 
2
rb id. , pp. 104f. 
3
Ibid. , pp.123f. 
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professed, let him also be inwardly felt, and secretly understood as 
a princi~le of divine life within us, as well as a Saviour without 
us". 1 Whichcote sums up his position as follows: 
"I am verie free to aclmowledge Christ, the onlie 
foundation; since the apostasie and sinne of man: Hee 
alone gave the stoppe to God's just displeasure; His 
interposing prevayled with God, not to take the forfeiture; 
or, if taken, Hee procured the restauration arrl recoverie. 
Upon this account I acknowledge Christ, in parts of nature, 
reason and understanding; as well as in gifts of grace; 
so that Christ is not by mee anie where left out, nor faith 
neglected; no, nor not advanced to Superioritie and super-
eminencie everie where; for I beleeve that I hold and 
enjoy my reason and understanding, by and under Christ. 
And what I have meant expressed and endeavoured all along, 
hath bin; to call men to the due and carefull use, employ-
ment and improvement of what they hold by and under Christ •••• 
I attribute to the creature, upon itt's own accounte, nothing 
but unworthiness, inabilitie and insufriciencie; and look-at 
Christ, as the onlie ground of acceptance; and his spirit, as 
the onlie principle of enoblement, power and sufficiencie." 2 
Because of the fundamental importance of the difference between 
Whichcote and Tuckney, we feel that we have been justified in this 
prolonged discussion of this aspect of the controversy. We have 
seen how the previous points of difference have entered into the way 
they view reconciliation. Whichcote, who from the outset, has given 
signal importance to human reason in the comprehension of truth, has 
here stressed the responsibility of man both in the beginning of the 
saving process and its continuation - by repentance and holy living. 
1Ibid., p.125. Cf. Works, I, 69f.; Ibid., III, 282, where 
Whichcote seeks to justify his views on ReCOii'Ciliation and his 
preaching a "moral gospel". 
2Ibid. , pp.126f. 
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On the other hand, Tuckney, who from the outset set forth the basic 
principle of sola scriptura, has in his concept of reconciliation 
added the logical corollary to the former principle, viz., sola gratia. 
The differences between these two men as we indicated at the outset 
of the discussion stem directly from tte Renaissance-Reformation 
period. Whichcote, being greatly influenced by the Renaissance 
doctrine of the dignity of man and its corollary the exaltation of 
human reason, has made this influence felt throughout all his thought. 
Tuclmey, on the other hand, derives his direct inspiration from 
the thought of the Reformers and more specifically, as interpreted 
by the Puritan Party of his day. This does not by any means deny the 
possibility of Whichcote being influenced by the Reformation or 
Tuckney by the Renaissance, but these observations seem to indicate the 
dominant influence in each case. We believe this explains both the 
agreements and differences between these two men as the controversy 
proceeds. Both men acknowledge reason and scripture as having 
importance, and in their controversy over reconciliation, both 
recognise the need for "free grace" and holy living, and both desire 
peace in Christendom. The difference in each instance is either in 
emphasis or approach • Between Tuckney and Whichcote we have what 
. Collingwood conveniently describes as "a distinction without a 
difference", or a difference of "degree" rather than "kind". 1 And 
1collingwood, Philosophical Method, p.50. Milton is a good example 
of a Puritan who believed firmly in the Puritan doctrine of Scripture, 
but whose concept of reason was almost identical with tbat of Whichcote. 
It is obvious that he had, more than is true in the case of Tuclmey, 
taken seriously the Renaissance doctrine of man and its corollary the 
centrality of reason in the comprehension of truth. This tendency in 
Mil ton is evident alike in his poetic and prose VfOrks ,· i.e. Paradise 
Lost and De Doctrina Christiana. Cf. Haller, The Rise of Puritanism, 
pp.308f., 334. 
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though their points of view were too far apart, on what they 
considered as fUndamentals, to compromise - yet these conclusions 
1 
help us to understand the spirit underlying their disagreements. 
The fourth letter of each man is a valuable index to the 
character of the two men. Tuckney writes: 
"In the bodie or your after-discourse, in some things 
I find you immoveable; you being, as you write, under the 
power of them; and therefore, itt would bee in vayne, as 
to them, for me to move anie farther; itt is enough, that 
I have faithfullie expressed myself about them."2 
And Whichcote replies: 
" •.••• I cannot practise upon my judgment; nor use anie 
force to command my understanding into other apprehensions, 
in the matter debated betwixt us; than I have expressed to 
you ••••• Wherefore if in this poynte of discerning, we differ; 
there is no helpe for it; we must forbear one another: and 
nothing is to be done, unless so farre mutualie to value 
each other's judgments; as to think that from such differ-
ence there is occasion given to each of us to examine our 
. . t "3 own sp1r1 s ••••• 
The basic principles 01· Puritanism, namely, the supreme authority 
of Scripture and the doctrine of Predestination, are under attack by 
Whichcote. Tuckney represents a group of Puri tans who consider the 
position of Whichcote a threat to the very foundations of their view 
point. Indeed, the "germ" of a new movement is contained in Whichcote's 
position. And though Tuclmey appears to "agree to differ" and to 
1The friendship between Whichcote and Tuclmey continues after this 
controversy, as we observe from their work together at Cambridge. Cf. 
Supra, Ch. I. 
2Letters, pp.131f. 
3Ibid. , pp. 132f • 
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close the correspondence with unusual understanding, the next year, 
4th July, 1652, his Commencement Sermon is obviously in remembrance 
of his controversy with Whic-mote. Tuclarey says: 
" ••••• Salvation is only by Christ, therefore in all matters of 
salvation, with a single eye let us look to Christ and to God 
in him, as Elected in him, Redeemed by him, Justified by his 
grace, and the imputation of his righteousness, in which is 
the ground of comfort, and sanctified by his spirit, not by a 
philosophical faith; or tte use of right Reason, or a virtuous 
morality, too much now-a-days admired and cried up. As of old, 
the Temple or the Lord, the Temple of the Lord. So now, the 
Candle of the Lord, the Candle of the Lord. I would not have 
that Candle put out, I would have it snuffed and improved as a 
handmaid to faith, but not so (as when the Candle is set up) to 
shut the window, either wholly to keep out, or in the least to 
darken the Sunshine, as it is with men's eyes, who can read 
better by a candle in the night, than by day-light ••••• Whatever 
Nature and Morality may be to others, yet to us let Christ be 
all in all. Nor let us be Deists, but Christians; let us not 
take up in such a Religion, as a Jew, or Turk, or Pagan, in a 
way of Nature and Reason only ma.y rise up unto, but let us indeed 
be wha.t we are called Christians, Christians ••..• Not a philosophical 
dull :Morality, but the Law of the Spirit of life, which is in 
Christ Jesus ••••• not that Candle light, but the Sun of righteous-
ness, that will guide our feet into the way of peace."1 
The remainder of this study may be considered as Whichc ote' s 
answer and his justification for his departure from the rigid 
doctrinalism of Puritanism. 
1Tuckney, None But Christ, pp.50f. According to Haller, 
Calvinism ran counter to humanism and mysticism. It ran counter to 
the Renaissance Neo-Platonic idealism and to the rationalism promoted 
by the knowledge of ancient philosophy, literature and history. See 
Haller, op. cit., p.194. It is wise, however, to bear in mind the 
difference between Calvin and Calvinism (esp. Puritanism). Brunner 
obser1ves that there is a "platonic" element in Calvin's thought and even 
in Barth's Epistle to the Romans. See Brunner, op. cit., pp.34f. Thus 
Platonism has a tendency to be reflected in the most unexpected places. 
CHAPTER FOUR 
RELIGION OF FIRST-INSCRIPTION (i) 
"The Reason of Man is the Candle of the Lord 11 
As we begin our discussion of Whichcote's view of natural 
! 
religion, we must remember that for him natural religion is subsumed 
under the more comprehensive notion of revealed religion. The 
"light of the creation" is preparatory to a "fU.ller" light and the 
latter is in a real sense the fulfilment and consummation of the 
former. Thus our separation of the two concepts is primarily for 
convenience of discussion. This fact will become increasingly 
evident as we proceed with our study. 
It is not easy to fix upon a precise meaning for the term 
"reason" as Whichcote employs it. It would appear that he makes it 
include both the mental processes by means of which we arrive at a 
conclusion, a·nd also the insight we possess into self-evident 
principles which condition these processes. It seems to stand, too, 
for our capacity to acknowledge God, the source and sustainer of all 
that is good and beautif\11 and true. Furthermore, reason appropriates 
these values and incorporates them within the soul in such wise that 
they form its disposition and become its temper; and so it is the 
governing principle which directs our appetites and controls our 
1 
passions. There is no question, but that for Whichcote reason is 
1ne Pauley, The Candle of the Lord, pp.10f. Cf. A. N. Whitehead, 
The Function of Reason, p.2; Infra, Ch.VI. 
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the highest and noblest of our faculties 1 - the faculty which marks 
us off from all other created beings as personal, and fits us to 
enter into fellowship with God. 
Reason is the best instrument we have to work with; it is 
2 uniform and the reason in one man speaks to the reason in another. 
It is a law which none may transgress; for it is used by God in His 
communications with men. It discovers the natural and receives the 
3 
supernatural. Reason is the perfection of our souls as well as 
the law and rule of men's minds. To go against reason is to go 
against God, while to follow reason is the same as to obey God. God 
is the highest Intelligence and reason is His voice, and the principle 
4 
by which He governs the world. Reason is the only rule in natural 
knowledge and it is the foundation of nature. 5 Whichcote concludes 
that nothing without reason is to be proposed and nothing against it 
6 
is to be believed. The concept of reason is central to all 
Whichcote bas to say. 
There is one aspect of reason, however, to which Whichcote 
repeatedly draws our attention, namely, that reason is not a self-
~Vhichcote, Works, IV, 286. Will be usually quoted by volume 
and page except where more detail is necessary. Cf. Pascal, Pensees 
(Stewart), "Apology", Pens. , 157ff. See also, Richard Baxter, The 
Reasons of the Christian Religion (1667), p.4. The entire first part 
of this work dealing with natural theology may be compared favourably 
with Whichcote's views on this subject. 
2 Aphs. 459, 1191. 
5Aphs. 778, 1021. 
3Ibid., 99. 




sufficient endowment equipped either by God or by nature to fUlfil 
its own functions. It has been adapted to work with God and in 
harmony with Him to reflect His mind. Reason, in so far as it 
speaks true, is the voice of God speaking within the human soul; 
and contrariwise, it is man's witness that what God says is good and 
true. 1 Thus "reason" is the "candle of the Lord, lighted by God 
and lighting unto God". 2 
"Divine truth allwaies carries it's own light and evidence; 
so as that the mind receiving itt is illuminated, edified, 
satisfied ••••• It speaks for itt selfe, it recommendes itt selfe 
to its owne enterteinment, by it's owne excellencie. I adde 
1 III, 163. 
2 
Prov.20:27. So important is this text as the basis of 
Cambridge Platonism that it deserves special attention. Oesterley 
gives a good commentary on the passage when he says: "This verse 
seems to have got here by mistake as vv.26,28 clearly belong 
together:. 'The spirit of man'• The Hebr. has 'breath' of man 
( i1 r.J 1JI } ) which is not elsewhere used as synonymous with 'spirit'; 
it i~ therefore possible that the emendation 'Jahweb preserveth tbe 
breath of man' l I -1 ·J 'preserveth' for -, J 'lamp') suggested by 
some commentators, fs justified. On the other hand, the second line 
suggests the text as it stands; and in this case we must understand 
'breath' as equivalent to 'spirit'. The meaning then presumably is 
that man's spirit is utilized by God, as a means for discerning his 
innermost thoughts, but, if so, the thought is unparalleled in the 
Old Testament, and quite out of harmony with such a passage as xxiv. 12. 
It is, however, worth considering whether the Hebrew sage bad not been 
influenced here by an Egyptian conception; the idea that some part 
of the human body is identical with part of a god and must therefore 
be used in accordance with the will of the deity, occurs in the 
'Teaching of Amen-em-ope', XV, xvii. 7: 
'The beak of Ibis is the finger of the scribe.' 
It is possible that the Hebrew sage made use of this idea and 
adonted it in a more spiritual direction." See, Proverbs, p.174. 
Though Oesterley's interpretation seems to accord with Whicbcote's 
meaning, it would be unjustifiable to claim for our author such a 
profound and critical analysis of the verse. What seems most 
probable is that this verse agreed with his preconceptions. Cf. 
Brunner, Natural Theology, p.31. 
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allsoe, that the persuasion of the holie spirit contributes to 
the minde's assurance and satisfaction."1 
The proper employment of intellectual raculties is to seek God. 2 
The nnind i·s the f'aculty by h" h wiic man is capable of God, and unless a 
man brings his reason with him, he cannot receive the principles of 
1
. . 3 re 1g1on. A man is by no means confirmed in religion until his 
religion and reason are one. If this union is proper, when he thinks 
he speaks reason, he speaks religion; or when he thinks be speaks 
1 . . 4 re 1g1ously, he speaks reasonably. 
"In the state of religion, spirituals and naturals join and 
mingle in their subjects; so that if a man be once in a true 
state of religion, he cannot distinguish between religion and the 
reason of his mind; so that his religion is the reason of his 
mind and the reason or his mind is his religion ••••• The products 
of reason and religion are the same, in a person that is truly 
religious; his reason is sanctified by his religion, and his 
religion helps and makes use of his reason: so that in the 
subject it is but one thing; you may call it, if you will, 
religious reason, and the reason made religious; they are not 
divided or separated; but the union is more intimate and near, 
as the principles are more immaterial and spiritual; whereas 
gross and material things keep at a distance, because of the 
impossibility of penetration.u5 
Closely associated with the relation of reason and religion is 
Whichcote' s treatment of natural truth, or truth of tlfirst-inscription". 
Such truth is "connatural" to man, for the lmowledge of truth is drawn 




5rbid., p.147. It was upon the principle of the "impenetrability" 
of matter and other related concepts that Henry :More offered to challenge 
Descartes in his correspondence with the Frenchman. Cf. Immortality of 
the Soul, I, iii, v. passim. 
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out of us, not brought in to us. There are "common notions"l or 
"notions of truth", which light up and adorn the mind. These 
truths are knowable, necessary and immutable in their nature and 
quali ty
3
, they are the first "emanation"4 of divine truth in the 
moment of creation as the candle which God lights in man. 5 Truth 
comes to us by way of descent6 , as a "ray" or "beam" from God. 7 
Truth is akin to man's soul and speaks the same language and it is 
so near to the soul that it is the soul's image or form. Just as 
the soul is derived from God, even so truth comes from Him by 
communication. 
soul and truth. 8 
This explains the proper relationship between the 
At first gls.nce it may appear that truth for Whichcote is some-
what subjective, that truth is subjectivity - to use the phrase made 
famous by Kierkegaard. 9 This tendency toward solipsism is foreign 
1 II, 13. 
2III, 215. Here we are reminded, at once, of Flatonic 
"recollection" an~ the "common notions" of Lord Herbert of Cherbury. 
3 
Ibid. , p. 20. 
4rt is characteristic of \V'hichcote to use Nee-Platonic words 
and phrases. 
5rrr, 29. 6Ibid., p.20. 7Ibid., pp.54f. 
8rbid. , p.15. When Whichcote sneaks here of truth as an old 
friend and "ancient" acquaintance of the soul, we are again reminded 
of Plstonic "recollection". 
9The present writer is not here proposing to define the phrase 
es Kierkegaard uses it. 
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to Whichcote, who believes truths to have objective reality answerable 
to the idea of them in the divine mind. When these truths are 
grasped by the mind, the mind is acting according to its true nature; 
for God created the mind to comprehend reality. Truth belongs to 
those things which have eternal and immutable existence prior to the 
mind's apprehension of them and the mind's apprehension of them 
properly agrees with their objective reality.1 
Cudworth's commentary at this point is so important that we 
consider it justifiable to present the substance of it here. He 
asserts that either understanding may be looked upon as a tabula rasa 
or it may have certain intelligible forms by which things are under-
stood and known. The former theory is impossible, for how can the 
understanding being given a single individual image, connect this with 
others as cause or effect, or regard it as possible or impossible, when 
these ideas cannot be given by sense? 2 The latter theory is true, 
viz., that such (vo11~ a, ra.. ) are implanted upon the mind as "anticipations" 
or (rrp0 A.ny;t.c<;); not, indeed, actually present, but always potential, 
ready to fit any sense - presentation with its notional unity, and 
thereby give this composite object its true place in our objective 
experience. 3 If knowledge is possible, there must be something 
permanent and immutable, else the mind could have naught to fix itself 
1 III, 370ff. 
2cua worth, Eternal and Immutable Morality { 17 31), Bk. IV, Ch. I, 
Sec. s. 
3Ibid., Bk.IV, Ch.II, Sec.1. 
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upon and all communication between men would be impossible. The 
immutable must lie in the fitting of the (vo1(A.<..Z T!l-) to the 
contributions of sense. The re fore, the (vortaa. ni.. ) themsel vea are 
immutable. 'rhough the (vo114tarA.) and essences of things exist in 
the mind, they are at the same time independent of any created mind 
and have a constant and never-failing entity of their own, i.e. 
in the mind of God. Since these (vo11'.4'a. 74-) are modifications of 
mind, and at the same time eternal and independent Of our minds, there 
must be some eternal mind existing, as it were, to contain the ideas. 
These essences of things must be either substances or modifications 
of substances. They are not substances, because they are "true of 
1 
something", which something thus acts as their substance , and for 
this reason they are modes. But all modes are of matter or of mind. 
They cannot be modes of matter, because matter is mutable, while ideas 
are immutable. Therefore they are modes of mind; but they are 
2 eternal, theref'ore they must be the modes of Eternal Mind, viz., God. 
This discussion is important not only because it indicates Cudworth's 
attempt to clarify the nature of truth and its comprehension as 
grasped by Whichcote, but it is also considered by Cudworth as the 
"first proof" of the existence of God. 
It is interesting that Cudworth's argument arrives at approximately 
1Ibid., Cb.IV, Sec.9. 
2
Ibid., Ch.II, Sec.12, 13. Cf. More, Theological Works, (1768), 
pp.765ff-:; Smith, Select Discourses, (185~), pp.1ff. 
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the same conclusion as Whichcote. 1 This fact may be explained, 
it seems to me, by the 1·act that the two men have the same fUndamental 
presuppositions, but different purposes. Cudworth is here concerned 
with epistemology, ethics is secondary ,for him at this point, and 
this treatise was for him merely a prolegomena for a projected work 
in ethics which never appeared. On the other hand, W'hichcote with 
the same presuppositions and basic conclusions, loses sight of 
epistemological subtleties in pursuit of his ethical purpose and at 
the summit of his vision of virtue, truth and beauty unite. 
Whichcote says: 
'trhe understanding, as it comes into the world ••••• is as 
rasa t8bula, or a 'white sheet or paper', whereon nothing is 
writ; but when it doth receive notions of truth, it is then 
beautified ••••• Such is the understanding when it is illuminated: 
truth, it is glory, light and beauty to the soul to shine and 
to appear fair and beautifUl ••••• But on the contrary, as one 
shut up in a dungeon of darkness ••••• so is one who is i~ a. 
state 01· ignorance, or bGJt h his mind depraved by vice." 
Truth is universal, and there is a remarkable agreement between 
divine truth and the ideals set up by non-Christian religions and 
their ethical systems. Whichcote adds that in their ethical ideals 
not only are we unable to speak beyond them but many adherents to 
these ideals act so well as to shame those who only profess to live 
by the :fuller revelation in Christ. 3 
~·rmchcote, II, 4. 
2 III, 215. 
If the objection be offered 
3Ibid., p. 30. Whichcote has in mind non-Christians who live up 
to the light they have. 
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that many non-Christians fail to live up to such a high standard, 
Whichcote would answer by limiting what he means by universal 
acknowledgement. Universal acknowledgement as he employs it, does 
not depend upon universal acceptance, but upon the affinity it holds, 
with the universal reason of mankind. The claim he would make for 
universal reason is that men, "improved in their intellectuals, and 
refined in their morals hold certain common notions on the ground 
of reason". It follows that truths of first-inscription are tully 
agreed upon by all persons that have lived up to their true nature, 
1 and this for Whichcote amounts to universal acknowledgement. 
Whicbcote justifies this claim for natural light upon passages 
from the first stages of St. Paul's argument in Romans. Here is to 
be found the locus classicus of natural religion. It declares that 
God speaks to man's conscience, and makes him to perceive His 
invisible things through the things that are made; and that all who 
live contrary to reason are without excuse. Of certain verses in 
chapters i and ii, Whichcote says that they "have forced upon me all 
those notions I do entertain, or have publically delivered; concerning 
natural light, or the use of reason. 112 
The question concerning the validity of non-Christian religions 
arose in response to Whichcote' s view of natural truth. ·3 For instance, 
1Ibid., pp.31-35. 
2Letters, p.9. Cf. Rom.1:18-21, 28, 31; 2:14. 
3 . 
Cf. Tuclmey, None But Christ, (1654), pp.50ff. 
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what about. the validity of the Islamic faith? According to Whichcote, 
Mohammed bases his faith on "gentilism" and Judaism, but his additions 
are contemptible to sober reason as well as contrary to his extractions 
from the Old Testament. He may easily be detected as an imposter, 
for apart from what he borrowed from the Bible, the remainder opposes 
reason. When God bears witness to a religion, it is reasonable. 
Further, God only reveals truth in a way of purity and holiness, and 
never in agreement with immorality and irrationality. By these 
standards, history has condemned I:fohammed, who, even in his own life-
time, became immoral. The only valid representation of divine truth 
is that which satisfies reason and acquaints us with the nature of 
1 God. 
There is for Whichcote an unbroken transition from natural truth 
to revealed truth, the latter being actually an "addition" to the 
former. Revelation is "grafted on" this natural foundation, and the 
former is in a real sense, preparatory, and a necessary prerequisite 
for the latter and fuller revelation of God in Scripture, and more 
specifically in Christ. 2 This intensifies the importance of 
Whichcote's assertion that the several truths hang together by mutual 
dependence and lead one to the other. 
1whichcote, III, 36, 40. It is interesting that Whichcote and 
his followers use the same ideas to attack Romanism and the fanatic 
Sectaries within Christendom as he uses here against Islam. Cf. 
Baxter, op. cit., pp.198ff. 
2Infra, Ch.VI. Here we devote a section to a treatment of the 
relation of natural and revealed truth. 
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"By truth already received, we have a double advantage 
for receiving more ••••• The way to understanding which was 
obstructed is opened ••••• The mind is brought into disposition 
and preparation to receive all di vine truth. 11 1 
Whichcote was very sensitive to the atheistic tendencies of his 
time. 2 For him, atheism is the most unaccountable of all things 
since the existence of God is so self-evident, while atheism is so 
3 
irrational. This is where Cudworth's approach to the same subject 
varies from Whichcote's, for to Cudworth atheism requires polemical 
disputation. Thus Cudworth devotes the first book of his most 
celebrated work, The True Intellectual System of the Universe, to an 
argument against atheism. The seriousness with which Cudworth viewed 
this problem of atheism is indicated by the fact that he argued 
against atheism more than in favour of theism, and he devotes the 
first three of five chapters of book one to a statement and refutation 
of several atheistic systems as conceived by him. Though he begins 
a more positive approach in the fourth chapter of book one, it is only 
in the fifth and last chapter that he approximates a statement of 
argumentative evidence for the being of God. This essentially 
negative approach of Cudworth may be compared with Whichcote's more 
positive and self-confident assertion that it is the most self-evident 
of all truths, that God is, and that conversely atheism is the most 
unreasonable of all things. 4 
1 2 3 II, 12. I, 65. II, 57. 
4At this point it would not be amiss to say that Whichcote is more 
biblical while Cudworth is more philosophical in the approach to the 
problem. The message of the Bible throughout is that God exists without 
any necessity for rational proor, while the philosophical approach is to 
offer proofs for the existence of deity. The difference here between 
Whichcote and Cudworth seems to be merely one of emphasis. 
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Whichcote's attitude towards atheism does not indicate any 
indifference concerning the fact of atheism or any lack of insight 
into its unwholesome implications. He asserts that a man may be an 
atheist by neglect, the failure to use reason to know God, or by 
1 contempt, the desire for the non-existence of God. To deny God's 
existence is to deny absolute moral distinctions, and to consider all 
moral decisions as relative. In this sense, atheism is a perversion 
2 of human nature since man is made to lmow, love and obey God. 
Further, atheism results in giving first place to temporal things 
3 
instead of subordinating them to spiritual realities. In fact, the 
denial of God is the denial of one's own soul and its immortality, for 
self-denial and atheism are a single attitude. 4 For Whichcote, tbe 
5 
essential being of man as man is identical with bis relation to God. 
Whichcote captures the spirit of Berd7aev who says, "where there is no 
God there is no man". 6 It is consistent with the trend of Wbichcote's 
thought to conclude that when man ceases to be rooted in God, he 
relapses inevitably into the sub-human. 7 Thus Whichcote conceives 
the plight of the atheist as a very serious one. 
"He that affects to be an atheist is no longer at rest than 
God will give him leave; God will be there to awe and command at 
his pleasure, where he is refused as to love and afrection ••••• 
1III, 238ff. 2Ibid., pp.240ff. 3Ibid., pp.276ff. 
4rv, 320. 5cr. Brunner, God and :Man (Eng. tr. ) , p.155. 
6cr. Berdyaev, The End of Our Time (Eng.tr.), p.80. 
7cf. John Baillie, Our Knowledge of God, p.42. 
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No men ever stoo~ more in fear of God, than those that most deny 
and least love him; and so it will be if men do affect to be 
atheists, that so they may live exorbitantly and loosely• there 
is more slavish fear of God in these men ••••• than there !s in 
them that fear, obey and love God. n1 
Since Whichcote assumes a Christian world-view, Weltanschauung, 
for him the existence of God is self-evident. Therefore, his proof 
for the existence of God is in the interest of those who need proof. 
But a man does not need to look beyond himself for such proof since 
a man is himself the best possible evidence of the existence of God. 
The best proof of God's existence is a man's awareness of his self-
activity. Descartes' cogi to ergo sum becomes for Whichcote, "I act, 
therefore I am; I do, therefore I have being". Though the concept 
may have been suggested by Descartes, it is obvious that Descartes 
begins his ontology by self-reflection while Whichcote sets out from 
self-activity. 2 Whichcote presents his argument as follows: If I 
1whichcote, III, 61. Cf. H. More, Antidote Against Atheism (1662) 
and Immortality of the Soul (1662). In both works the author has a 
similar aim, viz., to present the proper notion or spirit, to prove its 
existence and its special nature and qualities. Though More goes to 
extremes in his witness to witcbcrart and apparitions, his intention is 
sound, for he attempts to establish the fact of the existence of God by 
defending the reality of spirit. See also his Explication of the Nature 
of Spirits, etc ••• \1700). 
2Both men base their ontology on personal experience even if it is 
viewed differently. However, Descartes' fundamental proof for the 
existence of God is rooted in his more comprehensive conception of 
initial doubt and uuon his notion of clear end distinct ideas. God as 
a Perfect Being is for Descartes a clear and distinct conception. Cf. 
Anselm, Proslbgion. What Whichcote, Descartes and Anselm have in common 
is an anxiety to satisfy reason and to assert that thought leads by 
logical necessity from their respective presuppositions to the existence 
of God. For criticisms of this general approach to proving the existence 
of God, see Aquinas, Contra Gentiles, i, 11;· Kant, Critique of Pure 
Reason (tr. Kemp Smith), p.505, and Casserley, The Christian in Philosopby, 
pu.60ff. uassim. 
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am, either I made myself, or I was made by another. I did not make 
myself; for if I made myself at ·my ovm will, I could continue myself 
in being during my ovm pleasure and this I know I cannot do. It takes 
less power to continue a thing which has being than to call a thing 
out of nothing, ex nihilo, into being; therefore I was not made by 
myselr, but by Another. And that Other must be neither my equal nor 
my inferior; for I can do more than my inferior and as much as my 
equal. It follows that I was made by a Greater than myself both in 
wisdom and power and this First Independent Being is God. 1 
Though Wbichcote is partially influenced by the negative approach 
to the existence of God as set forth by many Christien Platonists 
2 
before his time , bis emphasis is more positive. God's existence 
is attested by universal reason and even if He cannot be comprehended 
in essence, yet He is universally knovm by His moral perfections and 
providence. Thus what our author implies by knowledge of God involves 
likewise support for his assertion that God exists. 
The roots of .God are in the soul and by sheer force of mind one 
knows that God made the world and governs it. The first knowledge 
is that God exists. If God did not make us to know that He is, then 
He cannot judge us nor make demands upon us. We are not merely 
1Ibid., pp.241f. Cf. Arist. Meta, xii; Baxter, op. cit., p.32. 
2E.i. Aug. Trin. viii, 3, 2. Casserley asserts that the Christian 
is committed to two ways o:t' conceiving God: (a) a biblical way of 
affirmation, and (b) a philosophical way of negation which keeps us 
aware that the glory of God exceeds even His self-disclosure in Christ. 
op. cit., pp.36ff. 
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taught to know God, but we a.re made to lmow Him, or we could never 
know Him. There is no basis for divine faith save divine authority. 
It is for this reason that we are not capable of 1'aith unless we know 
that God is. His existence must precede faith, and without natural 
1 
Imowledge of God, faith is impossible. Thus with the author of the 
Boole of Hebrews Whichcote agrees, "he that comes to God must believe 
h t He . " 2 t a is • 
When Whichcote reasons from the "effects" in the natural world 
and in the moral experience of man to the God behind them, we are 
reminded of the Prime Mover of Aristotle 3 and the cosmological proofs 
for the existence of God set forth by Aquinas. 4 In each case, the 
argument is from phenomena in the world to a Cause behind things 
outside of the world. However, Whichcote argues from the incompre-
hensibility of these effects by our finite minds to the existence of an 
Infinite and Eternal J\Und which fully comprehends them. He asserts 
that if a man acknowledges a being more able and wise than himself, 
he acknowledges deity, for things which excel human knowledge may 
be known only by an Eternal Mind which is the original of our mind. 
lwhichcote, III, 142ff.' 160. Cf. E.R.E.' XII, 324. 
2 
Heb. 11:6. 
3Arist. Loe. cit.; Cf. Plato, Laws, x. 
4Aquinas, Contra Gentiles \Eng.tr.), i, 13. Cf. Summa Theologica 
tEng.tr. ), Pt.I, Q.2, Art.3. In Aquinas the cosmological proofs take 
the place of the ontological proof 01· Anselm. Whichcote makes use of 
the cosmological approach as well as the ontological. Cf. Aristotle, 
Loe. cit. 
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He reasons thus: if the mind of man is transcended, there is no 
creature below him capable 01· explaining this fact. This being 
so, and the fact that man is ttoverborntt by these transcendent realities 
the cause of these realities as well as the comprehension of them 
1 must be in a primary, original and independent Intelligence. Once 
again Whichcote attempts to establish the fact of God's existence in 
a rational manner. But the weakness of any such attempt is in the 
fact that all men do not have the same presuppositions. li'or instance, 
in this argument, in order to agree with Whichcote's conclusions, one 
would have to accept most of' his intellectualism and especially the 
dignity he attributes to man. 
But though God's existence is knowable by reason, according to 
Whichcote, yet our knowledge of God also transcends reason. Beyond a 
certain point our reason will not carry us and we must believe, where 
we cannot prove. However, this limitation should be admitted only 
when we shall have reasoned to the top of our minds, for after all, 
God is more knowable than all else besides. First, God is more 
knowable because of the "fulness" of His being, while things unknowable 
are so because of their "littleness" of being. Since God is the 
fullest Being, He is the most intelligible.
2 
Second, the ways of 
1Whichcote, III, 164-170. Cf. Cicero, De Natura Deorum, ii, 6f.; 
Aug. Trin. xv, 1. 
2Tbough Whichcote is consistent with h~s Neo-Platonic backgr?und, 
Tillich is quite critical of this view. Whichcote speaks of God in 
terms of superlatives, and here God is conceived as. th~ "fulles~" 
Being and therefore, the most knowable. But for Tillich, God is 
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knowing God are the most dependable, that is by perfection or negation. 
By ascribing to Him perfection, we cannot attribute too much 
perfection to Him since God is the Best, and inrinitely Perfect. 
Conversely, by means of negation, we cannot remove too much imperfection 
from God. Our very words must be purified of all limitations before 
1 
we can say clearly what God is not. Third, God is most knowable 
by virtue of our relation to Him since we are closer to God than to 
anything else. God is more inward than our souls, more than what is 
most ourselves. And, fourth, God is most knowable because of our 
dependence upon Him. There is such a "naturalness" between our souls 
and God, that it is impossible not to know Him. 2 
Though the mind does not have the power to get final knowledge, 
3 
yet further knowledge comes through illuminations from God. God 
being - itself, and has the infinite power of being, and therefore 
the being of God cannot be understood as the existence of "a" being 
alongside others. If God is "a" being, He is subject to the 
categories 01· fini tude, especiallJr to space and substance. When 
applied to God, superlatives become diminutives. They place Him on 
the level of other beings while elevating him above them. But 
whenever infinite or unconditional power or meaning are attributed 
to the highest being, it bas ceased to be "a" being, and has become 
being - itself, or the ground 01· being. Systematic Theology, I, 2611·f. 
This general criticism will apply to most of Whicbcote's thoughts of 
God, metauhysical and ethical as well as theological. 
1By his two-fold method or· seeking knowledge of God, Whichcote 
is at one with the early merger of Christian and lieo-Platonic strands 
of thought, i.e. in Pseudo-Dionysius and Augustine. 
2Whichcote, III, 176-180. 
3Picino, op. om., pp.267f. {cited by Kristeller, The Philosophy 
or Ficino, op. cit., p.253). Cf. Aug. Trin. xiv. 14. 
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who made "finite and fallible" spirits, guides and directs them. 
When Whichcote asserts that "the spirit of man is the candle of the 
Lord", he asks us to add the.t a candle is first "lighted and then 
lighting", that is, the mind is first illumined by "divine influences". 
It is only when a ma.n's mind has been exposed to such di vine 
illumination that he is enabled to know truly God in creation and 
providence. God is the Father of our spirits and to us He is 
"all in all, original, final, and the centre 01· our souls. Our 
faculties are sagacious and the nearness of the light 01· knowledge 
is ours. If we are without a sense of deity, it is our fault. 11 1 
We have already implied that f'or V/hichcote many of the divine 
perfections remained incomprehensible, i.e. omnipotence, eternity, 
ubiquity and the like. But while making this admission, he insists 
that other divine perfections are 1mowable, especially moral perfections 
and the lmowledge of these latter is :ftmdamental to religion and 
morality. Thus his treatment of the attributes of God is limited 
almost exclusively to what he calls moral perfections, such as 
goodness, wisdom, liberty, justice and power.2 These moral perfections 
of God are at the heart or his entire scheme of thought, for the "copy" 
of these principles is for him the evidence in man of his "divine 
likeness". 
When Which::ote speaks of God as the greatest good, summum bonum, 
1Whichcote, on. cit., pp.187ff. 
2 . 
Ibid., I, 381"; Aph. 85. 
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1 his meaning is closer to Plato than to Plotinus. The latter places 
the One above good and evil, while Plato conceives the absolute and 
2 
final reality and ultimate unity as the Good or the "Form of the Good". 
Whichcote asserts that goodness is God's prime perfection and our 
truest conception of God is as Almighty Goodness. 3 The divine nature 
is goodness, infinite gocx1ness, God is as good as good can be, and will 
not fail in any act of goodness. The true effect of goodness is known 
by communication, and thus we know God to be the highest Good by His 
communication of goodness to us. 
4 
the Best as he is the Greatest". 5 
It follows that God is "necessarily 
To accent his ethical concept of 
the divine nature, Whichcote includes holiness and truth in divine 
goodness. When speaking of the divine nature, holiness and righteous-
ness are synonymous, and so are truth and faithfUlness. 6 All the ways 
of God are ways of goodness, righteousness, and truth. 7 Now, these 
divine attributes a.re the very foundation of religion and, unless they 
are a part of the nature of God religion is groundless since religion 
is the imitation of God in these. 
Divine knowledge is true wisdom since it is from God, and is 
1plotinus, Enneads, vi. 9. 3, 4. 
2!>1ato, Republic, vi. There is no question but that for Plato the 
idea of the Good is the highest Idea, but as to whether he indentifies 
the Idea of the Good with God is less certain, though the trend of his 
thought is often in this direction. As for Whichcote, God is 
certainly the Summum Bonum. 
3vrhic he ote, I, 22. 
6
I' 381. 
4 II, 343. 
7 Apb. 995. 
5Aph. 320. 
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perfected only in Him. 1 In this connection Whichcote fails to do 
justice to the concept of wisdom in God. However, we will meet 
the notion later in his views concerning Scripture. 2 Whichcote's 
main concern here is to establish God's dealings with us, as also 
our response to Eim, as rational. Man's reason is a derived light, 
lighted by a greater Light, the infinite wisdom of God. 
infinitely, and teaches man by His wisdom. 3 
God lmows 
Concerning the liberty of God, Wbichcote ascribes to God mastery 
of His ovm right, that is, God does as he pleases and His will is a 
law to Him. 4 But a necessary distinction is to be made between His 
secret will and revealed will only in the superficial sense that the 
former is unlmmvn while the latter is knovm, actually they are the 
5 
same. Having made this statement, he goes forward with his 
6 assertion that God's freedom is limited by His goodness. There is 
that in God, which is more beautiful than will7 , viz., goodness. 
Thus, God is certain because in Him there is, at once, the fulness of 
h l t . 8 liberty and all ot er mora perrec ions. God only can say He will, 
because He will in view of the complete agreement between His will 
1 IV, 280f. 2 Infra, Ch. VI. 
3"Reflections", Loe. cit., IV, 264. 
4 I, 28; Aph. 158. 
5Ibid. , p. 223. 
7 II, 397f. 
6Ibid. , p. 251. 
8 Aph. 158. 
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and the right. 1 
God's justice is the basis of His integrity and uprightness, and 
these agree with reason and right. 2 When Whichcote uses the example 
of God's punishment of sin to describe justi~e, other moral perfections 
merge with justice and we see their interdependence. If God punishes 
sin, it is just, for sin deserves punishment. But we cannot say that 
it is necessary for God to punish sin, for this would be to impinge 
upon His liberty. Punishment for sin is just, if it is carried out 
and just if it is not. This must be true since otherwise we make a 
law for God and He is not bound by it. Since God has the right of 
an owner over man, He can forgive sin if He pleases. However, God 
does this only if the sinner repents, since to do so for an impenitent 
would bring God's will in conflict with His goodness. On this 
point Whichcote captures the essential spirit of Origen, namely, "God 
--·-·-----
1Ibid., 413. Whether it was his intention or not, Whichcote has, 
to a certain extent, offered a finite God. In the case of Edgar 
Brightman, the evil in the world prompted him to seek an explanation. 
Brightman concludes by asserting the necessity of a God limited in 
goodness or power to explain the vast amount of evil in the world, and 
the result is his doctrine of a finite God. Whichcote, on the other 
hand, conceives a self-limitation of God as necessary for self-
consistency in the divine nature conceived as morally perfect. 
Cudworth unhesitatingly declares God's wisdom and goodness to be 
above His will, and therefore morality does not depend upon divine 
commands. Eternal and Immutable Morality, i. 3. 1, 8. It is only 
a brief step from Cudworth's position to Kant's "categorical imperative" 
which requires the service of God only to guarantee that the commands 
of the moral order will be obeyed, and a thing is not good because it 




by goodness punishes impenitency and by justice relieves penitency". 1 
Thus justice is to be conceived in the divine nature not only as being 
in agreement With reason and right, but also in conjunction with the 
liberty and goodness of God. 
God is self-sufficient and His sovereignty puts Him out of fear; 
He is always clothed with omnipotency. 2 Power is "a" perfection of 
God, but of the three eminent perfections of God, power comes after 
both goodness and wisdom. Power, therefore, does not exclude other 
divine perfections. 3 God's power is always in relation to His 
righteousness and holiness, but it is sufficient to do what is 
"needful and fulfil His promises". 4 God does not by virtue of His 
omnipotency, deal arbitrarily with us, but according to right and 
reason. 5 It follows from this that, in spite of the fulness of 
God's liberty and power, we can be more certain of His righteousness 
and equity than of all other beings. 6 God's creation in infinite 
1IV, 15f.; Cf. Orig., De Prine. ii. 10. 2II, 344f. 
3 III, 66. For Brightman power is never an intrinsic good, but 
only an instrumental good at best. The use of power, therefore, 
determines its moral quality. It appears that Whichcote desires to 
make some such assertion to counteract Hobbes' Absolutism as more 
recent philosophers have attacked the concept of the Will to Power as 
set forth by Nietzsche. Whichcote certainly provides a saf'eguard to 
his concept 01· power by subordinating it to goodness, wisdom and the 
like, as he applies it to his notion of the divine nature. Thus without 
any undue limitation of power in God, he assures us that even power in 
God is virtuous, because it is always consistent with the other ethical 
attributes of the divine nature, and because it enables God to work for 
good in nature and history. 
4Ibid. , pp. 349f. 5 Aph. 417. 6Ibid. 685. 
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wisdom and power speaks goodness in principle. The variety, order 
and fitness of things, declare the wisdom of God and to bring things 
remotely distant together, non ens to ~' declares His power. 1 
From what has been said, it is evident that God is conceived by 
Whichcote as personal. Galloway has pointed out that between the 
notion Of personal and that Of ethical, an intimate relation subsists, 
and the one implies the other. 2 Further, reverence is possible 
between persons, but not between persons and things. Thus on the 
level of spiritual religion the idea of God as personal and ethical 
is dominant, and this is clearly expressed in the character of worship. 
The vitality of religious consciousness is bound up with the conviction 
that the object of reverence is a personal Being. 3 If c. J. Webb is 
right when he asserts that personal nature is identical with rational 
nature, we have further support for adding the personal element to 
Whichcote's conception of God. 4 Professor H. H. Farmer often speaks 
1 r, 30. 
2 Galloway, The Philosopb;y of Religion, p.492. 
3 
Ibid., p.491. Galloway has made a convenient distinction between 
what he calls the metaphysical attributes of God, i.e. omnipotence, 
omnipresence and omniscience, and the personal and ethical attributes 
of God. ,,'fhichcote comes close to this distinction except in his 
reference to the personal-ethical attributes as ethical only. However 
it appears obvious that these ethical attributes are personal also. 
4webb, God and Personality, Lect.v, pp.109ff. Here it is 
stated that it is because personality is ethical as well as rational 
that Bosanquet attem~ts to place God above personality in order to 
make Him transcend all moral distinctions, since personality and 
morality go together. Ibid., pp.124ff. 
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of the "radical personalism" of the Christian religion and the 
awareness of God as personal as the essence of all living religion. 
He says: "The essence of religion in all its forms is response to 
the ul ti mate as personal. "
1 
One meets a similaP view in the 
writings 01· Brunner, John Baillie and Ferre, but what we meet in these 
men is not the personalism of Brightman. Ferre has in no uncertain 
terms attacked the school of personalists and asserted that imperson-
alism and personalism alike detract from the fulness of the Christian 
faith.
2 
By considering, then, only the natural theology of Whichcote 
we have good reason to believe that ror him, God is nersonal. This 
fact will become more obvious as we pass on to a consideration of 
providence. 
Whichcote conceives God as active in nature and history. We 
have the assurance that we are in the hands of a good God, whatever 
the appearance of things may be. The God who governs the world is 
a mild, gentle and loving spirit. God is at work in the world 3 
and all things are in some way under His management. All things 
are either willed by God or permitted by Him. That is to say, God 
permits some things out or wisdom, which He does not prevent by power, 
and even the things merely permitted by God are for our instruction 
in goodness. All God's acts in nature and history are purposeful 
1Farmer, The World and God, pp.27f. 
2Ferre, The Christian Understanding of God, pp.11, 26, 31ff. 
3
Whichcote, I, 62. 
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and especially designed to lead men to growth in goodness. 1 Here 
we are reminded of F'erre' s convenient observations upon what he 
calls the general and special providences of God. The former 
allowing for a belief' in an "open" universe, (an idea made famous 
by Bergson and William James), and in human freedom. General 
providence is conceived as permissive rather than intentional, but it 
is nevertheless purposive. Thus God allows accidents to happen not 
against His will but according to His general will. On the other 
band, the special providence of God is in keeping with God's personal 
purpose and by this means God releases in nature and history His 
redemptive being and force. It follows that the closer one draws 
to God spiritually the more one comes under the direction of His 
special providence, and it is to be remembered that God's general 
providence is likewise under His control, and He may change its 
course at will. 2 It appears that Ferre has in many ways enlarged 
u~on and ~rovided a necessary supplement to Whictcote's view of 
providence. 
Whichcote conceived God as the Crea.tor and Governor of the 
world in nature and history. If a man will only use his reason, 
the work of God may be easily discerned all around him. The 
prerequisites of the proper interpretation of providence are: 
reason, scripture and a good life. 3 Whichcote believed one common 
1Ibid., pp.124-217. 
~Vhichcote, I, 128-133. 
2 ,, 
Ferre, op. cit., pp.139-153. 
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misunderstanding of God to stem from unworthy notions of God. 1 
A good example of an unwortr~ notion of God is considered by him to 
be the doctrine of predestination. He asserts that God has not 
pre-determined our sin or our misery. Such a belief makes one 
unwilling to be reconciled to God, and the idea is false since God 
2 does not will the death, but the salvation of a sinner. 
To believe there is a God is to believe the existence of all 
possible Good and Perfection in the universe, and that things finally 
3 
shall be as they should be. Here Whichcote is in essential agree-
ment with William James who gives us the assurance that the world is 
safe in God's care and that no matter how much it might zigzag in its 
course, He can bring it home at last. 4 Just as created beings 
provide for their offsprings, even so the Creator will not fail to 
provide for His creatures. 5 But to Whichcote, God is more concerned 
in the moral order than He is in the natural, and this is because the 
moral order has greater possibilities for good or for ill. The 
proper use of rational and voluntary nature is of the greatest 
importance, but its perversion is more destructive. It follows that 
God's "superintendency" should be more evident in the moral than in 
the natural order. 6 Thus Whichcote 's confidence in providence is 
1rbid. , PP· 338-341. 2rr, 359. 
3Aph. 70. We are here reminded of Leibniz's famous assertion that 
this is the best possible world. 
~Villiam James, Will to Believe { 1898), p.182. 
~Vhichcote, Aph. 533. Cf. Lu. 12:22-31 6rrr, 173f. 
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unquestioned. God is the "Original of our being, the Father of 
our spirits, the Centre of our souls, and our utmost End". 1 He is 
the Universal Father and the whole world is His family. He maintains, 
settles and establishes the order and government of things, and His 
concern is to control evil and maintain right. 2 
"There is no :Biate; but on our part Reason and Prudence; 
on God's part Providence; and this Providence, and all necessary 
Help, are as sure and certain; as the Existence and Perfections 
of God. u3 
But when we face up to reality - to the hard facts of this life, 
is the proper understanding of providence reasonable at all times, 
or isn't it really a matter of faith? In spite of Whichcote's words, 
there are times when it is hard to believe in a providential God 
apart from the faith and patience of Job. 4 One wonders if this is 
not one point where the rigid intellectualism of Whichcote breaks 
down. Indeed, it would seem that his rational approach is a faith 
in God which transcends his rational explanation. Further, as 
Farmer reminds us, there is a great danger in searching out in the 
lives of others, the course of history or the order of nature 
evidences of God's providence, for sucb evidence is bound to be 
insecure. The rationalist theologians who conceived it possible to 
demonstrate a beneficent and contriving agency in nature providing 
for the well-being of all creatures including man, bad their argument 
1rr, 187. 2rv, 100. 3 Aph. 974. 
4Job 13:15; Cf. Ferre, op. cit., pp.143f. 
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wrecked by the ne.tural abnormality of the Lisbon earthquake. 1 If 
we appeal solely to scripture as the basis of our interpretation of 
providence, then there is always the danger of biblical literalism 
wbich may prove disastrous. 2 There is also the question of approach. 
In Bultman's opinion, any consideration of Godswork in nature or 
bi story should begin with the revelation of God in Christ, for to 
begin from man and his experience can never lead to the truth. Thus, 
with the wrong starting-point one can only expect to arrive at the 
l . 3 wrong cone usion. However, I would maintain that when one takes 
into account the whole sweep of Whichcote's thought, his view of 
providence is sound and praiseworthy. His view of God's relation 
to the world is obviously what is sometimes called "panentheism", 
now held with varieties of emphasis by writers like Tillich, Hartsborne 
and s. L. Prank. God is at once immanent in the world, and transcend-
ent to it; the world as Farmer describes it has "relative independence", 
but since God is the all-including reality, He grants it being and 
continues it in being. 4 It is in this spirit that Whichcote describes 
the providence of God. 
1 Farmer, op. cit., pp.231f. 
2E.i. Those who believe in the inevitability o~ war simply as 
a result of their literalistic interpretation of scripture, viz., 
Matt.24:6; Mk.13:7. 
3Bultman, Essays Philosophical and Theological, ltr. Greig), 
pp.90-118 (from his Offenbarung und Heilsgeschehen, 1941, pp.3-26). 
4nuthie, God in His World, pp.53f. 
145. 
What is man? The answer to this question is of great 
importance to the entire scheme of Whichcote's thought. The "image 
of God" is in man and man is in some sense a "middle being" to 
Wbichcote, a view characteristic of the Renaissance especially when 
the Nee-Platonic or Christian-Platonic strands have been most 
evident. 1 In respect of his higher faculties, man is rational and 
free, and by virtue of his possibilities transcends the whole 
creation below him. The real exaltation of man is by virtue of his 
reason and as Pascal has so well said, "man is only a reed, but he is 
a thinking reed". 2 To Whichcote man is the masterpiece of creation, 
and is more valuable than all the rest of creation. 3 Man is made 
in the image of God and though he is of the "earth earthy"; yet 
because he partakes of the image of God, imago Dei, he is no less 
4 "heavenly". The "generation" of man is by "superinducing" the 
rational soul upon the "sensitive", and thus man is more than 
5 
animal. Whichcote's concept of the image of God is inseparably 
bound up with his assertion that the "reason of man is the candle of 
1Ficino, Theologies Platonica, Bk.IV, Ch.II, p.119 (tr. Robb, 
op. cit., p.87). Cf. Pico, De Hominis Dignitate (1486) from Opera, 
(Basle: 1572), I, 313 (tr. Robb, op. cit., p.87); Whichcote, I, 195; 
Aph. 8. 
2Pascal, op. cit., Pen., 161. 
3vihichcote, I, 298ff. 
4II, 43. Cf. Gen.1:26-27. 
5Aph. 855. Cf. Bergson's critic~sm ?f t~e traditional classi-
fications of life, viz., vegetative, instinctive and rational life, 
see Creative Evolution (tr. Mitchell), p.135. 
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the Lord; lighted by God and lighting unto God., Res illuminate. 
1 
illuminans." •. So important is this concept of the "image" of God 
2 
in man to all Whichcote has to say that it deserves special attention. 
In Whichcote's conception or the image of God it is obvious we 
have an ecclecticism or many strands of thought. As we have seen, 
he combines in his conception (Gen.1:26-7), man's being made in the 
"image and likeness of God" with (Prov.20:27) the spirit of man a.s 
"the candle of the Lord". And as it is his custom to "run through" 
the Bible, he adds at least one supporting passage from the New 
Testament (Mark 12:16), where Jesus upon asking for a penny inquired 
as to whose "image or supe1-ascriptionu was upon it, and commanded 
"Render unto Caesar the things that are Caesar's and to God the 
things that are God's." Whichcote concludes tha.t God's "super-
script ion" is upon man, and for this reason man's nature and destiny 
are inextricably bound up with God. 3 It is obvious that if we 
applied critical biblical exegesis or the rigours of the modern 
historical method to Whichcote' s use of the Bible, we could easily 
condemn him for misuse of the Bible, for he has approached the Bible 
with his own preconceived ideas. Further, he has made use of his 
knowledge of the history of thought, philosophical and theological, 
1Ibid. 916. There is no question but that the dignity of man as 
he conceives it is based on "reason". 
2The best source to filY knowledge on the subject is Cairns', The 
Image of God in 1~an; Cf. Egg-Olofsson, Inner Light, and T. F. Toffince, 
Calvin's Doctrine of tlan. 
3 
Mk.12:16. Cf. Cairns, op. cit., p.30. 
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to arrive at his synthesis. The Platonic-Stoic, Jewish-Hellenic, 
and Christian-Platonic strands of thought converge in Whichcote's 
concept of the "image of God" in man. It will be necessary for us 
to return to this subject again when we consider his doctrine of 
revelation and especially his doctrine of sin. 1 Our purpose here 
has been to underline the centrality of the idea, and to suggest the 
several channels through which the idea perhaps reached our author. 
Finally, it has been our present purpose to indicate the centrality 
of the concept to all that is to follow in this study. 
Man by virtue of his rational and free nature is a moral agent. 
Whichcote adds to this assertion a belief in man's "dei-form" nature 
2 
or a natural sympathy in man for true morality and religion. 
But for Whichcote, man's real moral responsibility is based upon 
man's endowment with "self-reflecting" faculties capable of making 
moral distinctions. 
3 
It is natural for man to choose good and 
avoid evil, for it is the same thing for moral agents to observe and 
comply with reason, as for inferior creatures to act according to 
sense. 
4 
It is only necessary at this point to state Whichcote's 
view of man as a free moral agent since the further implications of 
5 this notion are treated elsewhere. 
However, the question as to the nature of human freedom deserves 
1 Infra, Ch. VI. 
2 
Whichcote, Aph. 1133. 
3 
I, 131. 
4Ibid. , p. 212. 
5 Infra, Ch. v. 
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some attention here, even though it will emerge again in relation to 
Whichcote 's moral theory. 1 Whichcote is here in essential agreement 
with Kant in asserting that "I ought" implies "I can". But man's 
freedom is a limited freedom since man is not free to disregard reason 
or the moral order. However, the very fact that God created man as 
a rational being implies that man has freedom to direct his own 
fa cul ties, or God would necessarily control His own "workmanship". 
This is !X)t in keeping with God's true relation to man, for on this 
basis man could not be a real person nor a moral agent. On the 
other hand, will in man, as in God, is properly used only in 
relation to reason and right, and for this reason a man is not free 
to will because he will. 2 It is easy for us to tend toward 
arbitrariness, but this is not liberty in a true sense, but servitude 
to unwholesome desires. 3 Free-will is not an absolute perfection 
in this unlimited sense, ·for even though it does include the power 
to choose evil, such choice is not a perfection. 4 To clarify his 
position further, he speaks of the two possible acts of man, viz., 
the internal and external acts. The external act is less an act of 
man because it may be coerced, while the internal act cannot. 5 He 
concludes that the one thing which we can really call our own is the 
consent of our minds 6 , but it is to be remembered that if we are 
1Ibid. 
3Ibid. , p.185. 
6 




6 III, 209f. 
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free, others must be as free as ourselves. 1 We will return to this 
concept both in Whichcote's theory of morality2 and bis doctrine 
f 
. 3 o sin. It appears that Whichcote means by human freedom neither 
complete determinism or indeterminism, but a self-determination: that 
is, within certain limits man has the freedom to determine bis own 
t . 4 des 1ny. 
According to Whichcote the body is inferior to the soul, even 
at its best. When the mind raises itself to a contemplation of 
immaterial things, the imagination suggests the corporeal, which are 
the things of inferior nature. The matters of greatest ethical and 
5 spiritual importance are imperceptible to the body. It follows 
that we should give more attention to the refinements of our minds 
than to the concerns of our bodies, and this should be done to the 
extent in which our minds transcend them. This would not be to deny 
their relation; we have this treasure of the mind in an "earthen 
vessel 11 , the body. The vessel deserves the best of care, in view of 
t . t t . 6 he treasure 1 con a1ns. The relation of mind and body is one 
of interdependence and for this reason any unnatural use of either 
has an unwholesome effect upon the other. Nevertheless, the body is 
1 Aph. 55. 
2 Infra, Ch. V. 3 Infra, Ch. VI. 
4Galloway, ou. cit., pp.531ff. Cudworth has worked this ~roblem 
out more carefully than Whichcote, see, Treatise of Free-Will, (ed. 
Allen, 1838). Cf. Infra, Ch.IX. 
5Whichcote, III, 103f. 
6Ibid., pp.146f., 360. 
Cf. Baxter, op. cit., p.4. 
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to be subordinated to the mind and all its lower passions, and 
appetites are to be under the constant control and direction of the 
1 
mind. 
Even though man is of the "earth eart by", yet by virtue of the 
"image of God" in him, he is "heavenly". God lays his foundation 
in the body in all its lowliness in order to indicate the excellency 
of the body when it shall be glorified. Man is made of dust, the 
most contemptible of all things, but it is the image of God in man 
that enhances his value. We are body and soul and these are so 
inextricably bound together that we must glorify God with both at 
2 
once. Thus Whichcote conceives the body as the soul's dwelling-
place and instrument. The house is rendered suitable for the 
inhabitants and not the reverse, while the value of an instrument 
lies in its fitness to fulfil its function. The body, then, 
deserves the proper care that it may be appropriate as a dwelling-
place and instrument of the soul. 3 
Certain points are obvious as we study Whichcote's conception 
of the nature and relation of body and soul. He makes no real 
distinction between mind and soul and uses these terms interchange-
ably. Further, he makes use of the Platonic, Old Testament and 
the New Testament views on the subject. At times he oscillates 
from the Platonic to the biblical views. For instance, his concept 
of the body as at best a hindrance to the proper freedom and 
1 IV, 12f. 2 II, 42f. 
3 
Ibid. , p. 214. 
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development of the mind is radically Platonic; his notion that man 
is made from dust and that his value is in the "image of God" within 
is most probably taken from the Old Testament; and his view that 
the body and soul are interdependent, that the bcdy is in some sense 
the dwelling-place and instrument of the soul, together with his 
belief in the glorification of the body, is almost assuredly Pauline. 1 
There will be ample opportunity to draw out further implications 
of this subject as we proceed with our treatment of Whichcote's 
thought. 
The real emphasis of Whic·hcote' s discussion concerning man is 
not concentrated upon what man is himself, but upon man in relation 
to God. Man is dependent upon God and the recognition of this 
2 should lead to the submission of man to God. Man as a finite 
spirit was created with the provision of being related to and com-
municating with the divine Spirit 3 , and for this reason our highest 
faculties are capable of di vine communion, "spirit with spirit can 
4 meet". Since we are only "second causes", we are sufficient only 
in God the First Cause. 5 A self-sufficient creature is a contra-
diction in subjecto, fbr all things are derived from and refer to 
1cf. Robinson, "The Body", Studies in Biblical Theology, No.5, 
Ch. I. In Whichcote' s attem-pt to distinguish between body and soul and 
establish their relationship we are reminded of Bergson's attempt to 
solve this problem by asserting tbat the distinction between mind and 
matter should be made in terms of duration - qualitative time (not 
space time) instead of space, because time thus understood admits of 
degrees. Matter and M:emory, (tr. Paul and Palmer, 1911), pp. 2~5f. ,234f. 
2whichcote, I, 74. 3Ibid., p.150. 4Ibid., pp.197f. 5Ibid. ,p.217. 
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their original. It follows that there is absolute insufficiency in 
every second cause, and it is impotent and ineffective when the 
First Cause is absent or inactive. 1 Man's dependence upon God, then, 
implies the necessity for a proper God-relationship, to put it in 
Kierkegaardian terms. Whichcote says: 
"To this man is made; this was the very end and design of 
his creation, to have a sense of God as the rirst cause; and 
to have rest in him as the centre: and to have intention of God 
as the last end."2 
God deals with us as persons, as free and responsible moral 
a gen ts. 
"God deals with every creature according to its nature. 
Therefore, he deals With man by means of illumination, persuasion, 
mental conviction and satisfaction sine e intellectual nature 
cannot be divested of intelligence and freedom without which man 
ceases to be man. u3 
It is reasonable as befits our God-relationship that we should 
obey God. This is based upon our relation to God and our capacity 
to acknowledge God and serve Him.4 The fact that God has made us 
capable of Himself, means tbat He will "fill" our ca.paci ties for 
receiving Him and fulfil His relation to us. We are made in His 
image, not only morally, but naturally and intellectually. God will 
not forsake this image-foundation in man but will, if we permit Him, 
build a superstructure upon it. 5 
1Ibid. ' 220. 
3Ibid. , PP• 336f. 
Since God has made man in a 
2rbid. , pp. 298f. 
4rbid. ' p. 385. 
5Allowing for Brunner's technical distinction between the formal 
and oaterial imago, we are here reminded of his concept of humanum, 
man's "possibility of being addressed 11 • Natural Theology, PP• 24, 32. 
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special relation to Himself, He will comply with it1 and, conversely, 
tbe "activity" of man should answer the "influence" of God. 2 
"Look we upon ourselves, as subordinate and subservient: 
take no more, than the place and proportion of second causes. 
God will do the work of the first Cause; but exvects we 
shou' d de:> the work of the second Cause. ~rhere is a Conjunction 
of the first and second Cause to the same e!'fect, in their several 
Ora ers. "3 
Whichcote conceives our God-relationship almost in the mystical 
sense of our souls in communion with God. Our souls upon communing 
with God, discover their virtues and display their powers. God is 
their proper object and we know not our powers or :t'acul ties, but by 
their acts; and we cannot act save in the presence of the object. 
Tbus when we give ourselves to meditation, we enoble and enlarge our 
fa cul ties. 4 Our souls are used to their maximum onl:y in the 
enjoyment of God and all else is beneath the possibility and capacity 
of tte soul. To fix our souls upon any thing less than God can only 
5 lead to great loss. 
"God is our proper object, our chief concern. Were it not 
for man's canacity for God; if our rational faculties had no 
employment about God, but were intended only for drudgeries of 
the world; it would have been better for man to have been made 
in a lower order. Had man had bis ful:t'ilment in things of earth; 
had he been made to converse with creatures - be would have been 
bap9ier if be were equal to them. There is no free converse, 
1~Yhic hcot e, II, 93f. 
2 Aph. 176, 224. 
3
Ibid. 1128; Cf. Arist., Meta. xii; Plato, Phaedrus, xxiv (D). 
4 IV, 195f. 
5Ibid. , pp. 301f. 
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where there is inequality. A man cannot communicate with 
creatures below him. They cannot understand him as their 
equal; but as their governor. Man would have been made 
leas; if he were made to be concerned with beasts. But 
in relation to God is our nature. Our motion should be 
Godward, upwards. Our converse is with spirits. The mind 
of man is made for communication in the rational and spiritual 
world ••••• The reasonable part in man is God's mansion: it 
has the impression of God upon it: it has a neculiar reserva-
tion for God - to be used in his service - inAacts of faith 
and trust, homage, and employed about Goa."1 
Any proper estimate of man must take into account his future 
2 
life. Less of man is here and more of him is in another world 
and that which is most our own may be least in worldly appearance. 
A man is infinitely more valuable than appearances seem to indicate. 
This is true for instance in regard to his duration or longevity of 
life, his possibility and his opportunity. In many ways man is 
at present immature and the present life does not afford him sufficient 
time to realise self-:fUlfilment. Further, such development as is 
possible for man, in the present, is curtailed by hindrances of the 
body, by the "non-use" and "misuse" of himself, and as a result man 
is not as he ought to be or as he desires to be because of the tendencies 
and limitations of his mortality. But man is really made for 
immortality, his soul is divine and continues after the death of the 
body. 3 Accordingly, man's destiny and God-relationship are of a 
piece. 
By understanding and knowing God, we come to a true self-
1Ibid., pp.73f. 2I, 273. 
3Ibid., pp.274-298. Cf. Infra, Cb.VII. 
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enjoyment. There is no happiness apart from composure of mind, and 
this sta.te can only be realised by communion with God. And it is 
worth remembering that man's proper relation to God is one of 
communion rather than union.
1 
Vital happiness within us consists in 
a personal act whereby we enjoy God. Objective happiness presupposes 
God as the Object we seek and fruition and enjoyment belong only to the 
attainment of the end. God is the ultimate End - the Object of 
happiness, all else is means. Here Whichcote speaks of God paradox-
ically in the sense o'f a "Beyond within". God is in one sense 
already within the soul of the believer, and by bis own mental 
activity, a man is capable of an awareness and enjoyment of God, in 
this sense God is "closer to us than bres.thing". But, on the other 
2 
hand, God is in a real sense the "Reach which exceeds our grasp". 
In conceiving man's happiness in God alone, Whichcote exclaims in a 
passage reminiscent of Augustine: 
1The notion of union, one-ness with God, would only be consistent 
with a pantheistic world-view, while Whichcote's world-view leaves 
room. for personal freedom and responsibility, and even the natural 
order is a "relatively established" order leaving room for contingency 
to a limited degree. We are here reminded of such recent philosophers 
as William James end Bergson, and or theological writers like Tennant 
and more especially Brunner. Whichcote and Brunner seem to agree 
that man in his God-relationship has self-hood, individuality - there 
is "ove~instness" on man's side, that is the possibility of saying 
"yes" or."no" to God. And yet man bas to reckon with God, and for 
Whichcote as for Brunner this God-man-relationship is either positive 
or negative. Cf. Brunner, Revelation and Reason, p.79. 
~Vhichcote, IV, 301. 
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"O God! Thou hast made us for thyself, our souls are 
unsatisfied_and unquiet in us; there is emptiness, till thou 
dost communicate thyself, till we return unto thee."1 
Souls that are properly related to God have a great deal of 
internal peace, quiet and satisfaction and they feel often such 
"influences and communications 11 :t'rom God as give delight and 
2 satia1·action which transcend the pleasures or sense. Thus human 
happiness is to be found only in communion with God. 
In this chapter we have attempted to examine Whichcote's view 
on natural revelation in relation to his doctrines of God and man. 
Whichcote gives a convenient summary of bis observations on the 
proper relation of God and man as follows: 
"We are to aclmowledge God, as the Original of our Being and 
the Father of our Spirits; to be thankful to Him, as preserving 
and maintaining us; to be governed by Him, He being Supreme and 
Sovereign; to serve Him, as our Lord and Owner; to reverence, 
admire and adore Him, as the most Perfect Being; to believe in 
Him, as most Certain and Infallible; to trust in Him, and commit 
our Selves and our Concerns to Him as being most FaithfUl; to 
love and delight in Him, as the first and chiet'est Goodness; to 
rest in Him, as the Centre of immortal Spirits; in a.11 things to 
refer our-selves to Him as being Ultimate end Final. "3 
1Ibid., pp. 314f. Cf. Aug. Conf. i. 1. 
2




RELIGION OF FIRST-INSCRIPTION (ii) 
Natural Ethics 
Whicbcote believed in the permanence of moral distinctions. 
He arrived at a similar conclusion to those in our time who believe in 
moral absolution as opposed to moral relativity. To him the great 
rights of the world which govern all human life and experience are 
determined by the relation of things and therefore may not be altered 
at will. These rights are a law with God because they are according 
to His nature. 1 The germ of this idea which is to be developed by 
his disciples, especially in Cudworth's Eternal and Immutable 
Morality and More's Enchiridion Ethicum, is found in Whichcote. 2 
This stable moral order places upon man a responsibility to recognise 
and obey its commands. To this end man has his reason to enable him 
to observe the moral law in its particulars a.nd failure to do so leads 
1Whichcote, Aph. 250. 
2cudworth has developed the epistemological discussion of the 
concept beyond our author, but he is rather brief in his application of 
the theory mainly because his projected work for this purpose never 
appeared. More, on the other hand, has done a better job in developing 
a comprehensive ethical work than either Whichcote or Cudworth. 
The nresent writer is aware that citations from modern ethicists 
supply no-satisfactory criterion by which to judge Whichcote's moral 
theory. Social conditions, ideals and problems today bear little 
resemblance to those of his period. Further, many such problems 
received little serious thought or study in the seventeenth century. 
But these facts only render the favourable comparison between Whichcote's 
moral theory and the thought of some of the most outstanding moralists 
of today more remarkable. 
157. 
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to selt·-condemnation. 1 Truth and goodness are in things themselves 
and our duty consists in the obedience with which we comply with their 
2 
demands. Thus, for Whicbcote, morals consist of things good in 
themselves, in their nature and quality. 3 According to him, "things 
themselves speak to us, and offer notions to our minds; and 'this' 
is the voice o:f God". 4 The moral order is composed of absolute 
perfections, always the same everywhere and for all time. 
5 
There is a distinction between natural principles and moral 
duties, but they are interrelated. By the former is meant impressions 
originally stamped upon the nature of things necessary for the fulfil-
ment of their created purpose. ~he most universal principle is self-
preservation expressed in man by his desire for happiness. On the 
other hand, the means to this end may be conceived as a moral duty. 
Duty in a moral sense derives its necessity from the effectiveness 
with which it promotes the end. Happiness, then, the supreme and 
ultimate end to which all else must be subservient by natural necessity, 
is the foundation of moral duty. 
LNhichcote, I, 40. 
3 
Ibid. , p. 122. 





5rrr, 92. Harold Titus has conveniently divided ethical theory 
into four main types viz., Formalism (Kant); Utilitarianism (Mill); 
Naturalistic Ethics (Spencer); and Self-Realisation (Aristotle, Dewey). 
It is difficult to fit our author neatly into a catego.ry because of the 
ecclectic nature of his ethical theory. He agrees with the Formalists 
that rightness is an inherent quality of the act itself, that right and 
wrong differ absolutely, but he does not stand diametrically opposed to 
the good in other types mentioned by Titus, i.e. Self-Realisation. See 
Ethics For Today, pp.41ff. 
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but some, for lack of understanding, substitute something else in 
its stead. But if a11 men were firmly convinced that God was 
their real happiness, they would necessarily love Him. 1 It is 
wise to remember that for our author there can be no true happiness 
for an individual apart from the proper relation to one's fellows and 
2 
to God. 
We have a moral obligation to be intelligent and there is an 
obligation for an intelligent person to be informed as to the effect 
of bis conduct. In order to do our duty, we must know what our duty 
is. Thus, an intelligent man needs to scrutinise not only the motives 
which prompt him to act, but also the situation in which his action will 
take place. It is the duty of each person to seek truth and make f'ull 
use of his powers of judgment. We are to recognise the permanence of 
the difference between good and evil and use our faculties to the 
maximum in moral decisions. 3 Whichcote makes it clear that he is 
aware of the fact that some moral decisions are hard to make, because 
the line between good and evil, right and wrong, is at times obscure. 
1Ibid., pp.328ff. 
a.lfi th Hobhouse, Whichcote does not separate social theory and 
. individual conduct, but suggests that there is an objective standard 
of morality in place of individual arbitrary choice, which places 
demands upon the individual and society alike. See Elements of Social 
Justice, ( n.1), pp. 15f. 
3Hobhouse, Ibid., p.15. Cf. Whichcote, I, 152ff.; Titus, op. cit., 
Ch.XV, pp.232:ff. According to Titus, the effort to meet moral obliga-
tion with diligence is the principle of "due care". See Ibid., pp. 235f. 
Cf. Whichcote, I, 157f. 
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"~n many cases it is hard to fix the utmost bounds of good 
and e~i~, because these part as day and night which are separated 
by twilight, so that there is a dim day - light between both. 
Thus it is a very nice point for a man to lrnow how far he may go 
and farther he may not. "1 
The sheer difficulty of making moral decisions makes the proper 
development of our moral faculties the more important. Thia fact is 
intensified by the fact that man is born only with faculties possessing 
potential power for moral decision and action. And these faculties 
(by which Whichcote means mind and conscience) develop through education 
and the acquisition of habits. Man, then, is endowed merely with 
moral possibilities, but these faculties, capable of moral judgments if 
developed, are not to be trusted unless they are "qualified and seconded!12 
One cannot help but wonder if our author is not heading for a contra-
diction in his assertion that human nature is naturally good. If we 
divide the three general attitudes towards human nature into categories, 
those who hold that it is essentially evil (Augustine, Calvin); those 
who hold that it is good (Rousseau); and those who hold that it is 
neutral (Titus), then Whichcote' s position cannot be strictly classified 
since be bas elements of the last two views in his total view of human 
nature. This point seems to be of the utmost importance, affecting 
his theory of social morality as well as his concept of true religion, 
i.e. the doctrine of the Fall. 
Titus' evaluation of the three usual approaches to the subject as 
1whichcote, I, 189; 
2
rbid. , PP• 158f • 
Cf. Anh. 507. _.._ 
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listed above is instructive and explains, I believe, wh.y Whichcote has 
asserted that man is born morally neutral with possibilities for good 
or evil. According to Titus·, the notion that human nature is radically 
evil appears untenable. ·This position is refuted by historical and 
scientific evidence and has no foundation. The doctrine also 
attributes to God practices which would be disapproved or considered 
immoral if done by human beings; for men do not consider it moral to 
punish one person for the sins of another. There can be no immoral 
act apart from persons who are guilty of committing acts of misconduct. 
To submit to such a view would be to admit that many social evils are 
inevitable. There is in this same camp, those who base their 
conclusions on man's biological or psychological inheritance. They 
assume, for example, that due to some force called "instinct" inherent 
in human beings, a certain widespread pattern of conduct may be 
explained. Since men fight, there must be an instinct of pugnacity 
and thus it is fUtile to speak of non-violence or the abolition of war. 
The view that man is naturally good, in some sense held by our author 
though he has his own version of the Fall, is at once true and false. 
That is to say, many human traits, such as generosity, s·ympatby, 
sociability, and the like, are desirable, while others such as 
selfishness, combativeness, and jealousy are undesirable. Apparently, 
all these qualities are found in man, now one, now the other. Human 
nature is many-sided and plastic and any idea that it is rigid and 
162. 
1 
of only one quality is a false conception. Thia general conclusion 
appears to be entirely consistent with Whichcote'a general view on the 
subject. Within this framework he urges us to develop our moral 
faculties and use them to discover the good and live by it. 
Another important consideration in Whicbcote'a·moral theory, is bis 
emphasis upon the end or intention of a moral action as all important. 
He asserts that the intention is of first importance and the means is 
significant only as it contributes to the fulfilment of the end. The 
end exists in the mind prior to choice or action, that is, the last in 
action is first in intention. A decision to seek a good end rightly 
precedes the selection and employment of means. This is why so much 
care should be used in the choice, alike, of immediate and ultimate 
ends; for immediate ends should be warrantable and ultimate ends 
should be universally good. The good life is one over-ruled by a 
good intention and carried forward by a certain purpose. 2 There is 
no excuse for failure in intention; for every man knows the reason 
for his action. :Man as a moral agent is responsible for intentional 
behaviour and nothing is virtuous which does not stem from a mind 
1Titus, ou. cit., XII, pp.185ff. From this discussion it appears 
that Whicbcote is quite modern in his view and is in line with moat 
sociologists, psychologists, educators, moralists and many biologists 
of today. see also Knight Dunlap, "The Principles of Human Naturett, 
Religious Education, Vol.XVIII, (1923), pp.18-19; Julian Huxley, 
"The Biology of Human Nature", Yale Review, Vol.XXII (Dec., 1932), 
p.337. 
~Vbichcote, II, 163ff. 
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actually consenting to the good. 1 It follows that the intention 
and quality of a moral act are inextricably united and a morally good 
action m~st spring from a good intention. 
Knowledge is absolutely essential to goodness; for the heart 
cannot attain the good without it. However, 1mowledge alone is not 
the totality of the good life though knowledge precedes virtue. Here 
Whichcote is asserting that moral activity is rational and all truly 
moral decisions are to be made under the direction of reason. 2 Our 
author implies that there are at least a few acts of "non-attendancy" 
which do not come under this general rule. These actions are merely 
natural and are morally indifferent or neutral. For example, when 
men walk together, morally speaking, it does not matter whether they 
walk backwards or forward, but what they do and say to each other has 
3 moral implications and is therefore subject to the direction of reason. 
Our author's real point here is that knowledge in the mind should 
activate will and affections and produce obedience. We are to begin 
by lmowledge and end in practice. Truth and that which follows upon 
1Aph. 590. It appears that 7hichcote does not give enough 
attention to the "means", its proper nature and relation to the "end". 
It is too often true that a good end is spoiled by an improper means. 
Professor John 1:ac:Murray's discussion on human action as "intentional" 
is a valuable supplement to our author's partial treatment of the 
subject. See Clue to Histor4r, pp. 8ff., 16ff. passim. 
~.7hi c he ote, I, 152ff. 
3rbid. , pp. 318f. What Whichcote means by acts of "non-attendancy" 
is acts outside the realm of moral judgment, unmoral or amoral acts. 
See Titus, op. cit., pp.3ff. 
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it are materially the same and they are called by different names to 
indicate their varied functions. The understanding is not finally 
enlightened for itself but for service. It receives and discusses 
moral issues, but then they are to influence life and practice. 
First tbe understanding satisfies reason, t~n the will consents and 
finally the notion becomes a way of life. 1 
Accorading to w·hichcote, conscience is God's "vice-gerent", or the 
d •th• 2 Go wi in us. It will render a man miserable if he is not governed 
by the right judgment of moral distinctions.3 We ce.nnot go against 
conscience without serious consequences to ourselves. The morally 
wrong is the morally "impossible" or "we should not" is morally 
4 
"we cannot". One cannot escape the condemnation of conscience even 
in secrecy. Our author warns us that "we never do anything so 
'secretly' but that it is in the presence of two witnesses; God and 
our Conscience". 5 One wonders if this significance given to 
conscience in moral decision in any way conflicts with the unique and 
all-important role of reason for the same purpose. Further, is 
conscience to be trusted as an infallible moral guide, in view of 
the fact that our author has just asserted that we are born only 
with potential capacities for moral decision? Putting our author's 
views together, which be has not satisfactorily done himself, it 







and action, both of which are to be properly developed by education and 
wholesome experience. Without this safeguard, it would appear quite 
dangerous to rely upon an undeveloped conscience or one developed in the 
1 wrong way. 
When Whichcote speaks of the problem of evil he is primarily 
concerned with moral evil. He makes casual reference to natural evil 
but makes little effort to explain it. Moral evil is for him the 
2 greatest of all evils because of its malignity and consequences. As 
we follow his discussion concerning moral evil, it will be helpfUl to 
recall some of the presuppositions of his moral theory. He has 
presented the notion that man is a free moral agent; that man is born 
only with moral possibilities; that the intention of the mind 
determines the goodness or badness of a more.l action and as a corollary 
to this last notion, that the same thing in man is potential virtue or 
vice. 3 From all this we can see both the freedom and responsibility of 
man as a moral agent. 
Whichcote's fU.ndamental assertion as he approaches the problem is 
that God is not the author of evil. Antecedent to the existence of 
evil, God does what infinite wisdom directs or goodness moves to prevent 
it, by declaring against it, by warning and admonishing, by frustrations, 
end cross-providence. Subsequent to evil, He brings good out of evil 
1Titus, op. cit., pp.18ff. Cf. A.K. Ro~ers, "Art and Conscience", 
International Journal of Ethics, tJan., 1931), p.146; J.S. MacKenzie, 
Manual of Ethics, l4th ed., 1900), pp.117-118. 
2whichcote, APB· 514. 3Ibid. 1052. 
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according to His goodness and pleasure. Evil is to. be explained 
primarily by the fact that man is in a probation-state and is 
necessarily free and for this reason evil is unavoidable. But God is 
the judge of evil rather than a partner to it. Some evils are natural, 
that is, they follow upon the condition of matter. Then, men bring 
some evils upon themselves by the abuse and misuse of themselves. 
Some evils result from the activity of malicious causes opposed to 
God. 1 
But Whichcote would insist that the main explanation for evil is 
the fact that God created "second causes" or "rational and voluntary" 
beings who are also "finite and fallible" and permits many things to 
go according to these second causes. These free moral agents are free 
to choose evil as well as good. Since God is not the author of evil, 
the greatest evil that we encounter may be our own fault or attributed 
2 to other second causes, that is, other men or fallen angels. 
results from man's choice and the man who embraces evil is self-
condemned by reason and conscience before he is judged by God. 
Evil 
He has 
deliberately rebelled against the light of God's creation which is 
ample to lead him to lay hold of the good according to his nature. 
It follows, also, that evil cannot be kept out of the world except 
by force, which God will not use against bis creative design. His 
design in creation was to make free moral agents. However, since 
these beings are finite, there is also the possibility of their 
1III, 2901"f. 2Ibid. , 292-305. 
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transgression of His commands and their abuse of their nature in view 
of their freedom to do so. This "peccability" of man arises from the 
imperfection of free-willed causes being le~ to themselves. Our 
present state is one of trial in which we must not be with-held 
ab extra from doing worse as well as better; for if we were, there 
would be no possibility for merit or demerit in the moral life. 
Whichcote has a slight tendency to try and explain some of the moral 
evil and perhaps some of the natural evil, which is not explainable 
to his satisfaction by man's apostasy, by fallen angels. However, 
this tendency in his writing is very raint and is not to be compared 
with the same tendency in a Puritan like Milton, i.e. Paradise Lost. 
Whichcote appears to be more anxious to relieve God of all responsibility 
for moral evil by placing all responsibility upon man and to a lesser 
degree upon "other second causes", i.e. fallen angels, who have abused 
. 1 their freedom, than to find any solution for the problem of evil. 
1Iv, 356f. The total picture of Whichcote's view of evil cannot be 
clearly seen until we treat his doctrine of sin. See Infra, Ch.VI. How-
ever, this brief discussion on the problem places Whichcote in a great 
succession of thinkers, philosophical and theological, who have struggled 
with this problem. In modern times such notables have treated the sub-
ject as Kant in his pamphlet, Ueber das Misslingen aller philosophischen 
Versucbe in der Theodicee \1791), \cited by E.S. Brightman, A Philosop!ly 
of Religion, p.147 \n.15 ; Leibnitz's Essais de Theodicee \1712), and 
Voltaire's Candide l1759 as well as more recent writers like A.:M. 
Fairbairn, The Pbilosopl& of the Christian Religion, Bk.I; Elton Trueblocxl, 
Logic of Belief; and Brightman, on. cit. While the present writer is not 
satisfied with Brightman's "Finite God"(Ibid. ,IX,155f~; X,170ff.) or with 
bis "Given" (Ibid. ,pp.167,199,202,210,22~it appears that he has put 
his finger on a fundamental criticism of those who seek to explain all 
moral evil by human freedom or the freedom of rational beings, i.e. men 
and angels. This view leaves much evil, even moral evil, unexplained. 
Freedom, as Brightman asserts, explains much moral evil but it does not 
explain either the force of t·emptation or the debasing consequences of 
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When Whicbcote attempts a definition of virtue, he is not as clear 
or as definite as we would like, but he presents a working concept of 
the term. He asserts that in a strict sense, it signifies any moral 
perfection, while philosophically and theologically speaking, it refers 
to the good. He speaks of the intellectual and moral virtues natural 
to man, and these are held by the best men outside the "pale" of the 
1 
Church. The several virtues are 11 connatural 11 to man, that is, they 
agree with the reason of his mind. But, even though virtue is good-
in-itself, it is good for me only if I do it out of a good motive. 
We repeat our author's assertion that two things may be materially 
the same and yet they may differ because of the motive. A thing is 
virtuous only if it is done because it is good or avoided because it 
is evil. 2 Thus virtue originates in the mind and then issues forth 
3 
into action. For instance, an unselfish deed may be done out of a 
selfish motive, thereby diminishing its virtue. But the concept which 
is central to Wbicbcote's total moral theory is his assertion that 
virtue is natural to human nature, while vice is tmnatural. r.rhis is 
intensified by the fact tbat virtue is rational, while vice is illogical 
moral evil. See Ibid. , p.147. Cf. F. H. Ross, "Personal ism and t be 
Problem oi' Evil n, Yale Studies in Religion, No. 11. 1940. This is a 
critical appraisal of the views concerning the problem of evil of 
Browne, Knudson and Brightman. 
1rv, 120ff. When Wbichcote speaks of moral and intellectual 
virtues, he appears to be quoting directly from Aristotle. See 
Aristotle , Eth. i , 13 , 20 ; ii , 8 ; vi , 12 , 4. 
2r, 246ff. 3Ibid., p.51. 
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and bas no affinity with man as a rational being. 1 It follows that 
virtue is the basis of our peace and happiness, While vice is the 
foundation of misery. Vice, like all evil, has within itself the seeds 
of its ovm destruction, and misery follows upon its path as surely as 
the night follows the day.
2 
These assumptions are at the heart of 
our author's moral theory and for this reason they will be met 
frequently in our discussion. 
In his inadequate discussion of virtue, Ylhicbcote a-ppears to 
involve himself in a partial contradiction: if he believes in objective 
and absolute moral values, bow can be make them contingent upon human 
motives? But when we consider that, for him, virtue is virtue 
according to the intention of free moral agents, then it appears 
consistent. By virtue he does not refer to moral perfections, which 
are good in themselves but the reaction of free moral agents to them, 
in their attainment and use. And he would want to get behind a. 
particular moral decision or action to the proper attitude of life; 
for to him the moral life consists of "a gocxl mind and a good life". 
One wonders if his belief in the natural goodness of man cannot be 
partially explained by his own sweet disposition. If he had been the 
3 victim of violent temptations like Augustine or even Pascal , one 
wonders if his whole system of thought would not have been different. 
1 III, 148f. 2 IV, 195ff. 
3Aug. Conf. , viii. 12; Pascal, Pensees (Stewart), "Ad versaria", 
Pen. 1. 
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Often the psychological factor does explain the trend of a man's 
thought. It seems that our author clearly belongs to the "once-
born" in contradistinction to the "twice-born" of William James' 
Varieties of Religious Exnerience. 
Our author in his discussion of natural ethics is concerned almost 
exclusively with an explanation and application of these three terms: 
sobriety, justice and piety. 1 It is instructive that he goes to the 
Bible to find a basis for his moral theory as he has done for the 
ground of his theory of knowledge. Though the text fundamental to 
his ethics is found in the New Testament, it is obvious from his 
writings that he is strongly influenced by ethical monotheism expressed 
by the Old Testament prophets of social justice, i.e. (Micah 6:8). As 
he employs these three terms, sobriety is primarily personal; justice, 
social; and piety, religious. Nevertheless, it is.wise to remember 
that though this classification is convenient for our discussion, it 
is obvious that we have here what Collingwood describes as an "over-lap" 
2 of classes , that is, they are interrelated and interdependent concepts 
as used by our author. 
Sobriety implies a moderate use of our natural appetite and the 
avoidance of the abuse of ourselves through excessive use of material 
3 
things. Sobriety refers partly to the mind and partly to the body. 
~Vhichcote, I, 40f.; Cf. Titus 2:12. 
2 
Collingwood, Philosophical Method, pp. 26ff. , 49ff. 
3whichcote, I, 41ff. 
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Mental sobriety is 1movm as modesty or humility, while the soberness of 
the body is called temperance. The sober-minded man is uniform and 
does not involve himself in contradiction; for he has the assurance 
that truth will finally prevail. He is reasonable even in eating and 
drinking and avoids all excess. The body should be thought of as the 
dwelling place of the soul and for this reason all should be done in 
the interest of its health. Further, we should do nothing contrary 
to reason. Thus mental pride and bodily intemperance are to be 
avoided not only because they are harmful to body and mind, but also 
1 because they are unreasonable and therefore against our true nature. 
Our faculties are our own and yet we have no right to use them so 
as to indispose them for the ends and purposes for which they were 
created. In a real sense we destroy our faculties when we abuse 
them. Sobriety is fUndamental to our nature and actually conserves our 
faculties. To Whichcote a person given to excess is a moral "monster" 
and such a person is not a valid example of a man true to his real 
nature. He insists that drunkenness is not a "beastly" sin, it is 
even worse. Beasts live according to their true nature and for this 
reason do nothing which is unnatural to them. Thus to speak of a 
man involved in sub-human acts as beastly is to "bely" or underestimate 
2 
the true behaviour of beasts. Excessive drinking impairs man's 
3 
moral faculties and leaves him defenceless against all other evils. 
A recent moralist has well said: 





":Morality demands that we live at our best and bring our 
lower natures under the control of reason or our higher natures. 
Inasmuch as alcohol acts as a narcotic, it tends to deaden the 
higher centres first. The higher faculties are stupefied, and 
the impulses and emotions are less restrained ••••• Duty demands 
that we preserve our health and strength of body and exercise 
diligence in respecting the rights of others ••••• Tbe evidence as 
to the harmful effects of the excessive use of alcohol appears 
conclusive."1 
Throughout our author's discussion on sobriety one recalls the 
"golden mean" of Aristotle2 , but one wonders if this concept, whether 
presented by Aristotle or by Wbichcote is adequate as a comprehensive 
standard of moral judgment. Especially since Wbichcote is so 
insistent upon things good-in-themselves, intrinsic goods; bow can he 
base bis view of personal conduct so completely upon the principle of 
the "happy medium"? For if we follow his moral theory consistently 
from his presuppositions to bis conclusions surely there must be, 
morally speaking, decisions based not merely upon finding the "mean" 
between "excess" and "defect", but a choice between intrinsic good 
and intrinsic evil, where the difference is not merely one of "degree" 
but of "kind". 
3 
And while his theory may be tenable in selecting 
values, relative or instrumental, it appears woefully inadequate as a 
standard of judgment when one is making decisions in the area of what 
he considers to be eternal and immutable. Further, our author has 
failed to give us guidance when faced with a choice between two evils. 
1Titus, op. cit., p.228. 
2 
Aristotle, Eth. ii. 2. 6f. 
3collingwood, op. cit., pp.54ff. 
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The step from sobriety to social justice is direct, for, according 
to Whichcote, unless a man governs himself by sobriety, he is incapable 
of social justice or true piety.
1 
Thus the relation in which we 
stand to one another is properly one of just and equal dealings. 2 
Let us note that Whichcote wishes to distinguish between justice and 
equality. What is allowed by law or reason is just, while equity 
appears only when all circumstances are duly examined. It is in this 
way that equity moderates the rigour of the law. Thus, we can find 
justice without equity though sometimes we find both together. 
However, when there is a conflict between the two, equity should prevail. 
Equity should have first place, not only because it is reasonable, but 
also because it suspends judgment until all the facts are in and then 
acts accordingly. 3 
"There is that which may be called just ••• ; of which if a 
man will abate nothing; the law will allow it, nor none call 
him an unrighteous person if he will have it. And there is 
that which is equal and fit and good to be done, and which becomes 
a good man to do ••••• The righteous man is a man of strict right, 
he will do no wrong, but he hath hardly that largeness of spirit 
to do good, he will do nothing but what the law will admit, that 
which another man can neither hinder nor call him in question for 
doing it: but the other, the 'good' man, he will do that which 
is equal and fit; he will abate of strict right, he is willing to 
do courtesies, to perform all mutual offices ••••• "4 
This distinction made by Vlhichcote is, I believe, quite significant. 
1whichcote, Aph. 764. 
2 I, 384; Cf. Micah 6:8. 
3rr, 64-67. 
4rv, 5f.; Cf. More, Encbiridon Etbicum (1690), p.128f. 
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The attempt to Dlace equity above strict justice as he uses the two 
terms, is consistent with his view that man is fallible, that morality 
is rational and that punishment should be remedial. The assertion that 
all relevant facts should be weighed as the basis of judging the 
behaviour of others is becoming increasingly widespread in modern times. 
This principle is being employed by lawyers, psychologists, social 
workers and churches engaged in constructive social action; it is 
being used in passing judgment upon the misdeeds of juvenile offenders 
and mentally incompetent persons as well as in deciding the form of 
correction to be used in such cases. The term "equity", as used by 
our author, most adequately describes this principle. 
Right is determined by the relation of things, by voluntary 
determination or constitution as viewed by a proprietor or law-giver. 
That is to say, a man may dispose or his property as be wills and one 
with power to make laws may determine their operation. But lest we 
should accuse him of absolute wilfulness, Whichcote hastens to add tr~t 
even here reason must prevail. By "the reason of things" he means 
those rights which are eternally fixed, which are a law with God, 
1 
consistent with His nature and as unalterable as He is. When right 
is determined by positive constitution, the right of property or 
authority is implied and by such a right a man may do with his own as 
he wills. But a right which begins thus may have great moral 
implications as it affects others. Thus by the right of authority 
1 Ibid., pp.6-11. 
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one bas the power to make laws and enforce them. However, the man who 
disobeys these laws is in the wrong only if they are in keeping with 
universal reason, rather than the fiat of a particular will. 1 To obey 
law irrationally is not only to go against universal reason, but 
against one's own rational nature and this is why it is so difficult, 
and indeed unjust, for man to obey laws contrary to or even without 
reason. Thus a non-moral right, such as right of property or 
authority, when ap-plied to others becomes moral and must at once 
come under tbe judgment of reason. Here we see clearly Whichcote's 
reaction to the concept of Absolute Will, alike in Calvinistic and 
2 
Hobbesian thought, and bow his concept of reason emerges as supreme. 
This leads us to re-examine Whichcote's view of personal freedom 
and its relation to social responsibility. He asserts that where 
a situation involves a man's own right, a man is free to act without 
regard for his fellows or God. Behind this assertion is the conviction 
that a man's true rights are in accord with reason and with God. The 
freedom we have is to do good, promote friendship, love and good-will, 
but there is no freedom of self-will which rorfeits others of their 
3 
rights. Thus will alone must never be insisted upon for the 
4 justification of right and especially when it is unsupported by reason. 
1Ibid. , p. 13f. 
2By this I mean that Vfhichcote is opposing by his concept of reason 
in his moral theory, on the one band, the notion of Hobbes concerning the 
state as absolute, as being controlled by the absolute will of the ruler 
whose power is by "social contract", and on the other, the Puri tan version 
of the absolute will of God as they understood it from the writings of 
Calvin. Cf. I, 258f.; IV, 214f., 257. 
3rr, 162. 4Ibid., p.402. 
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Is Whicbcote really consistent here with his assertion that men are free 
to do good or evil? This problem is obvious unless we think of him 
as using the concept in a different context and therefore with a 
different meaning. Freedom here seems to mean "moral freedom" in a 
strict sense as distinguished from "immoral freedom" on one hand, and 
from "non-moral" freedom on the other. 1 We do have freedom to go 
against reason, but this can only lead to self-condemnation and self-
destruction, for this is to go against our ovm nature. Then we have 
the freedom to act arbitrarily concerning non-moral acts. But to 
speak of moral freedom implies that we are restricted within the bounds 
of reason. This is one point where, I believe, Cudworth learned from 
Whichcote, but as we shall see later in this study, Cudworth contributes 
2 
much to a clearer understanding of the concept. 
The love for justice and equality frees a man from severity of 
punishment; for he remembers that it is remedial rather than punitive. 
To be governed by these principles removes all arbitrariness or self-
will in the act of punisbment. 3 We are under a moral obligation to 
forgive those who repent of wrong actions. Further, there should be 
4 
plain and open dealing with the offender , but all have the right to 
just and equal treatment and this for our author means the practice of 
the Golden Rule. 5 We should use moderation in censure or punishment; 
1Titus, op. cit., pp.3ff. 
3vihichcote, II, 69f. 
5Ibid. , p. 229. 
2 
Infra, Ch. IX. 
4Ibid. , p. 72. 
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for when a man is punished he condemns himself to a certain extent 
because having done wrong he has dissatisfied his internal judge, his 
conscience. If he is punished ultra meritum, beyond desert, he is 
vexed; for he concludes that he is not suffering as a malefactor, but 
rather as a martyr being overcome by power. Outstanding here is 
Whicbcote's firm belief in the moral competence of the conscience and 
in the natural sympathy of man toward goodness. 
Much extreme punishment may be explained by the fact that persons 
are too easily provoked in their dealings with others. It is for this 
reason that a man should be slow to take offence and should always apply 
the best possible meaning to the speech or action of another. As a 
matter of fact, one should hesitate to be exposed to provocation for 
upon becoming provoked, one is no longer free and rational. If 
however, in spite of all, one does become provoked, one should even in 
this emotional state seek to be moderate and as reasonable as possible. 
To assure the triumph of justice and equality in such cases, one should 
invite a third person, morally trustworthy, who is also a disinterested 
party, to serve as judge. Another suggestion is that one should 
actually, as far as is possible, put oneself in the other's place. 
However, a proper third person is the best judge and even more 
praiseworthy still is the possibility of ignoring rather than resenting 
an evil intention and thereby nullifying it. This latter method is 
most eft·ective for it makes enemies friends and the person with evil 
intentions condemns himself. 1 Though the general spirit of the ideal 
1Ibid., pp.224-28. 
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here set forth by our author is consistent with his natural morality, 
the possibility of its realisation seems to be beyond our natural powers. 
This fact illustrates the essential unity of Whichcote's thought; for 
it is the same man who speaks as a moralist and as a Christian preacher. 
According to our author there should be no oppression anywhere. 
Where anyone happens to have ad vantage or power, these should not be 
used for cruelty or oppression. All men are created in the image of 
1 
God and therefore have an inherent right to dignified treatment. 
Further, power in itself is not good, and must always be used in 
relation to goodness. Having stated his principle for social justice 
be proceeds to apply it, first to domestic relations and then to 
political relations. By the former he means parent-child, husband-
wife and servant-master relations and by the latter he refers to the 
magistrate and the type of government he fosters. 
Just as God is original to man, even so the parent is original to 
the child and yet this does not entitle parents to mistreat their 
children. Children are to be dealt with with reasonableness and 
tenderness. On the other hand, the child must obey and honour his 
parents. 2 The relation of husband to wife is similarly treated. 
Though the husband is the head of the family, he must not be unfair or 
unreasonable in bis treatment of his wife and must always consider her 
as his equal with a different but equally important function in the life 
of the family as his own. On the other hand, the wife is to be kind and 




gentle with her husband and by her devotion to her husband and 
children fulfil her responsibility in this relationship. 1 It needs 
to be said that though Whichcote has introduced a valuable subject 
in the proper spirit, he has not done justice to his treatment of it. 
It seems to me that Brunner has made a summary of the family relation 
which migbt add clarity to what has been said. 
"All members [of the family] belong to each other - the 
father to the child, the child to the father, the mother to the 
child, the Child to the mother, just as the husband belongs to 
the wife and the wife to the husband. But the manner of 
belonging is not the same. The child belongs to the father 
otherwise than to the mother. This 'otherness' is determined 
by the divinely created order of nature. It establishes an 
unequivocal hierarchJr of the family which, without prejudice to 
the equal human dignity of each member, is determined by the 
functions of the individual members."2 
Whichcote gives us no guidance for the problem child or divorce. 
Perhaps it was because his wife was ideal according to his conception 
and he had no children, that these problems were of no great concern 
to him. It is to be remembered also that he spent the most active 
part of bis life in the University environment which at times may be 
an artificial climate apart from the real struggle of human life. 
Next Whicbcote considers the master-servant relation. Without 
labouring the point, our author simply applies the same princi~les. of 
dignified treatment, reasonableness and fair dealing to this relation-
ship as to the family relation. Re points up the mutual dependence 
1Ibid. , pp. 254f. 
2 . 
Brunner, Justice and the Social Order, p.131. 
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of master upon servant and servant upon master and that each should 
render to the other his due. The master should treat vri th respect 
1 
his servnnt and the servant should reverence and obey his master. 
sometimes he uses the more general reference of the relation of 
"superiors" to "inferiors 112 , but his conclusions are the same. He 
3 extends his concern to all creatures, even those below man. Thus, 
he appears to anticipate Schweitzer's principle of "reverence for all 
life". 
4 
From the general position of our author we may rightly conclude 
that he accepts the existing stratification of society. In other wo1.,ds 
he would in his day accept the master-servant relation as Paul in his 
accepted the master-slave relation. However, in both cases the social-
form is retained, but the social-content is challenged. Philemon ma:\r 
reclaim his slave as a slave according to Paul, but he must treat him as 
a "brother in Christ". 5 In like manner Whichcote, who himself was rich 
all his life, considers it in keeping with the "reason of things" to 
keep his servants, expect obedience from them, expect them to do all 
the menial work for him, but at the same time, recognise their human 
dignity and their right to humane treatment. This seems to me to 
state Whichcote' s real -position. 
Is this position really consistent With his moral theory? 
really Christian? Brunner going back to Aristotle's distinction 
1Whichcote, Ibid. 2 II, 220ff. 3 I, 255f. 






between contractual and proportional justice1 , makes a good case on 
purely natural grounds for what Brunner calls equitable treatment or 
equal-unequal treatment. When we take into account that all men are 
equal merely because they are human, but according to endowment and 
circumstances they are in fact unequal, then we can see the reasonable-
ness of this po~ition. 2 When Whichcote observes in Aristotle that 
equity is the truest justice and that there is no justice without 
equity3 , we realise bow close he is to Brunner and to Hobhouse 4 on 
this principle. The two questions we have raised above apply in a 
combined sense to Whichcote for being a Christian preacher he has read 
his Christian concepts even into his natural ethics. It is presupposed 
behind all t bat our author has said that he is convinced that the real 
basis of human equality is not philosophical but in the creation-act of 
God who created all men in the same image, in His image and Who reveals 
5 Himself in Christ as the Redeemer of all men and all peoples. When 
this biblical concept of justice is taken seriously, it does not 
merely accommodate itself to an existing order of society, or merely 
seek to purge its contents, but cuts away at the very roots of 
inequality end injustice in the structure of society itself. Inequality 
based upon class, race, religion and the like are inconsistent with 
any system of ethics which takes seriously the message of the Bible, 
1Aristotle, 
2 m. V.7. Brunner, op. cit. , p. 30. 
3 
18; Cf. Gen.1:27. Whichcote, IV, 
4 cit. , pp. 94ff. 5Brunner, op. cit. , p. 37. Hob house, op. 
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and this Whichcote claims to do. Ar~stotle1 and Plato2 may sincerely 
have accepted inequality and the Stoics3 by virtue of their concept 
of an impersonal spiritual principle, a ~ or logos pervading all 
things may take equality for granted, but the Christian may not take 
either for granted. While it is easy for a man of Whichcote's stamp 
to accept his exalted status as the will of God, it is not easy nor 
desirable for the disinherited masses to do so. It may be true that 
differences between men is the condition of community of natural 
created beings, but whenever sinful man sets himself up as the judge 
of these difference~, there is always inhumanity and injustice. 
seems to be because the principle employed is not usually mutual 
This 
helpfUlness but a superiority-inferiority relation with those who 
judge at the top of the scale of privilege and power. And though 
Whichcote has denounced oppression he has accommodated himself to the 
very type of social structure which perpetuates it. Brunner has well 
said: 
"Man does not derive his ·'dignity' from his service to the 
whole. His dignity as a person is anterior to fellowship because 
every individual is called by God Himself and is personally 
responsible to Him. The corporate community does not stand above 
the individual, making him a dependent, subordinate part of a 
higher whole, but fellowship is only truly personal when it is a 
community of independent, responsible persons."4 
To Whichcote, the governor is a minister of God for the public 
1Aristotle, Politics, i, 4. 
2 Plato, Rep. V, 469; Laws, vi, 776f. 
3 Brunner, op. cit., p.41. 4 Ibid. , p. 45. 
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good, and the governed are to obey his commands. 1 The purpose of 
government is to maintain peace, preserve the rights of its citizens 
and to promote good-will among men. It is the function of the 
t . 2 governor o see that the political order fUlfils its purpose. 




He agrees with Paul that the "powers that be are ordained 
There must be mutual responsibility and respect between 
the magistrate and his citizenry in order to maintain order. It is 
dishonourable for any magistrate to allow disorder to prevail in his 
realm, and in each province government should be consistent with 
God's government of the entire world. The whole world is God's 
family and He is the Governor of the world. God's providence is thus 
to be the pattern of political order and the magistrate rules not by 
bis personal will but by authority invested in him by God. The ruler, 
as well as the ruled, is accountable to God. The governor is 
responsible, therefore, to maintain justice in his realm between the 
citizens. Within his realm there should be no disorderly conduct 
allowed, no oppression of one class by another, no strife between rich 
and poor. All should in fact accept their condition as it is and deal 
peaceably and fairly with each other. Man is naturally kind and this 
is the principle by which government should be directea. 4 It is 
because all, including the governor, are made in the same image, the 
1Whichcote, II, 219f. 




image of God, that cruelty and oppression are not to be permitted. 
This assertion is strengthened by the fact that the gove1-nor receives 
his authority from God and rules under providential guidance. It is 
obvious that Whichcote bas struck a powerful blow at the Hobbesian 
1 
political theory. The weakness of our author's theory seems to be in 
his optimistic view of human nature together with bis static view of 
society. In our time with social mobility greater than ever before 
and with peoples who have been content with their inferior lot awakening 
from centuries of indifference to demand the rights belonging to them 
as human beings, the more conservative view of our author appears out-
dated. Then there is the more serious question, as to whether the 
class system itself is not immoral and unchristian. Do the poor not 
have a right to better living conditions and equality of opportunity? 
Should there not be a general levelling of society? Is it the will of 
God that a political order based upon unfair inequalities should remain 
undisturbed? How is the governor to keep order in bis realm when men 
become aware of the image of God within and the rights appertaining 
thereto and demand their portion of these rights? Notwithstanding the 
good implicit in ·wbicbc ote' s political theory, in my view, it will not 
stand the practical test in our time, nor the Christian test at any time. 
Whichcote believes that man is naturally benevolent. He attests 
to this by his life as well as by his thought. Ve described him in 
our first chapter as a man of good nature and his contemporaries 
1Hobbes, Leviathan (1914), Pt.II, Cb.XVIII, pp.90ff. 
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acknowledged him as a man with an unusually pleasant disposition. 
This should give added authority to the admonition to mutual 
~lpfulness among men so often repeated in his writings. 1 He never 
tires of reminding us that man is by nature "a mild, gentle, calm and 
2 
loving creature". As a result 01· his benevolent attitude, he exalts 
the benefactor as a representative of God. 3 
"Nothing is deeper in human nature than righteousness, 
fairness, benevolence, and this ingenuity of carriage ••••• 
Universal benevolence, which God ••••• did sow in the nature of 
man when he made man •••.• That universal benevolence which 
spirits the intellectual w~rld, doth require each man towards 
another, faith and truth." 
He asserts that this spirit of benevolence is the true genius of 
humanity. In spite of what some have said (most probably alluding to 
Hobbes) there is a bias in man toward mutual helpfulness, there is a 
"secret sympathy" in man for virtue and honesty. The mere fact that 
we are naturally members or one big family proceeding from the same 
source means t bat a 1·oundation is laid in our natures for mutual good-
5 
will. Now \V'hichcote' s optimism concerning human nature indicates 
at least a partial truth. But living the good life and helping his 
fellows appears so easy for him that he cannot see the problems of the 
mass of people who find both quite difficult. For instance, as we 
ponder his stress upon intention as determining the moral quality of 





5 Ibid., pp.212-218; Cf. Hobbes, op. cit., Pt.I, Ch.XIII, pp.63ff. 
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an act, the q_uestion arises as to whether many benefactors do not act 
unselfishly out of selfish intentions and thereby make the act morally 
void. Even if we take the universal fact of man's mutual helpful-
ness in times of sudden and great disaster, i.e., war, famine and the 
like, there is doubt even then if all intentions are morally pure. 
To be truthful,- we would need to assume the possibility of unconscious 
selfishness; for it is impossible to judge adequately a single act 
apart from a man's total attitude toward life. And even more serious 
is the fact that "for all the centuries of experience, men have not 
yet learned how to live together without compounding their vices and 
1 covering each other with mud and blood". Somehow we must not only 
take into account man's humanity to man, as -vYhichcote does, but also 
man's inhumanity to man. 
Man is a social being and his needs demand a social order. For 
years after birth man is dependent upon the love and carae of others. 
:Man's necessities are greater than those of other creatures and these 
cannot be supplied without the assistance of others. Thus proper 
social relations are essential to personal well-being. I\Ian can master 
the lower animals, but without the contribution of others in the same 
image, his fellows, he is of all beings the most miserable. Society, 
then, is a necessary supDlement and security for man, for men are 
mutually dependent throughout life. It follows, that by good human 
relations, the status of all men is improved. This means that a 
1Reinhold Niebuhr, Moral Man and Immoral Society, p.1. 
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personal contribution to social betterment is a moral and religious 
auty. 1 
Conversation is a peculiar excellency and privilege of rational 
nature. The only way to make a man's notions his ovm is to communicate 
them. Such exchange of ideas among men leads to self-improvement. 2 
The real purpose of speech is the communication of truth. A man 
does not need speech for himself or to speak to God. God may be 
worshipped by mental devotion unless worshi-p is observed publicly. 
Thus speech is essentially a social instrument. 3 
"Man is a conversable creature; forasmuch as be is invested 
with intellectual nature, and is qualified with principles of 
reason, and with a power of speech; for all these he is enabled 
and disposed for converse: the principles of reason work inwardly, 
conceive the notions of things, and prepare matter. By the power 
of speech man is able to deliver his thoughts, direct, communicate, 
resolve, satisfy, instruct and make others partakers of his 
knowledge. "4 
There is no question in Whichcote's mind but that we should always 
communicate the truth. Without truthfulness among men there can be no 
trust nor integrity. One's word is a sacred trust and one bas no 
greater assurance to give than one's word. One's word is the basis of 
all security between oneself and one's neighbour and upon this mutual 
5 trust society depends. However, Vfhichcote seems to contradict what 
he has put so well, at least to a certain extent, by his rigid "class 
1whichcote, IV, 75. 
3Ibid. , PP• 358. 
5rr, 2llff.; Aph. 296. 
2Ibid., pp.390ff. 
4Ibid. , pp. 376f. 
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. " consciousness • He makes a distinction between conversation with 
d . f . 1 equals an in eriors. Though he insists that the latter should 
be beard in a spirit of kindness and answered accordingly, one gets the 
feeling that here as elsewhere, Whichcote bas accommodated himself to 
the view that inequalities among men are almost a part of providential 
design. Thus, in spite of what seems to me to be bis advanced view 
of society, I fail to comprehend what he can possibly mean by "social 
betterment" for the d isinheri tea. 
When Whichcote comes to emphasise the relation of morality to 
religion, he takes some of the wind out of the sails of our criticisms. 
He asserts that even our social relations are a part of our imitation 
of Goa. 2 Everyone is born with the right to be fairly treated, bas 
the right to expect it, and even demand it. The right to fair treat-
ment is absolute and is far above the duty felt by the rich to provide 
charity for the necessitous. This is within every man's power to give 
and he who bears good-will imitates God Who is love and Who bears 
good-will to all. A man does not love God who does not love his 
brothers. This is an argument of the denial of the less to the denial 
of the greater. Every virtuous action depends upon one attitude of 
life, for all moral virtues are united and the exercise of one virtue 
requires t be "temper" which is productive of' all the rest. Accordingly 
the man who fails in easy duties, i.e. general good-will, will certainly 
3 
not perform the more costly duties, i.e. payment of debts. But 
1Ibid. , p. 220. 2 I, 32f. 
3rv, 386-390. 
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is it not true that many people find it far easier to pay their debts 
than to love their neighbours? The testimony of history is in fact 
that it frequently is and this is not to consider the even more 
difficult problem of loving one's enemies. However, Whichcote's 
princi~les themselves appear remarkably sound. This is especially 
apparent when he insists that we should "universalise" ourselves, 
should use wisely our time and opportunity to glorify God in the 
world by helping others and that concern for the needs of others 
should be considered above our personal well-being. 1 He puts our 
human relations firmly within a religious context when be writes: 
"He that wrongs any creature, sins against God, the Creator: 
because God is the Owner of the Creature, the Maintainer of Right, 
the Avenger of Iniquity, the Rule of Obedience, in His Nature, or 
by His Vlill. u2 
True religion is consistent with the reason of mankind 3 and it 
includes moral principles also, for God illuminates our understandings 
4 
for moral decision and action. Those who are handicapped by material 
things need "di vine affection" to quicken them and then they would be 
ready to imitate God. This is actually what the divine light does, 
it clears the mind and changes the affections. Knowledge is the 
first step to virtue, but then goodness follows by "delight and choice". 5 
1Iv, 325f. Here 
perspective reminds us 
Cf. The Metaphysics of 
2Apb. 1053. 
4 II, 20. 
t be notion of "universalising" one's 
of a similar concept to be developed 
Ethics, (tr. Semple), 1869, pp.172f. 
3 I, 174ff. 




Whichcote is, t herefo:ce, quite anxious to give reason and moral 
principles their rightful plsce in natural religion. 
We are tempted to be proud of our wisdom beyond bodily strength 
because it is within and because of its permanence. According to 
Whichcote, there are three tynes of wisdom: first, skills and 
professional knowledge; second, 11 carnal policy 11 , by which he means a 
selfish cleverness; and third, divine lmowledge, which is true wisdom 
because it brings us to God. The first type of wisdom is good as far 
as it goes, the second completely degenerate, and the third completely 
1 good. 
So important is \Yhichco te' s concept of 11 vocation" as a part of 
the divine purpose of one's life that it deserves separate treatment. 
He asserts that the more one prepares oneself in a particular skill or 
profession the more one :flllfils God's purpose for one's life and the 
more useful one becomes toward helping others. It is the duty of 
parents to educate their children and he considers this high purpose of 
education the justification for institutions of learning. It is his 
firm conviction that stemming from the providential design of the world 
and from the very nature of community among men, is the necessity for 
everyone to be prepared to make a constructive contribution to the 
whole. But he warns us that our vocation must not be the occasion of 
pride, for it is not a means to ultimate happiness. A man must not 
stake his eternal well-being upon "earthly wisdom" however useful it 
1 
IV, 27 4-282. 
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may be in this life. This is obvious for these reasons: it is 
inadequate for the unlimited possibilities of man: it is temporal 
only and man is born for eternity though he passes through time first. 1 
Now a few wor~s concerning the use of our skilled or professional 
knowledge. It is virtuous for a man to employ his faculties to help 
others. The more one is skilled or talented, the more one should 
2 
help his fellows. A man should do his work whole-heartedly; for one 
man's skill should be another man's security. The man without 
education has a right to expect education from the educated man. That 
Whicbcote believed this is evident from his own life, in tbat he paid 
for the education of several children at Milton and in his support of 
rl • th 3 iJffil • Further he seems to anticipate the need for specialisation, 
when he asserts that it is not competent for one man to 1mow all. 
, 
Division of labour, by which he means various trades and professions 
apparently carried on by experts, is for the good of mankind. Modern 
interdependence seems to be visualised by him as he asserts that we must 
depend upon the skill and fidelity of others. 4 
"These several distinct excellencies, and :perfections, are 
the ornaments and endowments of human nature ••••• They are so many 
rays and beams of the infiniteness of the divine knowledge and 
wisdom; the flourishes of God's liberal and bountiful creation. 
These also recommend us to one another as needing each other in 
1
rbid.' pp.283-287. 
2Ibid. , pp. 122f • 




sever~l w~ys, and to different purposes •.••• By a joint 
contribution of our several divided perfections, we make one 
~ody complete~ Whereas an absoluteness and self-sufficiency 
is not found in any -particular. 11 1 
When VThichcote turns to a direct consideration of divine 1mowledge 
be reminds us that such lmowledge is only perceivable by those who have 
a "deiform" soul, a soul reconciled to God and at the same time holy 
and pure. To convey his thoughts on this subject he turns to Platonic 
metaphysics. He asserts that the mind must be prepared for the 
knowledge of God by abstraction from matter and separation from impurity. 
By the former requirement, he means that we must be aware of the mind's 
superiority over the body and their essential distinction. And by the 
latter requirement he agrees with the Platonists that it is impossible 
for the pure and impure to unite, that the disposition of the receiver 
determines the nature of the thing to be received. It follows that 
only the man With a good life and pure mind can discern di vine truth. 2 
John Smith clearly states the same views as he says: 
"Di vine things are to be understood rather by a spiritual 
sensation than a verbal description, or mere speculation. Sin 
and wickedness are prejudicial to true knowledge. Purity of 
heart and life, and an ingenuous freedom of judgment are ~he best 
grounds and preparations for the entertainment of truth." 
1Ibid., 127. Though the doctrine of "vocation" was restored by 
Calvin and Luther, it appears that our author does not only look back 
to the Reformers, but forward to the future to the "ministry of the 
laity". Cf. \V. R. Forrester, Christian Vocation, pp.146ff. See also 
Calvin, Institutes, (1611), Bk.III, Ch.X, sec.6; Luther, Works 
(Erlanger ;-8d-:-),--Vol. v, p.102 (cited by Forrester, Ibid. , p.147, n. 2 ). 
2Ibid. , pp. 314-323; Cf. ;.,'fa tt. 5: 8. 
3John Smith, Select Discourses (1859), p.1. 
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He adds: 
"The reason why ••••• truth prevails no more in the world is 
we so often disjoin truth and true goodness, which in themselves, 
can never be disunited; they grow both from the same root and 
live in one another. "1 ' 
Whichcote firmly insists that since God is the Highest Good, to 
do a thing because it is good is to do it out of love for God, while 
to avoid it because it is evil is the same as not doing it because evil 
2 
offends God. Thus religion is divine participation, or the imitation 
of Him Whom we worship. 3 
"Religion doth -possess and affect the 'whole' man: in the 
Understanding, it is Knowledge; in the Life, it is Obedience; 
in the Affections, it is Delight in God; in our Carriage and 
Behaviour, it is Modesty, Calmness, Gentleness, Quietness, Candour, 
Ingenuity; in our Dealings, it is Uprightness, Integrity, 
Correspondence with the Rule of Righteousness: Religion makes 
men 'Virtuous', in all Instances."1:1: 
At certain points in Whichcote's natural theology he reaches the 
heights of the mystic. He asserts that when the mind is employed in 
meditation and extracting spiritual notions from material things, it 
is properly employed. There is more satisfaction in meditation, 
devotional reading and prayer, than in all possible bodily pleasures. 
There is sufficient divine light in the world to be seen by the mind 
prepared for its rece~tion. liothing in human experience is more 
knowable than God and it is our ovm fault if we are estranged :t'rom Him. 5 
1Ibid. , p. 4. 
3Ibid. , p. 311. 
5 III, 98ff. 
2Whichcote, I, 248. 
4 Aph. 956. 
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A truly religious man is "an instrument in tune". 1 When our minds 
are transformed by religion, we feel, at times, strong and vigorous 
inclinations toward God. It is in this way that our minds are best 
satisfied since this is most suitable to our nature and the highest 
use our faculties are ca~)able of; for it is in contemplation of God 
that we find our highest ful1'ilment and happiness. 2 
Our author sums up what he means by natural religion in reference 
to personal and social morality as follows: 
"· •••• The majora jura, pietas, justiti~_~sobrietatis, the 
greater rights of piety to God, reverence, regard, duty, observance 
of him; fairness, justice, equal dealing with men; sobriety, 
chastity, temperance, the government of the body, so to be sub-
servient to the temper of the mind; and the mind living in love, 
dwelling in peace, well-composed, fitted for mental and spiritual 
acts; these are such bright lights as the eye of reason cannot 
but see them. No man can make an excuse for being immoral, in 
any kind whatsoever. For these are of universal acknowledgement, 
in all times, in all places; there is nothing in religion and 
conscience where these things do not take place. The principles 
of reason, and the further light of revelation agree in these 
things."3 
He properly concludes: 
" ••••• The sum of all religion ••••• lies in this, to imitate him 
whom we worship, and endeavour after those excellencies and 
perfections, which we attribute to God. The state of religion 
consists in a God-like frame and temper of mind and expresses 
itself in life and actions conformed to the di vine will. "4 
In our examination of Whichcote's view of morality, his versonal 
and social application of this and of rational principles, we have 
1Ibid. , p.146. 
2IV, 191f. Cf. Aug., Conf. i. 1. 
3
Ibid. , p. 437. 
4Ibid. , p. 300. 
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penetrated to the heart of his entire scheme of thought. At many 
points we have found what appeared to us to be wealmesses, but what 
has impressed us most has been the remarkable spirit and insight of the 
man which have so often transcended his ability to communicate the 
real depth of his thought to us with all of its profundity. We are to 
remember, further, that Whichcote's thought is essentially a unity and 
the division we have made has only been necessary for our study. For 
this reason, therefore, we must look to the following three chapters 
for an enlargement and necessary supplement of much that bas been 
introduced and it will only be after we have surveyed the whole sweep 
of his thought that we may justly and adequately estimate the merit or 
demerit of his thought. 
CHAPTER SIX 
RELIGION OF AFTER-REVELATION (1) 
Saving Knowledge 
Any discussion of Whichcote's thought begins logically with a 
consideration 01· his concept of the relation of natural to revealed 
theology. There seems to be at least two good reasons for this: 
first, as De Pauley says, "Great thoughts were great things to him 
and he expresses them with directness as they come to bim"1 - thus 
the unsystematic nature of his discourse; and, second, there is such 
an interdependence of natural and revealed truth in his thought that 
the only justificatio·n for their separate discussion is that it leads 
to clarity and convenience of treatment. Revealed truth is super-
imposed on natura.l truth and what we have is "more of the same thin~"· 
Thus we seem to have in Whichcote what Professor John Baillie describes 
as the "traditional" concept of revelation. 2 
However, the "traditiona1 11 concept of revelation is only a half-
truth when applied to Whichcote'a view. Even when our author speaks 
lrrhe Candle of the Lord, p.37. 
Zrhe Idea of Revelation in Recent Thought, p.18. Whichcote's 
contemporary, Richard Baxter, clearly states this position as follows: 
" ••••• Grace is medicinal to Nature ••••• Wbere Natural light endeth, 
Supernatural beginneth; and that superstructure which Christ hath 
built upon Nature, is wonderfully adopted to its foundation." See 
The Reasons of the Christian Religion, (1667), p.241. 
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of reason he does not refer to the unaided intellect, but, rather, 
reason divinely illuminated. In Whichcote we are closer to the 
credo ut intelligam of Augustine than the neat division of theologia 
naturalis and theologia revelata characteristic of Scholasticism. 1 
Like Brunner, Whichcote cautions us against "the irrational arrogance 
of those who pride themselves on their intellect, and of the irrational 
self-sufficiency of reason". 2 And for Whichcote as for Brunner there 
is no question of revelation "or" reason, but of revelation "and" 
reason. 3 For Whic hcote "the reason of man is the candle of the Lord, 
lighted by God and lighting unto God". It follows that reason is in 
a real sense subsumed under the more comprehensive conception of 
revelation - it includes all that he calls truths of natural-inscription. 
It is likewise true that truths of after-revelation satisfy reason, 
they are at times supra-rational but never infra or irrational. Any 
so-called truth that is contrary to reason cannot be revealed. 
c. c. J. Webb states this general position thus: 
"· •••• 'Reason' is the only possible judge of 'Revelation' 
••••• The judgment of the original credentials [of Revelation] 
••••• at least cannot possibly be withdrawn from the tribunal of 
Reason; I must have some 'reason' ••••• for accepting the 
Revelation as genuine. And so Reason cannot possibly be 
confined to a sphere distinct from that of Revelation. tr4 
lcf. Gilson, Reason and Revelation in the Middle Ages, Cha.I, II. 
2Revelation and Reason (tr. Wyon), 1946, pp.16f. 
3Jewett, Emil Brunner's Concept of Revelation, p.85. 
4i>roblems in the Relations of God and Man, p.25. Cf. Supra, 
Ohs. III, IV. 
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Yet of all the merit we may discern in Whichcote'e attempt to 
harmonise faith and reason we cannot completely absolve him of Webb's 
observations and criticisms of the rational theologians of the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries who defended the necessity of 
revelation and likewise the impossibility of revealed truths having 
been found out by natural reason (fallen reason), but who conceived 
revealed religion mainly as a superstructure resting on foundations 
consisting of the truths which were apprehended by natural religion. 
According to Webb, 
"They must there:t'ore have thought of the articles of 
Natural Religion in a sense in which the 'revealed' doctrines 
were not• since what they called 'the truths 01· natural 
religionf could be held and bad been held without the 'revealed' 
doctrines, while the latter could not be held without the former."1 
When we turn to direct consideration of what Whichcote bas to 
say concerning truth of "after-revelation", we find that be conceives 
this truth as coming with the same evidence and assurance as natural 
truth. 2 Divine truth, both natural and revealed, satisfies the mind. 
Revealed truth is "super-added" to natural truth and this revealed 
knowledge not only confirms the natural but restores reason to its 
original brilliance. Further, revealed truth does its own proper 
1Ibid., p.52. This appears to be Whichcote's approach, but his 
more comprehensive view of revelation includes natural truth. We are 
reminded of Prof. J. Baillie's observation that recently the concept 
of nature is swallowed up by revelation and nature is regarded as a 
more general kind of revelation and, therefore, there is no man and no 
nature apart from revelation, see, Our Knowledge of God, pp.37ff. 
2whichcote, Works, III, 18ff. 
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work; it teaches man to return to God. 1 All divine truth is 
distinguishable from the natural only as being a different "emanation". 2 
Just as natural truths are the first emanation from God, even so truthS 
of after-revelation, saving truths are the second emanation3 from God 
and the proper supplement to the former. 4 We should not be confu.sed 
by our author's phraseology, i.e., when he speaks of natural truth as 
truth of creation and of supernatural truth as truth of revelation. 5 
Thia caution is necessary since Whichcote conceives all divine knowledge 
as revelation. Dr. John Baillie's conclusion seems to clarify his 
position as stated thus: 
u ••••• Such moral and spiritual knowledge as may in any one 
period of human history seem to have become an inherent part of 
human nature, and so to be an 'unaided' natural knowledge, is 
actually the blessed fruit of GOd's personal and historical 
dealings with man's soul, and so in the last resort also a 
revealed knowledge.u6 
All religion is intelligible, the moral part from creation and the 
purely revealed part from the time it was "given". Religion is 
1 Ibid. , PP• 49f. 2 Ibid. , p. 20. -
3 Ibid., pp.121ff. Elsewhere I have attempted to prove that Pascal's 
real contribution to religious thought is the concept or "saving know-
ledge". Roberts, "The Problem of Faith and Reason as Treated in the 
Writings of Pascal, Bergson and James" (Unpublished S.T.M. dissertation, 
Hartford Theological Seminary, 1952), Cha.II, III. 
4Ibid. , pp. 29f. 
5Brunner's distinction between "general" and "special" revelation 
would lend clarity to our author's over-all view or revelation, allowing, 
ot course, for Brunner's special use of the terms. It seems, also, 
that "saving knowledge" is what Whichcote implies by truths of uafter-
revelation". Cf. Baxter, op. cit., pp.192f., 241f., 259, 445. 
6our Knowledge of God, pp.42f. 
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knowable, it can be understood, for if it is revealed, it is made 
intelligible, and if not intelligible, it is not revealed. 1 The 
natural knowledge of religion is as spiritual as the revealed. The 
moral part of" religion is the knowledge of God's nature, while the 
"positive" part is the knowledge of Hie will. 2 There are two things 
in religion, morals and institutions. Morals may be known by reason 
and t bey· a re "nineteen pa rt s in twenty" of all religion. On the 
other hand, institutions depend upon Scripture, but never upon a single 
text; for an institution which has only one text or Scripture to 
support it, is actually unsupported. 3 Concerning these two approaches 
to divine knowledge, Wbichcote says: 
0 God bath set up Two Lights; to enlighten us in our Way: 
the Light of Reason, which is the Light of his Creation; and 
the Light of Scripture, which is After-Revelation from him. 
Let us make use of" these two Lights; and eu:f'fer neither to be 
put out.tt4 
Divine wisdom, the knowledge of God, of divine things, of eternal 
life, is knowledge in the 11 scripture-sense". Such knowledge is not 
attainable by the efforts of" the unaided intellect or by simple 
apprehension. Knowledge of God revealed in Scripture presupposes 
1whicreote, Ibid. , IV, 289ff. 
2Aph. 29. 3Ibid., 586. 
4rbid. 109; Cf. Locke, Essay, 31st ed., (1853), IV, 19, 14. 
See also Milton, De Doctrine, ttr. Sumner, 1825), pp.7, 8~, 472-75. 
Milton, while promising to rely on Scripture alone as a religious 
authority, actually holds reason as well as Scripture as a religious 
authority. By bis description of a twofold Scripture: external and 
internal, it is not difficult to see that what he calla "internal" 
Scripture is close to Whichcote's definition of reason. See also, 
Bush, Paradise Lost in Our Time, pp.36f. 
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"concomitant affection" for God and this means that the pre-requisite 
for the knowledge of God is love of Him. 1 Divine wisdom is "given" 
and any want of perfection in our understanding of it may be attributed 
to our failure to awaken our faculties by meditation and care:ful study 
of Scripture. Thus real divine knowledge is not the result of a 
formal education, tradition and the like, but knowledge arrived at by 
the proper use of reason and the proper search of Scripture. 2 
It is Whichcote's view that purely revealed truth is recorded in 
Scripture and thus the authority of Scripture is of great importance 
to him. However, his interpretation of Scripture is rather critical 
for bis day3 , and in many ways he seems to anticipate modern Biblical 
criticism. Further, because for him truth is truth wherever it is 
found, he uses uncann·onical sources, i.e., Wisdom of Solomon, and 
extra-Biblical writings freely. Nevertheless, Scripture has for him 
a special authority to which he gives fUll reco~ition. He asserts 
that God's "super-additions" to the law 01· creation are found in 
Scripture, but for him Scripture "contains" rather than "is" the 
revelation of God. 4 This latter assumption leaves him free to use 
reason even in bis interpretation of Scripture. He opposes literalism 
in scriptural-interpretation: Scripture must be interpreted in 
relation to other Scripture and especially the context. 
1works, IV, 287ff.; Cf. Aug. De Trin, xiv, 14. 
2 Ibid. , pp. 291:f"f. ; Cf. Aug. De Trin, vii, 3. 
3suura, Ch. III. 4Aph. 542. 
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" ••••• If you will have divine authority, see wbat is said; and 
think it not enough that it is barely related in that book; 
neither is it enough to pretend to a single text, nor to anythin~ 
accidentally spoken, that can amount either to matter of faith, or 
divine instruction: it must be express scripture in conjunction 
with scripture: for scripture as a rule of raith is not one 
scripture but all. 11 1 
In his estimation of various aspects of Scripture, Whichcote 
seems to anticipate the recent concept of "pro~ressive revelationtt in 
the 1 Bible. 2 Nevertheless he assures us that the Bible is "clear and 
fulln concerning all things necessary i'or aalvation. 3 Concerning 
non-essentials we are left to our prudence and :t'ideli ty of interpret-
ation and thus we are as free as we should be and are not bound by 
words and phrases of Scripture where there is no necessity. 4 
"We are all, whether we dissent or agree, one with another, 
in some matters, agreed that we ou~ht to be iUided by scripture. 
Scripture is cle·ar, :full, in all matters of life· and absolutely 
determining in all matters of necessary belief."5 
From this point Whicbcote makes a "leap of faith" which seems to 
go beyond his general position. He would leave room for "implicit 
faithu concerning things which have not been clearly revealed. These 
1works, III, 50ff. 
2Ibid. , I, 179f. This is the general approach o:t· H. E. Fosdick in 
his Guide to the Understanding of the Bible. Cf. Owen, John, Of the 
Divine Ori inall Authorit Self-evidencin Li ht and Power of the 
Scriptures, etc •••• , l1659 , pp.2ff. Owen, a Calvinist, Protestant 
and Independent represents those among Whichcote's contemporaries who 
believed that the penmen of the Bible were totally passive and received 
all immediately from God. ·See also, Mofratt, Golden Book of John Owen, 
pp.148ff. 
3Ibid. , II I , 56. 4Ibid. , IV, 183!'1'. 
5Ibid., pp.203f. Cf. Taylor, Jeremy, Liberty of Prophesying, 
(1834), pp.81fr., 102. 
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things may be contained in Scripture and yet transcend the reach or 
reason. In such cases, one can only refer oneself to God and "believe 
that that is true which God intended in those words". Then there are 
times when God only partly reveals Himself. When God at once reveals 
and hides Himself, we should lmow no more than God reveals. To know 
no more than God reveals is "learned ignorance" and to resign one's 
understanding to ·God is "implicit faith". We should be willing to be 
1 ignorant where God is silent and anxious to understand what God speaks. 
Only the Spirit of God can declare the mind and will of God and for this 
reason we are greatly dependent upon the Spirit in the interpretation 
of Scripture. 2 Where we are unable to come to a meaning:f'ul conclusion 
after a diligent rational search of Scripture, it is safer to suspend 
judgment rather than ·to hasten to an erroneous conclusion. 3 We may 
be certain that if we are sincere and reverent in our search for truth, 
that some organ of God's Spirit will tell us what we should do. 4 And 
if we see at this point an element of irrationality and therefore an 
inconsistency in Whichcote's thought, he would remind us of the 
advantages of this position. This reliance upon the Spirit for truth 
beyond the grasp of reason makes us receptive of all truth and protects 
us against error and intolerance. 5 
1Ibid. , I, 154f. Cf. Pascal, Pensees, (Stewart), "Apology", 515, 
"Verily Thou art a God that hidest Thyself". Whichcote 's concept of 
"learned ignorance" reminds us of the similar view set forth by Cusa 
in his De Docta Ignorantia. 
2Ibid. , p. 169. 
4Ibid. , pp.17f. 
3 Ibid. , II, 3. 
5Ibid., p.6. 
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While this reliance upon the Spirit is g.ood in one respect, our 
author conceives a danger here also. Being aware of the claims made 
by individuals and various religious sects of special spiritual gifts, 
he warns: 
"If you give leave, and listen to persons that now pretend 
to a private spirit of interpreting, and who do not give us 
assurance that their interpretation is warranted by the context; 
we set wanton wit at liberty to bring any fancy whatsoever, and 
lay a foundation for all manner of imaginary conceit; 
1
and so 
frustrate ana enervate scripture, as a rule of faith." 
He adds: 
"If you only say, you have a Revelation from God: I must 
have a Revelation from God too, before I can believe you."2 
Whichcote conceives the Bible as an instrument of God and since it 
contains saving knowledge, a man must read it in order to become a 
Christian. In the Bible, God has "committed his mind to writing" and 
sent His saving truth into the world thereby. When the Bible is 
properly read, it yields assurance of its sacred purpose as well as the 
knowledge of divine truth. 3 Concerning matters of revealed truth we 
are persuaded by the word of God as contained in the Scripture. 
Christianity cannot be forced, because it is a matter of supernatural 
revelation. Here we cannot be convinced by reason alone which is 
supreme in the reception of natural knowledge. This is true because 
Christianity involves the results of God's will which may be known 
only by revelation. 4 
1Ibid., III, 116f. 
3works, III, 58f. 
Articles of faith are resolutions of the divine 
2 
Aph. 443. 
4 Ibid. , I, 176. 
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will and are lm.own only by God's voluntary revelation. To this end, 
the Bible is God's instrument in the world and we have the assurance 
that as far as revelation is necessary to convey anything by way of 
"super-addition" to the light of creation, God bas "clearly, plainly, 
f'ully and satisfactorily laid [it) down in holy scripture". 1 Thus 
we may safely conclude that for Whichcote the revelation of God in 
Scripture is primarily saving knowledge. 
" ••••• Concerning revealed truth, he that is not satisfied in the 
authority of scripture revealing to us matters of faith, is not 
yet persuaded to become a christian. To make one religious in 
general, the principles of God's creation may suffice; to make 
one a christian, the receiving matters of faith is necessary: 
to the discerning of things of natural knowledge, the true, 
severe, impartial use of reason is needfUl: to the knowing of 
things of revealed truth, the fair and ingenuous construction of 
words and phrases in scripture is needful."2 
Looking more cri'tically at Whichcote's view of Scripture, it 
appears that he has some insights which carry him beyond his time, but 
that others place him among his contemporaries. When he cone ei ves 
the special revelation of the Bible as necessary for becoming a 
Christian, he thinks of Christianity primarily as a religion of the 
"Book" - of salvation as depending upon revealed truth as written 
down in the Bible. The more recent view, and one which the present 
writer finds more acceptable, is a more personal conception of 
revelation. As Dr. Jolm Baillie puts it: ttGod does not give 
1Ibid., IV, 152. Cf. Baxter, op. cit., p.240. 
2 Ibid. , I, 386f. 
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us information by communication; He gives us Himself in communion."1 
Whichcote provides himself with the thought-form to develop this more 
wholesome view when he speaks of the spirit of man as the candle of 
the Lord. But this more recent view which H. H. Farmer calls t be 
"radical personalism" of Christian revelation escapes Whicbcote when 
he treats Scripture as a religious authority. In this more recent 
view the Christian revelation is conceived as communion of Person 
with person. Whichcote partly overcomes this criticism in his 
Christology, but it is worth remembering Brunne~'s worthy statement 
of the more personal view of divine revelation. 
"Because, and in so far as, the Scripture testifies to Christ 
•.... I can believe it. Faith in the message carries with it 
faith in the Book ••••• It is not the Book which carries Christ, but 
Christ who carries the Book, and He carries it onl~ ao far as it 
bears witness to· Him, the self-revelation of God."2 
A proper approach to Whichcote's doctrine of sin must begin with a 
consideration of his view of the Fall. Though he relates the story of 
3 
the Fall as recorded in Genesis , he interprets it symbolically rather 
than literally. For him the story indicates man's rebellious nature, 
1Revelation in Recent Tho:u,ght, p.47. To be made aware of this 
new emphasis in the concept of revelation one only needs to be reminded 
of the "God-relationship" of Kierkegaard; the "I and Thou" relationship 
of Buber and the "divine-human encounter" of Brunner. We do not here 
have in mind the type of Personalism set forth by E.S. Brightman. 
2Revelation and Reason, pp.175f. According to Baillie, "Revelation 
consists neither in the dictation of writing nor in the communication of 
information, but in personal communion - the self-disclosure of Person-
ality." Our Knowledge of God, pp.36f. Cf. W. Temple, Nature, Man and 
God, P• 322. 
3Whichcote, op. cit., II, 41f. 
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the refusal to use his reason and freedom to love God. Thus Adam is 
described by Whichcote as a "double" sinner: as immoral since he 
neither feared nor loved God; and as a rebel because of his wilfUl 
1 disobedience. 
The Fall for Whichcote implies that the imago dei has been marred. 
Since the imago dei includes the powers of reason and freedom, the Fall 
implies the fall of reason and perversion of freedom. 2 It follows 
that a careful consideration of the imago dei and the effect of' the 
Fall upon it is desirable at this point. 3 It is to Augustine tbat we 
must go to find a historical reminder of our author's view. Augustine 
says: 
"It is in the soul of' man, that is, in bis rational or 
intellectual soul, that we must find the image of the Creator 
which is immortally implanted in its immortality ••••• Although 
reason or intellect be at one time dormant within it, at another 
appear to be small and at another great, yet the human soul is 
never anything but rational and intellectual. Hence if' it is 
made after the image of God in respect to this, that it is able 
to use reason for the understanding and beholding of God, then 
1Ibid. , PP• 278f. Cf. Mil ton, op. cit. , pp. 262ff. ; P. L. , Bk. III. 
2 Supra, Cb.IV. Cf. Webb, op. cit., pp.127ff. Here original sin 
is described as tbe counterpart not or grace but of the image of God in 
man. It stands :ror the solicitations of the lower nature, conceived 
of' proleptically as sin, of which they constitute the potentiality, 
described from the point of view of one who has already turned away 
from evil to God. 
3
Reinhold Niebuhr bas given a convenient summary of the imago dei 
in historical theology. He concludes that Augustine contributed the 
most satisfying concept of the imago dei of all early thought and 
therefore, Augustine is the first theologian to comprehend the f\lll 
implications of tbe Christian doctrine of man. Nature and Destiny of 
Man, I, 164f. Cf. Brunner, Man in Revolt {tr. Wyon), pp.82-205. 
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from the very moment when that nature so marvellous and so great 
began to be almost none at all, whether it be obscure and defaced 
or bright and beautiful, assuredly it always ia."1 
It would appear that Whichcote derived his view of the imago dei 
and its condition after the Fall almost directly from Augustine. 
he means by the Fall is also implied in the above statement from 
What 
Augustine. Calvin found Augustine's view praisewortb1'2 and according 
to Professor T. F. Torrance, Calvin "ref'used to advance any doctrine of 
man, apart from God's original intention of grace in creating bim in 
the image of Godtt. 3 Unfortunately, Whichcote had to face the kind of 
Cal viniat theology which in Professor Torrance's own words "produced 
a doctrine of the tall and o:t' human depravity apart from the context 
of grace, and interpreted grace as God's answer to human depravity". 4 
Thus it will· be best ·to recall Augustine's general position as we look 
more carefUlly at Whichcote's view. 
Whichcote asserts that when a man fails to use his reason properly, 
he becomes an accessory to bis own destruction. 5 Man is dependent 
1ne Trin, XIV. 4, 6; Cf. Ibid., XV. 1 passim. Milton was greatly 
concerned with the problem of the Fall and by virtue of the influence 
of humanism upon him, his observations on this subject resemble those 
of Whichcote. See Hutchison, Milton and the English Mind, pp.116, 176ff. 
See also, Milton, P.L., III, 372 passim. 
2Niebubr, op. cit., p.165, n.1. 
3calvin's Doctrine of Man, p.20. 
4Ibid. Unfortunately, Luther's view of the imago dei is derined 
purely--ril'terms of contrast to the present state of sin. Commentary on 
Genesis, reterred to by Niebuhr, op. cit., p.171, {n.2). 
5wbichcote, Works, I, 90. 
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upon God tor his existence and when he asserts his independence he 
becomes vain, that is, vain in a "private" sense, for he deforms and 
defaces the image of God within. When a man by his disobedience to 
the divine will mars this high perfection, the imago dei, he loses 
more than all creation can repair. The result of the Fall leads to 
the impotency of reason and guilt of conscience. By this unnatural use 
of our faculties, they are spoiled; this is especially true of the mind 
and the consequence·can be nothing less than unhappiness. 1 All men 
are born with a natural sympathy for the good life. However, by consent 
to evil, man develops a disposition contrary to virtue. By repetition 
this tendency increases until the habit of virtue is not only weakened 
2 
but displaced by vice. Our fallen condition is moral depravity, it 
is not natural but acquired. Whichcote asserts that nothing moral 
can be by genera.tion, but by habit only. Howe.ver, we are not born 
with habits, but only with faculties. Any inclination which is not 
acquired is amoral and nothing is virtue or vice apart from a mind 
actually consenting to good or evil. We are as we have used ourselves 
3 and man's fallen condition may be explained by his self-abuse. Thus 
"to neglect or abuse ourselves" is what Whichcote conceives as the true 




3works, III, 338ff. Whichcote indicates that the Platonists 
contribute to our understanding of man's fallen condition. Cf. Ibid., 
II, 179. 
4Apb. 31. Cf. Milton, De Doctrina, pp.194ff. 
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"In this sunk, degenerate and apostate state of mankind, 
reason is much depressed and even inthralled to sense. Yet it is 
not completely bereft of all sense lat all times at least) of its 
noble pedigree; but is now and then awakened by God, stirred up 
at times to some generous motions in itself; touched with some 
deep remorse at the remembrance of its own ancient, pristine state 
and dignity. When it remembers, recollects and considers what 
it was or may be, it makes some faint efforts to recover that 
which was lost. The goodness and compassion of God directs and 
guides those notions that remind us of the height of .our maker 
and ••••• that we are His offsprings. The grace 01· God stirs up 
in us these motions that we may be restored ••••• No man is good 
enough to bis own satisi'action; the guilt that men have will 
make them tremble when they have been depraved, that they are 
short and imperfect and not as they should be."1 
A few critical observations at this point will clarify Whichcote's 
general position concerning the Fall and point us to the next consider-
ation, viz., sin and guilt. It seems good to look back upon bis view 
from the position held by a select group of modern theologians, Brunner, 
Barth, J. Baillie and J. s. Whale. Barth who stands in the general 
Augustinian tradition, but who seeks to prove that revelation from God 
to man bas practically no point o:t· contact with man except that which 
it creates !'or i tselr, would find Whicbcote' s concept of the imago dei 
1works, IV, 303ff. Wbicbcote describes the Devil as an "enemy 
extraordinaryu. God made no such enemy for man, but the Devil is the 
result of apostacy of the higher creation. God defends men from the 
Devil by His special providence, unless they wilfully betray or offend 
God and turn to the Devil by consent. However, if men will not accept 
their finitude and insist upon knowing more than God reveals by other 
means, even contrary to reason, this gives the Devil bis opportunity 
to seize them. In such cases God removes bis protection and su:f:t'ers 
men to receive the errect of their choice. If we remain under the 
protection or God's special providence, tbe power Satan has over us is 
limited and be is not able to do us much harm. Ibid., pp.306ff. We 
are here reminded or what Milton describes as Go'd1'°S"extraordinary" 
providence, op. cit., pp.215f. 
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very inconvenient and would no doubt criticise it severely. 1 On the 
other hand, Brunner at certain points comes remarkably close to Which-
cote on the subject. He refuses to depart from what he calla 
Ansprechbarkeit, addressability in man, even sin:f\11 man. Thus he 
distinguishes between the :eorm.al and material imago. The formal imago 
is untouched by sin, while the material imago is lost. Brunner says: 
uTo formulate it differently: as before, man is a person, 
i.e., he is in a derived sense that which God is originally. Yet 
he is not a personal person but an anti-personal person; for the 
truly personal is existence in love, the submission of the self 
to the will of God and there1'ore an entering into communion with 
one's f'ellow-creature because one enjoys communion with God. 
This quid of' personality is negatived through sin, whereas the 
guod of personality constitutes the humanum or every man, also 
that of the sinner. 0 2 
Professor Baillie who gives a careful study and criticism of the 
position or Barth and Brunner alike seems to come closer to Whichcote 
than the other two theologians when he says that the doctrine of the 
imago dei has its basis in the fact that our existent human nature 
presents itself to us, not as a simply bad thing, but as "a good thing 
spoiled". 3 And Dr. J. s. Whale agrees that man's initial endowment 
is indestructible. He says: " ••••• Man, just because he is man, is 
1cr. "Nein~" in Brunner' s Natural Theology, pp. 67fr. 
2 "Nature and Grace", Brunner, lliQ.., p.24. Cf. Brunner, Man in 
Revolt, p.98. 
3our Knowledge of God, p.23. The first section of this work is 
a valuable appraisal of Barth's and Brunner's controversy concerning 
nature and grace. ·Baillie's introduction to Brunner's Natural 
Theology is also invaluable. 
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unable to destroy his endowment. God's image is not destroyed. 11 1 
When we turn to a direct consideration of Whichcote's concept 
of sin we face once again his "classical view" of man. 2 Niebuhr has 
significantly pointed out that wherever the classical view of man 
predominates, the tendency is to equate sin with sensuality, while the 
definition of sin as pride is consistently maintained in the strain of 
theology generally known as Augustinian. 3 Niebuhr concludes: 
"Biblical and Christian thought has maintained with a fair 
degree of consistency that pride is more basic than sensuality and 
that the latter is, in some way, derived from the former ••••• The 
Pauline exposition of man's self-glorification ••••• is really an 
admirable summary of the whole Biblical doctrine of sin."4 
If Niebuhr's general observations are correct and they seem to 
the present writer to be so, then Whicbcote's concept of sin is, in 
emphasis at least, unAugustinian and what is more serious, unbiblical. 
To our author sin is always sin against the light, consent to known 
iniquity, or holding the truth in unrigbteousness. 5 
moral evil, it is not only irrational, but immoral. 
Further sin is 
By voluntary 
consent to lmown iniquity, a man parts, at once, with reason and 
1christian Doctrine, p.45. 
2According to Niebuhr the classical view of man consists primarily 
of Platonic, Aristotelian and Stoic conceptions of human nature with 
varying emphasis upon man's capacity for thought and reason, op. cit., 
p.6. The Christian view, on the other band, is determined by the 
ultimate presuppositions of the Christian faith and human nature in 
Christian thought allows for the unity of body and soul in human person-
ality, op. cit., pp.12f. 
3Niebuhr, op. cit~, p.199 1 (n.1). Cf. Aug. De Civ. Dei, xii. 13, xiv. 13; CalVin, Institutes, \1611), Bk.I, Ch.4. 
4 Ibid. , pp.198f. 5wbichcote, Works, I, 41. 
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1 conscience. Sin is the result of a rational and free moral agent 
choosing evil in preference to the gooa. 2 Thus far the classical view 
of Which Niebuhr speaks seems to apply to Whichcote's concept of sin -
sin is irrationality and sensuality. 
But to recognise this tendency in Whichcote's thought is only 
part of the picture, for to him sin is self-will as well as the lack 
of self-control. Whicbcote asserts that self-will is the greatest 
idol in the world, it is anti-Christ or anti-Goa. 3 Even here, however, 
our attention is called back to the classical strand in his thought, 
for be insists that "ignorance" of our limitations is the basis of 
pride. 4 Thus instead of explaining man's fallen reason and sensuality 
by pride, Whicbcote attempts to do just the opposite. It is because 
man bas lost his self-control, because his passions have subdued his 
reason, that he has given himself over to self-will and pride. It is 
to the credit of Whichcote that he manages to give some significant 
emphasis to what be calls spiritual sins. Since true human behaviour 
is always for him intentional behaviour, he conceives hypocracy as a 
serious spiritual sin. Concerning the hypocrite, he says "He, that is 
bad is worst of all; when he feigns himself to be good". 5 He also 
1 Ibid. , pp. 96ff. 
2Ibid., pp.81ff. Cf. Milton, op. cit., p.277. 3 Aph. 653. 
4Ibid., 747. J. s. Whale is in essential agreement with Niebuhr 
that pride is the basis of all sin. Whale uses Jung's apt definition 
of man's proud trust in himself as "his Godalmigbtinessu, op. cit., p.45. 
5Aph. 1147. 
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includes among spiritual sins: evil thoughts, sins of will and sins of 
passion. 
Evil thoughts are first conceived in the mind and for this reason 
the mind of an evil man is his worst part just as the mind of a good 
man is his best part. An evil man cannot do all the evil he desires 
and it follows f'rom this that evil thoughts are to be considered as the 
highest degree of wickedness. Sins of will occur when the will is 
undirected by reason, for it is like "wild-fire" for man in bis 
fini tude to set up will as a "light". Unless reason guides the will 
the order of nature is inverted and sins of the will are the result. 
Sins of passion are also among the spiritual sins, since it is in 
order for affections to follow judgment and choice. Our affections 
are only to quicken· a.n action determined by reason and it is because 
passions are blind in themselves that they must always follow reason. 
Sins of passion always occur when the order is reversed or when reason 
1 is banished all together. To sum up his general view of sin, 
Wbichcote says: 
"Here is a declaration of its filthiness and unworthiness, 
its odiousness in the sight of God, its ill demerit, its 
hurtfUlness to the creature; for it destroys the subject, 
and is a pernicious example ••••• It bath in it all impurity; 
there is no natural corruption bath in it that degree of 
naughtiness and impurity, that moral impurity bath; for in 
moral turpitude there is that that is spiritual impurity ••••• 
It is loathsome, abominable, and detestable in the eyes of 
God; for it is contrary to bis nature, and contrary to his mind 
and will. And then it is ill demerit; for whereas God delights 
to do bis creatures good, this provokes God to turn from his 
creatures."2 
lworks, IV, 429-435. 2Ibid., II, 276f. 
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Two important implications of Whichcote's concept of sin are 
that temptation is not sin and that there are degrees of sin. Since 
sin is the consent to known iniquity, the mere knowledge of evil is 
not evil. God is aware of evil or He could not punish it. "It is 
not what you know or think, but what you make choice of, and delight in" 
that is rightly conceived as sin.1 F. R. Tennant puts it this way, 
"The thought of evil is not necessarily an evil thought". And Tennant 
adds that this view is consistent with the Christian belief that Christ 
was one tempted without sin. 2 The assertion of Whichcote that sin 
is "sin against the light" logically leads to the conclusion that the 
amount of light determines the degree of sin. If there is "clear 
light and full liberty", sin is great, but if sin results from 
"confusion of conscience" a man is not fUlly responsible, sin is of a 
lesser degree. 3 Tennant's agreement here is noteworthy. 
"Not the highest that a given individual can conceive as 
the highest ideal to be known, but the highest that a given 
individual at a given time can know, must be the standard by 
which, at that time, that individua!'s acts and character are 
to be judged as sinfill or sinless." 
1Ibid., p.368. Aph. 841. Whichcote does not take temptation 
lightly for he is aware of the prevalence and power of temptation, of 
the deceitfulness of sin and the tendency of sin to be self-perpetuatin~ 
Cf. Works, II, 353f.; I, 12. 
2concept of Sin, p.194. 
3whichcote, Works, I, 142f. 
4Tennant, op. cit., p.87. According to Tennant, the absolute 
or objective ideal of moral conduct, such as Christians find embodied in 
Christ, cannot be adopted as the standard or criticism by which all sorts 
and ·conditions of men including heathen and children, for instance, are 
at once convicted of sin, without making sin a metaphysical necessity, 
a consequence of the limitations belonging to the finite as such: 
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Oddly enough the beat statement of the rationalist-classical view 
of sin and the Biblical view, both or· which are manifest in Whichcote's 
concept of sin, comes from Niebuhr who bas taken his stand against the 
classical view. This observation by Niebuhr is also a worthy defence 
of Whichcote's view. Niebuhr says: 
uTbe Biblical view colours the definitions of the Christian 
rationalists so that, when they define sin primarily as sensuality, 
they recognise, at least, that this sensuality is not merely the 
expression of physical impulse but represents an inordinate 
quality made possible by the freedom of the spirit." 
We have seen that in our author's concept of the Fall, each man is 
the "Adam of his own soul" and in giving himself over to sensuality 
the candle of the Lord within burns so dim that he cannot see by it. 
Thus Whichcote's approach tot he subject of the Fall and sin generally 
has the semblance of the classical view of man. It is not surprising 
without making sin, in fact, precisely what it is not. Ibid., p.83. 
It is the form rather than the content of the standard that is constant; 
and the relativity of the content is not only compatible with the 
absoluteness of the form - the bare imperative - but constitutes an 
essential condition of its obligatoriness, ~·, p.85. Tennant's 
concept of sin is a ~ood supplement and commentary and in many ways a 
defence of Whicbcote s view of sin. See Tennant's definition of sin, 
Ibid., p.245. Cf. The Origin and Propagation of Sin,(1902~ and~ 
Sources of the Doctrine of the Fall and Ori~inal Sin,(1903l by the 
same author. Whale's criticism of Tennant s use of tbe evolutionary 
theory to explain the origin of sin does not apply to Wbicbcote's view. 
Cf. Whale, op. cit., pp. 47ff. 
~iebuhr, op. cit., p.200. Gregory of Nyssa is cited as an 
example as be says: "Thus the arising of anger in us is indeed akin 
to the impulses of brutes; but it grows by the alliance of thought." 
Ibid., (n.1), from On the Making of Man, XVIII, 4. 
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that when he speaks of guilt, he does so in terms of self-condemnation. 1 
He asserts that when God made man, He endowed him with "such principles 
that he was a law given to himself", and if he varied from this law of 
his creation, he must be self-condemned, and if self-condemned, 
unavoidably miserable. 
contract guilt. 2 
Thus to go against the way God made us is to 
"Man knows what he ought to do both by reason and revelation. 
And he has put out both of his eyes, that does not see these things, 
that does not discern his obligation to them. He has ~ut out the 
eye of natural light and the eye of divine revelation. tt3 
We would expect from Whichcote's general position that once a 
man had deadened his conscience by sin, be would no longer feel the 
pangs of guilt. Our author sees the matter differently, for as sin 
multiplies we become more miserable. We must recall Whichcote's 
assertion that man's happiness is only in accordance with his relation 
to God~ and he is consistent when be argues that sin leads to 
unhappiness, because it alienates us from God. It follows that the 
more habitual sin becomes the more miserable a man becomes. 
"The ground of ma.n's misery is not the first fall but the 
second fault, that is, a lapse upon a lapse. A second sin is 
not another of the same kind, but the consummation of the first. " 5 
In the lower degree of sin God is neglected, but in the higher 
1we have seen Supra, Ch.V, how he applies this notion to the 
function of conscience and in the next chapter he applies it in a special 
way to his concept of punishment. Cf. Cudworth, A Sermon Preached 
Before The House of Commons, {1647), pp.72f. 
2wbichcote, Works, III, 347. 3Ibid., IV, 437f. 
4see Supra, Ch. v. 5Apb. 525. 
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degree of Bin He is af1·ronted 1 , and man comes to live entirely by sense 
and passion because of his violation of judgment, reason and conscience.2 
Guilt, then, is the normal consequence of sin. Because of sin God 
awakens such guilt in the sinner that he cannot escape it by various 
diversions. Even those who would sin themselves into senselessness, 
find that by sinning against the light they hurt ttemselves inwardly, 
and this wound within does not release them from guilt but adds to the 
torture of their souls. Nothing can bring inner peace to the man who 
voluntarily consents to known iniquity, for such a person is separated 
from God and in this state no man can be happy. 3 Whichcote concludes 
that in the state of guilt a sinner is self-condemned by conscience 
before he is judged by God, but he is finally condemned by botb. 
"There is ·no defence for that man who is in danger in respect 
of God; and the desperateness of the condition lies further in 
this; that this mischief is not alone: but a wounded conscience 
accompanies it: and this is a misery beyond all expression, to 
have almighty God, whose power no man can withstand, engaged 
against a person, and to have our own conscience accusing and 
condemning also; this is a state which causes astonishment both 
from without and from within: a man will be a1·raid to stay at 
home, or to enjoy his own thoughts, because of the troublesomeness 
and uneasiness of his own mind. And who can interpose in this 
case? Who can comfort, when God and conscience doth condemn and 
give testimony against a man? These are testimonies; against 
which there can be no objection; God's omniscience, and our own 
conscience."4 
1Ibid. , 766. 2Ibid. I 985. 3worka, I, 94f. 
4Ibid., pp.129r. According to Whichcote, a man is even more 
guilty wben he enjoys the sins of others. It takes an extremely 
degenerate conscience and mind to get "pleasure and profit" from tbe 
sins of others. Ibid. , III, 286ff. Cf. H. R. Mackintosh, The 
Christian Experience-or Forgiveness, pp.52f. 
21Y. 
In spite of all the emphasis Whicbcote places upon the individual 
nature ot' sin and personal responsibility for it, he is also aware of 
social sins. Sin is destructive to oneself, but it goes deeper and is 
more far reaching than the effect upon a single life. Sin is a 
variation from the "reason of things", it is an attempt to over-rule 
1 the proper order of things "settled and established from eternity". 
Sin is an attempt "to control the immutable and unalterable Laws of 
everlasting Righteousness, Goodness and Truth; upon which the 
Universe depends."2 As J. s. Whale reminds us, all serious thought 
about the mystery of iniquity has had to grapple with its constitut-
3 ional, as well as its volitional, aspect. It is significant that 
Whichcote with all his emphasis upon the "volitional" aspect of sin 
also perceived what Tillich calls the "demonic" aspect of society, 
history, and the cosmos, as the result of sin. Wbichcote states his 
view aptly thus: "Sin is such an ill-natured thing that a sinner is 
an Incendiary and sets the world on fire". 4 In a sermon before the 
House of Commons, 4th February, 1673, Whichcote says: 
1 Aph. 646. 
2Ibid. 682. 
3whale, op. cit.; Whale feels that some explanation for tbe 
universality of sin is necessary. He considers the concept of original 
sin which implies and means original guilt completely untenable 
especially on moral grounds. Thus he suggests that it is time to 
rethink the main implications attested to by the doctrine or original 
sin in 1·ace of the historical :t•act of universal moral imperfection. 
Ibid. , pp. 48f. 
4whichcote, Apb. 730. 
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"It sba.11 be my business this day ••••• to press not only 
what is external ••••• but what is vital ••••• in the motion of 
repentance, which now this nation doth profess in this solemn 
application unto God. Our ~reat and loud ·sins, they are the 
things that expose us to God s displeasure, indignation and 
wrath. And because generals do not affect, I shall instance 
in some particulars: our falseness and treachery to the true 
religion, in Which this nation hath prospered above a hundred 
years: our affected atheism, and avowed profaneness, beyond 
what former times have had experience of: our wantonness and 
licentiousness, disgraceful to human nature: our own high 
immoralities and debacheries in several ways. These have 
brought the judgments of God upon us, and turned God from us 
in displeasure. And none that is sober-minded can think 
otherwise, if he acknowledges God's government of the world, 
and doth consider tha.t Wickedness and unrighteousness are an 
abomination to him. 11 1 
Indeed, when one reads the above sermon or Cudworth's famous 
sermon to the same assembly, one is reminded of the Old Testament 
prophets of social justice, i.e., Amos, Micah and Isaiah. On the 
other hand the same spirit is found in the writings 01· J~ c. Bennett 
and Reinbold Niebuhr. But as Bennett reminds us it is not sufficient 
merely to distinguish between the two types of sin by definition, 
they must be overcome by different means. Bennett, in speaking of 
social sin, as.ya: 
"It can only be overcome by a variety of' means which include 
knowledge of cause and effect and large scale changes in2insti-tutions and in external circumstances by social action." 
Whichcote now arrives at the central point of Christian theology. 
Between man's fallen and sinful condition and his redemption, Wbicbcote 
1works, I, 123. 
2social Salvation, pp.Sf. That Whichcote meets this more active 
test is attested to by bis life of general social concern. Cf. 
Supra , Ch. I. 
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places the work of Christ. For him Christology continually merges 
into Soteriologyl, and in his thought the Person of Christ can be 
discerned primarily from His work. 2 Nevertheless, he gives us some 
preliminary observations concerning the Person of Christ. 
In the Incarnation Christ is made "like unto us" but this like-
ness requires qualification especially in the light of our imperfectiona 
Thus Whichcote finds it necessary to distinguish between negative and 
privative imperfections in us. The former belong to our creature-
liness, while the latter are the fruits of our apostacy. It is 
reasonable to assume that Christ shares the limitations of our 
creation with us, but He does not share our sina. 3 Brunner seems to 
capture our author's view when he asserts that Christ came "in" the 
flesh but not "after" the flesh. Whichcote insists, then, that our 
Saviour by partaking with us in our natures, partakes also in our 
weakness and infirmities and we, on our side, thus partake of the 
1n. M. Baillie, God Was in Christ, p.160. Cf. c. E. Raven, 
Natural Science and Christian Theology, II, 90. 
2Brunner, Dogmatics, II, 272. Dean Inge observes that Bishop 
Westcott "like all Hellenisers ••••• makes the Incarnation, rather than 
the Atonement, the central point of his theology". But according 
to Inge the Incarnation is the Atonement, see, The Platonic Tradition 
in English Religious Thought, p.102. Elsewhere the same author 
asserts that the religious philosophy to which Augustine was converted 
was the Platonism of Plotinus with the doctrine of the Incarnation 
added, see, The Philosophy of Plotinus, II, 207; Cf. Aug., Conf., vii.9. 
Here, however, Inge's comprehensive notion of the Incarnation as the 
Atonement holds and only thus may we classify Whicbcote among the 
Christian Platonists as Inge conceives them. 
3whichcote, Works, II, 247f. 
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d 1 vine nature, which is free from ell want and imperfection. ·1 To 
state it differently, the Word became flesh that flesh might become 
Word. 
As a result of' the Incarnation, the natural order can no longer 
be conceived as "base" for this is the real meaning of the Incarnation, 
that God reveals Himself as, at once, the Author of' nature and the 
2 
Giver of' grace. When our Saviour became embodied in flesh, the 
greatest honour was bestowed upon not only human nature but all nature. 
It is nevertheless true that God in the Incarnation assumes a special 
relation to man. 
" ••••• Observe ••••• tbe great honour put upon human nature; when 
tbe son of' God came into it; when divine goodness did take into 
consideration the rise and advance of created nature; and to 
recover and ra~se it to all possible perfection: be did take to 
himself a peculiar relation to human nature ••••• God united human 
nature to his own existence, and set it at his own right band ••••• 
This ••••• is one of the greatest works of' God. This, if' possible, 
doth transcend tbe very creation of God, at first: for, there 
was nothing there to resist him: but, in the restoration, there 
was malignity and sin. 11 3 
Unfortunately, Whichcote's consideration of' the way in which the 
Incarnation transcends creation appears inadequate. So important is 
this insight in relation to all his thought that Professor John 
Baillie's observation is welcomed at this point. 
"What God does in Christ is a miracle not of omnipotence 
but of grace. Grace implies a selr-limitation on the part of' 
omnipotence, since there can only be grace where there is self-
acceptance in the absence of coercion. The act of creation is 
1Ibid. , PP• 246f. 
3Ibid. , IV, 189. 
2Ibid., p.76. 
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an act of sheer omnipotence, but the act of recreation of God's 
image is essentially an act of grace - and to that extent 
different from an act of creation."1 
The goodness of God, Whichcote conceives as the motivation of 
God's act of restoration in Christ. 2 Our Saviour came from God to 
do the work of God. While using the terminology of Aristotle he 
gives these terms Christian content: the First Mover or the Unmoved 
:Mover becomes the Self-moving God, Who by His goodness moves in our 
direction in Christ to restore us from our lost condition. God 
takes the initiative in Christ to save us. This goodness of God 
moved Him to have compassion for sinful man and was the "moving 
cause" of Christ's coming. 3 Here Whicbcote breaks not only with 
the passionless God of Aristotle, but with the Neo-Platonic Absolute. 
To predicate motion on the part of the Absolute thus conceived is an 
intolerable contradiction, for movement means striving, and striving 
means to seek for something one does not possess, and this implies 
imperfection. It is often true that where Whichcote appears at 
first glance to be most Platonic, be is most Christian. Here the 
Platonic concept of the good is "baptisedu into the concept of Agape. 
1our Knowledge of God, p.24. Since Whicbcote's primary concern 
is with the work of Christ no detailed discussion concerning the person 
of Christ seems necessary. The following works are suggested for 
further investigation: D. M. Baillie, God Was in Christ; H. R. 
Mackintosh, The Doctrine of the Person o:t' Jesus Christ; P. T. Forsyth, 
The Person and Place of Jesus Christ; W. L. Bradley, P. T. Forsyth, 
The Man and His Work, Ch.V; c. s. Duthie, God in His World, Ch.II; 
A. B. Bruce, The Humiliation of Christ; and Brunner, The Mediator, 
(tr. O. Wyon, 1934). 
2whichcote, Works, II, 77. 3Ibid., pp.96f. 
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He uses the concept of the good in precisely the same way that Nygren1 
or Brunner employ Agape. Whichcote appears to anticipate Brunner's 
very words, allowing for the use of "love" instead of goodness, as 
Brunner says: "The God or the Christian faith ••••• the Living God, is 
in Himself motion, because in His very Nature He is Love." 2 
Let us compare Whichcote's own words: 
"I will make the goodness of God's nature, which is his 
natural perfection, that that doth 'inwardly' affect ••••• him 
to benevolence ••••• and compassion and to relieve lost creaturea." 3 
God and the sinner, Whichcote asserts, come together only by 
means of a mediator.4 The worst apoatacy is the failure to acce~t 
Christ as the only Mediator between God and man. With this principle 
in mind, our author challenges the concept of "good works" held by 
Jews, Papists, and "mere" Naturalist, alike. 5 But he freely uses 
the ideas of the Jews and Platonists alike to illustrate his concept 
of mediation in Christ. 
The Platonists, he recalls, had a notion of mediation between 
God and man which conceived Deity as being so transcendent as to be 
inaccessible to man in his meanness. They were aware of man's 
fallen condition and offered this as an explanation for the impossibility 
of man's approach to supreme Deity. It was !'or this reason that they 
1Nygren's Agape and Eros is a monumental work on this subject. 
2Brunner, The Mediator, p.285; Cf. Ibid., p.287. 
3whichcote, Works, IV, 77f. 4rbid., II, 334. 
5Ibid. , pp. 320f. 
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introduced a sort of "middle powers" called Daemons as intermediate 
between Deity and man. Now they were correct as to the idea, but 
they knew not the Person. But the real point is, that these heathen 
writers, outside the pale of the Church, without the light of 
Scripture, held such a bigh concept of mediation as to humble the 
proud within the Church, who attempt to embrace the Gospel without 
accepting Christ as their mediator. 1 
To illustrate the priestly function of Christ as mediator, 
Whicbcote recalls the function of the Jewish high priest. He 
asserts that tbe Jewish high priest was an instrument of God, a 
"middle person" between God and the people and by God's appointment 
he made "reconciliation and atonement" for them. But the function 
of the Jewish high priest is superseded by our Great High Priest. 
We have in Christ a high priest in "substance and truth". Those who 
relied upon the Jewish high priest only touched the hem of His 
garment, they were acquainted only with His proxy, but we who accept 
Christ es our Mediator have tbe knowledge of His Person. 
2 
He 
concei vea the priesthood of Christ a.s a fUlfilment of what bad only 
been foreshadowed by the Jewish high priest. 
1 Ibid., pp.302ff. Cf. Aug., De Civ. Dei, viii. 4, 5. It was 
concerning their inadequate view of the mediation of Christ that Henry 
More attacked the Quakers of his day. See Tbe Grand Mystery of 
Godliness, Bk.X, Ch.XIII, pp.533:r. Cf. Tallack, "Quakers and Cambridge 
Platonists", F.Q.E., Vol.XXIII, (1889), p.191. A comparison of 
Ficino's view of' the media.tion of Christ with that of Whichcote is 
instructive, see Kristeller, The Philosophy of Ficino, Appendix I, 
pp. 405f. 
2Ibid. , p. 254. 
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Christ, according to Whichcote, is the "middle person" in the 
order of being and is for this reason suitable as Mediator between 
God and man. It follows that all who are acceptable to God are 
accepted in Christ, and a fallen creature that is not accepted in 
Christ is rejected for ever. The fact that men may only be 
acceptable to God by Christ means that Christ is not merely a 
convenience but a sheer necessity. We are now, says Whichcote, at 
the centre of "gospel-revelation" and though it is supra-rational, 
it is not irrational. 1 He reasons thus: there is no one more 
suitable for the office of mediator than Christ, that is, if we 
consider the height of Hie Person, the integrity of His nature, and 
His nearness to God and to man. In the height of His Person, He is 
equal to God; in the integrity of His nature, He is perfect; and, 
in His relation to God and man there is no one to compare with Him, 
for He is the God-man. 2 To sum up bis concept of the mediation of 
Christ, Whichcote says: 
"I do observe in the history of all times, that those 
in all places, in all ages, that have been anything raised 
in their intellectuals, or refined in their morals, have 
expected some way from God whereby he should save sinners. 
If we were as real in matters of religion, as in other 
matters, we should find a necessity of some mediation with 
God, as they have done, and in answer to this, the scripture 
calla Christ the 'desire of all nations' ••••• If he was not 
the voice of their souls, I am sure he was the voice of 
1Ibid.' pp.300ff. 
2Ibid. , p. 335. 
in Curl5eUs Homo? 
Here we recall the similar argument of Anselm 
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t~eir necess~ty ••.•• Let us make just use of him, and receive 
him ror our JUstification ••••• Let us be willing to be as 
much beholden to Christ, as he is ready to gratify us. u1 
Christ is not only the Mediator in a general sense, but He is 
also the Reconciler. Thus our author asserts that Christ resigns 
Himself entirely to the will of God and is obedient unto death in 
2 order to move God to forgive fallen men. Christ is the Reconciler 
of the offended God and the offending man. As Reconciler, Christ 
considers the right of both parties, that of God and man equally. 
God has a two1'old right over man, the right of authority and of 
owner. In keeping with the former claim upon us, God bas the right 
to expect our service and in keeping with the latter, our payment o'f 
debts. The creditor bas the right to expect payment ot· a loan even 
if the debtor is non~solvent and it follows that God retains His demand 
upon us even if we have disabled ourselves by apostacy. However, if 
God meted out strict justice at this point, we should be eternally 
lost; but fortunately, it is at this point that Christ as Reconciler, 
intercedes for us. Man as an apostate and rebel cannot render God 
satisfaction, but he may still do something, for however dim the light 
of God's candle within man may be, it is not extinguished. The 
Reconciler considers at once the creditor's right and the debtor's 
necessity. He asks man to do what he can, i.e., acknowledge God, 
repent and return to duty. If man does all he can, then the Reconciler 
1 Ibid., pp.331f.; Cf. Milton, P.L., III, 160-182. 
2Ibid., pp.263ff. 
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"moves" God to "abate" His right and accept the "little but all" that 
the sinner can offer. The Reconciler does not "overbear" either 
party, but is completely governed by each party's rights and by the 
necessity of the case. But Whichcote adds that the Reconciler is 
most anxious to rend~r God satisfaction and to protect His honour. 
"He convinces the offender of his ingratitude and t bat 
be must orfer something to the offended in exchange for 
forgiveness. There must be voluntary submission of the 
delinquent party, and voluntary remission of' the oft'ended 
party. There must be free forgiveness on God's part, and 
ingenuous submission on the sinner's part. Our Saviour 
takes care that God may come off with honour, and that that 
may be done that is sa1·e and best, by the creature. By 
his sacrit1ice be doth persuade God to pardon; and thereby 
secures God's honour: for it is acknowledged 'God bath 
right'. The case is rightly stated for God's honour, and 
the creature is brought to rights again. Truth is 
acknowledged; and God is justi1'ied. 11 1 
Whichcote conceives the Cross as the crucial point in Christ's 
act of reconciliation of God and man. Reconciliation is by the act 
of atonement and as conceived by Whichcote it indicates the awfUlness 
of sin. When Christ dies :f'or sin He condemns sin in His death. 2 
1Ibid., pp.266fr. er. Anselm, Cur Deus Homo?, Bk.II. So close 
is Whichcote's doctrine of Atonement to Anselm's in its logical method 
and its emphasis upon rendering "satisraction" and "honour" to God that 
Professor Mackintosh's criticism or Anselm's Cur Deus Homo? is applic-
able to our author's view. According to Mackintosh, "· •••• This 
severely logical procedure provides no real guarantee o:f truth". 
The Person of Christ, p.408. It may be observed that Whichcote, in 
his conception of the complete se11·-abasement of Christ as Reconciler, 
seems to anticipate the Kenotic Theory of the Incarnation in recent 
thought. See a criticism o:f the theory by D. M. Baillie, op. c it. , 
pp.94ff. Cf. A defence of the theory by Mackintosh, op. cit., pp.466f. 
See also Duthie, op. cit., pp.2~ff. 
2Ibid. , p. 136. 
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The Son of God upon coming to abolish sin finds it necessary to lay 
down His lire. Christ is the second Adam who renders satia:f'action to 
God for sin in the very nature that baa trangressea. 1 God had 
prohibited sin under the penalty of death and Christ dies for sin 
overcoming death itself. In the death of Christ God's truthfulness 
and holiness are declared and vindicated according to the mind and 
will of God. And what makes the death of Christ more e1'1'icacious 
than all the passive sacrifices of Judaism was that His sacrifice was 
!ully conscious, it was a true self-humiliation. Thus His sacrifice 
for sin is a "reasonable service" and for this reason highly acceptable 
to God. 2 
"Now our Saviour being highly intelligent, and fully 
voluntary did in his understanding, design and aim at all 
these ends, whi6h are so good for man as be was apprehensive 
of them, so be
3
was free in all that he did; he did it with 
all his soUl." 
Not only His conscious self-abasement, but His sinless nature 
enhances tbe erficacy or His sacririce for sin. When the New 
Testament states that Christ 0 was made sin for us", it is using the 
language of' the Hebrews. Thia being so, one word signii'ies sin, 
sacririce for sin and expiation of sin. Christ, then, was a 
sacrifice for sin, for our Saviour was completely sinless or else He 
would have been unable to render satisfaction for sin. It is not 
1Ibid. , pp.277-81. 
2 .IE1[. , PP• 281f. Here we are reminded of the Kenotic Theory. 
3Ibid. , pp.283f.; Cf. Milton, De Doctrine, pp.295, 316, 328. 
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His passion itself but the fact that it is a propitiation for sin that 
is the ground of our comfort. His passion is our justification 
because it leads to our reconciliation with God. 1 
A sacrifice suffers that which it does not deserve on behalf of 
others. Therefore Christ's suffering was vicarious, for He suffered 
in our stead. His suffering was above all others because of His 
unique and compassionate nature. Accordingly, His suffering was 
deeply in obedience to God and in compassion for us. 2 God is not 
responsible for His suffering since He suffered entirely of His own 
will. He identified Himself with us in His suffering being clothed 
with out nature and touched with our infirmities and tempted as we 
are. At the same time, His suffering was in accord with the will of 
His Father and by it.the Father's honour is vindicated. By Christ's 
suffering, God is portrayed as One Who bates iniquity and Who govems 
with justice and righteousness. God might have pardoned sin by His 
power but did not consider this the best way. But He decided that sin 
should not be pardoned without atonement and that His displeasure 
concerning man's apostacy should be fUlly disclosed. Thus God chose 
Christ, the Person above all persons, One acceptable to Him as a proxy 
for sinful man as an offering for sin and Christ is permitted to suffer 
this evil for the establishment of the rule of righteousness. 3 And 
1Ibid., pp.267-70. 




since Wbichcote conceives Christ as equal with God, it would be 
consistent to add with Brunner 
" ••••• In the New Testament the Cross of Christ is conceived 
as the self-offering of God. It is God who does it, it is 
God Himself who suffers, it "is God who takes the burden upon 
Himself."1 
In our author's general conception of the work of Christ bis 
purpose appears to be the wholesome one of demonstrating what he calls 
the goodness and compassion of God. But Dr. Whale' a critical 
observation on the subject applies here. 
"Because the 'objective' theories [of atonement] represent 
Christ's death as necessary, not only to man but to God; and 
because Western soteriology has used the legal word 'Satisfaction' 
to affirm the holiness of God's love and the eternal moral 
realities which are implicit in his forgiveness, modern men 
protest that such a word makes God out to be a capricious 
Oriental Sultan, a cruel tyrant who arbitrarily demands the 
suffering and death of an innocent Vic~im, that the guilty 
man may be spared his avenging anger." 
1The Mediator, pp.482f. One can only regret that Whichcote does 
not avail himself of more moving terms than the "goodness" or "compassion" 
of God in his concept of the Atonement. "Love" and what Nygren calls 
the "Agape of the Crosstt seem to capture and communicate the full meaning 
of the suffering love of God for "us men and our salvation" much better. 
See Agape and Eros, pp.105ff. 
2whale, op. cit., pp.92f. A concise, yet a worthy view of the 
atonement is presented by Principal c.s. Duthie, op. cit., p.33. 
Anselm's doctrine of the Atonement was opposed by Abelard who offered 
his moral theory of atonement which is even less acceptable than Anselm's 
view, see Aulen, Christus Victor, (tr. Hebert, 1931), pp.112f. Cf. E.R.E., 
I, 16ff. In his emphasis, at once, upon the rational and moral nature of 
the saving work of Christ, Whichcote combines in bis view Anselmic and 
Abelardian elements. Whatever contradictions there are in this combin-
ation may be attributed to our author's anxiety to state a completely 
intelligible doctrine of the Atonement. Cf. De Pauley, The Candle of the 
Lord, p.33. Aulen's work is invaluable as a historical and theological 
study of the three main types of the idea of the atonement. 
232. 
God is the giver of grace and this grace is what Whichcote calla 
. 1 a "superaddition" to the creation. God as the Author of nature is 
also the Giver of grace and bestows at once the gifts of nature and 
2 
grace. God's grace is truly a gift; it is not merited but flows 
naturally from God's intentions to do us good. Our Saviour came as 
the fulfilment of God's gracious purpose, to make even more evident 
the unmerited character of divine grace. 3 Our author defines grace 
in two ways which are complementary to each other. First, there is 
gratia gratum faciens, the favour of God through which He renders man 
acceptable to Himself. This is the usual meaning of the term in 
Scripture a.nd in this sense, God is the Subject of grace while we are 
only objects. But, secondly, there is grata gratis data, or grace 
freely given by God. · This latter concept of grace is the effect of 
the former and we are the subjects of it in such wise that the same 
thing which is virtue in us is grace in reference to God. 4 It is 
in agreement with the last usage of the word grace that the Gospel is 
often called the Gospel of grace, by virtue of the fact that it results 
from the goOdness of God extended to us. It is significant that by 
his twofold employment of the concept of grace, Whicbcote points to 
his views concerning justification by faith and by works as well as 
the agreement between them. Thus his assertion that the same t bing 
which in man the subject, is virtue, is in God the Author, grace is 
1Whichcote, Works, II, 74. 
3
Ibid. , PP• 86ff • 
2Ibid. , PP• 75f. 
4Ibid., pp. 204ff. 
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central to his thought. 
The work of grace is that of enabling us to do that which we 
could never do by reliance upon our own strength. With the help of 
grace, we are more than ourselves and, therefore, when God's grace 
is at hand we should follow its impressiona. 1 Grace fortifies and 
encourages us to come to God, to seek His mercy in spite of our offence. 
Grace goes before salvation and follows a~er it. We are here 
reminded of Pascal's famous assertion "Thou wouldst not be seeking Me 
hadst thou not found Me". 2 Grace, according to Whichcote, opens up 
a new and living approach to God which may be employed with great 
assurance since grace qualifies the subject to receive t be benefits 
of the Gospel. It removes all hindrances such as the guilt contracted 
. 3 t by sin. Grace takes be initiative: it has the priority in that 
it first lays hold upon us without any merit on our part and it is 
efficacious and effective as it expresses itself in love. 4 And in 
the strength of grace received, we may fulfil its purpose, for all 
divine help is sufficient for the act for which it is given. 5 Nygren 
1 
Ibid. , I, 46ff. 
2Pensees (Stewart ed.), "Adversaria", 7. 
3whichcote, Works, I, 112f. While Whichcote belongs to the "once-
born", his contemporary, John Bunyan, belongs to the "twice-born". Tbe 
struggle of Bunyan toward conversion, bis lack of formal education, bis 
impressionable temperament and the influence of Puritan theology upon 
him make.his Grace Abounding one of the most marvellous and dramatic 
accounts of conversion ever written. A comparison of Whicbcote's 
doctrine of Grace With Bunyan's is instructive. 
4Ibid., pp.367f. 5Ibid., II, 347ff. 
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in his description of the idea of Agape, describes 1 t as "groundless" 
to stress the absence of any extrinsic reason for it. He says: 
"God's love is altogether 'spontaneous'. It does not 
look for anything in man that could be adduced as motivation 
for it. In relation to man, Divine love is 'unmotivated'. 
When it is said that God loves man, this is not a judgment on 
what man is like, but on what God is like."1 
Indicative or the essentially rational character of Whicbcote's 
thought is his assertion that knowledge of God's self-disclosure in 
Christ is saving knowledge. He says, "As Sin is a Vitiating the 
Reason of man; the Restauration must be by the Reason o:t' God, ••• 
O Ao yo5. "2 Christ becomes for us, wisdom to atone for our unreasonable 
consent to iniquity.3 This means that the knowledge 01· Christ's 
saving work is o:t' the greatest importance. Further, when one thinks 
seriously about Christ's atoning work, it brings mental satisfaction 
by virtue of its sheer reasonableness. 
"The doctrine o:f" the Gospel is a 'vital principle'. It 
gives satisfaction to the reason of our mind, removes fears and 
doubts, brings rest and peace, creates within quietness, composure 
and comfort. This is vital; for 'to live is to be well'. We 
can be sure that through Christ and by repentance, we are pardoned. 
This is 'gospel-knowledge'. In the intellectual nature a 
principle is vital ••••• We may call the doctrine of the gospel a 
vital principle, because it satisfies the reason of our mind and 
brings inner peace."4 
Whichcote turns next to a consideration of repentance as a 
1Nygren, op. cit., pp.75f. 
2whichcote, Aph. 1023. 3works, II, 138. 
4Ibid., III, 74ff. Cf. Aug. De Trin., vii, 3, 5. Augustine says: 
" ••••• When anything concerning wisdom is declared or narrated in the 
Scriptures, the Son chiefly is intimated to us." 
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precondition of forgiveness. There is no promise of remission of 
sins without repentance, but we may be assured that· repentance is 
effective if it is done sincerely. 1 But even if repentance were not 
effective this would not abolish God's claim upon us to humbly acknow-
ledge and obey Him. God's first claim upon us is obedience and His 
second is repentance. Though the effect of repentance depends upon 
the Gospel of grace, the obligation to repent is natural and 
reasonable. 2 
"'Tis true, we are obliged to repent whether God will 
pardon or not; because we owe duty and obedience to God, as we 
are his creatures; and ir we do not repent, we do, upon account, 
sin again. For ••••• wbosoever bath done amiss, and doth not 
repent ••••• is in such a frame and disposition, that had he the 
like occasion and temptation offered him, he would do it again. 
So that both nature and grace do meet here, and shew tbe 
indispensable necessity of repentance, in the case of contracted 
guilt, and a wounded conscience. 11 3 
If Whichcote adheres to the notion of Total Corruption at a 11, 
it is in the sense "that tbe depravity which sin bas produced in human 
nature 'extends to the whole of it'". 4 He does not mean that we 
"are utterly indisposed, disabled and made opposite to all good, and 
wholly inclined to all evil". 5 Thus he is :t'ree, et once, to assert 
man's freedom and responsibility to repent and to deny that God out of 
His pleasure and by His irresistable power either elects the sinner to 
1Ibid., I, 7-20. 
3~., pp.202ff. 
2Ibid., pp.212-29. 
4whale, op. cit., p.42. 
5westminster Conf., vi, 4, cited by Whale, Ibid. Baxter, like 
Whichcote, while attributing great importance to reason, admits tbat 
reason is 11 1~allen reason" because of sin, see op. cit., p.195. 
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salvation or condemns him to eternal punishment. God made us free 
moral agents, therefore He does not force us to do anything against 
our will. 1 It follows that repentance is a free and rational act 
and it is not true repentance unless it takes place in this internal 
and vital sense. True repentance occurs only when a man "loathes sin 
out of a sense and judgment of the baseness and vileness of it and out 
of reverence for God". 2 And we have the assurance that through grace 
assisting our faculties, we may repent and obtain p:irdon. 3 There is 
the further reminder that repentance for sin committed in the past 
carries with it the resolve to avoid the same sin in the :ruture and to 
develop a general attitude of obedience to God. 
" ••••• The first motion towards repentance ••••• ia lookt upon as 
if it were the ••••• remedy of repentance itself ••••• as if sorrow 
for sin were the whole product of repentance, whereas indeed, 
that Which is true repentance must be e.ccompanied with the 
forsaking of sin and bringing torth the fruits of righteousness • 
••••• My caution, therefore, is that you look towards God and 
your minds serve you to make any application to him; that you 
pursue that motion till you bring it into a settled state; for 
otherwise the first motion towards repentance may prove an 
aggravation of your sin, and heavier condemnation."4 
Now repentance and faith go together and therefore "no man repents, 
who does not believe; nor can any believe, who does not repent". 
This is true by virtue of the fact that repentance is a prerequisite 
1Whichcote, Works, I, 27f. Cf. Milton, De Doctrina, pp.44-79. 
2rbid., pp.262-68. 
3Ibid., p.205. Cf. Milton, op. cit., p.333. See also Barker, 
Milton--and the Puritan Dilemma, pp.326ff. 
4 Ibid., p.190. 
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of faith. A man is never in the condition required for a vital act 
of faith until he repents 01· sin. Grace encourages our faith just 
as it leads us to repentance and, therefore, whoever believes and 
1 relies upon the goodness of God in Christ is set free from sin. 
Repentance includes faith and it is impotent without it. 2 Speaking 
specifically of faith, Whichcote asserts that it includes obedience, 
in fact, belief and obedience are one. 3 Faith, then, is our free 
a.nd rational assent to God in Christ. When a man receives any 
proposition upon God's authority, that is faith. And for this reason, 
natural knowledge is antecedent and fUndamental to faith. His final 
. 4 point is that faith is accompanied and supported by obedience. 
Here we recall the credo ut intelligam of Augustine and Anselm. 
Whicbcote's faith is.one seeking to know, to understand and he combines 
a faithfU.1 reason with a reasonable faith. The Gospel proclaims a 
"saving knowledge" when it states that God saves through Christ and 
that this is accomplished by repentance and faith through the grace of 
God. 5 
1Ibid., III, 73f. 2Ibid. , p. 83. 3 Aph. 831. 4works, III, 134f. 
5Ibid., I, 389. The soundness of Whichcote's view of repentance 
and faith, together with his aesum~tions concerning man as a free moral 
agent free to accept or reject God s offer of salvation is supported by 
Dr. John Baillie as he opposes Barth's view that man is totally corrupted 
by sin. Barth adds that the revelation of God has to create its own 
capacity for reception when it is given. Dr. Baillie observes that 
what God does in Christ is a miracle not of omnipotence but of grace 
and that there can be grace only where there is self-acceptance. See 
Our Knowledge of God, p.24. We are also reminded of Brunner's concept 
of Ansprechbarkeit, though quali:t'ication is in order. See Natural 
Theology; Cf. Baillie, op. cit., Ch.I. 
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Our final concern in this chapter is to gather from our author's 
writings a workable understanding of his view of salvation. It is 
characteristic of Whichcote to be unsystematic and thus he presents ten 
terms which he conceives as implying alike the single state of 
salvation. He recognises a difference between these terms only in 
degree and insists that any attempt to impose an accurate distinction 
between them is superfluous since Scripture employs them with indiffer-
ence. The words are: conversion, regeneration, adoption, vocation, 
sanctification, justification, reconciliation, redemption, salvation and 
glorification. 
"• •••• 'Regeneration' is used to dist'inguisb the di vine and 
heavenly lif'e from the natural and animal. 'Conversion', 
that imports a runnegate, one that had departed from God, 
and righteousness, and he is reduced from the practice of 
iniquity, to his duty to God. 'Adoption', that intimates 
that a man bath broke with God, and parted from him; and 
here is again the renewal of the former relation to God, he 
is again made the son of God. 'Vocation', tha.t imports the 
taking a man ofr from ill usage, and guise of the world. 
'Sanctification', that imports the renewal of us in the spirit 
of our minds. 'Justification' imports pardon of sin. 
'Redemption' imports rescuing us from the slavery oft be devil. 
'Salvation' denotes holiness here and happiness hereafter. 
'Reconciliation' implies peace restored with God, and with our 
consciences. 'Glorit'ica ti on' is a consummation and accomplish-
ment 01· them all •••.• 0 1 
It is indeed unfortunate that Wbicbcote does not give a definitive 
treatment of these important terms in a more acceptable and comprehensive 
manner. However, be hes singled out a few or them for more detailed 
treatment and some other insights may be grasped by gathering some of 
1Ibid., II, 80ff. 
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his scattered reflections together. It is clear that conversion is 
understood by him as a mutual act of God and man. It is a serious and 
deliberate act and should not be delayed until sickness or death comes. 
It is important that conversion take place in the time of youth and 
health when one is capable of beginning a new way of life and 
acquiring religious knowledge. 1 We may be assured of the assistance 
of God's grace to draw us toward conversion and to empower us to 
carry this act through to its completion, for when one dares to begin 
a new lire by means of grace received, God provides sustaining grace. 2 
Regeneration, or the new birth, is the transformation of the whole 
inner man. Fallen man is re-created by this act and he is brought to 
a new obedience to his created principles. This takes place by 
mental illumination and by man's willingness to be transformed by the 
3 
grace of God. Whichcote says: "The Regeneration of a Christian is 
by Superinducing the Divine Spirit upon the Rational; which makes him 
more than man. 114 Concerning regeneration, he concludes that by 
creation we are "earthly" but by regeneration we are "heavenly". 5 
Conversion and regeneration flow logically int he more comprehensive 
concept of reconciliation. God calls us to be reconciled in the name 
of Christ, according to Whichcote, and though God begins the act, He 
expects us to respond. 
I, 48. 
III, 194. 
God in Christ accommodates Himself to human 




5Ibid. 1192. Cf. Milton, op. cit., p.294. 
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principles, He addresses man as a person and gives man the capacity 
by His grace to be reconciled to Himself. God is the active party 
in the act Of reconciliation and He seeks to arouse in us a favourable 
response to His offer of grace. 1 It follows that this act is 
acceptable both to God and man. On the one hand, God's honour is 
maintained, His infinite wisdom and goodness are employed; and on the 
other, man experiences the good and knows for the first time real 
blessedness.2 
" ••••. Through this happy work of reconciliation, we come to 
savour and relish the things of God ••••• come to adhere to the 
ru.J.e of righteousness as God doth ••••• We shall be, in our 
measure, in our underst~nding and will, suitable to God, 
judging as he judgeth. " 
Any consideration of Whichcote's view of justification by faith 
must begin with his e·xegesis of (Phil. 2 :12, 13 ). For Whichcote, 
imputed and inherent righteousness are of a piece and thus justification 
is conceived as a mutual act of God and man. He observes tha.t the 
Greek text uses the participle "working". The verb would indicate a 
single act while the participle denotes continual action. The passage 
thus interpreted implies that God "is" working in us both "to will and 
to do" and we are called upon to respond to God's activity. We are 
to act for God is acting, and where God is active there is sufficient 
grace to enable us to act. 4 Scripture is here concerned with what God 
does with us and what we do is ascribed to God. We work and God 
works, that is, we are awakened, assisted and directed by Him. But 




4Ibid., I, 287ff. 
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this does not imply that we merit salvation since it is impossible for 
any creature to merit anything from God.1 Thus our author seeks a 
middle position between the radical assertion of the Reformers on 
one hand of justification by faith alone and the Roman Catholic 
concept of meritorious works. 
2 
Whichcote asserts that to be righteous according to the Gospel 
is to be saved. This is true, notwithstanding certain limitations 
and imperfections found in the doctrine of the law. If a sinner 
truly repents and sincerely endeavours to imitate Christ's example, he 
has eternal life and shall be eternally savea. 3 Holiness could not 
denote absolute innocence since there is no such person among mortals, 
but it refers rather to a state of justification in which our sins are 
forgiven and we are accepted by God through Christ. And we are in 
this new relationship absolved of all necessity of punishment - that is 
we are made righteous. 4 Christ is made unto righteousness, He is 
our sanctification and redemption, for by Him God has received 
satisfaction for our sins and through Him God bestows mercy upon us. 
It follows that we are justified not by works of righteousness but by 
the intercession of Christ. 5 Christ stood in our stead and we are 
1Ibid. ' pp. 312f. 
2 Cf. Supra, Ch. III; Infra, Ch. VIII. 
3whichcote, Works, III, 112. 
4Ibid., pp.60ff. Cf. Mackintosh, The Christian Experience of 
Forgiveness, p.115. 
5Ibid., II, 138f. 
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looked upon as being in Him. It is appropriate that we should be in 
relation to Him since He was put in relation to us in His death. In 
this way we truly love and are accepted by God and righteousness is 
translated from Him to u a. Holiness is bestowed upon us by God's 
gracious acceptance of us in Christ. 
We must remember, however, the distinction between the righteous-
ness of Christ and that of a Christian. · Though the righteousness of 
Christ belongs to the Christian, yet it is not the same. Christ is 
justified by works of righteousness, but the Christian is justified by 
pardon of sin. To state it differently, Christ is justified by the 
law of works, while the Christian is justified by faith. We are 
recommended to God by Christ and have the benefits of His passion and 
obedience. Christ fs made our righteousness by virtue of the fact 
that He procures grace for us from the throne of grace and thus we are 
received as in Him and brought into a proper relation to God by Him. 
This takes place by communication as God communicates the gift of His 
grace of the Holy Spirit to us by Christ. It is of the greatest 
importance, then, that we should be found in Christ since our justifi-
cation is the fruit of His grace in and through His saving work. 1 
The final note sounded here points to our concern in the next 
1Ibid., pp.378ff. Whichcote comes closer to the notion of 
"communion" in bis use of the word "participation" mainly in connection 
with his more natural theology than he does here when he speaks of 
God "communicating" grace to us in Christ. Dr. John Baillie rightly 
points out the inadequacy of the term "communication" in speaking of' 
God's self-disclosure in Christ since God here gives Himself in 
communion. Cf. Revelation in Recent Thought, p.47. 
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chapter. Whichcote assures us that righteousness in Christ does 
not interfere with but actually heightens our natural inherent 
righteousness. Reason and conscience, impaired by sin, are restored 
to their natural perfection. But even more important Whichcote 
comes remarkably close to the Pauline concept of union with Christ, 
that justification implies not only the assurance of forgiveness of 
sin, but as Professor H. R. Mackintosh says: 
"It is through Christ that he [the Christian] has seen 
utter mercy in God's face; in Christ, therefore, he beholds 
fU.lly and persuasively revealed the will of God which he is 
called to lmow and obey. ul 
1Mackintosh, op. cit., pp.121f. Cf. Wbicbcote, Works, II, 282f. 
Howard in his introduction to Ward's Life of Henry More, p.7, rightly 
observes: "Wbichcote was suspected of preaching more Platonism than 
Christianity, but be did not mislead bis followers, who strenuously 
maintained the doctrine of conversion, which implies Evangelicalism. 
This is indeed the very keynote of their (the Cambridge Platonists] 
system, death unto sin and a new birth unto righteousness ••••• " 
CHAPTER SEVEN 
RELIGION OF AFTER-REVELATION (ii) 
Christian Morals 
Whichcote states that social consciousness and responsibility 
are as much a part of revealed religion as of the natural. The death 
and resurrection of Christ must be verified in us and this means that 
we must die to the world, to selfishness and to sensuality. 1 When 
God calls us to salvation, He calls us from wickedness to holiness. 
The doctrines of the Gospel must become the "reason of our minds" and 
the "principles of our life". 2 Christ is a nature, a spirit and life 
in us, and His "design" is to advance the divine life in men. The 
fact that Christ condemned sin by His death means that none can be 
relieved by His death who would justify sin by their lives. 3 Dean 
Inge who quotes Whichcote in defence of his position asserts that 
"religion and ethics are, for a Christian, inseparable. There are 
unethical religions, and there are irreligious ethical schools or 
societies; but these are not Christian". 4 It appears that Inge has 
1wbichcote, Works, II, 143ff.; I, 380. 
2Ibid., II, 83; Aph. 94. 3Aphs. 355, 409, 689, 736. 
4Inge, Christian Ethics and Modern Problems, p.379. It appears 
significant that Dr. c. E. Raven (in a conversation with the present 
writer) stated that one main influence behind his social concern was 
an early study of the Cambridge Platonists. 
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captured precisely Whichcote's position and thus we refer to 
Whicbcote's views here as Christian morality. 
Wbicbcote's favourite New Testament text (Tit. 2:11, 12) is 
considered by him as a summary of all "necessary divinity". 1 Thia 
text is the basis or his treatment of both natural and Christian 
morality. If the question is raised as to the difference between them, 
Wbichcote's answer is that the difference is one of degree rather than 
kind. That is to say, as a result of the "super-additions" of the 
Gospel, the principles of natural morality are "heightened" and 
developed. This answer can only be consistent, however, if we can 
conceive 01· a man as "naturally" attaining the height of bis natural 
possibilities as Wbicbcote understands them. Thus Whichcote is forced 
to admit that man is·a fallen and sin!Ul creature, and for this reason 
the Gospel not only "adds" but "restores" and to this extent the 
notion of Christian morality does not only imply a quantitative but 
also a qualitative advance over mere natural morality as it stands. 
It is perhaps with this insight in mind that Whicbcote seeks to root 
all his ethics in Scripture, using the ideas 01· Plato and other 
philosophers to illustrate what he finds there. The promise of God 
in Christ be considers to be a new principle of action in that it 
carries us beyond our natural possibilities. It restores the image 
of God in us and by it we partake of the divine nature. This new nature 
consists of knowledge first and then goodness, for without knowledge 
1Whichcote, Works, II, 133f. 
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the heart cannot be good. It is "unnatural" to have this knowledge 
without obedience to Christ, for this is "holding the truth in 
unrighteousness" - "sin against the light 11 • The very knowledge of 
Christ is saving knowledge bringing us to a holy lire. His doctrine 
transcends all principles of natural morality and religion. 1 
Christians are to remember that the "moral part" of Christianity is 
just as binding as the "instituted part". 2 Whichcote seems to believe 
that the moral part of Christianity is the more binding inasmuch as 
righteousness, equity and piety are the foundation or all religion. 
"These things are of certainty to all the world. Whereas ••• 
other things in [revealed] religion (as these) the immortality o~ 
reasonable souls; :tuture rewards and punishments; God pardoning 
sin to all those who repent; divine aid and assistance, as it 
is declared in the gospel ••••• these the famous philosophers did 
only hope they were true; but they were not assured of them. 
But of all the other things they were undoubtedly assured. We 
indeed have extraordinary assurance; because we have the gospel-
revela.tion, they are certain to us Christians: but they were 
but hope, end fair persuasions, and belief to tbe philosophers, 
who had no scripture ••••• But in the other points, we have the 
happy harmony of the world; it is the language of every one's 
thoughts; it is nature's sense that these things are so. 
These are things or general obligation, and universal acknowledge-
ment: for they bear a true and even proportion to the common 
reason o i' mankind. "3 
But lest we should as Christians, dismiss morals as mere "heathenish" 
virtues, Whichcote reminds us that they are "necessities". It is a. 
1Ibid., pp.134ff. 2Ibid., pp.231f., 236. 
3Ibid., pp. 239f. With this intense emphasis on the "moral part;' 
of Christianity by Whichcote it is little wonder that the statesman-
philosopber Shaftesbury, a luke-warm Christian, believing merely in 
"religion by state established", should !'ind in Whicbcote'a writings tbe 
basis of a "benevolent" society without accepting Whicbcote's deep 
spirituality. 
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serious mistake to oppose reason to faith and consequently morality to 
religion. Moral principles are an essential aspect of our Christian 
commitment. The Christian must seek to "know" as well as "believe" 
and this knowledge binds the Christian to all principles of religion, 
those "con-natural" to our make and those that are final in Christ. 1 
The man beginning the Christian life should not be led to despair by 
the morel responsibilities involved, for grace will always be at band 
to aid him. We must be willing to begin well with the assurance that 
grace to promote and consummate our life will be added. 2 
A genuine Christian, by the grace of God, is enabled to excel in 
all natural virtues. A man becomes refined and reformed in nature as 
he advances in the Christian faith. 3 The Gospel inclines us toward a 
constant reverence fo·r God, and an obedient and trustful attitude toward 
Him and through the assistance of grace, we are both able and willing 
to fulfil our moral and religious obligations. The principles of the 
Christian religion control, at once, external intemperance and inner 
motives, so that the Christ-like man seeks to do the will of God as 
it is made known in Christ. Through his "participation" of Christ, 
his "temper" becomes meek, patient and gentle. It is by faith in 
Christ that we win a victory over the world and apprehend things 
invisible to reason and sense. Faith, which Whicbcote implies to be 
supra-rational knowledge, illuminates the most important things of our 
1Ibid. , pp. 241f. -
2Ibid., pp.34f.; Ibid., III, 66-71. 
3Ibid. , III, 48. 
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Christian life, and for this reason we should resolve to allow faith to 
govern our lives. In this way, things of the future will become actual 
for us in the present. 1 The spirit of the Gospel transforms the 
Christian's attitude of life. He takes Christ as He is, as "king to 
2 rule and govern, as a prophet to instruct, and as a saviour ·to save". 
In defence of his conception or Christian morality, Wbichcote says: 
" ••••• We may gather how little they understand themselves, who 
in divinity, 'decry morality', or that are impatient to hear it, 
and say that it doth not belong to 'Christ'. But I have the 
candor, as to think that they do not understand the terms, but 
that they mean some external ornament; that which is called 
'civility'; such a thing as doth not die ••••• ; such a thing as 
doth not establish a frame, and temper, a constitution of mind; 
such a thing as doth not make a man deiform, or restore a man to 
the image of' God and make him really God-like. But now these 
principles of morality are those that do, and nothing else can do 
it; yea, these are final, and ultimate to all the doctrine of 
Christ to all matters of faith, and the principles thereof, if 
they do not finally end in all moral goodness and righteousness. 
For these do import the fullest 'imitation of God', and the 
exactest 'participation' of the divine nature ••••• This is the 
gospel obtaining in erfect; and in the ultimate issue, this is 
to have 'Christ formed in us'; and the gospel in its final 
accomplisbment •••.• These are the principles of everlasting 
righteousness, of unchangeable truth and goodness: and of this 
I may say that it is not a law that is subject to any power 
whatsoever: it is a law or· its 'own nat·ure'; it is that which 3 is according to the nature of God; and that is the law of heaven." 
1Ibid., p.79. Here Whichcote's Johannine position is manifest. The 
note sounded forth in the Fourth Gospel is that to know God in Christ is 
eternal life and eternal life conceived as qualitative rather than 
"temporal" begins when salvation begins. 
2 1.:!2.!Q.. , p. 82. 
3Ibid., II, 60ff. This passage might well be Whichcote's answer 
to Tuckney' s accusation that his view 01· Reconciliation consisted of' 
11 inherent righteousness" with a. little of Christ added. Here Whichcote 
places Christian morality at the heart of bis Christology. Cudworth's 
Sermon Before the House of Commons t1647) is almost a perfect copy of 
Whichcote's views on this subject. Cf. Inrra, Ch.IX. 
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In order to put on Christ one must put off oneself since the image 
of Christ is self-denial. Christ became a servant for us and a 
servant is one who parts with his own will. It is for this reason 
that one who imitates Christ must live in entire self-surrender. The 
true Christian is necessarily bumble in view of his awareness ot his 
imperfections and his dependence upon God. Where there is most 01· 
God, there is the least of self and in this way faith testifies to 
hu~ility. 1 A truly religious man is humble in the face of his need 
for fUrther growth. 
"He that is in a good state bas still work to do to free his 
Understanding from Ignorance and Error, and to advance bis 
knowledge of Truth to a just Height; to work-out perfectly th~ 
habit of sin and to work-in perfectly the habits of goodness." 
Reformation of life must begin within, by the renewal of the mind, 
before action may be redirected. 3 .An intellectual calmness and proper 
self-control are of the greatest importance to the good life. The man 
who does not reverence himself, his own nature and dignity, will not 
have due honour for God and his fellows. 4 Reverence for self and God 
are so interrelated that Christian morals begin with the reformation 
of the inward man. 5 The heart is the principle of action, it is where 
life begins, it is the centre of motion. The greatest responsibility 
we have is that of regulating our mind and spirit in order to properly 
direct our actions and lives. 6 The actions of the good life proceed 
1Ibid. , I, 349-361. 2Aph. 564. 
4Ibid., p.179; II, 398f. 5Ibid., I, 282. 
3works, I, 257. 
6Ibid., IV, 78f. 
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from the heart and only the "pure in heart shall see God".1 
In bis appeal to our "self-interest" as preceding the proper 
reverence for God and the proper attitude towards others, Whichcote 
appears somewhat to anticipate Butler's concept of "self-love". 2 
But what seems more important is the insight he has tbat if a man does 
not have the proper reverence and respect for himself he readily 
perverts all ethical and religious ideals. For example, the Golden 
R~le presupposes self-respect, for even this rule employed by one with-
out reverence for his own nature and dignity, might easily prove more 
harmful than good. Whichcote, however, is aware that selfishness is 
at the root of sin and the danger for man is that he may become too 
fond of himself. What he calls for here is the wholesome love of 
self which is not turned in upon itself but finds its :fulfilment in 
God and others. Butler's reflections on the subject of "self-love" 
would appear to be a valuable supplement to what is implied by Which-
cote's notion of reverence for self. Knudson puts it this way, "it 
is the divine sanctity of the human soul that imposes the obligation of 
love upon us, and this obligation applies to ourselves as well es to 
others". 3 
Virtue, when used in reference to Christian morals implies whet 
1c f. Matt. 5 : 8. 
2
see Infra, Ch.X; Cf. Butler, Sermons (1749), Sers. i, xi. See 
also, Baxter, The Reasons of the Christian Religion,--rf667), pp.90ff. 
3The Princi~les of Christian Ethics, (1943), p.178. 
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Whichcote describes as Christian "graces" or the "frui tstt of the Spirit. 
Accordingly grace conferred upon us and the fruits of the Spirit 
constitute Christian virtue. The same thing which is called grace 
as proceeding from God is known as virtue in ua. We are not to 
oppose virtue to grace since grace received in us becomes virtue or 
1 
moral perfection. 
Since we have dealt with Whichcote's concepts of justice and 
eq~ality elsewhere2 , we need mention them here only in relation to his 
view of mercy. He asserts that equity makes allowance in view of 
circumstances, but mercy goes beyond this. Mercy is manifest when a 
person does more than can reasonably be expected. As Christians we 
are called upon to "walk the second mile", to "love our enemies" and 
this implies that we are not only to "do justly" but to "love mercy" 
also. The Gospel itself is a revelation of God's mercy to us sinful 
men. 3 A Christian, then, is to acknowledge the intrinsic and universal 
validity of justice and equity but he is at the same time to "love 
mercy". Mercifulness should normally and logically follow our 
acknowledgement of Christ's saving work. Because God extends His 
mercy to us in Christ and God in Christ speaks the words of forgiveness 
to us, we are to extend the same mercifulness to our fellows since 
Christ died as a sacrifice for all men.4 This is part, at least, of 
1Wbichcote, Works, IV, 121-131 •. Cf. Supra, Ch.V. 
2supra, Ch. v. 
4Ibid., pp.31-47. 
3works, IV, 14-31; Cf. Matt. 18:34, 35. 
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the answer Whichcote gives to the searching question of our Lord to 
all Christians: "What do ye more than others?"1 Thia is one 
significant instance where Whichcote in his treatment of Christian 
morals takes us beyond the attainment of natural goodness. 
By ~urity, Whichcote understands holiness. The holy life is a 
twofold obligation for Christians, for this demand is made upon us by 
the principles of creation and the purpose of Christ's redemption. 
His view of holiness is at the centre of what Whichcote means by t~ 
very state of religion. Holiness involves the health of our minds 
as well as the divine life of the soul. It is the ultimate issue, 
the end of all institutions and ceremonies in religion. Holiness is 
a process of inwardly renewing, sanctifying and reconciling men to the 
nature, mind and will·of God. A man receives the grace of God in vain 
if there is no evidence of holiness. In fact, the main objective of 
all religious acts is to produce holiness in us; for it is God's 
greatest concern to make us holy. Holiness is our resemblance to God 
and our participation in Him as far as we are capable. It is also in 
keeping with our status and dignity as men, our relation to God and our 
adoption by His grace. Holiness is the real truth and substance of our 
faith since beatitude belongs only to those who attain the real effects 
of holiness. 2 Only men with holy hearts and lives are capable of 
1Matt. 5:47. 
2works, Ibid., pp.77-83. Wbichcote significantly distinguishes 
between "relative" and "real" holiness. The former is arbitrary and 
changeable; the latter is a participation of and resemblance to God. 
Relative holiness implies the use of things for holy or sacred purposes, 
but real holiness refers to "deiformity" or God-likeness - holy hearts 
and lives. Cf. Ibid., pp.57f., 264; Aph. 285. 
253. 
judging "holy doctrines and things". Holiness of life is even a 
pre-condition of clear revelation from God concerning His mind and 
will. But Whichcote does not imply by holy living a personal 
perfectionism. He is aware of the fallibility of man and the need 
for growth in goodness. 1 
Neither does he mean an ascetic life. The Christian is a pilgrim 
on earth, a citizen of heaven; yet be must live in the world though 
not of it. It follows that the holy life involves social concern. 
This is a necessary presupposition.of the holy life. We are to deal 
with others with the same love with which God deals with us. If we 
have in our souls a true sense of God's goodness to us, it will form 
2 
us into a like disposition of kindness towards men. The Christian 
religion was given by.God for the good of men, individually and 
socially. Wbichcote says: 
"Did 'Christians' live 'according-to' their Religion; 'They' 
would do nothing, but what Truth, Righteousness and Goodness do; 
according to their Understanding and Ability: and then one man 
would be 'God' unto another. n3 
Concerning the proper attitude toward m~terial wealth, Whichcote 
bas for us some valuable suggestions attested to by his own life. He 
asserts that it is neither a virtue to be poor nor a sin to be rich. 
1Wbicbcote appears not to be bound by what Reinhold Niebuhr 
describes as the source of "perfectionist illusions", viz., the "Hellenic 
spirit" , see The Nature and Destiny of Man, II , 134f. 
2Ibid., pp.174ff. 
3Aph. 27. C!'. John Smith, The Excellency and Nobleness of True 
Religion, (Glasgow: 1745). 
254. 
It is sinful to use riches out of pride and for luxury rather than as 
an instrument of virtue. On the other hand, it is a mistake to think 
that poverty is a state of perfection or in any way meritorious; for 
we are not approved or disap~roved by God either by poverty or riches. 
Since Whichcote was wealthy all his life, perhaps he has worked out an 
apology for the rich in view of the radical challenges to the rich in 
the ethics of Jesus. On the other hand, perhaps he has in mind the 
vow of poverty of the Roman Church with the claim of merit for those who 
take it. Whatever the motive behind his general position it appears 
to be a commendable view in intention. 
Whicbcote asks, how is it that some men are so rich, while others 
are extremely poor? His answer is that the distribution of worldly 
goods does not belong ·to the Kingdom of Christ. Possessions come by 
inheritance and the like and thus the right of property is based on 
nature rather than grace.1 It follows that there is no connection 
between a man's prosperity here and his happiness in the future life 
since the providence of God which governs the world and the Kingdom 
of Christ does not determine worldly prosperity. Happiness which 
comes from Christ has nothing to do with the distribution of earthly 
goods. Earthly goods tend to bring either happiness or misery 
according to their use. Thus a man should be a good steward of his 
earthly possessions, but he should never become a slave to them. His 
real concern should be to lay hold upon those things which bring true 
1Ibid., p. 274. 
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happiness. 1 Whichcote, however, appears to weaken and even contradict 
this position elsewhere. He asserts that there is a different 
"disposition" of providence as to "men's estate and ar1·airs" which may 
be explained by God's sovereignty and "good pleasure". Further, he 
suggests that it is commendable to comply with the necessity of one's 
condition, in other words, to submit to the inevitable with complete 
resignation. 2 He cannot have it both ways, either providence is 
involved in the distribution of wealth or it is not. It appears 
that in this latter assertion, Whichcote without meaning to do so, 
gives a religious cloak to the oppressor of the poor and at the same 
time, deals a deadly blow to the disinherited. Being a wealthy man 
himself, it was quite easy for him to accept his "lot" with resignation. 
In view of his good-nature and wholesome life purpose, he easily found 
opportunities to do good. But it is more difficult with the same 
natural gi:t'ts and convictions to live the good lif'e when one has not the 
means to procure even the necessities of life to say nothing of helping 
others. Such a poverty-ridden person is not likely to receive much 
comfort from Whichcote's assertion that his "lot" is the will of' God. 
There is a real question as to whether Whichcote himself would have 
found this ~osition acceptable had his condition been reversed. It 
appears that Whichcote's intention throughout is commendable, but I 
would consider his latter assertion untenable and dangerous by 
1Ibid., p.322; Cf. Ibid., pp.275, 325f. 
2Ibid. , pp. 269f. 
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implication. 
The f 1 inal ste.tement concerning earthly weal th is essentially 
Christian. For Whichcote a man may be said to love all for Christ when 
he places loyalty to Christ above his estate. This means that we 
should put our ultimate trust in Christ rather than in our possessions 
and that we should retain them only so long as they do not interfere 
with our Christian commitment. We are to acknowledge God as the 
ultimate owner of all and act merely as stewards of our possessions. 1 
"When we love less our estates, than our interest in God 
and his favour; less value the accommodations of this state, 
than the future; and subordinate all to the honour of God and 
to the public good, considering ourselves but stewards in 
respect to God, we have the proper attitude towards this world's 
goods."2 
Those who acknowledge God and pray for help are not alone in the 
struggle for goodness, they are assisted by the Spirit and instructed 
concerning the good life. Accompanying this knowledge, the effects 
of holiness and goodness are experienced. 
3 
Divine assistance is 
always available to those who are sincerely honest. 4 
"The Spirit of God in us is a living Law, Informing the Soul; 
not Constrained by a Law without, that enlivens not; but we act 
in the Power of an inward Principle oi' Life, which enables, 
inclines, facilitates, determines. Our Nature is reconciled to 
the Law of Heaven, the Rule or Everlasting Righteousness, Goodness 
and Truth. 11 5 
1Ibid., II, 149f. 
2Ibid., pp.151:t'f. When Shaftesbury speaks of a wholesome type of 
religion which supports and heightens man's natural benevolence, he 
might well have had in mind the religion envisioned by Whichcote, Cf. 
Infra , Ch. X. 
3Ibid. , II I, 57. 4 Ibid. , II, 142. 5 Aph. 625. 
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But it is important to have the correct view of the Holy 
Spirit; for He is not a "third rule" distinct from Reason and 
Seri pture. The Spirit adds only assistance to Reason and Scripture 
which are together the "whole" Revelation 01· the Spiri t.1 The 
Spirit in us is Reason illuminated by the written Word and the 
Spirit now teaches by these Writings. 2 To assure us of the truth 
o:r the Scriptures we have "the inward work of' the Holy Spirit, 
bearing witness by and with the word in our hearta113 , but this 
witness is always "by and with", never independent of, the Word. 4 
Thus having the Spirit, being guided by the Spirit, led by the 
Spirit, and following the Spirit, all mean the same thing. These 
phrases imply the necessity of following the plain doctrine of the 
apostles who were inspired with and spoke by the Holy Spirit. The 
Spirit inspired them because they lived under His direction. It 
follows that we who receive words 1·rom those who were under the 
guidance of the Spirit are led by the Spirit speaking through them 
to us. 5 It seems obvious that Whichcote is attempting to counteract 
the irrationalism and even the immorality associated with the 
1Ibid. , 920. 
2Ibid. , 337. 
3Tbe Westminster Conression, Cb.i, 5, cited by John Baillie, 
Revelation in Recent Thought, p.117. 
4Baillie, Ibid. 
5whichcote, Works, II, 82ff.; Cf'. Baillie, Ibid., p.111. 
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erroneous conception of the work of the Spirit. 1 
"· •••• God sends not his truth into the world alone and 
unaccompanied, but having done one thing, will also do another 
to make the former effectual. Now they that have not the 
divine spirit, want the great inter-preter upon the words of 
God, the great commentator upon divine truth in the world; 
and therefore their minds are left unsatis1·ied and unresolved. 
And therefore let such men look arter it. For this is a great 
and certain truth, that God, in his grace and goodness, will 
give his spirit to guide, and teach, and assure the minds or 
good men; tho' none know it but those that reel it. But they 
who have the spirit 01· God, know nothing more certain; for 
they have satisfaction, inward peace, and joy in believing; 
they perceive such operations of God in themselves, whereof 
the world cannot receive any account. The divine spirit doth 
open their understandings, as it did the apostles; brings 
things to their remembrance; makes them consider the inwards of 
things, and calls them to e.dvertency and consideration. The 
great work or the divine spirit is to lead men in the right 
apprehensions, and stay a man's thoughts in consideration, till 
the principles do receive admittance, and become a temper and 
constitution; till they infuse and instill themselves, and make 
a lasting impression."2 
Whic hcote' s doctrine of Christian morals is closely dependent 
on his doctrine of last things which leads us to a consideration of 
his view of the relation of time to eternity. He asserts that unused 
time is lost and that the virtue of time consists in the use of it. 
The best employment of time is toward reconciliation with God. 3 The 
1cf. Henry More, "Grand Mystery of Godliness", Theological Works 
(1708), Bk.X, Ch.xiii, p.533. According to Richard Baxter, the 
Quakers made the "inner light" a sufficient rule. They made much of 
the "dwelling and working of the Spirit in us", but little of justi-
fication and pardon of sin and our reconciliation with God through 
Jesus Christ. They pretended to depend on the Spirit's conduct, 
against set times of prayer and against sacraments, and against due 
esteem of Scripture and the ministry and would not have the Scripture 
called the Word of God. See Autobiography (ed. Thomas, 1931), pp.72ff. 
Against this background we can understand Whichcote's treatment of the 
Spirit in defence of "sober piety and rational religion 11 • 
2whichcote, op. cit. , III, 55f. 3Ibid. , I, 51ff. 
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good life is not attained at once but is the result of continual 
moral and spiritual growth. It is for this reason that one should 
not wait until the time of sickness, old age or death to seek 
reconciliation With God. 1 However, if a person fails to turn to 
God early in li1'e, he should seek to make up for his previous 
negligence when he does turn. In view of the fact that we cannot 
erase our past we should be tbe more anxious to redeem the time that 
remains with the hope that this may compensate for the whole span of 
life. 2 Time is conceived by Whichcote mainly as a scene of good 
work for God and men, or a preparatory state for eternity.'3 In the 
present state, we have every opportunity to achieve this end. Youth 
is the time of our greatest physical strength which with divine help 
may be directed to good ends and thus it is the best time to become 
concerned about religion. 4 Time has considerable value as a "day of 
grace" or a "probation state". It also follows that we may by the 
refusal or abuse of grace undo ourselves in time for eternity. 5 
We must always bear in mind the uncertainty of time upon which the 
immortal soul depends. 6 We must be aware of the deceptive nature of 
lrbid., pp. 53f. 2Ibid., pp.54f.; Cf. Aphs. 1068, 1094. 
3Ibid., pp.49f. 4Ibid., p.51. 
5Ibid., pp.262-70. Theologically Whichcote's view is rooted in 
the Fourth Gospel. Philosophically we are reminded of Bergson's 
concept of time as "durationu rather than "space-time" or time conceived 
as spiritualistic and qualitative rather than materialistic and 




appearances, which parade as realities in the present life. 1 Time 
according to Whichcote has no intrinsic value but derives its value 
from its relation to eternity. It is in reference to eternity, to the 
immortal existence and welfare of the soul that every instance of time 
takes upon itself a note of urgency. It would appear that Whichcote 
is influenced by Plato's concept of time as "the moving image of 
eternity" and thus eternity is what really matters. Time is subord-
inated to eternity just as body is to the soul and it follows that the 
main work to be done in time is preparation for eternity. 2 Entrance 
into eternal blessedness is based upon the proper temper of mind, 
relation to temporal things and reconciliation with fU.ndamental moral 
and religious truths. 3 
The Christian is called upon to behave as a citizen of heaven. He 
lives in this world under the law of heaven and though his body is 
present here, yet his soul is in heaven. Being a citizen of heaven, 
1
Ibid., pp.280ff. 
2Ibid., pp.324ff.; Cf. IQ.!Q., pp.35f.; Muirhead, The Platonic 
Tradition in An lo-Saxon Pbiloso h , p.418. See also Bishop Joseph 
Butler, "Analogy", Works 1900 , Vol.II, Pt.I, Chs. IV, V, pp.68-99. 
3Ibid., p. 55. To use Fer.re's convenient treatment of time appears 
valuable here. He understands the problems of "time" in terms of the 
kronos, or mere succession; logos, or meaning; and kairos, or concrete 
or filled time. For Whichcote time is conceived as kronos, but mainly 
as logos and kairos, as meaning and content. Ci'. .lc'erre, The Christian 
Understanding of God, pp.79ff. See also, Cullman, Christ and Time 
(Eng. tr.), pp.39ff. There appears to be no suggestion by Whichcote 
concerning Christ as the centre of time as presented by Cullman. How-
ever, Whicbcote'a view is firmly rooted in the New Testament in spite of 
his Platonic leanings. He appears to anticipate, though faintly, 
something of the "realised eschatology" of C. H. Dodd. 
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1 heaven becomes the purpose and rule of his life. A Christian is to 
subordinate all things of this life to his preparation for heaven. 2 
The rule of heaven is most suitable to be law here below and all things 
below should resemble things above. In Platonic language Whicbcote 
asserts that things above are to be conceived as the "purest form" of 
which things here should be "a copy". The understanding when it becomes 
the thing understood, modo spiri tuali, is formed by the "images" of 
things represented and our souls become like that to which they are 
related. God made man in the "middle" between immortal and mortal 
nature. By motion upwards we contemplate God and are transformed into 
His image but by motion downwards we lose ourselves. These facts 
indicate our probation-state and point up the importance of our 
h 
. 3 c oice. 
Our "conversation" is in heaven, analogice secondum materiam, in 
regard to the quality of' our actions and life. Our employment as well 
as our happiness are the same here and hereafter. 4 Heaven as an 
object is God, while heaven in the subject is our likeness to God. 
Thus to be happy we must enjoy God by vision and choice. We experience 
heaven when God becomes our all in all. If God is our all we are 
heavenly; for heaven is God's all and heaven and God are for us best 
of all. Thus the "state of grace" in the present and the "state of 
1Ibid., II, 154f. 2Ibid., p.155, Cf. Aph. 818. 
3Ibid., pp.160f.; Cf. John Smith, op. cit., pp.6f. 
4 Ibid. , p. 165. 
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glory" in the future differ only in degree. The "kingdom of grace" 
is the "kingdom of heaven" and the Kingdom of' God is, indeed, within. 
It is within by virtue of the fact that it begins in grace and ends 
in glory. 1 
Heaven is known in two ways, as a state and as a place. Heaven 
as a state, Whichcote calls "heaven moral" or heaven in a moral sense, 
while heaven as place, is designated by him as "heaven local". The 
former may be experienced now, while the latter is "the ••••• place where 
all the blessed are entertained, and shall be entertained hereaftertt. 
By way of contrast, "hell moral 11 is a state of wickedness and impurity 
a.nd "hell local" is a place of imprisonment, where "damned spirits" 
are confined. Thus both hell and heaven are states experienced in 
the present. Whichcote hesitates to seek further description of 
heaven or hell as places since they are "things we have not seen". It 
is for this reason that be lays stress on heaven and hell as states 
instead of places. We will have more to say concerning his view on 
this subject later, but now we are mainly concerned with his notion of 
heaven as a quality of life. As far as the place is concerned, he is 
of the opinion that the state of one's life necessarily determines the 
place. The real point is, we have here and now the opportunity to 
determine our state. To use Pauline language as Christians we are 
properly citizens or heaven and pilgrims and sojourners on earth. 2 
1Ibid., p.167; Cf. Milton, De Doctrina, pp.398f. 
2Ibid., pp.156ff. C:f. Aph. 216 - "It is impossible for a man to 
be made Happy, by putting him in a Happy ~place'; unless be be in a 
Happy 'State'." 
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Our preparation for the state of heaven moral involves contempt 
for this world tunderstood as wickedness), but not for the created 
order, which is for Whichcote the medium of natural revelation. Heaven 
consists in the mortification of the body in the "state of humiliation" 
but not the body our souls shall be clothed with, namely a spiritual 
body. Whichcote is aware that he parts company with the philosophers 
at this point; for he is consciously Pauline. 1 He insists that 
Christian faith involves the assurance that the "form" of this earthly 
body shall be changed. This is a significant point where Whichcote's 
Christian convictions lead him beyond Platonism. But here we are 
mainly concerned with his assertion that in order to be capable of 
entering heaven, we must be born anew by regeneration and participate 
in the divine nature. He asserts that there is a descent from above 
and an ascent from below by several degrees and every higher degree of 
perfection is "predominant" to that beneath it, includes the lower 
degree and rules over it. There are, then, four degrees of life, 
namely, the vegetative - the life of plants; the sensitive - the life 
of animals; the rational - the life of angels and men; and, the 
divine - the life. of regeneration or the life of eternity. It is only 
by the life of eternity that we are prepared for heaven; for there can 
be no experience of heaven unless our wills are surrendered to God. 
There can be no citizenship in heaven as long as we contest with the 
Lord of' heaven. Our wills are too feeble ultimately to prevail 
1 r Cor. 15:35-58. 
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against the irresistible will of God. Of this act of selr-surrender, 
essential to the heavenly state, our Saviour is a perfect example. 
He illustrates the truth of the creature-state, namely, that we are to 
be regulat.ed by the will of Goa. 1 
Entrance into heaven is not at the hour of death, but at the 
moment 01· conversion. Sal vat ion is not "wholly to come" but is 
already begun. Christ brought salvation with Him at His first coming, 
and, therefore, at His second coming, He will not begin a new thing, 
but will complete a thing of which the foundation has been laid in time. 
Here in this world is the "salvation of grace" which is the same thing 
as the "salvation o:f glory". In the world to come things are "carried 
on" which are "set on foot" here and thus a man is in a heavenly state 
when he comes to know, love and obey God. 2 No man who lives with out 
God need expect to experience heaven. Heaven is where God is all in 
a.11. Those who live at present without God have no knowledge of His 
ways, no reconciliation with Him and no delight in Him. God has 
no "negative" heaven for those interested only in escaping "torment" 
and who refuse the responsibility of the divine life. 3 
"Heaven present is our resemblance and imitation of' God; 
and holiness ••••• Heaven is rectitude, goodness of temper, health, 
1Whichcote, Ibid., pp.173-185. 
2Ibid.' pp.194r.; Cf. Apbs. 368, 818. 
3Ibid., pp.196:Lf.; Cf. Aph. 290 - "We must now 'Naturalise' our-
selvestO"the Employment of Eternity." 
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strength of constitution, a God-like frame and temper or mind; 
consequently, it sreaks or ease, pleasure content and 
satis1·action ••••• " ' 
Whichcote's emphasis upon the future life as determiningtbe course 
of the present gives religion a significant place in the _ordering of 
lit'e here and now. Religion for Whichcote is much more than a mere 
profession, it is reasonable, bas transforming power and produces 
"fruits" in our experience. For Whicbcote as for Bergson in his 
Les Deux Sources de la Morale et de la Religion, religion is dynamic 
rather than static, it is the elan vital in man's earthly life. 
Although he refuses to give up the notion of heaven as a place, his 
obvious stress upon heaven as moral, as the divine life is of great 
value. This prepares the way for a vital and lasting view of eternal 
life even if his conception of the physical world in terms of t bree 
stories is no longer tenable. Perhaps the New Science with its 
modified view of the physical universe had begun to have a telling 
effect upon Whichcote and though he has faint hints concerning heaven 
as a place, be regards heaven as a quality of li:fe. 2 Thus Whichcote's 
notion that salvation begins in the present and is consummated in the 
future is of tremendous importance for present Christian life and thought. 
1Ibid. , p. 196; C:e. W. H. Rigg, The Fourth Gospel and Its Message 
Today, Ch. III. 
2we should bear in mind that Whichcote is most probably following 
the suggestion of the Fourth Gospel. Thus he has the advantage of 
having his view of eternal life grounded in the New Testament. A 
similar view is held by Westcott and Maurice, see Inge, Platonic 
Tradition, pp.103f. c:r. Richard Niebuhr, Christ and Culture, pp.197ff., 
218rf.; Westcott, The Gospel According to St. John, {1898), p.87. 
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Whichcote appears to anticipate much modern theological discussion 
concerning the Now and the Not Yet or the fact that Christ has come and 
is to come. This idea ran through the ecumenical meeting of the World 
Council of Churches at Evanston in 1954. 1 Whichcote anticipates 
Cullman's position that the coming of Christ, His saving work, is 
decisive for the entire line of revelation hencefortb.2 For Wbichcote 
time is Hebraic or linear rather than Greek or cyclical and eternity 
appears to be quite close to Cullman's "endless time". 3 But 
Whichcote' s main position, though making use of Pauline and Platonic 
concepts, is essentially Johannine. That is to say, his central 
purpose appears to be a description of the divine life or eternal life 
as a quality of life which is everlasting. In this sense a man 
becomes, by virtue of his relation to Christ, a permanent citizen of 
heaven and thus eternal life is for Whichcote relational rather than 
merely durational. 
To live one's life against the background of eternity, meditation 
and prayer are necessities. Thus Whichcote reminded Tuckney tbat he 
had spent more time meditating than reading. 4 Wbichcote cautions us 
that unless we take ourselves out of the world, we are liable to lose 
ourselves in it. A man's spiritual capacities are rendered insensitive 
1cf. Brunner, Eternal Hope, pp.90!'f.; "The Message", The Second 
Assembly of the World Council or Churches, Evanston, 1954, c.c., 
Vol.LXXI, No.38, (September 22, 1954), p.1123. 
2 Cullman, op. cit., p.59. 
3Ibid. , pp. 45f. 4 Cf. Supra, Ch. III. 
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by our over-indulgence in the things of this life. At this point 
Whichcote' s mysticism asserts itselr. He points out that when the 
mind reflects upon God as object, it is fUlly occupied.1 This is the 
way to IJUt the soul into "holy ecstasy and rapture"; for the soul 
exercised by divine contemplations, inflamed with heavenly affections, 
is transported beyond the lower world and "sees and feels beyond all 
language 11 • And thus it is by enquiring what God is in Himself and to 
us, that "we are swallowed up into heavenly exercise, experience and 
acquaintance with things that are excellent and transcendent". In 
order to have such an experience, purity of mind is necessary; for the 
mind can never contemplate God unless it be God-like. There must be 
a suitable disposition of the faculty to the object and no faculty 
extends beyond its proper object, nulla facultas extendit ae extra 
rationem sui objecti. Thus man must be in a spiritual 11 temper" to 
qualify him for spiritual-mindedness; otherwise he mars an action which 
would be good in itself. It is the business of genuine religion to 
render us capable of heaven as a state by making our hearts pure. 2 
But the spiritual retreat suggested by Whichcote is not an end in itself; 
it is for the purpose of the divine life which involves a relationship 
of love to God and to one's fellows. 
God as governor of the world, as the sustainer of righteousness 
and truth, controls and punishes sin. If we speak correctly of 
punishment, God only "chastises" sinners. A man is not punished by 
1Wbichcote, Works, II, 201, 220f. 2Ibid., pp.189-191. 
268. 
every evil that befalls him since he may not have done anything to 
deserve punishment. What appears to be punishment may be only the 
effects of God's absolute sovereignty. God in the use of His power 
may deal differently with several creatures; and yet where He "deals 
better", He does not reward, nor does He punish where He "deals worse". 
That is to say, He may make "a vessel of higher use,,, another of 
"inferior use" since this is His privilege. Furthermore, natural 
evil sometimes comes from God to test our "affections" for Him. 
These "harder conditions" are to lead to our moral growth. Or it may 
be that some evils are for "an evil neighbour's sake". 1 Whichcote 'a 
insistence that all evil that befalls man is not the result of sin is 
praiseworthy. Perhaps here he has learned from Job, one of his 
favourite Old Testament sources. One of the wealmesses of Whichcote'a 
approach is his attempt, often very feeble, to explain everything 
rationally. In his explanation of evil that befalls good men as well 
2 
as the good fortune that comes to evil men, he anticipates Butler. 
Butler's views are generally more pessimistic but are based primarily 
upon probable knowledge. Whichcote 's views, on the other band, appear 
unworthy of his more rational approach to religious knowledge. Thia 
1Ibid., I, 78ff.; Cf. Aph. 1003. 
2Butler, ~cit., Cha.II, IV, V, pp.34ff. Whichcote, unlike 
Butler, has little sense of the "toughness" and perversity of' the 
material world or of the difficulty of the moral struggle. It would be 
unfair to accuse him of other-worldliness or complacency; but his sense 
of sin and the experience of suffering seem defective. However, when 
one considers his good nature (without effort) and his wealth, his moral 
insights are commendable. 
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seems to be one point at which he might well admit that be is dependent, 
at least at some points, on probable knowledge - that he "believes where 
he cannot prove". 
Punishment is required to maintain God's order in the world. We 
might easily forget that God governs the world if men could disregard 
the moral order of the universe without punishment. God does not love 
punishment, but uses it to maintain right and for the good of his 
creatures. 1 It follows that we, by our disobedience, incur our own 
punishment. God is not to blame I'or our punishment, the cause is in 
us and we should busy ourselves in removing it.2 Guilt in the sinner 
is a form of punishment. 3 Every sinfUl action will eventually be 
punished and right shall finally prevail. 4 Thus Whichcote's clear 
statement that punishment, when correctly understood, is the result of 
sin is the key to all he has to say concerning this subject. 
By considering the present state as a "probation-state" and "hell 
moral" as a present experience, Whichcote can make bis point that 
punishment is now "remedial" rather than "punitive". God seeks the 
reformation of our lives and inflicts punishment to obtain an end 
which is better. Sometimes God brings about a small evil to prevent a 
greater or a present evil to prevent a future - suffering in time to 
lwhichcote, op. cit., pp.83f. 
2Ibid. , pp.85ff.; Cf. Ibid. , III, 84. 
3Ibid. , pp.110f.; Cf. Su:Qra, Ch. VI. 
4Ibid. , pp.201, 323 passim. 
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prevent suffering in eternity. Basically Divine goodness aims at two 
things: first, the ref'ormation of the sinner; and, second, the 
"information" of the onlooker. Punishment in human society should 
follow this pattern, that is, it should be remedial. We should 
always remember that God desires the salvation of a sinner rather than 
his death. 1 Without adopting the universalism of Origen, Whichcote 
reminds us of his Alexandrian predecessor as he speaks on the same 
subject. Whichcote points toward the future to Butler's Analogy and 
the theory behind modern social work, i.e. prison reforms. 2 Whichcote' s 
view that God is moved by goodness to seek our good by means of 
punishment points to Nygren's treatment of Agape and his conclusion 
that "Whatever refuses to be won by ••••• self-giving love cannot be won 
at all". 3 
The cause of all our misery is rational, it arises from within us, 
and our relation with God is in no danger if we are innocent of sin. 
Hell according to Wbichcote is not primarily a place, but a state. 
The guilt of conscience is the "fUel" of hell. 4 No greater "violenceu 
is to be found in the "lower world" (among creatures below man in the 
order of creation), than the contradiction of the truth of judgment by 
lrbid.' IV, 165ff.; Cf. Aphs. 761, 1029. 
2cr. Supra, Ch.X; Origen, De Prine. ii. 10. 
3Nygren, Agape and Eros (Eng. tr., 1953), p.104. 
4;Nhichcote, Works, III, 139f.; Cf. Aphs. 100, 824; Cudworth, 
op. cit. , p. 51. 
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will and practice. Further, there is no such condemnation in the 
state of the future as self-condemnation. The worst o:t· hell is the 
inward torture of one's conscience. Whichcote describes the "worm of 
conscience as the life of hell". 1 With Butler, Whichcote assures us 
that every sin has its punishment regardless of the appearance of things. 
Sometimes malum passionis, the evil of suffering, follows after malum 
actionis, the evil of action, at some distance, but retribution will 
always follow unrepented sin. 2 Whicbcote says: 
"By contradiction to reason, men are challenged within 
themselves at present, and will be condemned hereafter at the day 
of judgment. It is the reason of man's mind that condemns, not 
God's power. Condemnation arises from man's own guilt. Without 
the condemnation of man's own reason, there is nothing in the 
world formidable: for God's power is directed by his wisdom, 
limited by bis goodness, and never acts out of ways of justice or 
truth. But a man is confounded and broken, when he cannot approve 
himself to the reason or bis mind. To go against the light of 
reason is to have a real experience of hell."3 
If God punishes sin, it is no more than just. Justice in God does 
not require that a penitent man should be punished, but goodness requires 
that impenitence be controlled. However, sin committed may be 
1Ibid., II, 140f. 
2Ibid., IV, 423f.; Cf. Butler, op. cit., Ch.II, pp.34f~. 
3Ibid., pp.399f.; Cf. Aph. 129, 311. Whichcote'a confidence in 
reason and conscience (both are for him the "voice of God"), anticipates 
Butler's trust in the accuracy of conscience. The weakness in the views 
of both men appears to be in tbe failure to make sufficient allowance 
for the degeneration of these faculties, i.e. in the case of Whichcote, 
the perversion of reason and the searing of conscience. Kant upon 
observing that so many evil men appear to go unpunished in the present 
life infers necessarily the existence of God as well as the immortality 
of the soul in support of the moral order. 
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unpunished without injustice. Scripture does not show God necessarily 
punishing repented sin. All acts of justice and forgiveness are 
subject to wisdom. Actual punislnnent is not necessary to uphold 
1 government, but the power to punish and pardon is becoming to wisdom. 
"Punishments and Judgments are, 1. to Remind those who are 
within the Compass of Religion; that they may not lose themselves; 
2. to Awaken those who are Devoid of Religion; that they may come 
to Themselves; 3. to Discover those, who are Hypocrites in 
Religion; that they may not Prejudice their Neighbour; 4. to 
bear Testimony to those, who Renounce Religion; tbat
2
they may not 
Misrepresent God; as not maintaining Righteousness." 
The judgment of God is based upon Hie infallible understanding and 
unerring will. 3 Thus God judges us according to the general course of 
our life rather than by occasional acts; by what we do by choice rather 
than what we do with reluctance; by what we do in the full use of 
reason, rather than in confusion; by what we do through resolution, 
rather than in moments of wealmess. 4 What Whichcote wishes to say is 
that God's goaJness punishes the impenitent, while His justice and 
righteousness compassionate the penitent. 5 We have the assurance, 
there:t'ore, that things finally "will be as they should be". Concerning 
the future we have now a "fore-sight" from what we are and feel. 
However, things which are perfectly new are beyond our "fore-knowledge" 
and concerning these we must have faith and patience at present. 6 It 
is bis belief that for the committed Christian the :fUture life will be 
1Aph. 1108. 
3Ibid. 380. 
5works, IV, 48ff. 
2Ibid. 317; Cf. ~· 760. 
4Ib id. 1077. 
6Ibid. , I, 330. 
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one of blessedness and this we now know in part; for the lmowledge of 
God in Christ is eternal lif·e. The business of this life is to be 
Christ-like and heaven will be, at once, a present and fUture 
experience - a. proper relation to God which is man's true end and 
happiness. The God of Creation and Redemption are one - the Author 
of Nature is the Giver of Grace. If we seek God in His work and 
follow Him in His ways and if He has disclosed Himself to us by His 
saving work in Christ - His self-disclosure and fullest revelation to 
us, then we know assuredly that unrepented sin is punished and that 
the divine life - the life bid in Christ-in-God, is rewarded. As 
Whichcote says: 
"• •••• As God in the world of nature hath fitted one thing to 
another ••••• so will he also in the intellectual world of souls 
and spirits finally proportion capacities and states ••••• and fit 
moral actions and dispositions with recompence and reward, that 
no challenge may befall his superintendency and government."1 
It is significant that in speaking of death, Whichcote refers to 
the death of Socrates. Socrates was pleased to be free from his body 
for the benefit of the future growth of his soul. Although his disciple 
Plato and other friends mourned for him, Socrates was :f'ull of resolution 
and courage for in his own way he had conquered death. Death for him 
was the gateway to a richer and fuller life. 2 Thus Whicbcote conceives 
1Ibid., I, 331f.; Cf. Butler, Loe. cit. 
2Ibid., II, 110ff. Whicbcote's views on life as well as on death 
are an--eiample to us. Tillotson's account of Whichcote's death is 
remarkably similar to Plato's account of Socrates' death in the Apo~. 
However, just as his teaching concerning death takes us beyond the most 
admirable philosophical view of death, even so his acceptance of the 
Sacrament of the Lord's Supper as a declaration of bis communion with the 
uchurch of Christ all the world over" is an invaluable Christian example. 
Cf. Tillotson, Funeral Sermon o~ ••••• Whichcote, pp.28f. 
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the beat proof of the immortality of our souls before the Gospel as 
being philosophical. Philosophically speaking, arguments offered 
for the immortality of the soul are of two types, namely, natural and 
moral. Natural arguments may be based on the immateriality of soul, 
its independent action apart from the body and the separate existence 
1 
of the soul. On the other band, moral arguments are often based on 
the unequal distribution of worldly goods by providence and likewise 
upon the fact that many wrongs are not set right in t be present life. 
Whichcote is of the opinion that these rational arguments made the idea 
of immortality credible to philosophers while they were under the spell 
of their notions, but in their less thoughtful moments, doubts arose in 
their minds. It follows that even though they were convinced of the 
fact 01· immortality, they had not the assurance we have in Christ. 
Christ has brought meaning to life and immortality and in this He 
has fulfilled God's purpose. He has abolished death and He has brought 
life and immortality to light. These words include the fUlness of 
perfection, our ultimate accomplishments, all the happiness that 
created nature is capable of. Death may be understood in three ways, 
as external, internal and eternal. The worst effects of external 
death are removed. The "sting" of death conceived as the "wages of 
sin" is removed from those who "die in the Lord". The fear of external 
death is abolished. The apprehension or death is the greatest fear Of 
this world, but without such apprehensions, a man may die as securely 
1cr. Jobn Smith, "Of the Immortality of the Soul", Select Discourses, 
l 1859), pp. 62ff. 
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as he may fall asleep. By the Gospel and through faith in Obrist, Who 
is Lord over death, these apprehensions are removed. Internal death 
is death by sin as it affects us within: the difficulty of the mind, 
overcome by inferior faculties, to embrace pure virtue. It implies 
the tendency to allow sense to rule one's life rather than reason and 
virtue. This inevitably leads to internal death or death within. 
This death bas been abolished by Christ through His grace and the 
assistance 01· the Holy Spirit. Sin bas no dominion over the 
regenerate who partake of the spirit of Christ and the power of His 
resurrection. Finally, eternal death is no longer a menace to the 
redeemed. Christ bas removed eternsl death by taking away the "fewel 
of Tophet", namely, guilt. The fire of hell will go out if fuel 
is removed and this is precisely what Christ has done. He has removed 
our guilt and over against guilt He bas offered justification. We are 
relieved from eternal death by justification just as we are relieved 
from internal death by sanctification. In this belief, death is but a 
passage into another life, for death to tbe Christian means to be with 
Christ. And the only reason why a Christian should hesitate to die 
is for the purpose of fUrtber service to God and His Church. Christians 
have expectations of good by death - it is tbe passage to life, to a 
better state. The very notion and nature of death is cbanged. 1 
The death of the righteous, or of those that partake of the grace 
of the Gospel puts an end to their sorrow. Henceforth they are out of 
1Ibid., pp.105-112. 
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the Devil's reach either as a tempter or tormentor. They are rid of 
sin, the basis of death. Death for the righteous is not only the death 
of life, but the death of death, the death of sin, which is the death of 
the soul. By the death of sin, the soul is restored to life, and it is 
thus that death (which ends the present life) "takes away" but does not 
"destroy" life. It takes it away from time to be restored "after 
awhile" to last beyond time. Death carries the righteous out of this 
world, but for them it is a "happy passage" from labour to rest; from 
expectation to fUlfilment; from faith to knowledge; from the world to 
God; from death to life. Such death is not corruption but the 
occasion of a new and better life. 1 On the other hand, the wicked 
find death dreadful and terrible. Those who are unprepared, who are 
.without faith have no ground for expectation, no foundation for hope. 
They are beset by fears from within and from without. 
"On the one hand,.sin rises up to accuse them; on the other, 
the righteousness of God terrifies them. As they look downward, 
there is nothing but the open mouth of that vast chaos, the 
bottomless pit, that gaps upon them; upward, God, an angry judge; 
within, a tormenting, burning, accusing, condemning conscience; 
abroad the world a-fire about their ears. 11 2 
Christ brings life and immortality. These two abstractions 
signify the excellency of the tuture life of the righteous. The present 
life has the mixture of death in it, it is dependent upon sleep, the 
"image of death" and upon food and health. The present life is 
1 Ibid. , pp.117f. 
2rbid., pp.125f. This passage reveals Whichcote's Puritan 
background perhaps as much as any passage to be found in his writings. 
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contingent, indeed, the most uncertain thing about life is life itself. 
But the future life is different, it is all good and we have it in full 
possession without interruption. It involves complete communion with 
God and total reconciliation with the whole creation of God. As we 
grow to years of maturity we transcend ourselves as infants. How 
much better we shall be when we are born to eternity~ 1 The "good 
estate" of the righteous lies in the fact that they possess life and 
immortality or immortal life and that they are free from and have 
security against all contrary evils. All evils that befall us centre 
in death. By the abolition of death, by our Saviour, Who is Lord over 
death, all things leading to death are removed. Death does us no harm 
but rather a great courtesy; for it saves our life and makes it secure. 
It lets the soul out of the body to our benefit and advantage. The 
death of the righteous is not "a going out of being" but "an entrance 
into life", a departure from the world to be with the Lord. 
of the righteous is a great kindness. 2 
The death 
The final note of victory for the Christian is sounded by the 
Resurrection of our Lord. It is because He lives that we may live also. 
Whichcote' s reflections upon this subject show that Paul's influence is 
greater than Plato's on him. He insists that the body which we now have 
is to be remarkably changed, that it shall be a "spiritual body", an 




change shall be effected by almighty power. This will be for the 
Christian "a house not made with hands", a fit instrument for our soul 
throughout endless agea. 1 By His Resurrection, we know that Christ 
bas brought life and immortality to the redeemed. He only can 
effectively absolve men from their sins and death by sin, who can lose 
the "Bonds of Death". 2 This is exactly what Christ achieves by His 
death and resurrection - victory over sin and death. 
As J. A. T. Robinson puts it: 
"By His death Christ, as it were, 'died out on' the forces of 
evil without their being able to defeat or kill Him, thereby 
exhibiting their importance and gaining victory over them ••••• The 
Resurrection is the inevitable consequence of this defeat; death 
could have no grip on Him, since sin obtained no fQothold in Him. 
It was impossible that He should be holden of it."3 
From the point of view of dogmatic theology, the weakness of 
Whichcote 's views concerning last things will appear to be his refusal 
to speak significantly beyond the present. He deliberately makes a 
distinction between heaven and hell as states and as places, between 
these states in the present and future in order to place his emphasis 
1Ibid. , I, 292. 2Aph. 986; Cf. Rev. 1:18. 
3"Tbe Body", Studies in Biblical Theology, No. 5, p. 40. In this 
work (pp.11ff.) and in Cullman, op. cit., pp.61ff., the tendency appears 
to be to make a radical distinction between the Greek views of the 
relation of soul and body and time and eternity and the New Testament 
ideas on the same subjects. In Cullman this is carried over in hie 
reflections upon the immortality of the soul and the resurrection of the 
body. Cullman finds complete contrast between the death of Socrates and 
the death of Christ. Whichcote appears to be on safer ground. He can 
see a similarity between New Testament and Greek thought on these subjects, 
but always points out where Christianity takes us beyond the wisdom of 
the Greeks. 
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within the range of present experience and knowledge. Where he points 
beyond the present he does so by inference from the present to the 
fUture and he does even this with caution. He places bis conviction 
in the fact that the God of creation and redemption are one and that 
eternal life and heavenly ci ti'zenship are present possibilities. Thus 
through the Incarnation the Kingdom of God has come and is to come. 
His message is more distinctly Johannine than Platonic. He accepts 
the good in the notion of the survival of the soul in primitive reljgions 
and the concept of the immortality of the soul in Greek philosophy; but 
for him the Christian belief in the resurrection of the body, while 
including a doctrine of survival and one of the immortality of the soul, 
goes beyond them. The Christian message is that God has both raised 
up Christ and will raise us up. The Christian doctrine of resurrection 
implies that the living and saving God holds man in being. God is 
always actively encountering and claiming man and man only exists as 
God's man. God might withdraw His creative love from a man and that 
person would be annihilated, but God's love will not let man go. In 
Christ shall all be made alive, He brings life and immortality through 
His saving work. Men cannot vanish into ttnotbingness" because of 
Christ. Whichcote is consistent with the scheme of his thought sire e 
his doctrine of resurrection and his doctrine of man are grounded in 
man's personal relation to God. A proper God-relation is the basis of 
man's happiness in this life and the life to come and this relation is 
possible only by the saving work of Christ. 
As we have followed Whicbeote through his reflections on Christian 
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morals, it is easy to understand why in 1821, his Aphorisms were 
published to "inculcate moral conduct on Christian principles"1 , and 
in 1930, Dean W. R. Inge expressed a similar purpose in presenting 
Whichcote's Aphorisms to this century. 2 Certainly for Whichcote, 
Christianity and morality are united in what we have treated here as 
Christian morals. He presents a religion or real effects, a religion 
that is dynamic rather than static, a religion of life rather than 
ceremony and throughout his writings and, indeed, his life he echoes 
3 
the words of Jesus "by their frui ta ye shall know them". 
lwhichcote, Select Aphorisms, The C~ristian Tract Society, 
No.XXVIII, Vol.III, cited from the title page. 
2whichcote, Aphorisms (ed. Inge, 1930), preface. 
3Matt. 7:20. 
CHAPTER EIGHT 
RELIGION OF AFTER-REVELATION (iii) 
The Universal Church 
It appears significant that Bishop Westcott who has so much in 
common with Whichcote should accuse him 01· an inadequate doctrine 
of the Church1 and even attributes the transitoriness of Whichcote's 
influence to this. We must admit together with Westcott that 
Whichcote has not spoken definitely concerning the nature of the Church. 
The reason seems to be that he bas spoken mainly against popery and in 
def'ence of Christian tolerance. Thus, while accepting Westcott's 
criticism, we must, in all fairness to Whicbcote, portray him as a 
loyal member of the Church of England, but as one who deserves to be 
remembered most, ecclesiastically speaking, for his protest against 
religious intolerance among Roman Catholics and Protestants alike. 
Whicbcote is true to his purpose and the contribution he makes to this 
aspect of Church life lives till this day. 
Any observation of Whichcote's notion of the "universal Church" 
rightly begins with bis reaction against Romanism. 2 Wbicbcote says: 
~eligious Thought in the West, pp.393f. 
2rn order to understand :fully the reason why Whichcote's negative 
attitude toward Romanism was so passionate, one must take a look at 
the policy of the Roman Church at this time and pay special attention 
to its effects upon England. See Galton, Our Outlook Towards English 
Roman Catholics, and the Papal Court, pp.104-124. 
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"It had been better for the Christian Church· if that, 
which calls itself Catholic, had been less employ~d in creating 
pretended 'Faith', and more employed in maintaining universal 
'Charity'. u1 
Whichcote dislikes the credulity of the Roman Church, which calls 
its adherents to blind obedience. He is just as opposed, however, 
to the same tendency among Protestanta. 2 Whichcote raises the 
question, what is the true Church? Instead of giving us, as we 
would expect, a definitive answer, he proceeds to state the Roman 
claim to be the only true Church and his denial of the same. The 
Roman Church pretends to be the only true church and asserts that 
there is no salvation outside of it. Many reasons can be brought 
forward to illustrate the pretence of the Roman claim: for instance, 
they attempt to propagate- religion by fire and sword; and, also, they 
do not consider themselves bound to keep faith with heretics, for they 
insist that heretics lose all their right to truth. In both instances 
their methods are unworthy of Christiana. They try to sanctify by 
their religion many evils in order to bring men into their Church. 
But if we observe their practices, we would never think their intention 
t b 1 . . 3 o e re igious. 
Whichcote puts a series of questions to point up his protest 
against Romanism. Was this spirit 01· popery learned of the meek and 
lowly Jesus? Ia it not rather the spirit or him who 11 goeth about 
1wbichcote, Aph. 68. 
3Ibid., pp.160-64. 
2works, I, 156:e. 
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like a roaring lion, seeking whom be may devour"? Ia not this the 
work o:t' him who was a murderer from the beginning? Ia this the 
fruit 01· that religion which allows no evil and which requires patient 
bearing of wrongs and doing good for evil? The answers to these 
questions seem obvious to Wbichcote. Christianity is the best 
principle of kindness that there is, but often the corruption of the 
best proves to be the worst. The more false a man is in his religion, 
the more fierce be becomes; the more mistaken, the more imposing. 
The more a man's religion is bis own, the more he is concerned for it, 
and shows coolness and indifference to that which belongs to God. 1 
It is far better to rely on nature alone than upon an insincere 
and false religion. Whichcote here recognises nature to be debased, 
abused and neglected, in a word 11 fallen", but even t bis is better than 
false religion. He recalls Aristotle's assertion that man is by 
nature a "mild and gentle creature". Thus Whichcote concludes .that 
ir the only estimate of Christianity were popery, or any similar 
superstition, be would return to philosophy again and leave Christianity 
alone. Philosophy, as far as it goes, is sincere and attains "good 
ef:Lects". It is true that it falls abort of' the saving lmowledge 
revealed in Christ, but philosophy is free of the corruption of the 
Word 01· God under the spell of Popery. The Roman Church bas made 
"merchandise 11 out of the Word or God and the "ingredients" of its 
1Ibid., pp.165-167. 
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religion are power, pomp and weal th. 1 
Whichcote speaks of certain notorious errors of the Roman Church 
as being extremely dangerous. They impose upon the Christian faith 
things contrary to reason. A good example of this is the doctrine 
of transubstantiation. If we accept this doctrine, we may no longer 
trust our senses and if we concede that our senses are unreliable, 
how shall we hold that God made our faculties true? If God did not 
make them true, then we are released from all duty to God because we 
cannot know that God is God. If we cannot trust the reason of our 
mind in relation to three or four of our senses, how can we know 
anything to be good or true? Thus for Whichcote this doctrine is 
completely absurd. 2 Whichcote states that even when the Romanists 
acknowledge truth, they render it invalid by qualifications. A good 
example of this is their doctrine of probability. According to this· 
doctrine if any doctor among them held a certain view it made it 
probable. However, they also put up a mental reservation that what 
they say may be only half what they mean. They direct the intention, 
that is, they may declare what is false and deny the truth in the 
1Ibid., pp.168f. Whichcote's general position here is reflected 
in Shaftesbury's "luke-warm" attitude toward religion, see Infra, Ch.X. 
Cf. John Smith, "Superstition", Select Discourses ( 1859), pp. 28ff. 
2Ibid., p.170. Cf. Aulen, The Faith of the Christian Church, 
pp.394-97. Aulen's position is more tenable and convincing than Which-
cote's. While Whichcote is true here to his general rational position, 
Aulen's argument is more fundamental for he goes back to the Biblical 
record and the history of the early Church and points out that the 
Roman doctrine of transubstantiation has substituted a "realism" for the 
original "symbolism" of the doctrine of the Lord's Supper. See also 
"Eucharist", C. E. , V, 572ff. 
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interest of their Church. By equivocation they mean that a thing is 
self-explanatory, or by evasion a thing is believed to have a double 
meaning. And they employ "hypocritical prolucation", that is, they 
intone words in such a way as to deceive the na!ve.1 In their 
endeavour to "superadd" to religion things which are false, inhuman, 
and ungodly, and in their attempt to frustrate the effects of real 
religion by their pretence to power and privilege, they deserve the 
greatest condemnation. 2 The Romanists add things to the Christian 
faith unlikely to be true and dishonour God by these. They exalt 
image-worship and veneration of relics, and by these frustrate the 
effects of real religion. They pretend to make lawful what is 
unlawful. Whichcote refers to Ballarmine who claimed for the Pope 
the power to declare virtue to be vice and visa versa, and thereby 
turning attrition into contrition. They often substitute a bodily 
penance for an inward change of heart, by use of holy water and the 
cross. They pretend that indulgences are efficacious for the pardon 
of sin or absolution from oaths or obligations. The design of 
Papery, as Whichcote sees it, is clearly to keep the magistrate in awe, 
maintain the clergy in a state of submission and keep the people in 
ignorance, enslave them and disable them from seeing or knowing. 
man is willing to accept these three things, then he should turn to 
1Ibid~, pp.171f., 189. Cf. "Probabilismu, C.E., XII, 441ff. 
2Ibid. , p.170. 
If a 
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Romanism. 1 But Whichcote conceives Romanism as the arch-enemy of his 
entire scheme of religion and morality, for its tenets are opposed to 
any rational and moral view of religion whatsoever. 
The Church of Rome holds the doctrine of implicit faith which 
asserts that masses ought to be said to relieve souls in purgatory. 
Implicit faith, then, is a part of the notion of "merit" as held by 
the Roman Church. 2 Thus Whichcote aims his attack upon the doctrine 
of merit. By merit, meritum, the Roman Church means the following: 
" ••••• That property of a good work which entitles the doer to 
receive a reward (proemiu!!Lt_merces) from him in whose service the 
work is done. By antonomasia, the word has come to designate 
also the good work itself, in so far as it deserves a reward from 
the person in whose service it was performed. In the theological 
sense, a supernatural merit can only be a salutary act (actus 
salutaris), to which God in consequence of his infallible promise 
owes a supernatural reward, consisting u~timately in eternal life, 
which is the beatific vision in heaven." 
According to Whichcote there is no such t bing as the "creature's 
merit with God". It is above the capacity of any creature to merit 
anything at the hand ·of God. He condemns forthright the Roman notion 
of a "treasury of grace" or merit, out of which the grace of departed 
4 
saints may be bestowed upon the undeserving. The Papists place undue 
1Ibid., pp.173f. Cf. Ibid., II, 316; Aph. 502. See also, Henry 
More, "An Antidote Against Idolatry", Theological Works, ( 1708), pp. 773ff. 
All the Cambridge Platonists oppose Romanism since it threatens the very 
foundation of their ethical and religious structure. 
2Ibid., p.180. Whichcote's view of "implicit faith" is entirely 
di1·ferent. By this concept, Whichcote refers to faith in God concerning 
things not yet revealed and concerning things revealed in Scripture which 
are beyond the comprehension of the unaided reason. Cf. Supra, Ch.VI. 
See art. on "Faith", C. E. , V, 752ff. 
3Art. "Merit", C.E., X, 202. 4whichcote, op. cit., pp.312f. 
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stress upon the states of obedience, single life and poverty as 
perfections. 1 These "popish vows" are denounced by Whichcote as 
folly and superstition. There is nothing in these states automatic-
ally to recommend a man to God, for only virtue understood as 
obedience to the will of God, can do t bat. It is not genuine morti-
fication merely to abuse the body for the sake of the soul. A serious 
attempt to bring the lower appetites under the control of the higher 
faculties, involves a denial of the self, and keeping ourselves within 
the bounds of reason. But to pretend perfection by making a distinction 
between flesh and fish, by abstaining from flesh and drinking wine, is 
nothing but hypocrisy, and there is no true religion in it. 2 
Then Wbicbcote directs his attack at the Pope, the one person in 
the Christian world who pretends to be an infallible visible judge of 
the will of God for man. Whichcote satirically adds that if God had 
set him up a great deal of labour would have been saved, and all 
controversies would have ceased. There is no justification of this 
claim either by reason or revelation. It follows that the Pope is an 
imposter, having usurped upon God's ·authority and thereby making bis 
sin the more detestable. 3 It would be becoming to the Roman Church, 
1Ibid., p.276. 2Ibid., IV, 271f. 
3Ibid., II, 255. Cf. Ibid., I, pp.iiif. Wbichcote's Latin poem 
commemorating the death of Oliver Cromwell is mostly a protest against 
the Papacy. He describes the Lord Protector as his great ally in this 
cause. This is easily understood in view of the plea of Cromwell and 
Wbicbcote alike for religious toleration. It is worth remembering that 
Cromwell called Wbicbcote to bis conference concerning toleration for the 
Jews. Chillingwortb, in many ways a predecessor of Wbichcote, devotes 
his work, The Religion of Protestants, to a position quite similar to 
Whichcote 's. 
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with its pretence to apostolic succession to show by evidence of reason 
what it claims to be true. 1 The Pope is rather concerned with the 
infinite gain that comes from this one doctrine in terms of -power and 
privilege, and because the cheat is greater, the consequences are 
2 
greater. 
"Let these from whom we are departed, give an account to the 
world wh.y they make use of such mediations as they do. But I 
would here distinguish between means that upright persons use as 
helps and means that may operate upon God. If any one doth 
better dispose his mind to prayer, or meditations, by fasting, 
sepa~ation for a while from company; he may use it, I see no 
danger in it. But the danger is, when we fancy such a thing will 
recommend us to God, when God bath not said so ••••• n3 
Whichcote's protest against Papacy is based mainly upon rational 
and moral grounds. The reason for this is obvious since the Roman 
Church appealed to blind obedience on the part of its adherents, and 
by theory and practice upheld a relative standard of moral principles 
in regard to convenience. Since for Whichcote, reason and the 
immutable principles of morality are the essence of all true religion, 
and especially of Christianity, bis position is completely irreconcilable 
with that of Rome. Whicbcote's case appears reasonable as it stands, 
but his appeal to reason in his protest against popery overshadows any 
1Ibid., III, 161; Cf. The Apostolic Ministry (ed. Kirk), pp.40f. 
Here a similar claim is made for the episcopal ministry or Essential 
Ministry which alone is considered valid. 
2 
IQ..!Q. ' 'P• 387. 
3Ibid., II, 327. Cf. Whicbcote, The Malignity of Popery, ed. 
Je:t'fery;--{1717 ). For an account of "apostolic succession", see, Roman 
view: Art. "Apostolic Succession", C.E., I, 641ff.; other views, 
K.E. Kirk, op. cit., pp.lff., and A.G. Herbert, "Ministerial Episcopacy", 
Ibid. , pp.493ff. 
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appeal to Scripture or to the early Church in support 01· his views. 
His arguments against Romanism, theologically speaking, would have 
been far more convincing if he could have indicated where the Roman 
Church departed from the message of the New Testament and the Primitive 
Christian Church as well as from reason and morality. In this way 
he would have, so to speak, uprooted the traditional claims of the 
Roman Church, at their very foundation, and thereby made his protest 
more strong and convincing. 
Whichcote asserts, however, that there is "but One Church (one 
1 Religion) in all ages''. To make clear bis opposition to the Roman 
view, we prefer to use the term "universal" rather than "catholic" 
to express Whichcote's view of one Church for all times and places. 
Wbichcote insists that our Saviour accepts no other separation of His 
Church from the world than is required by "Truth, Virtue and Holiness 
of Life". 2 God rejects our institutions when we make them final, 
that is, when we put them in competition with morals or make them 
compensations for morals. 
" ••••• Institutes have their foundation, in the 'will' of God; 
and the matter of them is alterable: Morals have their foundation, 
in the 'nature' of God, and the matter of them is necessary and 
unalterable."3 
The Reformed Church meets Whichcote's approval. Some parties 
break the policy of this Church, but this cannot be held against the 
Church. According to Whichcote, the Reformed Church holds to the 
1 Aph. 1107. 
2Ibid. 138. 3Ibid. 1121. 
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following principles: (1) All worship is performed in the vulgar 
tongue so that knowledge and devotion may be united; \2) free use of 
Scripture in public and private; l3) the scripture is the only rule 
Of faith. Traditions, Councils and Fathers and the like are to be 
used only for better understanding of Scripture; (4) everyone has the 
right of' private judgment, that is, to distinguish between good and 
evil, truth and falsehood; they make themselves capable of this right 
by prayer and meditation and other helps to knowledge; t5) teachers 
of the Church are to be helpers rather than dictators and masters of 
men's f'ai th: they are not to make religion, but to show it, and their 
purpose is not to take away the key of knowledge from the people, but 
out of compassion they are to lead people in the way of truth and 
recover them out of error and mistake; \6) the people are told that 
Scripture is full and clear in all things necessary to life and practice; 
(7) the Reformed Church does not deceive men by fraud; it deals 
honestly with men and informs them that without personal holiness they 
cannot see the face of God; and t8) it asserts that all who agree 
in the main points of religion ma.y look upon themselves as members of 
the same Church notwithstanding any differences of apprehension in 
other matters. These principles, according to Whichcote, enable 
\ 
Christians to live togethe~ in peace and charity. It is his firm 
belief that these are the fundamental affirmations of Protestantism 
and if a man believes differently, although he may be a professed 
Protestant; yet he is actually a Papist. 1 Whichcote's statement of 
1works, I, 175-182. 
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the principles of the Reformed Church, which refer primarily to the 
Church of England, show that he is not a member of an established 
party in that Church. He is not a Laudian or Puritan and certainly be 
is not related to the Dissenters or Papists. There is a group in the 
Church of England aptly described by .Fowler as "moderate divines, 
abusively called La ti tudinariana", or which Whichcote' s poai ti on is 
representetive. 1 When Whicbcote is at the peak of his career in the 
middle of the seventeenth century, this group does not appear to be 
a strong "party", but to consist of isolated individuals of a liberal 
stamp, i.e. Chillingworth, Hales, Mead, Taylor and others. But by the 
inspiration of his predecessors and contemporaries, Whichcote develops 
Cambridge Platonism. 
It is easy to discern even in Whichcote's statement of tbe 
Reformed Faith his own presuppositions concerning a rational and 
moral religion. But he is honest, he admits that he "takes the 
reformed faith in latitude". A.s a matter of fact, this possibility 
for "liberty of comprehension" of religious knowledge makes this :raith 
moat desirable. He considers this religious liberty as a fUndamental 
justification for the Reformation. This may well be a hint to those 
Protestant groups, such as the Puritans, whose policy bad become as 
dogmatic as the Papists. He is also aware of the many divisions 
within Protestantism, wbich have challenged the integrity of tbe 
1Fowler, A Free Discourse Between Two Intimate Friends, l2nd ed., 
1671). See the title page. Cf. John Hales, "Schism and Schismatics", 
t1642), in Several Tracts, t1677); Jeremy Taylor, Liberty of Prophesying, 
l1834 - first appeared, 1646). 
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Reformation. To a certain degree, these dissentions are the price 
of religious liberty. 
It appears in order to give here such further explanation as 
Whichcote provides us of his conception of the Reformed Faith. It 
professes to do all things in a reasonable manner. Reasonable worship 
and service are according to the mind o~ God and are worthy of us. 
The Reformed Faith requires us to do what Scripture demands. For 
instance, we have in Scripture a "superaddition" to rational worship 
and we go to God by the mediation of Christ. We receive the sacraments 
and the preaching of the Word as "means of grace", and this implies 
that we are to lead a holy life in keeping with our profession. 1 There 
is nothing in the Reformed Church which infringes upon Christ's priestly 
office or which is a ''euperaddi tion" to God's institution. What we do 
is justified either by reason or Scripture and in most cases the beliefs 
and practices of the Reformed Church are attested to by both. Anything 
beyond what can be supported by reason and/or Scripture is to be 
considered circumstantial and therefore unnecessary for salvation. 
Since these surface matters do not recommend us to God, we should maintai~ 
love and agree to differ concerning them. 2 
"The Sense of t be 'Church' is not a 'Rule'; but a thing 
'Ruled'. The Church is bound unto Reason and Scripture, and 
governed by them as much as any 'particular' Person."3 
1Whichcote, Works, II, 324f. 
2Ibid. , p. 329. Cf. Fowler, op. cit. , pp. 228f1'. passim. 
3Aph. ~21. 
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Whichcote describes ministers of the Church as "rational 
instruments" of God. Ministers are helpers of men's faith, preachers 
of righteousness and interpreters of Scripture. To use H. H. Farmer's 
suggestive title, they are "servants of the Word". They are to seek 
the edification of the congregation, to administer the sacraments and 
in every way to lead men in the proper worship of God and holy living. 
These persons by virtue of their functions are used by God for a holy 
purpose, and, therefore, they may be said to be relatively holy. This 
appellation of relative holiness may be ascribed in like manner to the 
Lord's day and the Sacraments since these are set apart for super-
natural purposes. Whichcote appears to be saying what J. s. Whale 
has emphasised, "The Sacraments are efficacious, only because Christ 
Himself uses the minister as his instrument". 1 On the whole, then, 
Whichcote does not give us a definitive statement of the nature of 
the Church in terms of Scripture or the thirty-nine Articles, but be 
implies most that is worthy in both. What he has to say concerning the 
Reformed Church can be understood only against a background of intense 
desire for a rational and moral faith based upon the best concepts 
derived from the theological and philosophical traditions up to his 
time. There seems to be every reason to believe that Whichcote was a 
loyal member of the Church of England and that he accepted willingly, 
its liturgy, ceremonies, government and doctrine as one of his contemp-
oraries testifies. 2 Above all, we must remember his passion for 
1christian Doctrine, pp.160f.; Cf. Whichcote, Works, IV, 68. 
2s. P. (Simon Patrick), "A Brief Account of the Sect of Latitude-
Men" , ( 1662) in The Phenix, ( 1707 ) , pp. 504ff. 
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religious liberty which accounts for his negative reaction to all 
religious intolerance, whether Papist, Laudian, Puritan or Sectarian. 
The Church is for Whichcote universal and in a real sense invisible 
including only those persons who by thought, commitment and life 
acknowledge Christ as the Lord of the Church. 
"God looking upon us, not as we are in ourselves, but as we 
are gathered together in Christ, as a head. In the 'mystical 
body' the head is as truly influencial as the natural head is 
influencial and beneficial to the members of the natural body. rrl 
For Whichcote, as for the Old Testament prophets of social justice 
and for Jesus, worship is best when we resemble God most. 2 What 
Whichcote bas to say about worship has its basis in the exegesis of 
a passage of Scripture (Jn.4:24). The statement "God is a Spirit" 
in the Authorised Version of the Bible is understood by Whichcote as 
"Spirit is God"· The question is, where is the place of worship? 
Jesus answers that the place of worship is neither in Jerusalem, nor 
in the mountain, for worship is spiritual. Worship is elevated above 
our space-time conceptions. Spirit is God and, therefore, spiritual 
worship alone is acceptable to God. If we use the traditional state-
ment, God is a Spirit, there is no purpose for our Lord's argument. 
God had always been known as a spiritual substance according to Whicbcote, 
therefore, there would have been little purpose for Jesus' re-statement 
of this accepted fact - that "God is a Spirit". But to say that 




"Spirit is God" bas a special significance for worship. Only spirit 
can meet with spirit, and therefore any communion between ourselves and 
God must be by a spiritual and intellectual approach. What Jesus 
means here is that God has been approached all along by figures, types, 
rites, ceremonies and the like, but God bad been to a great extent hidden. 
It is only by spiritual worship that man may have a full encounter with 
Spirit. Jesus' definition of worship as spiritual communion stripped 
of all unnecessary ceremonialism shows the real essence and purpose of 
all that is implied by the words "Spirit is God". 1 This is the point 
at which the worship of the New Israel envisaged by Jesus is in a 
vital sense a "new thing" from that of the Old Israel. Whether we 
grant Wbicbcote bis rendering of the text or not, it seems most probable 
that the meaning he bas derived from the text is invaluable for the 
proper understanding of what is genuine Christian worship. 
If we worship God with sincerity, we may do so with cheerfulness 
and clear understanding. True worship is rational and moral. The 
profane have confUsion in their worship, and the superstitious look upon 
God as the enemy of their nature. These worship God in "dread and 
horror", but true worshippers worship God with delight. 2 As John Smith 
so aptly puts it: 
"Superstition is such an apprehension of God in the thoughts 
of men, as renders Him grievous and burdensome to them, and so 
destroys all free converse with Him; begetting, in the stead 
thereof, a forced and jejune devotion, void of inward life and love!' 3 
1works, II, 123f. 2Ibid., p.356. 3smith, op. cit.,p.37. 
Acts of worship and 
external, otherwise they 
formality without inward 
should be observant but 
the essence of worship. 
the Spirit's presence. 1 
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devotion must be intellectual as well as 
are not piety but hypocrisy. Outward 
loyalty to Christ is useless. The body 
one should not depend upon external acts as 
God as Spirit cannot be duly worshipped without 
This is the point at which idolatry so often 
emerges. Idolatry consists in the attempt to confine the Deity to a 
material thing or act and likewise in the endeavour to raise some 
material thing to a divine status by the mere fiat of our wills. 2 
Thankfulness and obedience are the true sacrifices, they are worthy of 
the creature and the Creator, and those which God will certainly accept. 
But it is certain that the zeal of any institution, though it be a 
divine institution, is unacceptable to God, if it is in conjunction 
with immorality. 3 In view of the formal nature of the accepted liturgy 
of the Church of England, a prophetic reminder of the true nature and 
purpose of worship in the spirit of Whichcote's observations is quite 
necessary. As a matter of fact, all Christians, even in "free churches", 
need to be reminded that worship is rational, moral and spiritual if it 
is not to degenerate to the level of magic or at best to a shell of 
ritualism with no spiritual substance. Whichcote also significantly 
1whichcote, op. cit., IV, 79; Cf. ~-, III, 316f. 
2Ibid., II, 101ff. 
3rbid., III, 207; Cf. Henry :More, "The True Grounds of the Certainty 
of Faith", op. cit., pp.765-770. Whichcote describes worship in the 
following Aphorisms: 474, 762, 753, 806, 936, 961, 1009, 1013, 1116, 142, 
143, 970, 1082, passim. 
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reminds us that every deed, word and attitude of life is a part of our 
worship. We enter the Church (the institution) to worship once or 
twice each week, but we depart to serve in our daily life. Worship 
is for him "reasonable service" and holy living. Thus in a real 
sense worship begins at the close of the formal service of worship. 
Finally, he cautions us to refrain from substituting the "instrumental 
part" of religion, i.e. prayer, hearing sermons, receiving sacraments, 
for the "end" of religion. The instruments "are valuable in respect 
to an end and are crowned when they attain their purpose". 1 He adds: 
"They, who mistake the Means for the End, may be reproved; 
without prejudice to the Means; for the Use of 'Means' is nothing, 
if there be not 'thereby' an Attainment of the End. 11 2 . 
Preaching is for Whichcote an indispensable part of worship. 
He appears to have been at his best in the pulpit proclaiming the 
Gospel. In a broad sense preaching was for him sacramental - "a means 
of grace". Preaching is a solemn and necessary responsibility arising 
out of the nature of the Gospel itself. Preaching is in a superlative 
degree the encounter of one person with another and God takes this 
human encounter up into a personal encounter with Himself. God makes 
the human word the "instrument" of t be Di vine Word. To Whichcote 
preaching is not always strictly Scriptural, the testimony of truth 
from other areas of human lmowledge and experience is also valid as long 
as it witnesses to Christ. The use of Scripture relates to the message 
which God reveals in Christ, but to twist a text changes it into a 




pretext - this is to use Scripture merely as a perch for one's own 
ideas. One should read Scripture as one would a letter from a 
friend to discern the "mind and will" of that friend. Preaching 
consists in making the mind and will of God as contained in the 
Scripture and as revealed in Christ, lmown to men with all its moral 
and rational claims. He says: "I have always found that such 
'Preaching' of' Others hath most commanded my 'Heart'; which hath 
most illuminated my Heaa.ul 
To be employed by God to preach His Gospel is the noblest calling 
in the world. There is no earthly vocation to be compared with the 
privilege and responsibility of declaring the Gospel of redemption. 
The preacher is sent on God's "errand", he bears a message from God 
to man and this is the highest honour God has bestowed upon mortal 
man. God does not direct the affairs of the visible Church by the 
ministry of angels, but by men whom he appoints as "stewards of the 
2 mysteries" 01· the Gospel. Preaching is to have a moral content and 
purpose. 
" ••••• Men are not wanting to preach the doctrine of the gospel, 
or to preach Christ, tho' they do not name Christ in every sentence 
or period 01· words; who contend !'or all effects of real goodness 
and decry every wickedness ••••• If men contend for the effects of 
real goodness, and decry wickedness, they do truly and properly 
preach Christ. And this is the reason; for this is the effect 
of Christ, and this is Christ's business. 11 3 
1Ibid., 3~3. Whicbcote's general attitude concerning preaching 
is quite similar to that presented by Dr. H.R. Farmer in his Servant of 
the Word, pp.14f., 24f. 
2works, III, 65; Cf. Whale, op. cit., p.161. 3Ibid. , p. 262. 
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Thus Christ is preached if His business is done and if His work 
is carried on. It follows that Christ is not effectively preached, 
even if His name is mentioned constantly, where there is no serious 
attempt to be Christ-like. 
"Therefore talk no more against moral preachers: for t bey 
who call upon men to live godly, righteously, soberly, they carry 
on the work of Christ , and these men preach c hri st. "1 
A contemporary estimation of the preaching of Whicbcote and his 
disciples by Fowler is invaluable. Fowler says: 
"They preached the whole duty of man to God, bis Neighbour, 
and to Himself. These insisted upon true holiness, the divine 
life of virtue, the righteousness which is of God by faith in 
Jesus Christ, inward rectitude and integrity and doing all the 
good we can from the best and most divine motives. They preached 
that divine and heavenly life whose root is faith in God and our 
Saviour Christ; and the branches or parts of it are humility, 
purity and charity. tt2 
It would be difficult to point to an individual who bas in greater 
measure lived up to this worthy view of what we may call the "total 
Gospel" than Whichcote. He shows us by word a.nd deed the real 
privilege and r esponsi bili ty of all "servants of the Word". 
Wbicbcote' s observations on prayer are just as worthy as what 
he bas to say concerning preaching. 
"All is not done when we have spoken to God by 'Prayer': 
our Petitions are to be pursued with real Endeavours; and 
our Prayers are to be Means and Instruments of Piety and Virtue, 
must be subservient to a Holy Life. If they are not the former, 
1Ibid. , p. 263. 
2Fowler, op. cit., pp.117f. Cf. Tillotson, The Funeral Sermon 
of ••••• Wbichcote, pp.214ff. 
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they are worth nothing· if they are not the latter, we but 
deceive ourselves."1 ' 
Oddly enough Whichcote appears to exalt prayer above the 
Sacraments because of its "purely mental" character. While the 
Sacraments lbaptism and communion) are temporary acts and are 
accommodated to this state of imperfection, prayer is a purely 
spiritual set, and, therefore, "continues to Eternity". 2 Here 
Whichcote is consistent with his mental, or spiritual view of worship 
and he is likewise true to his insistence that worship is moral, but 
this tendency to subordinate the Sacraments in his scheme would appear 
unjustified. We will, however, suspend our judgment until we examine 
his observations on tbe subject. 
In spite of his appreciation of a spiritual retreat when one 
is "alone with God", he views prayer as essentially social. This 
stems logically from the "social concern" which is fundamental to 
his total message. 
"The Right to 'Pray' is a Trust; from those, who are to 
pray 'with' us: therefore nothing doubtful and uncertain, or 
peculiar and singular shou'd be put into our Prayer: or be 
matter of it."3 
If we will remember that Whichcote has in mind here public 
prayer, we will find his suggestion quite helpful. Too often public 
prayers degenerate to the mere suggestive imposition of one's own 
interests upon others and the sense of mutual concern and divine 
1Whichcote, Aph. 201. Cf. Ibid. 1120. 
2Ibid. 1082. Cf. ill£• 970. 3Ibid. 1074. 
302. 
communion is absent. 
Whichcote regards prayer in the Reformed Church as both formal 
and conceived. Formal prayers are aids for wandering minds and they 
are proper and succinct; whereas spontaneous prayers are not always 
"purely prayer matter". Genuine prayer consists of these aspects: 
confession of sin; thankfulness to God for His goodness; adoration 
of His greatness and the awareness of our dependence; and a petition 
for grace. Anything that does not refer to these four aspects of 
prayer is to be considered as extravagance in prayer. 1 
In prayer we should be sure that we are in a "praying temper" 
and that we ofr·er to God in sacrifice 11prayer-matter". We should, 
then, be concerned at once Vii th the proper attitude in which we 
approach God in prayer and with the nature of our thoughts. Attitude 
and intention are united in prayer and we are to remember that "truth 
for the matter may be false for the manner". 2 If men would confine 
their prayers to what is necessary and essential, all undue repetitions 
would be removed and none would be too long. Above all, men should 
not in prayer take the liberty to tell God stories. If we confess 
our sins in prayer, we should do so with a desire for pardon. Those 
who make a serious attempt to live as they pray, will not have the 
same sins to confess a second time. The Christian religion is not 
1 Works, II, 327. 
2Ibid. , I, 15f. 
ed. of his Aphorisms 
concise statement of 
See Whichcote's own prayers appended to Salter's 
and to Vol.IV of his Works. These prayers are a 
his theology. 
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designed in order that we may sin and pray, and pray and sin. One 
may acknowledge that he has done something before which by some weakness 
or over-powering temptation he has done again; but to take confession 
lightly and to practise a sin again and again wil!Ully, is not 
religious but profane. When we pray in adoration of God, His 
perfections, superiority and greatness, we should be aware of our 
"unworthiness" in His presence, our dependence upon Him. We should 
be filled with a. sense of our insufficiency and wealmess and desire the 
assistance of His grace. And as we reflect upon God's goodness and 
faithfulness to us, we should render to Him most hearty and sincere 
thanks. 1 For Whichcote, as for H. H~ Farmer, prayer is man's sincere 
response to God's self-disclosure. Farmer says: 
"In the thought of revelation there is expressed the sense 
of God's active approach as personal to the spirit of man; in 
prayer there is expressed the·answe~ing activity of man, as self-
conscious personality towards God." 
We receive bread and wine in memory of Christ's passion and death 
and we use water in baptism to acknowledge Father, Son and Holy Ghost. 
The sacraments are required by Seri -pture as "means of grace" and these 
are the "superaddi tions" to rational worship. 3 Whichcote reminds us 
that no specific instructions are given concerning the institution of 
the Lord's Supper save the action and its interpretation. But men are 
divided on such questions as the following in regard to the Sacrament of 
1Ibid., III, 207ff. 
3whichcote, Works, II, 325. 
2The World and God, p.128. 
304. 
Holy Communion: In what company? What preparation? At what time? 
How often? In what posture? Such men seek "determinations beyond 
Scripture". All these questions are unanswered in Scripture. But 
our Lord clearly commands that we should celebrate this Feast in 
remembrance of Him. This alone is fundamental however we may answer 
the series of questions just stated. . There was no concern of our 
Lord about the company or Judas would have been excluded. All laws 
are rigorously obeyed when they are first made. Thus if the lawgiver 
did not insist upon the rule regarding a special company neither should 
we. No time was given for the Supper, for it was instituted when our 
Lord and His intimate disciples were met upon another occasion - in 
preparation for the Passover. At the Passover there were four 
eatings and two drinkings. Our Lord gave a new significance to one 
of the cups and one of the breads. It was a religious exercise that 
they had met to observe and it may be assumed that they were in a 
worship:t'ul mood. Those who live Christian lives and follow the 
Saviour's doctrine may freely and indifferently enter into all 
religious exercises. Some men, who make no preparation for prayer 
or other Christian acts of worship pretend to make serious and special 
preparation for Holy Communion. Is not the object of worship the 
same in all cases? It appears that such people conceive the Sacrament 
as possessing some "magical power" or their lives are so corrupt that 
they fear the literal meaning of the words of' Paul that "they eat and 
drink damnation to themselves" (I Cor. 11:29). Surely the sacrifice 
of the wicked is an abomination unto the Lord, but this is to point 
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up the fact that it is not sa1·e to "lay all the weight upon one piece 
of religion and be trifling and neglecti ve in others". 1 
observes: 
Whicbcote 
"Whosoever lives according to the difference of good and 
e~il, and governs himself so that he may make application to God, 
either by prayer, reading, meditation, or Christian conference, 
or any other Christian duty, is in a preparation and disposition, 
wherein he may come safely to the table of the Lord. 11 2 
Our Lord does not tell us how often we should observe the Feast, 
but He did say "as often as you do it", apparently implying frequency. 
As a matter of fact its importance implies frequency because it is 
in remembrance of the saving work of our Lord for us. It is reasonable 
that this Sacrament should be observed frequently and with sincerity 
of heart and life. As for the posture we should assume while observing 
the Feast, there is no instruction, for apparently our Lord "took them 
as he found them". The danger is that by our superstitions we may 
make rules which harden into dogmas and then seek to impose these on 
others. 
"It is to be feared, that so much of curiosity as a man 
bestows about any piece of religion and devotion that is of his 
own formation, so much will he abate in his consci~ntious 
observance of that which is of God's institution." 
Whichcote has not given us a definitive account of the Lord's 
Supper, but his position is consistent with his purpose to defend the 
principles of Christian liberty and charity. However, what he bas to 
1Ibid., IV, pp.179ff. 2Ibid. , p. 180. 
3Ibid. , pp.181f. Cf. Cudworth, "The True Notion of the Lord's 
Supper-rr-;-works, (1st American ed.), II, 499-542. See also, Farmer, 
op. cit. , pp. 72ff. 
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say is most vital, for he has called our attention from the surface 
matters surrounding the Holy Communion to the attitude of worship and 
life which are conditions of its meaning and effectiveness in our 
experience. He tells us how we are to live and worship if in this 
Sacrament God is to come to us and if God is to sacramentally unite 
the symbolic action and the grace it conveys for our growth in holy 
1
. . 1 i ving. He tells us what the dogmatic theologians omit for all their 
carefUl statements of Christian dogmas, namely, that if we are to 
commune together across barriers of incidental differences, we must not 
seek to "determine beyond Scripture". For those of us who are 
involved in the present ecumenical movement, be reminds us that we are 
not truly ecumenical until we can "keep the Feast" together and this we 
were not prepared to do at Evanston. And for those of us who exclude 
others from partaking of this Sacrament with us, he reminds us that 
the essential fact in the Eucharist is not man's remembrance and 
commemoration of Christ's death alone, but that Christ here gives 
Himself to man. It is Christ Himself Who administers this Sacrament. 
It is His, not mine, or yours, and He alone invites us to His table. 
He is at once, the Giver of the Feast and the Feast itself. It follows 
that no mortal man is worthy or has the power to exclude any one from 
the Lord's Table. Whicbcote correctly cautions us that determinations 
beyond Scripture may enlarge faith, but lessen charity. 
Whicbcote's treatment of Baptism is likewise casual. He assumes 
1Whale, op. cit., p.160. 
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that we have sufficient knowledge concerning the doctrine of Baptism 
and seeks to rid the celebration of this Sacrament from all adul ter-
ations and false dogmas which are the basis of so much contention 
among Christians. After he completes his discussion on Holy Communion, 
Whichcote says: 
"I might also shew you the very same thing in the other 
institution. For, there you have only the material action, 
and the acknowledgment ••••• Now, how hath the world been troubled 
about the circumstances of time, and several other things a bout 
this Sacrament? and all without foundation ••••• Charity hath been 
wanting, when men have gone about to make out scripture further 
than what hath been plainly declared. "1 
He adds: 
"· •••• Whatsoever is done throughout the life of man, that there 
is reason for; it is warranted by God; provided, still, that 
a man doth not vary from any particular and express institution 
oi .. God in sc·ripture. And, if this were understood, we should 
have the very foundation of differences in the Church of God 
taken away. It is but a vain pretence of zeal for God, and doing 
him service; for us to limit, appoint, constitute and determine, 
beyond what he himself hath done. tt2 
Whichcote's attention is focused upon tolerance in religion. 
"Tolerance" as used by Whichcote does not imply being "put up with" 
or as we say "merely tolerated", but in t re more wholesome sense of 
sympathetic understanding, positive good-will and mutual helpfUlness 
in spite of doctrinal differences. Further, "charity" as used by 
Whichcote here should be purged of all accretions. He means 
essentially what St. Paul means in his famous "Love Poem" (I Cor. 13), 
by the term translated in the Authorised Version of the Bible as 
1Whichcote, Works, IV, 182. 
l 
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"charity", but for which J. B. Phillips and other translators substitute 
the word "love". 1 
For V/hichcote religion is not a system of doctrines, "observance 
of modes", a "heat of af:t'ections", a "form of words", or a "spirit of 
consoriousness". 2 While it is necessary to know what God has revealed 
creatively in the natural order and redemptively in Christ; it is 
impossible to know more than he has revealed. It follows that if men 
would refrain from going beyond God's revelation, in nature and by 
3 grace, there would be less controversy. Thus his reaction against 
dogmatism is as marked as that agai.nst passion, false zeal, enthusiasm, 
superstition and the like. He says ~oncerning all these "disturbers 
of peace" among Christians: 
"Curious 'Determinations'· beyond Scripture, are thought to 
be improvement of Faith; and inconsiderate 'Dullness', to be the 
denial of our Reason; 'Fierceness' in a Sect, to be Zeal for 
Religion; and speaking 'without sense', to be the Simplicity of 
the Spirit. "4 
But as for him such things may have enlarged faith, they have 
certainly lessened charity, and increased divisions in Christendom. 
John Smith appropriately captures his master's meaning when he describes 
theology as a "divine life rather than a divine science". 5 Over 
against Whichcote' s reaction to these disturbers of peace among 
Christians, he presents his view of Christian tolerance and thus it is 
1Letters to Young Churches (Fontana Series), pp.79f. 
~Vhichcote, Aph. 1127. 3Ibid. 1054. 
4Ibid. 505. 5Smith, op. cit., p.1. 
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to his positive suggestions toward Christian understanding and co-
operation in spite of surface differences that we now turn. 
Whichcote makes clear his awareness of the difficulty of calling 
in question treasured beliefs, but, nevertheless, he insists that 
no wise, nor truly good man, should be so fond of an opinion that 
he will not give it up if he finds it to be false. The very nature 
of our creaturehood, as "finite and fallible" beings, indicates that 
we should always be enquirers after truth, that we should keep an 
open mind for the examination of new information, and that we should 
be willing to follow truth wherever it leads. 1 We should also 
remember that there are some things in religion that are not absolutely 
clear to any of us about which others may be "otherwise minded", and 
yet not be necessarily opposed to truth. Fortunately these obscure 
matters do not involve things "necessary to salvation", for these are 
clearly revealed. And, furthermore, God will "bring out of particular 
mistakes, him that is right in the main". It follows that those who 
differ in some particulars, but who agree on essential points of 
doctrine and policy, should "hold together" as if they were agreed in 
all things. The principle things of religion, which include the 
honour of God, form the foundation of Christian union and all matters 
of particular ap~rehension ought not to make for differences or 
separation. If the fundamentals of religion were digested and duly 
considered, there would be a solid ground for peace and unity in the 
1Which~ote, Works, I, 355; II, 8; IV, 103. 
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Church. The normal result would be agreement in "hearty love and 
good-will" and mutual helpfulness. 1 That is to say Christians are 
of "one spirit" and all enmity between them is to be "subdued and 
vanquished". Being fellow citizens of heaven, it is to be expected 
that Christians should be in essential accord upon earth, for men 
f'rom the same country are normally elated to meet each other abroad, 
and are faithful and kind to each other. 2 
It is a scandal to the world when professors or religion do 
not agree. Disagreements among Christians are hindrances to missionary 
work among the unsaved. 3 It is easy to understand, therefore, in view 
of the divisions within the Church wby those who stand outside refuse 
to come in, and why they look upon Christians with derision. Truth, 
nevertheless, is single and all who are joined in it are united. It 
follows that agreement between Christians would be of mutual benefit: 
for their spiritual edification, for their subsistence in an evil 
world, for their peace 01· mind, and :eor the general effectiveness of 
the Christian Church. Competition between parties can only lead to 
envious comparisons, while there should be but one division, that 
between the Church and the world. For the good of the Cause, those 
1Ibid., pp.377f.; Cf. Ibid., IV, 403. 
2Ibid., II, 23; Cf. Ibid., IV, 183. 
3It is necessary to point out that by disagreement, or difference 
among Christians, Whichcote means an unwholesome and odious division on 
non-essentials. He leaves ample room for s wholesome divergence of 
opinion in the Christian spirit. It is, indeed, unfortunate that 
various denominations within Protestantism were so belated in practising 
this principle on the foreign mission field. It is regrettable that 
many "enthusiastic" religious sects still prefer to "go it a lone" in 
their missionary programme to the detriment oft he entire Christian cause. 
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wbo profess faith in Christ should be one in heart, as to all issues 
1 and P.Urposes. 
Whicbcote reminds us of Socrates as be raises questions and 
makes us aware of our ignorance and limitations. Why should not 
agreement in the fundamentals of the faith be more conducive to 
concord than differences on non-essentials are to separation? All 
that are in accord on essentials are informed by the same spirit 
and the things agreed upon are more numerous and more important 
than the things upon which they diff'er. Wby should men differ con-
cerning religion which is the greatest bond of union? Religion bas 
two things "final" in it, namely, reconciliation with God as Creator 
and Redeemer, and reconciliation with each other. Why should one 
be aggrieved because every one uses his own right? There is no 
greater right than that of worshipping God with all our mind. 
one has the right to judge what he should believe and it is not 
within a man's power to judge as he wills, but only according to 
Every 
reason. As a matter of fact, if a man could believe as he wills, 
the sinner would never be self-condemned, for the guilt or self-
condemnation of the sinner implies the unnaturalness and irrationality 
of sin. Why over-emphasise the questionable matters of faith? In 
1Wbichcote, Works, II, 25f. The originality and courage of 
Whicbcote's views on Christian tolerance may be appreciated only 
against a background of a fUll realisation of the religious situation 
in seventeenth century England. His tolerant spirit is thrown into 
a higher reliet' when we recall the fanaticisms and extravagances of 
almost every type of Christianity and the unwholesome effects of the 
bitterness thus produced. 
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view of our finitude, is it wise to over-value our opinions while 
at the same time we undervalue the opinions of others? Why not 
make the same favourable interpretation on behalr of another which 
one desires for oneself? Is it not possible to lessen differences by 
fair debate, which may be increased by jealousy and suspicion. When 
persons with supposed differences talk together, they often find that 
they are not as far apart as they imagined. Is it fair to reject 
one from Christian conversation whom God in Christ has not rejected? 
Why condemn others on points which we are not willing to stake our 
eternal destiny? Why blame others for not knowing what we have 
arrived at by much effort over a long period of time? As long as 
there is a possibility of wisdom and experience, of growing in faith 
and knowledge, there is still hope for those who seek religious truth. 1 
This series of questions by Whichcote is suggestive of the answers he 
gives to them. Indeed, his intention runs through his enquiries. 
Both his questions and answers are or the deepest significance to all 
who are seriously seeking grounds for Christian understanding. 
Whichcote offers an apology for all who are honest in their 
search for truth, all who are of a "modest and teachable" spirit. He 
asserts that even if a man is mistaken, he need not be heretical and 
it is easy to perceive if a man is either a hypocrite or heretic. He 
is not a hypocrite if he means well, and he is not a heretic if he is 
sincere and ready to be informed. But Whichcote is also aware of the 
1Ibid., pp.29-36; Cf. Aph. 136. 
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danger of this position if carried to the extreme. Those who are 
less competent to judge 1·or want of education should rely upon 
qualified guides. Here he conceives the role of religious teachers 
not as the mere transmission of dogma but as an appeal to the mind 
and experience of others as dignified and autonomous persons. Great 
respect is due "superiors" in the government of the Church if 
disturbances arising out of pretence to private judgment are to be 
averted. Here he implies his loyalty to an ecclesiastical hierarchy 
in the Church and there is every reason to believe that he subscribed 
to the episcopal organisation and polity of the Church ot .. England. 
But episcopacy for him as for the liberal Churchmen, i.e. Chillingworth, 
Taylor and Stillingfleet, was to be understood as the bene ease rather 
than the esse of the Church. Thus Whichcote seeks a balance between 
the complete religious liberty of the individual on one hand and a 
secure control by those invested with religious authority on the other. 
Whether we accept his solution or not we must envisage his problem 
and the necessity of some constructive thought and action regarding it. 
Whichcote desires to see the principle o:t' democracy rule in the 
Church as elsewhere. He insists that a person should not consider his 
private judgment as superior to all others, and be considers it safer 
to err in a matter that is common than in one that is personal. One 
who asserts his personal judgment as final regardless of all other 
opinions should ask himself: "How went the spirit of God from the 
generality of worshippers, and determined itself to me?" By sincerely 
raising this question, one is led to caution and diligent enquiry, to 
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a desire for f'urther information. Before becoming certain of one's 
beliefs, one should submit them to impartial examination by others 
more competent to judge, weigh what others have to say, and suspend 
judgment until the matter has been repeatedly reflected upon. After 
this process our decisions are more reliable, for nothing is more 
certain than that which we have arrived at after honest doubt. Without 
these considerations we are likely to be easily persuaded and therefore 
credulous or "light of faith". It is essential that such modesty as 
becomes a Christian should always accompany our private judgments. 
Such judgments should be allied with good behaviour so as to prevent 
any unrest in the family of God, the Church. Private judgment is 
important but should be preceded by education, meditation and discussion. 
In this sense, private judgment is a fundamental right of° intellectual 
nature; but the fact that we are born only with faculties or possibil-
ities for acts and habits, means that we are responsible for the proper 
development and use of these potentialities. 1 This is just as 
important from the religious view point as it is from the moral, and 
by adherence to this principle greater understanding would be possible 
aciong Christians. 
Apart from Scripture and the Sacraments, all other things in 
Christianity are circumstantial. There are, then, "circumstantials" 
in religion which are changeable as the security of the Church may 
require and the maintenance of' charity among Christians demands. God 
libi·d II 36fr · Cf. Aph. 570, 637, passim. 
~~· ' ' . ' -
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intends that the Christian Church should have the protection of a 
sound government, but liberty among Christians concerning indifferent 
matters is also allowed. There is, then, a very great latitude 
within the framework of the Church especially concerning liturgy. We 
should, however, manifest obedience to those in authority and in order 
to attain brotherly love and charity, we should "live in love" among 
the members of the Church. Nothing is more prejudicial to charity 
than unnecessary separation. Therefore, it is advisable to "affect 
to differ" on merely circumstantial questions of religion since "every 
degree of separation begets an alienation". A valid distinction may 
be made in religion between those things which are good in themselves, 
and those that are good only in relation to other things. The former 
are immutable, for instance, love of God, faith in Him, truth and 
goodness. These things sanctify by their very presence. On the 
other band, matters in religion "good in order to these" are not 
important enough to cause a breach of peace in the Church. :B1or example, 
the manner of worship is not "necessary to salvation", and, therefore, 
is to be valued only as required by saving trutbs. 1 
Not only do men separate upon what they consider to be essential 
to the faith, but they divide over what they consider not to be of 
God; i.e. , the "moral part" of religion. There are those who insist 
that the very knowledge of our Lord is opposed to moral responsibility. 
This is for Wbichcote the "st1"'angest mistake" of all, since the very 
lrbid. ff. , 325f. 
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purpose of the saving work of Christ is to restore and reinforce the 
moral principles of creation, in other words, to "re-establish" the 
moral part of religion impaired by man's fallen and sinful condition. 
This being so, the fact that men should separate by setting morality 
over against religion is indeed difficult to understand. It follows 
that in this case, there is a serious mistake as well as a deviation 
from Christian love. 1 
Whichcote observes that most great differences in Christendom 
are not based on necessary and indispensable truth or Scripture, but 
on points of "curious" and "nice" speculation or on arbitrary modes of 
worship. b'uch surface differences should not make it impossible for 
men to live in peace, "with a safe conscience" and in "full communion" 
in the Church of God and to submit to its government. It appears 
that if Whichcote had to choose between the liturgy and government of 
th3 Church of England, he would give preference to the government. 
But most important, he would insist upon the acknowledgment of Christ 
as the Head of the Church. He is greatly disturbed because Christendom 
is "scattered into particular ways", multiplied into sects and parties, 
divided over non-essentials of the faith and what is worst, disagreed 
upon the great and bright truths of reason and Christianity. 2 In view 
of this state of affairs, he makes the following suggestion: 
1Ibid., pp.390f.; Cf. Supra, Ch.VII, for a detailed account of 
Whichcote's view of Christian morality. 
2Ibid., III, 33; Aphs. 588, 1036. 
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" ••..• All that are serious in religion, do agree in the main; 
so may hold communion. If they have the love of truth in their 
hear~s, if they mean by religion, to prepare themselves for 
happiness, all these do agree i~ main and principal things; 
therefore they may hold communion; and if they may they ought, 
if they ought and do not, they sin ••••• For it is founded in nature, 
that what is principal, at no time whatsoever, is to be prejudiced 
by an accessary or circumstant. They that do agree in the great 
things of religion, they do agree in that that is vital; there-
fore if they do not agree in other things of less moment, here 
what the rule is; that principles in no time whatsoever are to 
be prejudiced by an accessary. This is true in every matter; 
therefore it must be concluded, that all that are serious in 
religion, do agree in the main, and so may hold communion!'l 
We turn now to Whichcote's more constructive suggestions 
concerning Christian tolerance. We should not confuse the certainties 
of the faith with uncertainties. All uncertainties should be by 
themselves in a "catalogue of disputables" or matters requiring further 
enquiry; while the certainties of religion should issue into life 
and practice. That is to say, a man should never admit anything 
among his settled beliefs which is not in itself rational and self-
consistent. 2 With regard to uncertainties we may safely "observe 
superiors" and "comply with our brethren to increase love and good-will 
and use our own Christian prudence and liberty for the thing in its own 
nature does not determine us". Where the light of Scripture does not 
direct, God refers us to the light of creation. 3 
1rbid., p.59. Whichcote's contemporary John Milton was one of 
the greatest exponents of Christian liberty in seventeenth century 
England. This conception is set forth in Milton's De Doctrina (see 
p.424, passim.) and briefly near the end of Paradise Lost. Cf. 
Douglas Bush, Paradise Lost in Our Time, pp.35f. 
2rbid., p.60; Cf. More, Loe. cit. 
3Ibid. , p. 269. 
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Differences in a wholesome sense are natural and are to be 
expected. The persecution of a brother out of zeal for truth is 
unwarrantable, and any such pretence deserves careful examination; 
for men must think as they find cause; they have the freedom of 
their own thoughts; and, sincere believers do not greatly differ 
about saving truths. It is better for men to make mistakes about 
religion than to neglect it completely since the mere interest in it 
indicates that they are awake and are seeking truth even where they 
have not attained it. This emphasises the necessity for patience and 
love among Christians. 1 One should not expect unity in all opinions, 
and divergence in comprehension may be no one's fault. Things appear 
different to people of different temperaments and backgrounds. For 
all his intellectualism, Wbichcote realises that it is impossible to 
render such a conclusive reason for an opinion that another may not 
offer an even greater in contradiction. There is "reason against 
reason" in most cases and differences of opinion are, therefore, 
inevitable. We are naturally different, in temperament, education, 
employment, presuppositions, early prejudices, and the like. Moreover 
there is difficulty in judging many "uncertainties" partly from the 
nature of the things themselves, and partly because our understanding 
is fallible. Even those who are sincerely religious, who are diligent 
lrbid., IV, 201ff. Whichcote has sounded a significant warning 
for our age characterised so much by indifference to religion. 
Professor Matthew Spinka, of Hartford Seminary, used to say, "There 
are no more holy wars because no one cares enough for religion to fight 
about it." 
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to be informed, arrive at different conclusions. They find cause to 
suspend judgment, to rethink their tentative conclusions and to 
"compare notes" with others. Thus understanding for those who differ 
from us is a Christian responsibility. 1 Whichcote's point is that 
all saving truths are certain and clear and thus the things concerning 
which it is safe to differ and upon which sincere Christians often do 
differ, are the uncertain and incidental matters of faith. This 
being so, we should have sympathy and understanding for those who 
differ from us in their sincere search for truth. His suggestion, 
in brief, is that it is essential for the maintenance of the spirit of 
love for Christians to "agree to differ". 
"It is better for us that there shou'd be 'Difference' of 
Judgment: if we keep 'Charity': but it is unmanly to 'Quarrel', 
because we Differ."~ 
Whichcote is concerned with what may best be described as "unity 
in diversity". "Why should not they", he asks, "who meet in the 
regenerate nature, who agree in the great articles of the faith, and 
principles of the good life,\ over-look subordinate differences?" As 
a matter of fact, if there is love and good-will, we come to a .more 
rational and better grounded faith as a result of our different 
app re hens ions. Without differences, any conversation concerning 
faith would end as soon as it had begun, for it is only by disagreement 
and new insight that one's faith is examined. Without this give and 
take in discussion, truth will be lost for want of critical examination. 3 
1Ibid., pp.378ff. 2 Aph. 569. 3works, II, 26f. 
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Our position should be one of implicit faith in God, that is, belief in 
the Holy Spirit's meaning. If this is so we meet in "the rule of truth" 
even though we differ in the particular explanation of it. If there 
were no contradiction in the several apprehensions of men, we might 
never be awakened to search into things and if we were mistaken, we 
would never be delivered from it. But is it not possible that such 
discussion may lead to dangerous error? It is Whichcote's belief that 
this is God's "charge" and He will not allow a sincere "seeker" after 
truth to err in anything saving. This being so, our task is to put 
forward what we believe to be true, together with the reason for it. 
To say what is reasonable and make this clear to others by appealing 
to their minds and hearts, is the most we can do and the rest 'is up 
to God. Saving knowledge is available to all, it is clear and self-
evident. 
"Since all things that are necessary to salvation are 
delivered plainly in the holy scriptures; we may resolve that 
none but those who are gross neglecters, do err, 'dangerously'. 
There is no need of curiosity since the appearance of Christ •••• 
The points of Christian faith are clearly intelligible to all 
capacities, as they are clearly necessary to be believed by all men. 
God accents alike the faith that results from dark mists of the 
ignorant~ and from the clearest intelligence of the learned. The 
holy scriptures are so written, that they are sooner understood 
by an unlearned man that is pious and modest, than by a philosopher 
who is arrogant and proud. u1 
If the question is raised, as to the place of zeal for God and 
truth, Whichcote's answer is that this has its principal operation on 
oneself in improving one's judgment and practice. Towards others it 
1Ibid. , PP• 27f. 
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shows itself in strength of argument, a well-governed spirit and a 
Christian love and patience for those not yet satisfied. 1 Religion is 
a "bond of union" and obliges us at once to God and one another and 
should never be the basis of displeasure. 2 The charitable spirit is 
essential to Christianity
3 
and, therefore, Christians must be peace-
makers and reconcilers. 4 It is indeed difficult t o understand why 
some people are worse for their religion, who are otherwise good-natured. 
Some are moved by their religion to do things unnatural and unreasonable; 
while "common good-nature makes men innocent, harmless and friendly". 5 
Whichcote attested to these precepts by his example. Tillotson says 
concerning his work et Milton: 
" ••••• He preached constantly; and relieved the poor, and had 
their children taught to read at his own charge; and made up 
differences among neighbours ••••• u6 
In matters of religion, we are to maintain "unity of verity" in 
faith and "unity of charity" in communion, notwithstanding all 
differences in apprehension. This is possible because of a perfect 
rule of faith and practice in Scripture. It follows that all other 
differences should lessen daily, and if not, we may turn these into 
an advantage, making them matters of friendly debate. Some surface 
differences are wholesome since they offer a challenge to the faith 
1Ibid. , p. 28. 
2Ibid. , IV, 205. 
3Ibid. , p. 211. 4Ibid. , 212. 
5Ibid. , p. 214. 6Tillotson, 0)2. cit., p. 25. 
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without Which it may become "shallow and remiss" in practice. 1 Those 
who profess faith in Christ ere to be united in a common loyalty to 
Him in thought and life and be in loving fellowship one with another 
since our Lord, the Head of the Church, is the ground of our faith. 
"We must maintain good behaviour towards one another, love 
and goodwill, notwithstanding any difference whatever, as a 
material point of righteousness between man and man. If it be 
a difference concerning religion, it must be so upon account of 
religion; and religion requires concord. Religion is a bond 
of union between man and God and between man and man. You 
cannot imagine that that which is the principle of union should 
be the occasion of disaffection. We cannot uretend to do that 
for religion, which is unnatural to religion,' contrary to religion, 
and which religion forbids. Religion excludes all dissention, 
misbehaviour, everything contrary to peace, love and goodwill. 11 2 
This principle of unity in diversity is not only upheld by 
Scripture, but is duly supported by reason. We are only finite 
beings, there is a "distance of objects from our f'aculties" and, 
therefore, we naturally differ in many things. Furthermore, there 
is "misrepresentation" by our senses. By reason we are able to 
rectify the errors of sense and know things by our rational faculties 
otherwise than they appear to our senses. But the truth is that 
neither by the truths of creation or redemption can we secure an 
absolute certainty and exemption from all error and mistake. The 
Reformed Church makes no such claim to ~erfection or infallibility. 
What we shall be in the future life we only "know in part", but we 
do know that the nearer we draw to God, the more we shall be exempt 
from error and our approach to Him is by imitation and participation 
1Whichcote, Works, op. cit., pp.380ff. 2Ibid., pp.284ff. 
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of His nature, by becoming like Him in holiness, purity and right-
1 
eousness. Since reason is our highest perfection it should be 
recognised as what indeed it is - "the voice of God" Who is the 
Highest Intelligence. We must use reason, then, in seeking under-
standing one with another, for it is a uniform principle, that is, it 
is always constant and self-identical. Reason in one man accords 
with reason in another and, therefore, cannot be refused, it must be 
acknowledged and accepted. Reason is the rule of all men's minds, it 
leads to moderation of opinions and even where there is disagreement, 
it renders men more reconcilable. In a fair debate where reason 
directs, neither person will stray far from the truth or from each 
other. .And, furthermore, men thus divided will be more satisfied 
with each other and less fierce. 2 Thus by the authority of Reason 
and Scripture, we may agree to differ, since all things "saving" are 
made plain by Nature end Grace. 
"All objects affect; and all Faculties incline: God and 
Nature have appointed a 'directing' Principle ••••• that there might 
be, in multiplicity, a reduction to Unity; Harmony and Uniformity, 
in Variety. 11 3 
But it appears obvious that in his suggestions f'or Christian 
tolerance, the authority of Scripture has first place. 
"Nothing is 'of Faith', that is not in Scripture; nothing is 
'necessary', as otherwise expressed; nothing is 'certain', as 
farther made out. We may live in Christian Love and Union; with-
out Consent and Agreement in non-scriptural expressions and forms 
of words. "4 
libid. , I, 392. 
3 Aph. 1042. 
2Ibid. , IV, 401. 
4Ibid. 
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To conclude our observations upon Whicbcote's views concerning 
the Church, it is fair to say that he believed in a universal Church 
in the sense that all true Christians belong to it in spite of minor 
differences. As long as Christians are united on things necessary 
for salvation, surface differences should occasion no breach in the 
universal fellowship. Tillotson's sermon at Whicbcote's funeral 
is an invaluable estimate of the life which Whichcote set forth as 
a witness to his teaching. Here, however, it is sufficient to recall 
once again the scene a.t the death of Whichcote at the home of Cudworth. 
Whichcote took the Sacrament of Holy Communion and spoke highly of it 
as a symbol of the Universal Church. 1 If a man's last words have any 
special importance, it is clear that the Church and Sacraments have a 
central place in Whichcote's thought. However, it was not his purpose 
to present a doctrine of the Church or the Sacraments, but to plead for 
Christian tolerance. He remained loyal to the Church of England to 
the end and hi~ protest against what he regards as unwholesome 
tendencies within the Church of England, i.e., Laudian, Puritan and 
Sectarian, makes this loyalty more evident. But loyal as he was to 
the Church of England, he could envisage the need for a purging from 
the inside. In Whichcote and his successors, extremely interested as 
they were in the moral transformation of clergy and members alike, the 
Church of England reaches its highest peak of self-criticism in the 
seventeenth century. What is most amazing and significant is 
1Tillotson, op. cit., pp.28f. 
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Whichcote's anticipation of the ecumenical spirit and the sound manner 
in which he worked out his view. 
of his view: 
We repeat again his concise statement 
. "Determinations, 'beyond' Scripture, have indeed 'enlarged' 
Ic
1aith; but lessened 'Charity' and multiplied divisions. 11 1 
Indeed a statement on unity by_ the World Council of Churches at 
Evanston might easily be a summary of Whichcote's reflections on 
Christian tolerance. The statement reads: 
"Only in the light of the oneness of the church of Christ can 
we understand the difference between diversity and division in the 
church, and their relation to sin. There is diversity which is 
not sinful but good because it reflects botri the diversities of 
gifts of the Spirit in the one body and diversities of creation by 
the one Creator. But when diversity disrupts the manifest unity 
of the body then it changes its quality and becomes a sinful 
division. It is sinful because it obscures from men the sufficiency 
of Christ's atonement, inasmuch a.a the gospel of reconciliation is 
denied in the very lives of those who proclaim it. 11 2 
This being the final chapter in the presentation of Whichcote's 
thought, it seems appropriate to sum up what he means by true religion. 
Natural religion or religion of creation requires us to deal fairly, 
equally and righteously with our neighbour; and soberly or temperately 
as to ourselves. 3 The Gospel as a "superaddition" to the law of 
creation involves the acceptance of the mediatorship of Christ and the 
1whichcote, Aph. ~81. Richard Baxter resembles Whichcote as a 
urophet of Christian tolerance, see F. J. Powicke, Richard Baxter Under 
the Cross \1662-1691), pp.231-240. 
2"0ur Oneness in Christ and Our Disunity as Churches", Report of 
Sect. I - Faith and Order, C. C. , Vol. LXXI, No. 38, (Sept. 22, 1954), 
p.1137. 
3'/fbichcote, Works, III, 252f. 
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two sacraments.1 Religion of Creation and Redemption complete his 
total concept of revelation as follows: 
"I would superadd one thing more, that is the harmony and 
consistency that is between true reason, and Christianity. There 
is the greatest correspondence between the principles of reason, 
and Christianity ••••• For the latter, Christianity, doth wholly 
acknowledge the former; and Christianity coming in upon the 
apostacy from God's creation, it restores, and calls men back 
again: Christianity reinforceth, recovereth, establisheth, yea 
doth advance and highly improves every one of the principles of 
God's creation; which are the principles of reason ••••• 
Christianity doth not only recover human nature, but carries it 
on to a higher perfection; secures the common instincts of good 
and just; and polishes human nature ••••• The principles of reason, 
the principles of God's creation, and Christ's restoration, do the 
self-same thing, and if they are considered, nothing would give so 
great a satisfaction to the mind of man as they; nothing would 2 better carry him on to that perfection, of which he is capable." 
Having brought to focus what Whichcote has said in his writing 
concerning truths of "first-inscription" and "after-revelation", we 
turn next to a reflection of his thought in the writings of his 
disciples and successors. 
1Ibid. , p. 283. 2Ibid., pp.254f. 
CHAPTER NINE 
THE FATHER OF THE CHRISTIAN PLATONISTS OF CAMBRIDGE1 
Before we can discuss realistically Whichcote's relation to 
the so-called Cambridge Platonists, we must decide if, in fact, 
he was a Platonist. In order to have a standard of judgment, we 
must first arrive at a definition of Platonism. 
Dean W. R. Inge's observations are helpful here, for he points 
out that Plato is unintelligible until we read him as a prophet or 
prose-poet and cease to hunt for a system in his writings. Further, 
Inge draws a distinction between personal and traditional Platonism. 
1since the influence of Whichcote upon the other members of 
the school is fundamentally a personal one, the word "father" is more 
suggestive of the nature 01· his relation to the other members of the 
school than the more impersone.l term of "founder". Likewise, the 
phrase "the Christian Platonists of Cambridge in seventeenth century 
England" seems more appropriate than "the Cambridge Platonists", 
especially for our purpose here. They deserve to be called Christian 
Platonists as much as the Alexandrians, i.e. Clement and Origen. 
Historically, they deserve this title, for they represent the first 
elaborate attempt to wed Christianity and philosophy made by any 
Protestant school. And since Ficino and Pico were not theologians, 
although animated by a profound theological instinct, and since the 
movement among the Florentines was essentially literary and humanistic, 
the Cambridge men appear to be the real successors of the Alexandrina 
teachers, see Tulloch, Rational Theology, II, 14, (n.1). Theologic-
ally they deserve this title since they were all clergymen of the 
Church of England and, therefore, philosophers in the service of 
Christianity. Finally, it would appear that the use of the phrase 
"the Christian Platonists" will disarm the purely philosophical critics 
of this school as well as add clarity to the present discussion. For 
the most part, however, we will continue to use "the Cambridge 
Platonists" and the term "founder" to indicate Whichcote 's relation 
to the school since these usages are by common consent. But when 
the new phrase and the new term appear valuable to our meaning, we 
will feel justiried in employing them. 
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Traditional Platonism is the intellectual system based on the implicit 
philosophy or the personal Platonist. Personal Platonism is the 
mood of one who regards the endless variety of this visible and 
temporal world with an inquisitiveness, and at the same time is 
haunted by the presence of en invisible and eternal world, sustaining 
both the temporal world and man - a world not perceived as external 
to himself, but inwardly lived by him.· But Platonism, thus under-
stood, is more than a "mood"; it is a sustained attitude towards 
life founded on deep convictions - a practical philosophy or 
religion. 1 
Some reflections by Canon c. E. Raven help us to carry this 
discussion further. According to him, the Platonic attitude toward 
life at least from Origen onwards bequeathed to the Church the 
importance of nature as a medium or divine revelation. 2 Raven does 
not hesitate to assert that Whichcote profOundly affected the 
naturalist, Jobn Ray, by his Sunday lectures. Raven continues by 
asserting that one cannot study Ray's immensely in:rluential book, 
The Wisdom or God in the Works of Creation, without seeing how much 
1The Platonic Tradition in English Rfilgio~Thought, pp.65ff. 
Inge derives most or his insights here from Professor J. A. Stewart's 
essay, "Platonism in English Poets". Harrison in his Platonism in 
English Poetry of the 16th and 17th Centuries considers Henry More's 
Song of the Soul as the boldest attempt to blend Platonism and 
Christianity in the poetry or· his day. Overton in his William Law, 
p.413, points out the unsystematic nature or Plato's thought and the 
danger of quoting him in support of any doctrine. 
2Natural Religion and Christian Theology, I, 46ff. Cf. 
Whic hcote, Works, III, 176. " ••• Every grass in the field declares 
God." 
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he and the whole scientific movement owed to the wise, liberal and 
reverent teaching of Whichcote and his followers. It follows that 
the indirect influence of the Cambridge Platonists can hardly be 
overstated since they encouraged an attitude toward nature radically 
different from that which had prevailed in Christendom since the 
death of Origen. Hence, nature and the natural order ror them are 
not only God's creation but the foundation of the true religion 
both moral and philosophical and there is no contradiction between 
nature and grace. For Whicbcote the same God is the Author of 
nature and the Giver of grace. Under this influence Ray conceived 
communion with nature as real worship and even as a matter of' 
particular religious obligation. 1 Raven sums up his general position 
as follows: 
" ••••• The scholars, who appealed to antiquity, to the Greek 
and Latin Classics, to the Greek New Testament, and to the 
example and teaching of the earliest Church, actually found 
in the writings of the Greek Apologists and Christian Platonists 
of Alexandria an attitude towards nature, a concept of progress-
ive revelation, and an insistence upon education and intellectual 
eff'ort wholly appropriate to the new insistence upon observation 
and experiment. The naturalists, striving to develop hypotheses 
consistent with fresh data disclosed by astronomy and geology, 
botany and zoology, round themselves anticipated by thinkers, who 
had drawn their conclusions not from the study of the physical 
world, but from the ancient Logos-theology of Justin, Clement 
and Origen. 11 2 
We are assured that this appreciation of nature was by no means 
1Raven, ..Il2.!Q.., pp.110f'. Cr. Whichcote, Ibid., I, 370; Aph. 109 
See also John Smith, "Di vine Knowledge", Select Discour~, (1859), 
pp. lf'f. 
2English Naturalists from Neckham to Ray, etc ••••• , p.356. 
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irreligious. Raven says: 
"Not that the philosophy of Ray and bis contemporaries was 
naturalistic or irreligious: for almost everyone of the pioneers 
of science this is certainly far from the case. They were in 
fact men of deep and genuine Christianity sharing in the large 
and reasonable faith which Joseph Mead ••••• bad pioneered, which 
Benjamin Whicbcote at Emmanuel and later in his remarkable 
preaching at Holy Trinity bad proclaimed, and which More and 
Cudworth, John Smith and Nathaniel Culverwel and John Worthington 
had expounded. It was this group or men (whom John Wilkins 
joined for a brier space in 165Y) that created the 'latitude' 
or Cambridge Platonist school. They were men who repudiated 
the two antitheses both that between the secular and sacred 
characteristic of the Protestant Reformers; men who insisted 
that creation and redemption were alike manifestations of God; 
men who set themselves to welcome all truth, to study it 
reverently, end to interpret it so far as they could reasonably 
and Cbristianly. nl 
From the observations of Inge and Raven, Wbicbcote's status as 
a Platonist is unquestioned. To Inge, our author is a Platonist of 
the natural or personal type and even of the traditional type since 
there is sufficient evidence t bat be did study ancient philosophy and 
his thought reveals a casual acquaintance with the history of 
Platonism. Similarly, Raven bas attributed to Wbicbcote a Platonic 
attitude toward all experience. But it is to be remembered that 
these two writers are somewhat partial toward the Cambridge Platonists 
and this is indicated by their frequent and favourable references to 
them in their several writings. Further, we must take into account 
1syntbetic Philosophy in the Seventeenth Century, pp.21f. 
Wilkins deserves a brier tribute since be is not usually mentioned 
with the Cambridge Platonists. He be!"riended Whichcote after his 
ejection from the Provostship of King's College, recommending Whichcote 
to succeed himself as Vicar of st. Lawrence Jewry, London. Wilkins' 
views are quite similar to Whicbcote's. Cf. Wilkins, Of the Principles 
and Duties or Natural Religion, (1704), pp.19, 39-61, 125-135, 410 
passim. See also Burnet, History of My Own Time, l1833), I, 340; 
Supra, Ch. I. 
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the opinions of other writers who have attributed great religious and 
ethical importance to Whichcote's thought but who state that he made 
no contribution to philosophy or natural science.1 
It is characteristic of writers who approach the study of the 
Cambridge Platonists from a purely philosophical point of view to dis-
regard any acquaintance Whichcote may have bad with Platonic thought, 
though they admit that Smith, Cudworth and More were all Platonista. 2 
1
This view is held to a certain degree by Passmore, Ralfh Cudworth, 
Ch.I, and by Cassirer, The Platonic Renaissance in Ensland,tr. Pette-
grove), Ch.V. According to Cassirer, only Cudworth and More of the 
four main members of the school undertook to develop a philosophy of 
nature and they were totally unequipped for the task. He concludes 
that whereas in its philosophy of religion, the Cambridge school was 
ahead of its time, in its philosophy of science, it was far behind, see 
Ibid., pp.130f:t'. It should be remembered that Cassirer approaches this 
school from the viewpoint of its relationship to philosophic systems 
and the history of ideas, see Ibid., p.25 (n.1). In the opinion of 
the present writer this approach is inadequate for the simple reason 
that the Cambridge Platonists were philosophers in the service of 
Christianity. Thus the purely philosophical approach can reveal only 
"half-truths" concerning the real significance of their thought. 
2MacKinnon, ed., Philosophical Writings_Qf_Henry More, p.246. 
Mullinger, A History of the University of Cambridge, Ch.V, pp.123-74; 
The University of Cambridge, III, 595f.; See also art. by Mullinger, 
C.H.E.L., VIII, 277f. This is also true of the only two Ph.D. theses 
which have been written on this school to my knowledge. Both are 
philosophical. They are: De Boer, The Theory of Knowledge of the 
Ca.mbridge Platonists, l1931), and Austin, The Ethics of the Cambridge 
Platonists, (1935). Cf. Sorley, A History of English PhilosopQ,y, p.76. 
On the contrary, it may be that Inge is over zealous for Wbicbcote 
and his disciples. They represent f"or him the "high-water mark" in 
English religious history, especially in its rational and mystical 
development, see Christian Mysticism, pp.285f.; The Platonic Tradition 
in English Religious Thought, Ch.II, pp.36ff.; Christian Ethics and 
Modern Problems, p.379. Inge also published the most recent edition 
of" Whichcote 1s Aphorisms in 1930 and his preface to this volume makes 
his enthusiasm concerning Whicbcote's thought clear. 
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But if the school was founded by Whichcote, then it would appear 
impossible for him to be completely ignorant of Platonic thought. 
It is my belief that he did found this school, however, this will 
be our next problem. Concerning the present issue, there seems 
to be ample contemporary evidence that Whichcote was both acquainted 
with Platonic thought and that he taught it to others. 1 We should 
give special attention to Tuckney's insistence that quite early in 
his teaching career, Whichcote embarked upon an intensive study of 
"Philosopbie and Metapbysicks" and especially "Plato and his 
sc ho 11 a rs " • 2 Whichcote himself affirms his admiration for Platonic 
thought. 
"In some Philosophers especially Plato and his scollera 
I must need acknowledge from the little insight I have ••••• ! 
find many excellent and divine expressions. 11 3 
We may add to this the internal evidence of Whichcote's own 
writings. Mullinger asserts that Whichcote does not use either 
1Burnet, op. cit., pp.339f. Cf. Samuel Parker, A Free and 
Impartial Censure of the Platonick Philosophie, {1667); Edward 
Fowler, The Princi les and Practices of Certain Moderate Divines of 
the Church of England, etc •••• , 1671 ; and, S.P. imon Patric , 
"A Brief Account of the New Sect of Latitude-Men, etc. • •• ", { 1662), 
in the Phenix, {1707). The dating of these contemporary sources 
place them at the period when Cambridge Platonism was at its peak. 
The references are definitely concerning the Platonists rather than 
the Latitudinarians, i.e. Tillotson, who reached their peak toward 
the end of the century. There is, then, no explanation for the 
"censure" of Parker, or for the "apologies" of Fowler and S.P. apart 
from the existence of a real Platonic movement in England in tbe mid-
seventeenth century, viz., the Cambridge Platonists. 
2whichcote and Tuckney, Letters, pp.36-40. 
3"Reflections", Sloane MS., 2716.4, n.p. 
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Plato or Plotinus as authorities and that he does not mention 
Plotinus. He states that Burnet's comment that Whichcote taught 
"Plato, Tully and Plotinus" was "the inaccurate impression derived 
by a young man of twenty during a hurried visit to the University". 
Burnet's observation actually referred to Henry More who was then at 
the height of his reputation at Christ'a.1 One needs only to read 
Whichcote carefully to disprove Mullinger's observations. Whicbcote 
does mention Plotinus by name at least once2 , and Plato and Tully 
are frequent and significant authorities for him throughout his 
writings. 3 While Mullinger may be correct in asserting the 
inaccuracy of Burnet's observation there remains sufficient evidence 
to conclude that Whichcote bad direct knowledge of "Plato and his 
scollers". This is not to ignore the fact that such acquaintance 
as he had with this philosophical tradition was inadequate and uncrit-
ical and that he was excelled in many ways by Smith, Cudworth and 
More. Whichcote belongs to the class Inge bas described as a 
"natural" Platonist, that is, he seems to find a natural affinity 
between his own general outlook and the Platonic spirit. Powicke's 
conclusion that in Whichcote's writings, Platonic writers are used to 
illustrate rather than to establish his doctrines seems reasonable. 4 
1c. H. E. L. , Loe. c it. 
2works, II, 160. This one reference to Plotinus is too 
important to be ignored, see Supra, Ch.II. 
3see Supra, Ch.II. Cf. Tulloch, op. cit., pp.119f. 
4rrhe Cambridge Platonista, pp.193f. 
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Whichcote appears to be just as much impressed by Jewish 
Wisdom Literature and the Johannine and Pauline absorption of this 
same tendency. A careful study of the Scriptural references of 
Whichcote to illustrate points of doctrine indicates this. His use 
of passages from Job, the Psalms, Ecclesiastes, the Wisdom of 
Solomon and Proverbs, is incessant. His use of Johannine and 
Pauline writings is also frequent. The maxim of the movement he 
founded is from Proverbs 20:27 and the basis 01:' his natural theology 
is essentially Romans, Chapters 1 and 2 talso Genesis 1:26-27) and 
the basis or his natural ethics is Titus 2:12. 
Christian morals is based on Philippians 4:8. 1 
His concept of 
When Raven says 
that Whichcote was more "Johannine" than Platonic, he is true to 
the spirit of the man. This is another way or saying that though 
Whichcote was free to acknowledge all truth and was particularly 
influenced by Platonic thought he was even more insistent that all 
his thought should be firmly rooted in Scripture. His thought is 
too deeply rooted in the Judaeo-Christian tradition to ignore the 
possibility of the Wisdom Literature of' Israel together with its 
reflection in Johannine and Pauline thought as a direct influence 
1Inge finds a Platonic strain in St. Paul as well as in 
St. John. He conceives the Fourth Gospel as a further development 
and explication or Paulinism, with the help of Pbilo's Platonised 
Judaism, see Platonic Tradition, pp.10-13. Elsewhere, we asserted 
that although Hellenic-Judaism is manifest in the Fourth Gospel, 
the extent of Philo' a in!'luence is in question, see Supra, Ch. II. 
Cf. Raven, "Note on Greek and Jew", The Theological Basis of Christian 
Pacifism, pp.17f. 
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upon him. 1 Thus we conclude with De Boer concerning Whicbcote and 
his disciples: 
"Their Platonism was a Platonism in the broad sense in 
which it had become a part of the Christian tradition through 
Augustine and more directly through the Platonic Academy at 
Florence. 0 2 
Finally, one must not allow Whichcote'a frequent reference to 
Aristotle to obscure the extent of his indebtedness to Plato. 
Whichcote's starting-point, that truth is truth wherever it is found, 
leaves him free of course to derive his ideas from all sources. He 
read Calvin, and as De Pauley points out, was more of a true Calvinist 
than the Puritans of his day. 3 Similarly, he read the original 
Aristotle and was perhaps more true to what is central in his ethics 
and theology than many of the Scholastics who knew Aristotle only 
1For an excellent account ot· the impact of Jewish Wisdom Liter-
a ture on future moral and religious thought, see Rankin, Israel's 
Wisdom Literature. Rankin considers this literature as the source 
of all worthy "humanism" in Judais:m and Christianity. Cf. !.Q!.g,. , 
pp.viiif., 1f., 9, 14, 17. See also Howard's introduction to Ward's 
Lire of ••••• Henry More, pp.3f. 
2ne B~er, op. cit., pp.129-131, 98. Cf. Tulloch, op. cit., 
pp.117-119; Lowry, ±'J!e Philosophy of Ralph Cudworth, {1884), pp.59f.; 
Inge, Christian Mysticism, p.287; Pawson, The Cambridge Platoniste, 
pp. 9-18; R€musat, Histoire de la Philosophie en Angleterre, II, Y-10; 
Hertling, John Locke und Die Schule von Cambrid , p.134; Lamprecht, 
"Innate Ideas ', P.R. , Vol. , \ 1926 , pp. 553-571; Fisher, History of 
Christian Doctrine1 pp.368f.; E.R.E., III, 167f.; Willey,~ 
se·venteenth Centucy Background, pp.134-138; Bush, English Literature 
in the Earlier Seventeenth·Century (1600-1660), pp.342-345. 
3The Candle of the Lord, pp.231ff. This is especially true in 
regard to Calvin's Alexandrine background, his appreciation of 
Platonic thought and his version of the imago dei. 
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through St. Thomas. But there is a sense in which Aristotle is the 
student and disciple of Plato as well as the independent logician 
and scientific philosopher. It is most probably in the former 
sense that Whichcote knew Aristotle and admired bim moat. Although 
Whichcote refers directly to Aristotle more than to Plato, either by 
name or as "the Philosopher", there is a great deal more of the spirit 
of Plato in his writings. It is through the eyes of Plato that he 
views reality, especially the moral and religious life of man and 
where he goes beyond Plato it is as a Cbristian.1 
Having arrived at the conclusion that Whicbcote was a Platonist 
in the broad sense of the word, we now examine his status as founder 
of the Cambridge Platonist School. Although Whichcote is named as 
the founder of the movement by common consent, at least two other 
persons have been offered as deserving the same honour. These are 
Joseph Mead and John Sherman and a third person, Henry More, has 
been sometimes suggested. Since Whichcote's status as founder is 
contested by these claims we must carefUlly examine the evidence. 
Joseph Mead 2 t1586-1638) was educated at Christ's College, 
Cambridge. He was not a party man, but had an open mind, and 
expressed this by his maxim, "I cannot believe that truth can be 
prejudiced by the discovery of truth". Against the Presbyterian 
discipline, the institution of "lay-elders", and the use of the term 
1ne Pauley, ~·, PP• 35f. 
2The alternative spelling is "Mede", but we shall use "Mead" 
throughout this study. 
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0
minister" in place of presbyter, he argues learnedly in his Discourses. 
In the same strain are his historical arguments for reverence due to 
sacred places, and for the view of the Eucharist as a sacrifice. 
With the Puritans he held the Pope to be anti-Christ; with the high 
Churchmen he admitted that the Roman Church teaches the tundamentals 
or the faith. He was lecturer in Greek and fellow of Christ's 
College for many years. .Henry More came under the direct influence 
of Mead. 1 It is little wonder that he has been referred to as the 
rather or the Cambridge movement. in some respects. 2 Dr. Raven 
holds that Mead was the rore-runner or this new movement, but that 
Whichcote was its leader. That is to say, Mead had in many respects 
prepared the way, especially by his opposition to Calvinists and 
Laudians alike, opposing the former by moderation and the latter by 
his Greek outlook in contrast to the strict Latin view. Mead appealed 
to reason and insisted upon morality as manifesting the presence of 
the Spirit of.' God. He refused to place nature and grace in antithesis. 
He emphasised the need for loyalty to truth and took his stand against 
traditionalism and enthusiasm. 3 
1Article by Gordon, D.N.B., XIII, 178ff. 
2Ibid. , XXI, ~57. 
3John Ray, Naturalist, p.37. Ct. Raven, English Naturalists, 
p.356; Natural Religion and Christian Theology, I, 107f. See also 
Masterman, The Affe of Milton, pp.221f. Gilson observes that the 
notion of "image is central in Greek theology as "grace" is in Latin 
theology, see History of Christian Philoaopl1y, p.~4. It is signifi-
cant that both these tendencies are manirest in Whichcote's thought, 
yet in his case as in that of Mead's, the emphasis is more Greek than 
Latin. 
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Mullinger maintained that the real originator of the Platonist 
movement at Cambridge was John Sherman through hie "Commonplaces" 
of 1641. The title of Sherman's volume, A Greek in the Temple, 
indicates that hie appeal is from the traditions of the Latin Church 
to that pagan philosophy from which be, and those with whom he was 
in sympathy, derived their inspiration. He was slightly Whichcote's 
senior in academic status and for this reason may have contributed 
more to the origin of this movement through the publication of hie 
work than has been generally attributed to him.1 
Finally, Nicolson argues that in spite of the early association 
of Whicheote and Cudworth with Emmanuel College, Christ's College 
has always been considered the real home of Cambridge Platonism and 
the philosophical latitudinarianism synonymous with that term. That 
it should have been so considered we.s due largely to the presence there 
of Henry More. The history of the movement until at least 1654 must 
be read in his biography. More's importance is explained by his 
early association at Eton with Falkland and Hales and at Christ's with 
Mead. 2 Mullinger seems to lend support to this general position by 
insisting that Whic~ote's claim to rank as the founder of a school 
or the leader of a party in the University would not have survived bad 
not his efforts been seconded, bis learning surpassed, and the range 
of his "intellectual survey" greatly transcended by More. Mullinger's 
le. H. E. L. , Loe. cit. 
2M.P., Vol.27, (1929-30), p.36. 
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emphasis on More's contribution is mainly baaed on his assumption tbat 
Whichcote was not a Platonist and that Burnet's statement in support 
of this claim really applied to More. 1 
The justification for the statement of these various views is 
that all of them contain some truth. With Raven we would necessarily 
agree that Whichcote had been preceded by "forerunners" and Mead is 
no doubt one of them. Falltland, Hales, Chillingworth, Taylor and 
even Hooker deserve this honour. The present writer would agree that 
many came before Whichcote in the general trend of his thought. How-
ever, he would hasten to add that Whichcote is the leader of the new 
movement in the special sense that he was the first to give life and 
power to it. Mullinger's contention that Sherman's work, A Greek in 
the Temple is the basis of the movement misses the point since Which-
cote's status is not based upon his writings. And Mullinger'a 
contention that Whichcote was not a Platonist; has been considered 
earlier. While I would agree with him that Whicbcote's scholarship 
was surpassed by More, I am likewise reminded of the fantastic 
extremes to which More's brilliance led him. We need only add that 
Whichcote's status is not based on his scholarship. Nicolson's 
conclusion appears to be totally unfounded.. Without denying the 
importance of More to the movement, one may still maintain Whic!Eote's 
right as the leader. It is true that More came under the direct 
influence of liberal thinkers at Eton and Christ's and it is true that 
1Tbe History of the University of Cambridge, Ibid., pp.595ff. 
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by virtue of the presence of Mead, More and later Cudworth at Christ's, 
this institution as well as Emmanuel may be considered as a centre of 
Cambridge Platonism. The close association between the two colleges 
is a historical fact. Emmanuel College came out of Christ's and not 
only are they near to each other but there has been also a close 
fellowship and exchange of ideas between them throughout their history. 
Apart from the history of Emmanuel, the seat of Puritanism, founded 
to perpetuate Puritanism, one can never explain the new movement. To 
explain any movement of thought one must know what is denied as well 
as what is affirmed. Although More's reaction to Puritanism from 
early childhood is well-known, it is my contention that the most 
effective reaction is made not by More but by Whichcote. It is 
Whichcote, trained in the "nursery of Puritanism", rejecting and to 
a great extent defying the Puritan system for a more liberal approach 
to Christian thought who gives birth to the new movement and has the 
right to be called the "father" of it. 
Since Whichcote's place at the fountain-head of Cambridge Platon-
ism is unrivalled not because of his writings or his scholarship, but 
by virtue of his personal influence, the reference to him as father 
of the movement is suggestive. If we make this claim for him, then 
we are free to admit that others contributed their share by preparing 
the way for its advance and that even his disciples excel him in 
scholarship. Socrates' status as father of Greek philosophy is 
uncontested by pre-Socratic thought or by the more elaborate pbilo-
sophical system of Plato. Socrates' marvellous personal influence 
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upon the youth of Athens ia in a real sense echoed by the unusual 
influence of Whichcote in the University of Cambridge. In fact, we 
should remember that publications and unusual scholarship do not 
necessarily make a man the founder of a movement. Personal influence 
is o~ primary importance and thus it is Luther rather than Erasmus 
who heads the Reformation. It follows that Whichcote is the father 
of the Cambridge Platoniata by virtue of the incarnation and commun-
ication of truth through his powerfUl personality. It was thus that 
he drew his contemporaries to him and through his teaching, preaching 
and personal example, gave life to the Cambridge School. 
with De Boer's observation as follows: 
We agree 
"Whichcote may be called the father of the School, not 
because of his scholarly research of the classical sources of 
Platonism, for he has less claim to scholarship than any of the 
other members of the group; nor because of the systematic 
presentation of Platonism on his part. Rather it is because 
of the suggestive character of his tutoring and preaching, which 
inspired in his students an interest in the study
1
of ancient 
philosophers, chiefly Plato, Tully and Plotinus." 
Having presented our defence of Whichcote's position as a 
Platonist and as the father of the Christian Platonists of Cambridge, 
we are now concerned with the reflection o~ his thought in the 
writings of the other members of the school. These observations 
should further confirm what has gone before, for hie thought is the 
1ne Boer, op. cit., p.2. Cf. Tulloch, op. cit., pp.83ff.; 
Remusat, op. cit., pp.9ff.; Barry, op. cit., p.xvi; Sorley, op. cit., 
p.76; Fisher, op. cit., pp.367f.; Jordon, The Development of 
Toleration in England, IV, 94ff.; Austin, op. cit., p.8; MacKinnon, 
op; cit., p.246; Bullough, ed., Philosophical Poems of Henry More, 
( 1931), p. xviii. 
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real foundation upon which his followers build their system. This 
is true notwithstanding the fact that differences also appear. 
Where there are differences they should be indicated, for one of 
the unwholesome tendencies in most treatments of the thought of 
the school is the failure to point out the unique contribution of 
each member of the group. Thus we shall be concerned with the 
point at which Whichcote's disciples disagree with him and where 
they go beyond him. 
Dr. Raven considers Worthington as being personally the closest 
member of the group to our author and a careful study of Worthington's 
Diary and Correspondence appears to substantiate this claim. 1 
) 
Though Worthington holds the basic presuppositions of the school he 
contributes more to the literary advance of the movement than to 
its thought. Since our primary concern here is with thought, John 
Smith may be considered the disciple closest to Whichcote. In 
order to compare the thought of Whichcote and his disciples, their 
personal fellowship will need to be taken into account, but only as 
a means of illuminating the relation of their thought. We shall 
1He published Mead's Works and Smith's Discourses. It is 
of interest that Tillotson preached the funeral sermon of both 
Whichcote and Worthington. Whichcote married Worthington to Mary, 
daughter of his brother Christopher. Cudworth was a wedding 
guest. Cf. Tulloch, Loe. cit. From Worthington's Diary, it is 
obvious that be, Whicbcote and Cudworth were the best of rriends. 
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consider only the inner circle, namely, Smith, Cudworth and More. 1 
Concerning Smith's close association with Which::ote we have 
spoken earlier. 2 For this reason, we may proceed at once to point 
out the relation between his thought and that or Whichcote. In 
Smith the speculative character of the movement started by Whichcote 
increases. 3 Smith is a true Platonist and from the very beginning 
he takes his line of throught either from Plato or the Neo-Platonists. 
The questions which occupy him are more directly philosophical than 
the more specirically religious concern of Whichcote. In his 
Discourses, Smith is concerned with such questions as the essence of 
divine knowledge, the ultimate springs of our rational and spiritual 
life, the nature of revelation and the true idea of righteousness. 
Though these discourses are religious in the highest sense, yet they 
involve in their mere statement the primary data of all philosophy. 
According to Tulloch, these discourses "were intended for oral 
delivery by the preacher and yet they are handled with a freedom, 
1Tullocb,I.oc. cit., adds to the four main members of the group 
Culverwel, Worthington, Rust, Patrick, Fowler, Glanvill, Norris and 
Browne. De Pauley,Lop. cit., adds to this list Cumberland and 
Stillingfleet, while Powicke adds Sterry not listed by the other 
writers. Most other works on the Cambridge school hold to Which.cote, 
Smith, Cudworth and More. However, there is the undesirable tendency 
in some cases to omit Whichcote and replace him by Culverwel, i.e. 
De Boer, Lop. cit. In my opinion this attempt is· self-defeating 
since Wh1chcote 1s contribution is so central to the school that apart 
·from him no adequate account of the movement can be given. 
2supra, Ch. I. 
3Tulloch, op. cit., pp.120f. 
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elevation and amplitude of grasp, which stamps him pre-eminently 
as a Christian philosopher". 1 
To say that-Smith was a Platonist is enough to settle the 
genera.l character of his method. All knowledge to him, especially 
all higher divine knowledge, springs from the soul within. It is 
the reflection of our souls - the interpretation of our spiritual 
life. 
2 
The picture Smith draws, both of t be Gospel and its effects, 
corresponds in the main to that drawn by Whichcote - with here and 
there a f'uller insight and comprehension, greater wealth of spiritual 
allusion, and a deeper grasp o!' evangelical principles. For example, 
where Whichcote sketches tbe ethical and outwardly harmonious 
relations of the divine life, Smith gets more to the root and 
vitalising centre. His mind appears both more creative in conception 
and more largely philosophic in survey. The elevation or Smith's 
thought marks both a certain intellectual and spiritual advance over 
Whichcote. The breadth and freedom of mind we trace in Whichcote 
still lies, in some degree, on a polemical and scholastic background. 
Whichcote was in a sense a Platonist because he found in Platonic 
writings certain princi~les coincident with his own enlarged Christian 
thought:fUlness. But Smith drank deep of the "Platonic spring" and 
if as Pawson asserts, Platonism was allied in his day with the 
1Ibid., pp.121, 12Y, 186. Cf. Smith, op. cit., pp.lrf., 62ff., 
128f:f:'.-
2Ibid., p.140. Cf. Smith, "Of the Immortality of the Soul", 
Ibid. , -pp:-s2f. 
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attitude of protest1 , Smith makes this claim good by setting himself 
free from all scholastic trappings which, in some degree, still 
clung to his master. 2 
Smith made a clear advance upon the theological spirit of his 
age, having pushed the lines of his thought mantully forward, till 
they touched all the diverse aspects 01· speculative and moral culture. 
He thus redeemed religion from the dogmatism and faction which were 
alike preying upon it and taught men to see in it something higher 
than any mere profession of opinions or attachment to a side. But 
this, which may be said to form the summit of Whichcote's thought, 
attained through meditative struggle and prolonged converse with 
Platonic speculation, was the starting point of Smith. He began 
easily on this level, and never needed to work out for himself the 
rational conception of religion. This was given to him by his 
teacher and thus he began, so to speak, on Whichcote's shoulder. 
Religion for Smith was inconceivable under any other form than 
the idealisation and crown of our spiritual nature. The Divine 
represented to him from the first the complement of the human. The 
assimilation of man to God was consequently the one comprehensive 
fUnction of Christianity. But Smith saw what Wbicbcote perhaps bas 
not made apparent, that the Divine, while being linked to human reason, 
and finding its first and essential utterance in it, is yet a living 
1Pawson, op. ci~., p.11. 
2 Tulloch, op. cit., p.180. 
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power, something which human nature itself could never elaborate. 
According to Smith, mere philosophy or moraliam can never transmute 
i tsel:e into evangelical righteousness. This has its rise from 
within the heart, no doubt, but not as a spontaneous product. It can 
only come from the original fount of Divinity - a new divine force 
within us springing up into eternal life.1 No better statement can 
be made of Smith's Platonism, his religious depth and indebtedness 
to Whicbcote than bis own words as follows: 
And 
"Were I ••••• to define divinity, I should rather call it 
a 'di vine life' , t ban a 'di vine science' ••••• "~ 
"True religion is a vigorous eff'lux and emanation of the 
'rirst truth and primitive goodness• upon the spirits or men 
and is for this reason called a participation of the divine 
nature." 3 
Cudworth was a year older than Smith and entered Emmanuel a few 
years· earli.er. It is most probable that Smith was Cudworth's pupil 
though the fact is not mentioned in the scanty biography of either. 
Between them may be traced not merely the common type or mind belonging 
to the members of the school, but certain special affinities and ways 
of looking at the religious questions of their time. This is 
1Ibid., pp.187-1~1. Cf. Smith, The Excellency and Nobleness of 
True Rerigion, l1745), p.16. 
2smith, Diacour~, p.1. 
3smith True Religion, pp.4f. In addition to Tulloch's account 
of Smith as' well as the other members or the school, see De PauJ.ey, 
Un. cit. and Powicke,Loo. cit. So close is Smith to Whichcote that 
in order to understand either, one should read the other. 
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especially true of the earlier and more generalised phase of Cudworth's 
thought. A special bond of association between these two men is more 
likely when we remember that Whichcote, the life-long friend of 
Cudworth, was the patron and friend of Smith alao.1 
Cudworth is the most celebrated, systematic and formal writer of 
the school. While tutor in his college, be was presented to the 
rectory of North Cadbury. Wbichcote at a different time held the 
same poaition. 2 Cudworth was appointed master of Clare Hall by the 
Parliamentary Visitors. The Puritan authorities confided in him as 
they did in Whichcote, yet he was not a religious partisan and bis 
theological spirit was very unlike that of the Westminster Assembly. 3 
Along with Whicbcote he had been bred at Emmanuel and to have been a 
student there seems to have rormed a sufficient passport to promotion 
in the eyes of Parliament. Apparently Cudworth accepted the appoint-
ment without the scruples which Whicbcote h·aa in replacing Collins. 4 
As a matter of fact, Cudworth appears to have been generally free 
of conscience in the midst of a11 the changes around him. He was 
1Tullocb, op. cit., p.194. We have mentioned earlier the personal 
friendship of Whichcote and Cudworth. ct·. Supra, Ch. I. See also 
Passmore, Cudworth, pp.15f. Passmore pelieves that Cudworth may have 
learned from Smith even if the latter's indebtedness to Cudworth is 
more certain. 
2see Supra, Ch.I. Cf. Tulloch, op. cit., pp.194f. 
3see Supra, Cb. III. Both Cudworth and Wbicbcote were absent from 
the Assembly and yet both were appointed by its representatives 
(through Parliament) to key positions in the University of Cambridge. 
4cf. Supra, Cb.I. 
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even retained at his post at the Restoration while Whichcote was 
ejected. The comparatively active character of Whichcote as a 
leader of opinion may account partly for hie change of fortune, or 
it may be that Cudworth was protected by aome special influence. 1 
Cudworth was a Platonist, although his Platonism was that of the 
Renaissance, innocent of modern scholarship. The religious outlook 
which colours all his writings, with its emphasis on morel goodness 
and its distrust of all mechanical rules, was the common faith of all 
who fell under the influence of Whichcote. Whichcote was not in any 
professional sense a philosopher but it is obvious that Cudworth was 
profoundly influenced by him. 2 Cudworth has been described as a 
Plotinist rather than a Platonist in view of the extensive use he 
makes of the teachings of the Neo-Platonists (in its broadest sense, 
including Christian Platonism of writers like Clement and Ficino). 
All the same, Cudworth made a close study of the Platonic texts, 
particularly of the later dialogues. His Platonism is nee-Platonic-
ally tinged but it is not merely second-hand. 3 Whichcote had no real 
interest in many of the questions which Cudworth was later to ask and 
1Tulloch, op. cit., pp.203f. Cf. Leslie Paul, The English 
Philosophers, p.101. According to Paul, Cudworth made his peace 
with the new regime at the Restoration in the form of congratulatory 
verses addressed to King Charles II. 
2 Passmore, op~ cit., pp.1, 7f. 
3Ibid., pp.14f. 
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attempt to answer. Whichcote takes for granted a Christian world-
view; atheism is not for him, as it is for Cudworth, a "living 
option". 1 What Whichcote sets out to do is to develop a liberal 
and humanistic version of Christian ethics. This liberal ethics 
had a very great influence on Cudwortb's main problem - how is it 
possible to live the god-like life, as Wbicbeote conceived it?2 
Cudworth raises the question, bow is knowledge possible? This 
is also Kant's problem. 3 Cudworth set out to treat the metaphysical 
problems connected with the existence of God and the soul, the 
fixity of moral standards, and the spontaneity of the practical 
reason. The first question is dealt with in The True Intellectual 
System of the Universe, while his projected ethical work, which was 
never published, was intended to treat the two remaining problems. 
Fortunately, another of his works, ~Treatise Concerning Eternal and 
Immutable Morality, discusses explicitly the second problem and 
answers the third by implication, while it is also a critique of the 
faculties of cognition, since the problems of knowledge and moral 
action, according to Cudworth are related. However the last question 
is discussed in A Treatise Concerning Free-Will published post-
1cf. Supra, Cb.IV. We gave detailed attention to this 
difference when we treated Wbichcote's observations on atheism. 
2passmore, op. c!J.., pp.15f. 
3For a comparative study of the thought of Cudworth and Kant, 
see Martineau, TyPes of Ethical Theorz, ~1885), II, 410f. Martineau's 
account of Cudworth 1s thought is quite valuable, see Ibid., pp.396-424. 
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humously. 
But it is in Cudworth' a Sermon ••••• Before the House of Commons 
that he makes his greatest reflection of t be thought of Wbichcote. 
It is an early work of Cudworth thus implying that he may have been 
still under the more direct influence of Whichcote. 1 Furthermore, 
it is a sermon rather than a treatise as his moat celebrated works are. 
Most of Whichcote'a thought comes to us in sermons, even his aphorisms 
are mainly insights scattered throughout his sermons. Thia 
observation may, in part at least, explain the unusual similarity of 
this work of Cudworth to Whichcote'a writings. Thus the early date 
of this work and its homiletical purpose most probably account for 
its likeness to Whichcote'a thought. Whatever the explanation, 
Cudworth's moral theory2 , notion of Providence3 , reaction to Calvinism4 
and his general view of the "god-like" life is almost a copy of 
5 
Whichcote's thought. We are reminded of Wbichcote's own sermon to 
the same body as Cudworth says: 
" ••••• If we desire a true Reformation, as we seem to; Let 
us begin here in reforming our hearts and lives, in keeping 
of Christ's Commandments. All outward Formes and Models of 
1Powicke, op. cit., p.112. 
2cudwortb, Sermon ••••• Before the House of Commons, {1647), 
Preface [n.p~ ; Cf. 1.B!.9.·, pp.18ff., 61ff. 
3Ibid., Preface; Cf. Ibid., pp.26f. 
4 
1J2.!.Q.. ; cf. ~- , pp. 11f. 
5Ibid., pp.28ff. passim. 
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Reformation, though they be never so good in their kind; yet 
they are of little worth for us, without this inward Reformation 
of the heart. ttl 
Notwithstanding the similarity of Cudworth's thought as viewed 
above with Whichcote's, there are differences between them. As 
Passmore points out, "for all that Whichcote taught to Cudworth, even 
though Whichcote made him the sort of Christian he was, their moral 
psychology lies poles apart". 2 Whichcote distrusts all enthusiasm, 
while Cudworth takes the view that there is a kind of enthusiasm which 
is wholesome. To Whicooote anything that disturbs the deliberation 
of reason is suspect, but Cudworth asserts that reason without 
enthusiasm is impotent, as much t'or good as for evil. Whichcote 
finds no goodness in irrational obedience; Cudworth finds none in 
obedience without enthusiasm. 3 As a result of this difference 
between Whichcote and Cudworth, the latter stands closer to the 
Puritans than the former. However, Cudworth's religion and ethics 
still remain in intention that of Whicbcote. The real difference 
emerged mainly because Cudworth tried to work out systematically what 
Whichcote was satisfied to state as self-evident. 4 Furthermore, 
1Ibid., pp.81f. Cf. Ibid., pp.79f., 82. Cf. Whicbcote, "Sermon 
••••• Before the House of COiiiiii'Ons", Works, Vol.I, Dis.VIII, pp.119ff. 
It is clear from the dates of the sermons that Cudwortb's sermon could 
not be based on Whichcote's since Whichcote's sermon was delivered in 
1673 but what we are suggesting is that Cudworth was most probably 
infl~enced here as elsewhere by the general trend of Whichcote's 
thought. 
2Ralph Cudworth, p.53. Cf. Whichcote, Works,_IV, 432 with Cud- . 
worth's MS. On Liberty and Necessitz, No.4942,9, cited by Passmore, ~· 
3Ibid. , pp. 69f. 4Ibid. , p. 81. Cf. Whicbcote, ~·, P• 387. 
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this moral psychology of Cudworth appears to contradict his own 
position in a line of rational thinkers as well as his own logic 
and epistemology. 1 
In this matter, Whichcote appears to anticipate the eighteenth 
century Enlightenment, but his position is best explained by a total 
reaction against the Sectaries. Henry More's Antidote Against 
Enthusiasm, an intense reaction against enthusiasm,appears to be 
similar. 2 However, in all fairness to Cudworth, we must remember 
that he admits that there is a bad sort of enthusiasm. But his 
insistence is for the kind of enthusiasm without which not bing worth-
while can be accomplished. Cudworth's emphasis upon spontaneity does 
not ignore the role of knowledge in the good life. Whichcote had 
asserted that knowledge alone does not a.mount to virtue, but there is 
no virtue without knowledge. Whichcote leaves room for passion 
which follows reason and judgment. It appears that Whichcote's 
position is a modified version of the Socratic dictum such as 
Cudworth would accept. Cudworth would agree that the good life is 
rational by virtue of the fact that it implies a goodness which sees 
3 things as they are rather than a mere application of rules. Thus 
what first appears to be a f'undamental disagreement between the two 
men turns out to be a matter of emphasis since what Whichcote is 
1Ibid. , p. 52. 
2cr. More's Enchiridion Ethicum, (Eng. tr., 1890), pp.31, 33ff., 
79ff. passim. 
3Ibid. , pp. 69ff. 
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really opposing is "irrational obedience 11 1 and therefore an emotive 
quality of the good life is approved as long as it follows rather 
than precedes reason. 
Any further variance by Cudworth from Whichcote appears to be 
related either to the more systematic approach of Cudworth or his 
variety of interests, i.e. natural science. There is a very signif-
icant point at which the more systematic mind of Cudworth bas drawn 
out and developed a fundamental assumption of Whichcote's. Cudworth 
derived the basis of his notion of free-will from Whichcote. To 
Cudworth, free-will is a power in such beings as are not essentially 
good but yet are capable of being holy. 2 Free-will is not the same 
thing as freedom according to Cudworth, for a perfectly free being 
would not possess will. To talk of us as possessing the power to 
choose the good life implies that we are not perfect: a perfect being 
does not choose the good life, it is never to him an end, he lives 
the good life by nature. Thus, free-will is a mixture of perfection 
and imperfection. It is perfection in so far as it shows us 
capable of preferring goodness, it is imperfection in that it testifies 
to the heteronomy in our souls. Freedom and free-will must not be 
identified, but "free" in both cases has a similar significance: the 
1whichcote, Ibid., I, 258. 
2cudworth, MS. 4982, 20, cited by Passmore, op. cit., p.61, 
(n. 4); Cf. Whicbcote, Aph. 13. 
354. 
"freedom" of free-will is nothing but the capacity for preferring 
the spiritual to the animal. Free-will is the power of choosing to 
be free. But how can it be our capacity for free-will which is the 
source of our sin, if free-will consists, simply, in our power to 
ehoose the good life? Cudworth'a answer is that we do not sin through 
our exercise of free-will but rather through our failure to exercise 
it. Sin is privation in the positive sense of failing to live up to 
one's possibilities. Sin is not the willrul opposing of the arbitrary 
command of another person, but it is falling short or natural perfect-
ion. 1 However unsatis1·actory Cudwortb's conclusions are, there is 
no doubt concerning his "attempt to grapple with a serious problem, 
seriously envisaged". 2 It appears that be gives carefUl consideration 
to a problem introduced by Whichcote. 
In Cudworth Christian Platonism is in active conflict with the 
materialism of Hobbes and the mechanism of Descartes. Although he 
accepts in principle the position of Whichcote, his master's 
confident self-evident approach does not satisfy him. Cudworth sees 
the necessity for a clear and logical statement of the Christian 
position not merely as an apology but rather as a challenge to atheism, 
lpassmore, op. cit., pp.62-67. Cf. Ibid., his references to 
Cudwortb's MS. 4982, 40. 
2Passmore, Ibid., p.65. Cf. Supra, Cha.IV, V. To my knowledge, 
Passmore's Ralph-aucrworth: An Interpretation is the most valuable 
analysis of Cudworth's thought, while Muirhead's treatment of Cudworth's 
thought in his Platonic Tradition in Anglo-Saxon Pbilosopb,y, Cha.II, III, 
remains noteworthy. se·e also Martineau, Loe. cit.; Lowrey, The Philo-
sophy of Ralph Cudworth and Aspelin, Ralph Cudworth's Interpretation of 
Greek Philos.oph.y; Selby-Bigge, British Moralists, II, 247ff. 
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materialism and dogmatism. 
To establish a direct personal relation between Whichcote and 
More is more difficult than in the cases of Smith and Cudworth. 
It appears most probable that they were personal rriends. However, 
one has to be careful not to assume too much by virtue of the general 
agreement of their thought, both because of the marked differences of 
thought at certain points and the possibility that More by his early 
reaction to Puritanism and the in:fluence of the Liberal Churchmen at 
Eton and the teaching of Mead at Christ's may have arrived at his 
points of agreement with Whichcote independently. But when we consider 
the close ties between Christ's and Emmanuel, it is difficult to 
imagine that two men with so much in common railed to have any personal 
association especially in view of their mutual friends, i.e. Worthing-
ton and Cudworth. 
We are on safer ground when we attempt to establish Whichcote's 
relation to More through Cudworth. More was four years older than 
Cudworth. His main works were written before Cudworth had published 
anything but brief essays and sermons. It is logical to conclude 
that when More and Cudworth agree on a point or doctrine, More is the 
originator. But there is evidence against this conclusion. 
Cudworth was the first to graduate and was very likely More's teacher. 
The dispute between More and Cudworth over who would publish an 
ethical work is scarcely intelligible unless More was Cudworth's 
disciple. That is to say, Cudworth'a indignation and More's 
apologetic response is quite unintelligible unless Cudworth was the 
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master and More the disciple. More expresses his indebtedness to 
Cudworth in his apology. It is significant that the protest to 
More from Cudworth and the response are passed through their mutual 
friend Worthington. Worthington we know also as a close rriend of 
Smith and Whichcote.
1 
A further testimony to the intimate associ-
ation between More and Cudworth concerns the appointment or Cudworth 
to the mastership of Christ's in 1654. More was preferred for the 
position but most probably declined in favour of his rriend Cudworth. 2 
From these observations it appears in order to conclude that there 
was a mutual influence and personal respect between More and Cudworth 
and for this reason a personal relation between More and Whichcote 
seems most probable since Whichcote was the oldest member of the 
group and the aclmowledged leader. 3 
The Cambridge movement ripened into its finest personal and 
religious development in More. 4 Cudworth and More have more in 
1Ibid., p.18. Cf. Worthington, ~iary, Vol.II, Pt.I, p.116. 
The account of this incident between More and Cudworth is as rollows: 
Cudworth began an ethical treatise concerning moral good and evil. 
Thia work was to cover most of the great ethical problems, such as 
an explanation o:r the true notion o:e morality, ot· the Summum Bonum, 
and liberty. But at the same time, More had been approached by 
friends to write a treatise on morality. When More told Cudworth of 
his plans it became apparent that their plans were in conrlict and 
More withheld his treatise for a time. This was in 1665, but two 
years later l1667) More published his work in Latin tthe Enchiridion 
Ethicum) so that he would not interfere with Cudworth's plans. However, 
Cudworth' a work never appeared. 
2Tulloch, op. cit., p.324. 
4 Tullocht op. cit., P• 303. 
3 Passmore, op. cit., p.324. 
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common than Whichcote and More, that is, beyond the main concern of 
the Cambridge school. For example, the supposition that all higher 
wisdom and speculation were derived originally from Moses and the 
Hebrew Scriptures, and that this traditional connection confirmed 
both the truth of Scripture and the results of philosophy, was widely 
prevalent in the seventeenth century. Both Cudworth and More 
believed in this connection. Cudworth and More had a similar 
interest in the development of natural science in their time.1 
In his general method and the avowed basis of his thought, More 
occupies the common ground of the Cambridge school. He is a 
vigorous advocate of the rights of .reason, and believed it to be one 
of his chief missions to show how the "Christian and Philosophic 
genius" should "mix together". He asserted that the Christian 
1Ibid., p.352. Cf. Raven, Natural Religion and Christian 
Theology, I, 110-114. More was a member of the Royal Society, thus 
indicating his interest in natural science. Concerning his attempt 
to prove that the early Greeks received their wisdom from the Jews, 
see his Grand ~r.vstery of Godliness, {1660), Bk.I, Ch.IV, p.9. More 
and Whichcote are close at one point, viz., where More contends that 
John in his Gospel used the word {Aoyos) in the Jewish sense, although 
Platonism helped to prepare the way for Christianity, see Ibid., Ch.V., 
pp.11ff. Whichcote would agree that this is true, but he does not 
get involved as More and Cudworth do in Cabbalistical studies. See 
Coleridge's criticism in Notes on English Divines, l1853), I, 352. 
For a :further account of More and Cudworth on their scientific 
interests, see Raven, Ibid., pp.113f., 110; More, Antidote Against 
Atheism, t1662); Cudworth, Works, {1st American Ed., 1837), pp.213ft.; 
Cassirer, The Platonic Renaissance in~ngland, Ch.V, pp.129-156. 
Concerning the celebrated controversy between Bayle and Le Clerc on 
Cudworth' s concept of the "plastic medium", see Passmore, op. cit. , 
pp.22ff.; Leo Pierre Courtines, Bayle's Relations with England and 
the English,(New York, 1938), pp.47f. 
358. 
religion rightly understood is the deepest and choicest piece of 
philosophy. His doctrine of reason is eminently Alexandrine. 1 
More was more withdrawn from society than Cudworth or Whichcote and 
thus it is little wonder that when we read More's writings we feel 
that we are conversing with a mind too little embraced by active 
discipline in society. 2 
In More's early days at Cambridge, three factions flourished at 
Christ's, niclmamed "Powri tans", "Puritans" and "Medians". The 
Powritans, so called after their leader, William Power, were of the 
High Church Party suspected of Popery. The Puritans have been 
considered elsewhere. 3 The "Medians" were moderates between 
Powritans and Puritans, and were lead by Mead. Until his death in 
1638, Mead was one of the most popular figures in the college, and 
undoubtedly exercised some influence on More who was of his party. 
As Lecturer in Greek, Mead guided More's classical reading, his theory 
of the Bible and, es a moderate in religious observances, fostered 
More's general liberalism. Mead is at one with the Cambridge 
Platonists in bis insistence upon the necessity of good works as an 
aid to salvation, and he declared that none may be saved by faith 
alone. 
"If ever there was a time when Christians thus deceived 
themselves, that time is now ••••• because we look not to be 
saved by the merit of works ••••• but by faith in Christ alone; 
as though faith in Christ excluded works and not rather 
1Ibid. , pp. 353f • 2Ibid., pp.336ff. 3 Cf. Supra, Ch. III. 
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included them; ••••• or as if works could no way conduce unto 
the attaining of salvation, but by way of merit and desert, 
and not by way of the grace and :ravour of God in Christ. nl 
In Bullough's opinion the vigilant tolerance and moral emphasis 
of Mead anticipa~ed More's views in many ways and prepared More's mind 
for the influence of Whichcote. 2 But this influence of Mead upon 
More in no way undermines the role of Whichcote as the father of the 
C.ambridge Movement. There seems to be no way of linking the direct 
influence of Mead with the other members of the group; it may be 
traced only indirectly through More. On the other hand, Whichcote's 
direct and personal influence upon the group is unquestioned except 
in the case of More where it is most probable. 
There is a remarkable resemblance between Whichcote's general 
position and More's Psychozoia which makes More's debt to Whichcote 
almost a certainty. ~n describing his conversion More hints that 
1637, the year after Whichcote's appointment as University Preacher, 
marked the beginning of his return to serenity. Although their 
close association probably did not come about until after 1639, when 
More received his Fellowship, it appears that by this time More had 
already assimilated Whichcote's attitude to the philosophers, hie 
tolerance, and the stress on subjectivity in religious experience 
which added new force to bis own moral proclivities. Whichcote 's 
1Mead, Works, ( 1648), pp. 265.; Cf. Ibid., PP• 270, 280ff. All 
cited by Bullough, op. cit., pp.xiv. It is significant that 
Worthington, friend of the Cambridge Platonists, edited Mead's Works. 
2Bullough, ~·, p.xv. 
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influence upon More was pervasive rather than systematic. It was 
natural, thererore, that More, in recollecting the sources of his 
intellectual conversion, should mention only recognised authorities 
and the ultimate sources of their common views. In addition More 
differed from Whichcote in several ways, notably in his enthusiastic 
acceptance for imaginative purposes of the Plotinian system of the 
universe, and in the detail through which he followed the mystical 
process. 1 
More's approach to Platonism, like that of most Renaissance 
scholars, was unhistorical. He recognised no difference between 
Platonism, Neo-Platonism, Alexandrian mysticism, theurgy, Cabbalism 
and modern Italian commentary. Consequently, Pythagoras, Plato, 
Philo, Hermas, Trismegistus, Plotinus, Clement, Origen, Dionysius the 
Areopagite, and Ficino appeared to him equally Platonic and authorit-
2 ative and each contributed something to bis ecclectic creed. This 
is more or less true of all the Cambridge Platonists, though the list 
of authors and variety of subjects with which More was concerned 
relates him closer to Cudworth than to Whichcote or Smith. It is 
safe to say, however, that in most of his interests More was associated 
with some or all of the Cambridge Platonists. He was related to 
them by personal friendship, by academic association, by common 
philosophical interests and by his opposition to dogmatism and 
intolerance in religion. But More is to a certain extent differentiated 
1.I:Q14., pp.xxif. 
2 Ibid. , P• xxi i. 
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from the others by the variety of his interestsl, especially by his 
belief in witchcraft. 
In More's Discourse of the True Grounds of the Certainty of 
Faith, etc., he sets forth the moral and rational basis of faith like 
a true disciple of Whichcote. The following statement might well 
have been spoken by Whichcote as More s~ys: 
"No Revelation is from God that contradicts plain natural 
Truths ••••• If Reason where it is clearest is false, we have no 
Assurance it is ever true and therefore no 'Certainty of Faith' 
which presupposes Reason ••••• That which is contradictory to 
certain Truth is certainly false: But Di vine Revelation is true: 
Therefore there can be no Revelation from God that bears with it 
such a Contradiction •••.• No Revelation that enforces, counten-
ances, or abetts 'Immorality' or Dishonesty can be from God ••••• 
For it is repugnant to God's attributes, his Justice, Fidelity, 
Goodness, and Purit~ ••••• The Image of God is Righteousness and 
true Holiness ••••• " 
More's notions of the harmony of faith and reason, and morality 
and religion, and the relative importance of reason and scripture as 
religious authorities appear to be in essential agreement with 
Whichcote's views on these subjecta. 3 
Having compared the thought of Whichcote with that of his 
1MacKinnon, op. cit., pp.xvif. MacKinnon's treatment or More's 
philosophy is invaluable. Tulloch's analysis of More's life and 
thought is uncontested, see, op. cit., Ch.V. 
2Theological Works {ed. Downing, 1708), pp.766f.; Cf. Ibid., 
pp. 765-770. 
3Ey the "Boniform Faculty", More seems to imply a moral sense 
or faculty which immediately apprehends the morally good. One wonders 
if this insight is already implicit in Whichcote's view of conscience, 
see Supra, Ch.V. Cf. More, Ethicum, p.31~ Fu:thermore, More's . 
notions or the imago dei, body-soul relationship, orders of creation 
and related concepts are similar to Whichcote's views, see More, 
Complete Poems, (1878), p.48. 
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followers, we come finally to an observation of the general charact-
eristics of Cambridge Platonism. We are here concerned only with 
the main members of the group, Whichcote, Smith, Cudworth and More, 
a fellowship consisting or academic, personal and intellectual 
kinship. 
For these men the power of reason is more than a purely 
psychological fact. It is the "candle of the Lord", which, though 
sometimes immersed in affairs of time and sense, never fails to 
reflect the eternal realities. 1 For all these men activity is the 
moat general attribute of spirit. Whichcote revises Descartes' 
cogito ergo sum to read "I act, therefore I am". 2 More and Cudworth 
hold that spirit is or its own nature active but only certain grades 
3 
of spirit are possessed of consciousness. Smith argues the exist-
ence of spirit from the inactivity of matter (since the power of 
producing motion or rest is inconsistent with body), and from the 
nature of consciousness. 4 We note that even More is a real part of 
the fellowship. His personal and intellectual relation to Cudworth 
is unquestioned. He resembles Smith on the point just mentioned 
and he also resembles Whichcote and Smith in his discussion of the 
imago dei. 
1MacKinnon, op. cit., p.276. 2whichcote, Works, III, 241. 
3More, Divine Dialogues l1668), p.98; Cudworth, True Intellectual 
System, (1743), Pt.I, p.844. 
4smi th, "Of the Immortality of the Soul", op. cit. , PP• 69ff. ; 
Cr. Cudworth, Eternal and Immutable Morality tea. Duresme, 1731), Bk.II, 
Ch.VIII, Sect.II; Bk.IV, Ch.I, Sect.II. 
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The characteristic Platonic or Nee-Platonic doctrines which the 
Christian Platonists of Cambridge held in common, and which are 
touched at one point or another by all or them, i.e., the doctrines 
of the world-soul, the reality of innate knowledge, the substantiality 
and immortality of the human soul, while forming the basis on which 
they were Platonists, are less important, as bonds of connection 
between them, than their common feeling for the unity of the natural 
and spiritual world and their sense of the intimate nearness of the 
spirit of God to the mind of man. Their aim was to combine the new 
knowledge of the Renaissance with the teachings of the Church Fathers 
and the wisdom of the Greeks, to reconstruct theology on the basis of 
reason, to separate scientific fact from materialistic implication, and 
to show forth a unity of faith ana reason which should be indeed a 
"candle of the Lord" •1 
It was the purpose of these Christian Platonists to marry 
philosophy and religion; and to confirm the union on the basis of 
our humanity. Negatively, they differed from the dogmatic systems of 
their times: {1) In the interpretation they gave of what was essential 
in religious experience; t2) In the direction in which the foundation 
of belief in God as the object of religious experience was to be sought; 
~facKinnon, op. cit., pp.246r., 296-300. A comparative study 
of the life and thought or Nathaniel Culverwel and the Cambridge 
Platonists is invaluable. Although such a treatment is beyond the 
scope of the present study, it appears sare to say that Culverwel 
was one of the most constructive contemporary critics of Whichcote 
and his school. Cf. Culverwel, Discourse of the Light of Nature, 
(ed. John Brown, 1847), see especially the Introduction. See also, 
Tulloch, op. cit., pp.41-44. 
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and (3) In their view of the relation between faith and reason. 
Positively, they asserted that: {1) Religion is communion with 
God in Neo-Platonic fashion; t2) It is from the nature of the 
soul and its experience that we can learn of the existence, 
nature and operation or God; and t3) Reason is a reality trans-
cending our existence, and therewith a belief in a Providence in 
nature and history. As a corollary, :f\1.ndamental to morality 
and religion, they asserted that there is no antagonism between 
freedom and determinism. Man is t·ree because he can choose and 
determine himself by the idea of the good; he is more f'ully free 
according to the fullness of his knowledge of it. It follows 
that this antithesis between f'reedom and determinism is solved 
as well as that between faith and reason. Religion is committed 
to the honouring of reason.1 
their position as follows: 
Muirhead signi!'ican tly sums up 
" ••••• They were also bound to recognise in the name of 
reason that its own was a derived light, and that it 
might have to trust in the source of that light where 
it could not see. But this was entirely a different 
thing from declaring the object of faith wholly beyond 
lmowledge (in a sense they were ready to hold that the 
Infinite Source was the more known); a fortiori from 
declaring that it was contrary to knowledge. h2 
1Muirhead, op. cit., pp.28-31. 
2Ibid. , p. 31. Ct·. Tulloch, op. cit. , II, 6r. , 70; G:ierson, 
Cross GUrrents in English Literature, pp.222f.; Jones, Spiritual 
Reformers in the 16th and 17th Centuries, p.188; C.M.H., V, 752~. 
art. by Kaufman; Baxter, Autobiograph.y, p.185; Fisher, History 
of Christian Doctrine, p.366; Moorman, A History of the Church 
of England, pp.255f.; Burnet, op. cit. ,--pp.339-34Y; Jordan, 
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In this chapter we have been concerned with the sense in 
which Whichcote may be called a Platonist, his role as founder 
Of the Cambridge school and the reflection of bis thought in 
the writings of the members of this school. In the next chapter 
we shall be concerned with our author's influence down to the 
present. 
op. cit., p.99; Worthington, op. cit., Vol.I, p.iii (Crossley's 
note); Egg-Olorsson, Inner Light, pp.43f.; Remusat, op. cit., 
pp.9-14; Hunt, Religious Thought in England, I, 410, 432-440; 
George, Seventeenth Century Men or Latitude, pp.197r.; D.E.C.H., 
pp.83f.; Hutton, The English Church from the Accession of Charles I 
to the Death of Anne, pp.2Y1r.; Maurice, Moral and Metap!lysical 
Philosop~, II, 349ff.; Sorley, A History of English Philosophy, 
pp.75ff.; Hertling, John Locke und die Schule von Cambridge, pp.100-138; 
Nussbaum, The Triumph or Science and Reason, p.187r.; Redgrave, 
Bygone Beliet·s, pp. 201-205. 
CHAPTER TEN 
WHICHCOTE AND THE INTELLECTUAL TRADITION 
There is no satis!'actory measure of the relative importance of 
religious writers, but the extent of their influence at least 
indicates to what degree they mould later thought. In this respect 
Whichcote and his disciples occupy a peculiar position since they 
prof'oundly affect their successors. Because of their distinctive 
qualities, they seem slightly isolated from contemporary thought, and 
yet subsequent developments in theology are unintelligible if we 
ignore their in1'luence. The record of those who acknowledge a debt 
to them in itself suggests their importance.1 Powicke's statement 
1The thought of Glanvill and Norris was so coloured by the 
writings of the Cambridge men that they are sometimes treated as 
members of the group, see Glanvill, The Vanity of Dogmatising, etc •••• , 
t1661), and Muirhead, The Platonic Tradition in Anglo-Saxon Philosopby, 
Ch.V, pp.72ff. Cumberland also stood on the vague rrontier between 
the Latitudinarians and the Cambridge Platonists, see De Pauley, 
Candle or the Lord, pp.14~ff.; D.N.B., V, 28~f. art. by Leslie Stephen; 
Seth, English Philosophers and Schools of Philosophy, pp.Y1f.; 
Cumberland, De Legibus Naturae, Ch.I, p.39; Ch.II, 165; Ch.V, 18~, 
cited by Seth, Ibid. Stillingrleet, Tillotson, Patrick, Fowler and 
Burnet - the so-called Latitudinarians in 1'act - might modify the 
teachings of the Cambridge Platonists, but the imprint of' the older 
men was upon them to tbe end. For an account of Patrick's and 
Fowler's relation to them, see Tulloch, Rational Theology, II, 437ff.; 
s. P. , "A Brier Account or the New Sect of Latitude-Men", { 1662), The 
Phenix, pp.4YY-517; Fowler, A Free Discourse, (1671). Concerning 
Stillingrleet's relation to them, see his Origines Sacrae, l1666), and 
Irenicum, (1681); er. De Pauley, op. cit., Ch.IX, pp.187rr. 
Tillotson w111 be discussed later in this chapter to show the relation-
ship between the Latitudinarians and Whichcote. Burnet as one of the 
Latitudinarians and a memoir writer makes this link between the 
Platonists and the Latitudinarians unquestioned when he testifies 
thus: "The most eminent of those, who were formed under those men 
366. 
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of the case is so significant that it deserves repeating here. He says: 
"~he direct influence of individual members of the [Cambridge 
Platonist] School is easier to trace than its collective influence. 
Thus, Whichcote's influence on John Smith and Smith's on Simon 
Patrick (1626-1707) and John Worthington (1618-1671); More's on 
Joseph Glanvill (1636-1680) and Peter Sterry and John Norris 
(16~7-1711); Cudworth's on John Locke (1632-1704); Whichcote's, 
again, on John Wilkins (1614-1672), and John Tillotson (1630-1694), 
and ~through Tillotson) on Burnet (1643-1715), and (by means of his 
publis~ed Sermons) on the third Lord of Shaftesbury (1671-1713) •••• 
All this, and more of the kind, is traceable. In this way, no 
doubt, the collective influence of the School was transmitted and 
circulated. But, inasmuch as it necessarily mingled with other 
streams of tendency which might be flowing in the same direction, 
we cannot mark of its course and range with precision. Bearing 
this in mind, we may say, nevertheless, that some of the most 
salient developments of' the eighteenth century - Rationalism, 
Deism, Scripturalism, Moralism, Tolerance - went the way and took 
the form they did, because directed more or less, by the prin-
ciples or spirit of the Cambridge men. ttl 
The term "Latitudinarian" was first applied to the Cambridge 
Platonists, but was soon found to be more appropriate for the 
liberalism of the latter part of the seventeenth century. The 
[the Cambridge Platonists] ••••• were Tillotson, Stillingfleet and 
Patrick." Cf. History of My Own Time, {1833), I, 343. See also 
Cragg, From pyritanism to the Age of Reas~n, pp.59f. In addition to 
the positive agreement between the Platonists and their successors, 
Hobbes appears as the negative influence or "common enemy" of them 
all, see Laird, Hobbes, pp.258-285. 
1The Cambridge Platonists, p.198. While agreeing in the main 
with Powicke's excellent statement above, the present writer would 
contend that Wbicbcote's individual influence is difficult to separate 
from the collective influence of the School by virtue of his being 
the leader. Whichcote is in a real sense the personal symbol of the 
movement not merely by his own contribution, but by the fact that he 
directly influenced all the members of the school as well as others 
outside it. Thus at times we shall speak of Whichcote individually, 
but where his views are reflected in the collective influence of the 
school we shall feel justified to speak of Whichcote and his disciples 
or sim~ly the Cambridge Platonists. Cf. Howard's introduction to 
Ward, The,Life of ••••• Henry More, pp.6f.; Campagnac, The Cambridge 
Platonists, pp.xxxf. 
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Latitudinarians understood the mentality of their time and before 
the Revolution they were the moat influential preachers in London 
and after 1688 their ascendency on the bishops' bench was 
unchallenged.1 
By the term "Latitudinarian" we refer to a more inclusive group 
t ban the Cambridge Platonist s, in !'act, to the progressive theologians 
of the Restoration and Revolutionary periods. 2 But even though 
the Latitudinarians may be distinguished from the Platonists, their 
relation is close. 3 Apparently most of this latter group were 
tutored by Smith, Cudworth or More, and doubtless listened to 
Whichcote preach in Trinity Church. Tillotson we lmow to have been 
Whichcote'a assistant at St. Lawrence Jewry, London. Burnet, one 
of the Latitudinarians, assures us of the influence of the Platonists 
upon the younger men4 and this influence may be traced in the writings 
of the Latitudinarians. 5 
But their differences are as marked as their similarities. In 
the Platonists there is a vein of genius lacking in the Latitudin-
arians. There is a depth missing - rationalism can be transmitted 
but mysticism is more subtle and elusive. The Latitudinarians 
1cragg, op. cit., p.62. Cf. Burnet, op. cit., pp.347f. 
2cf. Kaufman, "Latitudinarianism and Pietism", C.M.H., V, 
745-753. 
3cf. Patrick's funeral sermon of Smith included in Smith, Select 
Discourses {1859); Tillotson, Funeral Sermon of ••••• Whichcote, (1683). 
~urnet, Loe. cit. 5cragg, op. cit., p.63. 
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stressed reason in religion and reacted against "fanaticism" and 
"enthusiasm". The threat of Romanism was for them a more formidable 
foe than Puritanism or Sectarianism when they were at the height of 
their influence. Against Romanism they asserted reason as an 
autbority.1 Against atheism also they appeal to reason and here 
Cudwortb's Intellectual System serves as a pointer. But the 
Latitudinarians were more ready to praise reason than to define it. 
To them it signifies in a general way all the mental faculties and 
their purpose was to eliminate the irrational from religion. 2 
Stillingfleet and Tillotson were more cautious than most of their 
party, but all of them willingly accepted the testimony of reason to 
natural religion. From the witness of reason they drew three 
important inferences: (1) that the concept of immortality bas the 
greatest practical and speculative importance; (2) that reason, by 
recognising the limitations in our knowledge, is the corrective of 
dogma; and (3) that in the light of reason, superstitious beliefs 
and practices, whether in religion or elsewhere, are utterly 
indefensible. The Latitudinarians sought first to frame a reason-
able system of belief and then demonstrate that it accorded with the 
traditional faitb. 3 They were interested, however, in vindicating 
the claims, at once, of reason and revelation. Against the fanatic 
they maintained with Wbicbcote the essential congruity between reason 
1cf. Whicbcote, The Malignity of Po~, (1717). Also in 
Works, I, 160ff. 
2cragg, op. cit., pp.63-65. 3ne Pauley, op. cit., p.200. 
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and revelation; against the pure rationalists, called by Whichcote, 
the "mere naturalists", they insisted on the supreme importance of 
the truths which, because they were beyond the reach of reason, God 
had disclosed. But because they were more conscious of the challenge 
from the fanatics than from the rationalists, Christian doctrine was 
generally overlaid by them with a veneer of natural morality. 1 
The Latitudinarians endorsed new scientific developments and 
concluded that any divorce between science and religion would be to 
the detriment 01· both. Thus, Wilkins, Glanvill, Burnet and other 
kindred minds were either directly or indirectly connected with the 
Royal Society.2 For the spirit of moderation to Non-Conformists 
expressed by Tillotson and Stillingfleet, they were bitterly 
criticised, and dubbed as Socinians and the like. 3 The doctrinal 
vagueness and indifference of the Latitudinarians were readily pointed 
out by their opponents. The fact is they avoided certain theological 
issues because they were sure that these topics had no vital purpose, 
they were concerned to teach men to live the good life. 
appear to be the true successors of Whichcote. 4 
Here they 
Tillotson was not an original genius. He was the heir of the 
Puritans on one hand and of the Cambridge Platonists on the other. 
1 Cragg, op. cit., pp.66-70. 2Ibid. , pp. 72f. 
3cf. Tuclmey's criticism of Wbichcote, Letters of Controversy, 
No.1. Cf. Supra, Ch.III. 
4cf. Burnet, A Sermon Preached at the Funeral 01· ••••• Tillotson •••• , 
cited by Cragg, op. cit., p.78. 
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He had his upbringing among them both. He was influenced by 
Cbillingworth and formed acquaintance at Cambridge with Whichcote, 
Smith, Cudworth and More. He accepted from the Platonists the 
axiom that human reason is capable of understanding the principles 
of natural and revealed religion. From the Puritans be retained a 
simplicity of life, a natural and familiar method of expression and 
1 perhaps his manner of preaching from a manuscript and not extempore. 
Tillotson was among the most outstanding preachers of his day. His 
homiletics represent a popular and effective protest against 
smothering sermons with quotations. Here Tillotson goes beyond the 
Platonists generally, though Whichcote's sermons are freer of 
excessive classical quotations than the writings of his disciples. 
The Platonists, like Tillotson, rebelled against the use to which 
classics had been put, nevertheless, they believed there was a 
legitimate authority in them which should be caretully observed, 
2 especially in Christian antiquity and Scripture. 
According to Tillotson, Scripture is plain in all things 
necessary to faith and the good life. He asserts that emotionalism 
is not the fundamental thing in religion, for reason plays a greater 
part. He is against intolerance and false zeal. In essential 
lsmyth, The Art of Preaching, p.102. For a furthe~ account of 
Tillotson's relation with Whichcote and disciples, see Birch, Life of 
•...• Tillotson, etc •••••• , t1753), p.101. 
2cragg, op. cit., pp.72f. For a contemporary account of Tillot-
son's homiletical method, see Burnet, Loe. cit. To compare his method 
with the Puritan preachers, see Haller, The Ri~f Puritanism, pp. 
19-23, 86f. 
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agreement with Wbichcote, Tillotson conceives faith as rational and 
as supported by good works. 1 Tillotaon's essential agreement with 
Whichcote is reflected in the following passage: 
"All revealed religion", says Tillotson, "does suppose 
and take for granted the clear and undoubted principles and 
precepts or natural religion, and builds upon them. By 
natural religion I mean obedience to the natural law and the 
performance of such duties as natural light, without any 
express and supernatural revelation, doth dictate ••••• These 
and such like are those which we call moral duties; and they 
are of eternal obligation, because they naturally oblige, with-
out any particular and express revelation from God. And tbese 
are the foundation of revealed and instituted religion, and all 
revealed religion does suppose them and build upon them; for 
revelation from God supposeth us to be men, and alters nothing 
of those duties to which we were naturally obliged before ••••• 
The great design of the Christian religion is to restore and 
reinforce the practice of the natural law, or, which is all 
one, moral duties. 11 2 
The convenient description of what Whichcote calls truths of 
"first inscription" and ttafter-revelation" is clearly reflected in 
Tillotson's thought. However, in spite of the fact that Whichcote's 
framework is left intact by Tillotson, much of the essential content 
is missing. This fact is especially evident in Tillotson's conception 
of Christianity. Here the vital message of Whichcote concerning grace, 
saving knowledge, the work of Christ and the guidance of the Spirit, 
are overshadowed by Tillotson's rationalism and moralism. 2 It 
appears, then, that for all the personal contact and influence which 
1T1llotson, Works, t1757), I, 315f., 430; II, 12, 213f.; III, 
20f., 249 passim. 
2Ibid., II, 307f.; Cf. 112.!£•, III, 442f. 
3cf. Ibid., II, 405 with Supra, Ch.VI. 
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Tillotson may have had with Wbichcote, he is not Whichcote's disciple. 1 
Tillotson was Whichcote's successor, nevertheless, in a vital sense. 
It was part of Tillotson' a service to the seventeenth century that he 
stated from the pulpit a number of diffused ideas about religion and 
reason which had been growing in the minds of ordinary people and by 
his simple and clear statement reinforced their hold upon the age. 
His excellency lay in seeing that reasonable Christianity involved 
moral requirements as well as mental. His attack upon enthusiasm was 
based not merely upon its denial of reason, but also because it often 
took moral standards lightly. He was very close to Whichcote in the 
variety and concern 01· his preaching as well as in the general trend 
of bis thougbt. 2 
From the available evidence we may conclude that the Latitudin-
arians carry on the spirit of the Cambridge Platonists by their 
emphasis upon the relation of reason and faith, morality and religion 
and in their general contribution to philanthropy and toleration. 
On the other hand, Christian doctrines are diluted by the Latitudin-
arians in anticipation of much of the Rationalism and Moralism of 
1cr. Moffatt, The Golden Book of Tillotson, pp.2f., 12, 32ff. 
See also, Leslie Stephen, English Thought in the Eighteenth Century, 
I, 79. 
2Moffatt, Ibid., pp.35-38. The Latitudinarians resemble the 
Platonists in their cbari table thought and work. c1·. Cragg, op. cit. , 
pp.79f.; Norman Sykes, The English Religious Traditifm, pp.53f. For 
an account of Whichcote's charitable work, see Supra, Ch.I and Tillot-
son ~'uneral Sermon or ••••• Whichcote, p.27. It would be difricult to 
ove;estimate the effect of Whichcote's personal example upon Tillotson. 
For an account of the general relationship between the Cambridge 
Platonists and the Latitudinarians, see Kaufman, .QI?• cit., pp.742-753. 
Richard Baxter's account of the "Latitudinarians" is valuable, see 
Autobiographz, p.185. 
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the Age of Reason. But although their trend appears to be away 
from the more balanced position of Whichcote, most of their pre-
suppositions are traceable in his writings. 
It is most probable that Whichcote had contact with the Friends 
on many deep questions. 1 Cambridge Platonism and early Quakerism 
are related both historically and theologically. Before George Fox 
drew attention to "the Light within", the importance of this doctrine 
had been stressed by Whichcote and his disciples. To Whichcote "the 
Inward Voice" was a practical and prized reality. 2 Whichcote often 
speaks of the "superintendency of the Spirit". It was precisely 
this belief of Whichcote and his disciples, in the reality 01· "innate 
ideas" and of "Divine intuitions", which obtained for them the name 
of "Pla tonists". 3 
In comparison with the Cal viniatic Puri tans, the early Friends 
were "Broad Church" but even these were not so "broad" either in a 
1cr. Tallack, "Quakers and Cambridge Platonists", F. Q. E. , 
Vol.XXIII, ~1889), p.187. 
2Prov. 20:27. We need only recall the maxim of Cambridge 
Platonism: "the reason of man is the Candle of the Lord"· 
3
p1ato's philosophy has for one o~ its characteristic features 
the prevalence 01· a similar doctrine. We need only to be reminded 
of Plato's notions concerning "pre-existence" and "reminiscence". 
Cf. Egg-Olofsaon, The Inner Light, pp.20fr. Here the concept of 
the "inner light" has been traced from early Greek thought through 
the writings of the Cambridge Platonists and Quakers. 
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Scriptural or philosophical sense as Whichcote. 1 Whichcote strikes 
a balance which appears difricult for the Quakers or his day. For 
instance, many of the early Friends, i.e. Naylor, Barclay, Sewel 
and others' attached somewhat too subordinate a posit ion to the 
authority o t• the Seri pture and to t be Incarnation. 2 
Wbichcote and Smith, in particular, resemble the early Quakers 
in their minor estimate or dogma, as compared with their emphasis 
upon living obedience to Christ and of the love of God and man. But 
Whicbcote and Smith are portrayed as great Gospel preachers and to 
them Jesus Christ, the "Word made flesh" is in a unique sense "the 
Be a re r of' God ' s Spirit". 3 The Cambridge Platonists regarded the 
Holy Spirit mainly as the worker ot· holy dispositions and godly 
lives, rather than as operating even by orthodox intellectual influences. 
God's laws were written on the affections in this Christian Dispens-
at ion. The special object and f'unction of God's human sympathies 
1My reference to Wbicbcote here instead of the Cambridge Platonists 
is deliberate since he appears to be free ot· the excesses traceable in 
the writings of his disciples, i.e. Cudworth and More. More's views on 
witchcraft in bis own treatise on the subject and his co-operation with 
Glanvill in presenting the subject, deserves the same severe criticism 
that is due the fanaticism of' the early Quakers, i.e. George Fox, er. 
Glanvill, Sadducismus Triumphatus, \ 1724), including More's "Supplement-
ary Collection of ••••• stories or Apparitions and Witchcraft", pp.403~f. 
2Tallack, op. cit., p.1~0. Henry More among the Cambridge Platon-
ists gives praise to the Quaker doctrine or "Divine immanence" and 
points out the inadequate notion ot· the Quakers concerning the historic 
Incarnation. Cf. Ibid., pp.1Y1f. See also, More, Theolo&ical Works, 
\1708), pp.533r. Wbicbcote would appear to be in complete agreement 
with More in his worthy defence ot· the Incarnation. 
3This expression, "the Bearer o:r God's Spirit'~ is used often by 
C.K. Barrett in his The Holy Spirit and the Gospel Tradition, pp.68, 
Y21·. He alternatively refers to Jesus, the Messiah as a "pneumatic" 
person. 
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and condescending experiences, in the Incarnation, is to draw out, 
awaken and sustain this affection and loving obedience of the heart. 
The pre-Incarnation anointings bad failed to do this, and only the 
Anointed Humanity of Jesus was able to do tbis, as brought home to 
the soul, by His own Holy Spirit, and the preaching of His own 
bl.·storic Gospel. 1 y t t e for all heir emphasis upon the Inward Teacher, 
they were careful to avoid discarding the "means of grace" instituted 
by Christ and the Holy Spirit. 2 The Cambridge men insist that the 
chie1· proof and test of t be possession o:r genuine spirituality 
consists in the faith "that Jesus Christ is come in the :flesh113 and 
this was their real issue with the Quakers. This warning of the 
1Selwyn points out tba.t the root of practical religion ±'or the 
New Testament writers lies in the indwelling of the Spirit of Christ 
in the spirit of man rather than a merely natural affinity between the 
divine and human spirit, for that natural affinity has been marred by 
sin. Thus for the bridging of the chasm so caused there is needed 
on God's side redemption, and on man's side repentance and for this 
reason the New Testament teaching about t be Holy Spirit is "historically 
conditioned", that is in relation to the Incarnation. This is pre-
cisely the note sounded by Whicbcote end More. Yet in a footnote 
concerning his statement above Selwyn adds this unjustified assertion, 
"It is, I think, because the ••• Cambridge Platonists ••• tended to 
obscure this side of New Testament teaching that their influence has 
not been widespread." See The First Epistle of St. Peter, p.285, 
.lb.id. , tn. ). More challenges the Quakers and Familists alike for 
dwelling upon the Word or Logos revealed to man before the Inca.mation 
and speaks of the "Logos, in conjunction with the Divine Soul of the 
Messiah" as the special object of Christian faith. Thus for the 
Cambridge Platonists the deepest spirituality is always in relation 
to Christ. See More, Loe. cit. 
2In keeping with his Cbristological argument, More wrote William 
Penn defending the Lord's Supper, on the ground of its being designed 
as an "abiding, visible monument" of the Incarnation. See Tallack, 
op. cit. , p.192. 
3I John 4: 2. 
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Platonists is signif'icant, ror Quakerism has been barren, repulsive, 
end dividing wherever it has divorced the Inward Voice from the 
Incarnate Wora. 1 
We may compare Whichcote and his disciples with the early 
Quakers on several points. Both appealed from Scripture to the 
authority that is within us. To the Platonists, "the spirit of 
man is the candle of the Lord" ; for the Quakers it is the ind welling 
Spirit which lights our darkened understanding. The Platonists 
start rrom human reason quickened by the Spirit, the Quakers from 
the Spirit quickening human intuition. The Platonists tell us of 
the divine spark of the image of God within which judges of God's 
truth without; the Quakers discourse more like the Puritans or the 
strivings of the Spirit. Both have links with Puritanism. The 
Platonists, however, shade off into Latitudinarianism, while 
Quakerism often tends toward false zeal and divisiveness among 
Christians. But when the two movements are true to their original 
2 intentions, they bear spiritual, moral and theological resemblance. 
John Locke, though an empiricist, may be said in some sense to 
be the successor of Whichcote. Even Maurice in his critical 
appraisal of the Cambridge Platonists considers them as "preparing to 
1 t " 
3 
make [the] ascendency [of Locke) ror a while more complete and abso u e • 
1Tallack, op. cit., pp.196ft. 
2cf. Gwatkin, Church and State in England, pp.340r. 
3Moral and Metaphysical Philosophy, II, 350f. 
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Professor Sykes asserts that "what they [the Cambridge Platonists] had 
taught in the academy, Locke and his disciples proclaimed in the 
market place". 1 Locke himself admits his appreciation for the sermons 
of Whichcote and Tillotson implying his moral and religious affinity 
with the Platonists and Latitudinarians. 2 Powicke asserts that 
Locke was personally acquainted with Cudworth, Tillotson and Whichcote. 
Locke is said by this author to have been a good friend or Tillotson. 
~'urther Locke most probably met Whichcote often in personal fellowship 
as well as heard him preach from his pulpit at St. Lawrence Jewry, 
3 London, between 1667-75 when Locke lived in London. 
It appears that Locke became less rather than more of a Puritan 
under Puritan rule at Oxford and in this sense his reaction to 
Puritanism can be said to be similar to Whichcote's. Many, if not 
most of Locke's friends, as far as we lmow, were churchmen. There 
is nothing to show that he ever shared the extreme views of the 
Puritans; but there is also nothing to show that he ever had much 
sympathy with the High Church party, as apart rrom political matters. 
His sympathy was rather with those Latitudinarian members of the 
church who were rising in importance under the living and posthumous 
influence of such men as Chillingworth, Whichcote and Tillotson. 4 
1sykes, op. cit._, p. 55. 
2sal ter, "Testimonies", p. xxxi v, in Whichcote, Aphorisms, ( 1753 ). 
Salter here refers to Locke's letter to Rev. Hichard King. 
3Powicke, .2P.!..-.£.i.i•, p.20. 
4Eourne, Li1·e of John Locke, I, 77; Cf. Hertling, John Locke und 
die Schule von Cambridge, p.160. 
379. 
Locke was exiled in Holland and became acquainted with Limborch, 
grand-nephew of Episcopius. Limborcb was busy when be made Locke's 
acquaintance, upon his Theologia Christiana - an unsectarian and 
undogmatic work. It seems to follow that Locke was a friend of 
liberal-minded theologians at home and abroad.1 
following observation concerning Locke: 
Fraser makes the 
"His religious as well as his metaphysical disposition 
always attracted him to theology. His revulsion from 
Presbyterian dogmatism and congregationalist fanaticism 
favoured friendly connection with latitudinarian Churchmen. 
Soon after the Restoration, Whichcote, the Cambridge divine, 
was his favourite preacher."2 
Cudworth's daughter, Lady Masham, was imbued with her father's 
philosophical and religious spirit, modified by the newer principles 
of Locke. She appears to have been Locke's pupil at Oxford and a 
friend and admirer of his for 1 ife. Locke died as a guest in her 
home in 1704. A little book which she anonymously published in 
1696, A Discourse Concerning the Love of God, marks a middle position 
between the spiritual fervour of the Cambridge Platonists and the 
"common sense" position of Locke's conception of duty and religion. 
In this pamphlet she sets the example of deprecating the demand for 
enthusi~sm in devotion, and of discouraging any claim, in the name 
1Bourne, IQ.!£., II, 228, 8, 212ff. 
2Fraser, Locke, p.16. Cf. Lord King, Locke, I, 337, 344. For 
an account of the personal relation of Cudworth's daughter, Damaris 
(later Lady Masham, Sir Francis' second wife) and Cudworth's widow to 
Locke, see Bourne, op. cit., I, 77, 170, 310; Martineau, Types of 
Ethical Theory, II, 403. 
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of God, beyond the one true end, of "a good life". At this point 
of contact between the Platonists and Locke, it is interesting to 
observe the vain attempt to maintain a balance between the ideal 
and material interpretations of the world, the intuitive and the 
. . l 1 empirics • Lady Masham's reflections are important in indicating 
this point of continuity and discontinuity between Whichcote, 
Cudworth and others, and Locke. 
Locke sets out to refute the doctrine of Innate Ideas - or to 
refute the claim of any elements in our so-called knowledge to be 
exempt from criticism. He opposes the insistence that a principle 
may be made the "principle of principles" and therefore unquestioned. 
Locke vindicates the right to examine critically all the so-called 
principles of human knowledge. 2 The materials of knowledge are 
called by Locke "ideas", an idea being the object of the understanding 
when a man thinks. In one sense, therefore, the measure of our 
knowledge is found in the extent and clearness of our ideas. What 
we actually know, we must have an idea of: that of which we have 
no idea, or only an obscure and inadequate idea, we cannot know, or 
can lmow only inadequately. The limitation ot' our knowledge will 
be found in the limitation of our ideas. The common source of 
our ideas is found by Locke in experience, in one or other of its 
two forms, sensation and reflection, or external and internal sense. 
It appears that Locke is building his epistemology upon the ruins of 
1Martineau, ~·, p.404. 2Locke, Essay, l1853), I.iii. 25. 
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that of Whichcote and especially that presented by Smith in his 
Discourse - "Of the Immortality of the Soul" and Cudworth in Eternal 
and Immutable Moralit~.1 
But if it is true that Locke opposed the concept of "innate ideas" 
held by Whichcote and disciples, it is just as true that they opposed 
empiricism which is most characteristic of Locke's thought. Of the 
two outstanding English empiricists who preceded Locke, namely, Bacon 
and Hobbes, Locke is closer to Bacon. Like Bacon, Locke is a critic 
of human knowledge and a surveyor of the foundations of knowledge. 
The difference between Locke and Bacon, epistemologically speaking, 
is that while Bacon sought to formulate the true method of scientific 
investig~tion, Locke is concerned with the previous question of the 
1For an account of Whichcote's epistemology see Supra, Ch.IV. 
For a fUll discussion concerning "innate ideas" in Cambridge Platonism, 
see Lamprecht, "Innate Idea.a", P.R., Vol.X.XV, ~1926), pp.553-73. It 
is the opinion of Seth, op. cit., pp.92f., that Locke is reacting 
negatively to Descartes' confidence in the "clearness and distinctness" 
of ideas as a criterion of truth. Even if we should accept this view, 
we would still need to consider his reaction to Cambridge Platonism. 
Cassirer points out in his The Platonic Renaissance in England, p.59 
(n.1), that in their defence of the a priori, most of the thinkers of 
the Cambridge School do not distinguish· between the "logical" and the 
"temporal" sense of the a priori concept. Hence they argue not only 
for the a prior± validity of.;_theoreticaL and ethical principles, but 
also for the "innateness" of these principles. In this respect they 
advocate essentially the position which Locke assails in the first 
book of his Essay. And it is quite probable that Locke, in formul-
ating his arguments, was aiming largely at the philosophers of Cambridge 
as his real opponents. It is significant that Culverwel, closely 
associated with the Platonists, rejects the t~mporal and psychological 
interpretation of the a priori and to this extent anticipates Locke's 
criticism. Cf. Of the Light of Nature, t1857), pp.123ff. It seems 
reasonable to the present writer that Locke's criticism of "innate 
ideas" may be a reaction, at once, against Descartes and the Platonists. 
For a comparison of "innate ideas" as conceived by Descartes and the 
Platonists, see Lamprecht, op. cit., pp.Q71-73. 
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possibility of knowledge itself; how far it extends, and where the 
line must be drawn between certain knowledge and probable opinion. 
While Bacon sought to formulate the methods of scientific knowledge, 
or to construct a system of inductive logic, Locke concludes that 
there is no certain knowledge of the real world end that the needs 
of practice are sufficiently met by probabilities of opinion, or 
belief. Thus, Locke appears to have been the first in British 
philosophy to state the problem in this form; his is the criticism 
of human knowledge, or epistemology. His philosophy is epoch-making 
in influence especially in the subsequent development of the thought 
of Hume and Kant. 
1 
Thus even in his theory of knowledge, Locke '"s 
empiricism is an empiricism radically different from Hobbes' and to 
a lesser degree from Bacon's. 
It is more significant for our purpose that Locke differs in his 
moral and religious thought from Bacon. According to Bacon, "sacred 
theology ••••• is grounded only upon the word and oracle of God, and not 
upon the light of nature ••••• This holdeth not only in those points of 
faith which concern the mysteries of the Deity., of the Creation, of 
the Redemption, but likewise those which concern the moral law truly 
interpreted. 112 At this point Locke parts with Bacon and is manifest 
1seth,Ioc. cit., Apparently Locke by his concept of probable 
knowledge anticipates this aspect of Butler's thought. This position 
of Locke also explains why Shaftesbury, his pupil, reacted negatively 
against his master's epistemology and found a greater affinity with 
his own views in the sermons of W~chcote. 
2Advancement of Learning, lEveryman Ed.), p.209. 
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as a disciple of Whichcote. Locke disagrees with Bacon and at the 
same time agrees with Whichcote that there is no divorce between 
reason and revelation. 1 Lowery considers Hertling's tendency to 
distinguish sharply between an empirical and rationalistic tendency 
in Locke's thought and to attribute the rationalistic tendency 
exclusively to the influence of Whichcote and his disciples as an 
exaggeration. However, Lowery_ would agree that the rationalistic 
aspect of Locke's theory came to be more definitely conceived and 
2 more sharply emphasised, as his reflection proceeded. Austin 
asserts that the rationalistic element in Locke's thought is definitely 
related to the Cambridge Platonists. In the little that Locke has 
to say about ethics this rationalistic element appears most frequently. 
In this domain th.ere is a constant wavering between a moral positivism 
with the consequent stress upon the senaualietic and the utilitarian 
motifs, and on the other hand, a recognition of an objective, rational 
moral law, with the underlying theological motive constantly in 
evidence. The empirical element by which Locke's system has come 
to be characterised most frequently, was never able to submerge 
completely the strain of rationalism which was constantly appearing in 
his writings. As a result there is a constant conflict wherever 
Locke turns his mind to the problem of morality. Had he written a 
1cr. Caasirer, op. cit., pp.5Y~.; Hertling, op. cit., pp.100-157, 
161-180, 2~3, 314f.; De Boer, The Theory of Knowledg__e of the Cambridge 
Platonists, pp.4ff. 
2Lowery, Locke's Theory of Knowledge and its Historical Relations, 
p. 237. 
384. 
book on ethics, we might have had his solution to the antinomy; in 
the absence thereof, we have no alternative but to accept the 
rationalistic element for what it is. And for the explanation of 
its presence in Locke's philosophy we must turn to the Cambridge 
Platonists. 1 
Locke was in complete sympathy with the outlook of Whichcote and 
his disciples concerning theology and ecclesiastical politics. Like 
them, he dreaded equally the arrogant claims of authority and the 
warm rancies of enthusiasm; like them, he sought in reason the 
basis of a simplified theology, the acceptance of which would lead 
to toleration in non-essentials.2 Locke summed up an attitude to 
religious issues which was steadily gaining ground as the seventeenth 
century ended, and his influence was even greater in the eighteenth 
century. Even in his philosophical work religion occupied an 
important place. He did more than affirm the importance of reason 
in religion; he explained how it worked, and made it seem both 
necessary and inevitable. 3 One passage written by Locke appears to 
make his affinity with Whichcote clear. Locke says: 
1Austin, The Ethics of the Cambridge Platonists, pp.78-80. 
Cf., Laird, Hobbes, pp.280f., 2YO. 
2i.owery, op. cit., pp.236f. 
3cragg, op. cit., pp.114-117. Th~s !riter conceives Locke's 
treatise, The Reasonable~-2.!:_Christianity, \1695), as a standard 
work in Christian theology in England for the greater part of a 
century. see lEiQ.·, pp.117f. 
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0 
."Reason is natural revelation, whereby the eternal Father 
f light,.and Fountain of all lmowledge, communicates to mankind 
that portion of truth which he has laid within the reach of , 
their natural faculties. Revelation is natural reason enlarged 
by_ a new set or discoveries communicated by God immediately, 
~hie~ reason vouches the truth of by the testimony and proofs 
it gives that they come from God. So that he that takes away 
reason to make way for revelation, puts out the light of both ••• "1 
Locke is in essential agreement with Whichcote on the necessity 
for toleration in Church and State. Whichcote is considered as the 
real apostle of toleration among the Cambridge Platonists and thus, 
at this point, Locke is his successor in a special way. Concerning 
the relation of Church and State, Locke presupposes that a government 
will be entitled to demand conformity to a simple form of religious 
belief, but will not undertake to force its subjects to accept any 
particular doctrinal system. It is the responsibility of the citizen 
to live up to the ideals of the Christian life, as set forth in the 
Bible; it is the duty of the State to make that possible. Locke was 
very much concerned with the question of religious toleration and 
liberty of conscience. Toleration followed naturally both from his 
conception of the nature of knowledge and from his view of the true 
character of the Christian faith. 2 
1i:,ocke, Essay, IV. 19. 4. Locke appears to be i~ ~n essential 
agreement with Wbichcote on several points: tl) Oppos7tion to 
enthusiasm, Ibid., IV. 19. 3. t2) The role of revelation, ~·, IV. 
16. 14; 18.~5, 7, 8, 10. Cf. Reasonableness of Christianity t1695), 
p.14. t3) Scripture, its authorit~ and interpretation, Reasonableness 
etc., pp.1, 4f., 43, 292ff. and (4) The relation of morality and 
religion, Ibid., pp.15, 19, 24f., 260f., 255, 243f. Cf. Essay, IV. 
3. 18; 12. 11. 
2one can hardly read Whichcote's Sermons and Aphorisms and compare 
them with Locke's Letters of Toleration without admitting the probab~ 
ility of Whichcote as a direct influence towards Locke's tolerant spirit. 
See supra, Ch.VIII, Cf. Locke, Four Letters on Toleration, l1876), 
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From what we have pointed out above, Locke's affinity with 
Whic hcote appears obvious. But, on the other hand, if Locke can be 
credited with handing on the moral and religious insights of Whichcote 
as well as others in the same tradition, there is a sense in which 
he betrays them. Locke sets forth his argument as a corrective for 
the irrationality of "enthusiasm", but those who followed him used it 
to challenge affirmations which Locke never questioned. The intell-
ectual atmosphere of the period fixed men's attention on one half of 
Locke's argument. He had asserted that religious knowledge discover-
able by reason is supplemented by revelation; but revelation is 
... 
subject to the scrutiny of reason. Given the mental outlook of the 
age, it was natural that the part played by reason should gradually 
eclipse the place given to revelation. 1 It is clear that Locke's 
contribution to the rationalism of the following century is to a 
great extent derived from Whichcote, his disciples and ·successors. 
It follows that if Whichcote is to be credited with contributing to 
esp. the lat Letter, {1689), 1.12!9.·' pp.2ff. Cf. Jordan, The Develop-
ment of Religious Toleration in England, IV, 111-116; Cragg, op. cit., 
pp.230, 190, 213-17. Locke's minimum faith, viz., the confession 
that Jesus is the Messiah is well known, see Reasonableness of 
Christianitz, pp.1, 4f., 43 passim. Locke in spite of bis affinity 
with the Cambridge Platonists and the Latitudinarians in simplifying 
the faith, goes beyond both in his doctrinal vagueness and indicates 
the suppositions which tend to overthrow the accepted systems of 
theology. 
1cragg, op. cit., pp.124f. Cf. Bourne, op. cit., II, 87; Oman, 
op cit p.105. Locke's intention and dedication to truth is 
re~arkabiy similar to Whichcote's. Cf. Lady Masbam's tribute to 
Locke in a letter to Jean Le Clerc cited by Cragg, op. cit., p.135, 
with Tillotson's tribute to Whichcote in his Funeral Sermon of ••••• 
Whichcote. 
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the notions modified and transmitted by Locke's superior genius, 
Whicbcote must share the blame with Locke for overshadowing revel-
ation by reason. Whichcote's unusual personal influence helped to 
create an atmosphere for the reception of Locke's rationalism. The 
intellectualism in Whichcote appears more intense than that in any of 
his disciples and to this extent he is closer to the Age of Reason 
t~nt~y. This tendency in Whichcote as in Locke may be partly 
explained by their common, but radical reaction against enthusiasm and 
their common desire for toleration. 
Liberal theologians like Chillingworth, Whichcote and Tillotson, 
accustomed to trust in reason and to practise toleration asserted that 
since men differ hopelessly on many points, let us take that in which 
all agree. That surely must be the essence of religion and the 
teaching of universal reason. Thus we should be able to found a 
reasonable Christianity. But others were willing to forgo a 
1 
reasonable Christianity to found a religion of reason. The vigour 
of English theology during the latter part of the seventeenth century 
was due to the fact that for a time, reason and Christian theology 
were in spontaneous alliance. Theologians like Taylor, Whichcote, 
Tillotson and others were anxious to construct a philosophical 
religion, but were not alive to the possibility that such a religion 
might cease to be Christian. If the Cambridge Platonists rationalise, 
it is with a sincere belief that they are bringing out the f'ull 
1stephen, op. cit., I, 85. 
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meaning of the doctrine which they expound,· purifying it from human 
accretions. Thia process had not yet developed far enough to imply 
any insincerity in the reasoners. But when their approach was later 
developed and employed by certain sceptics, it ran counter to their 
original intention. A change was inevitably approaching, and 
philosophy, hitherto in alliance with Christianity, began to show 
indications of a divorce. Though these latter philosophers might 
use the old language, it became increasingly difficult to identify 
. 1 
the God of philosophy with the God of Christianity. Passing from 
the original intention of Whichcote to develop a philosophical 
theology or a Christian philosophy to the Deists and the more 
comprehensive Rationalism of the Age of Reason, Pascal's famous 
distinction between the "God of Christians" and the "God of 
philosophers" becomes a truism. 2 
1Ibid., pp.77-81. 
2
Pascal, Pensees (Stewart ed.) "Apology", Pen. 12. Lord 
Herbert of Cherbury is considered the true father of Deism, see Oman, 
op. cit., pp.81ff.; Stephen, op. cit., pp.83f.; Nussbaum, The 
Triumph of Science and Reason, pp.186f.; Webb, Studies in the Hieto:ry 
of Natural Theology, pp.89f.; Seth, op. cit., pp.89f.; Cf. Cragg, 
op. cit., pp.137ff.; Locke, Essay, I, ii, 3. For an account of the 
manner in which John Toland builds his deistic theory upon Locke's 
general position, see Toland, Christianity Not Mysterious {1696), 
pp.6, 37, 42, 127-134, 139-155 passim. Cf. Cragg, Loe. cit.; Oman, 
op. cit., pp.107-110; Stephen, op. cit., pp.93ff. For an account 
of Stillingfleet's protest against Locke and Toland alike, see 
Stephen, op. cit., pp.112f. For Locke's defence, see Locke, Works, 
{1824), III, 108, 42. Stillingfleet may be said to represent the 
Cambridge Platonists and Latitudinarians in this controversy. 
Unfortunately, however, he blamed Locke for the inferences which 
Toland bad derived from Locke's epistemology and this most assuredly 
against Locke's consent. 
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For our purpose, John Toland's assertion that there is not only 
nothing in Christianity "contrary" to reason, but that there is 
nothing in it "above" reason indicates the extreme tendency of this 
new rationalism. Thus Toland says: 
"••·~•We hold that 'Reason' is the only Foundation of all 
Certitude; and that nothing reveal'd, whether as to its 
'Manner' or 'Existence' is more exempted from its Disquisitions, 
than the ordinary Phenomena of Nature ••••• There is nothing in 
the Gospel contrary to Reason, nor above it; and that no 
Christian Doctrine can be properly called a Mystery. n1 
This refusal to accept the supra-rational element in religion 
clearly goes beyond anything to be found in the religious thought of 
Whichcote or Locke. As Leslie Stephen reminds us, to expel mystery 
is to expel theology; for there is no religion and no God without 
mystery. This rejection of mystery even plucks at the roots of 
natural religion. It is fortunate that Toland's extreme view 
encouraged later writers to attempt a more constructive theory 
especially with regard to the Divine Nature. 2 Furthermore, it was 
fortunate that the most eminent of the early English religious 
thinkers, of the Age of Reason, were generally on the orthodox side. 
They could find liberty enough to satisfy their logical instincts 
within the old lines; and were not led to embrace Deism. Among the 
champions of the faith were such men as Loe~~, Berkeley, Clarke, 
Butler and others of similar rank. The Deists had the fUrther 
disadvantage of limited toleration. Toleration was still limited 
1Toland, !Q..!.Q.., p.6. 
2Stephen, op. cit., pp.110ff. Cf. Cragg, op. cit., pp.139-155. 
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primarily to adherents of the Church of England and for this 
reason there was little toleration for the outright Deists. 1 The 
Deists, then, are not to be considered Whichcote's true successors 
inasmuch as they are not true to his purpose to wed reason and 
revelation rather than to divorce them. 
Samuel Clarke reveals his interest in Whichcote's thought by 
publishing anonymously a fourth volume of Whichcote's sermons in 1707 
in spite of the protest of Jeffery who had been instructed by the 
Which.Cote family to publish Dr. Whichcote's writings. 2 This would 
seem to imply either that Clarke saw in Whichcote's thought the basis 
of his own or that he was impressed by the similarity of Whicbcote's 
thought with his own. At any rate, his anxiety to make Whichcote's 
thought public is of interest here. 
Clarke is described by Leslie Stephen as the founder of the so-
called "intellectual school". 3 Clarke was a great representative of 
the a priori method of constructing a system of theology. His 
1Ibid. , p. 85. -
2whichcote, Aphorisms l1753), see Salter's preface, pp.xviiif. 
3n.N.B., IV, 443-445. Martineau in the second volume of his 
Ty-pea of Ethical Theor~ treats Cudworth and Clarke as Dianoetic 
ethicists. Martineau s term was used by Aristotle in describing 
intellectual virtues. We have seen Supra, Ohs.II, V, that Whicbcote 
leans heavily upon Aristotle's Ethics. Furthermore, the essential 
"intellectual" element in Whichcote's ethics is more marked than in 
Cudworth. We have seen Supra, Ch.IX, that Cudworth's moral psychology 
is in part a reaction against the intense intellectualism of Whichcote's 
ethics. Clarke in his mathematical deduction of moral law from 
logical necessity appears to be closer to Whichcote than to Cudworth. 
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approach to religion and morality is mathematical. He clothes his 
arguments in quasi-mathematical phraseology, common to Descartes, 
Leibnitz and Spinoza. He names Spinoza as an adversary but appears 
to follow his argument up to the point where it conflicts with 
ordinary theism.1 
In Clarke's Discourse Concerning the Being and Attributes of God, 
he does not abandon revelation, but the centre of gravity has shifted, 
and revelation becomes an adjunct rather than the first consideration. 
Clarke goes to the limit in his attempt to derive good and evil from 
"the Eternal Fitness and Relation of Things". The very language 
and spirit of Clarke's writings is found in Whichcote's sermons. 
God, Clarke declares, has chosen these "fitnesses", not thereby 
constituting them "good" ex arbitrio, but choosing them because they 
were antecedently "best", and the ground or morality lies in these. 
2 We ought to act in accordance with the °Fitness and Reason of Things". 
Clarke asserts that that which is truly the "Law of Nature" or the 
"Reason of Things" is in like manner the. "Will of God". 3 Thus the 
will of God takes second place, as if its function were merely to 
1stephen, op. cit., I, 119-121. Cassirer finds a remarkable 
affinity between the rationalism of Whichcote and Leibnitz. If t~is 
observation is correct, there is little wonder that Clarke, an admirer 
of Leibnitz, should prize similar notions in Whichcote, a British 
predecessor of his, see Cassirer, op. cit., p.39. 
2c1arke Being and Attributes of God, pp.256f.; Cf. Discourse 
Concerning the Unchangeable Obligations of Natural Religion, l1705), 
p.86, lcited by Willey, The Eighteenth Century Background, p.60. ). 
3c1arke, Unchangeable Obligations, pp.147f., lcited by Willey, 
Jlli. ). 
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ratify the enactments of the natural legislature. Clarke conceives 
"Moral Virtue [as] ·••·•the Foundation and Summ, the Essence and 
Life of all true Religion". 1 
Clarke' however, does find a place 1·or revelation in his system. 
There is cause to believe rrom right reason and the light of nature 
that God would seek a way to assist man toward his salvation. 
Whichcote also considers revealed truth as being implied by the 
natural and he appears to be in agreement with Clarke that the 
purpose of this revealed addition to natural light is primarily 
for the purpose of man's salvation. 2 In his view of revelation as 
opposed to the Deists, Clarke anticipates Butler. Clarke is driven 
to abandon the high a priori view and only seek to demonstrate that 
some revel at ion or other is probable. That any given revelation is 
the true one can only be proved by evidence applicable to it alone, 
and consequently of the ordinary a posteriori kind. 3 Clarke, then 
points back to Whichcote and forward to the Deists. He adopts 
almost entirely the deist method, but applies it on behalf of 
Christianity. If the description is permissible, he may be called 
a Christian Deist. He was not an originator of thought but 
represented a modification or current opinions. As a result be 
1Ibid., p.141, ~cited by Willey, Ibid.). Allowing for the 
scientifIC and philosophical advancement between the Cambridge 
Platonists and Clarke, most of his ethical theory is anticipat~d in 
the writings of Whichcote and Cudworth and to a lesser degree in 
More's work on ethics. See Martineau, op. cit., pp.425-38. 
2see supra, Ch.VI. 3stephen, op. cit., pp.127-2~. 
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influenced a number of younger men, including Butler and plainly 
exerted 8 powerful influence upon the moral liberal thinkers of the 
1 
day. He appears to transmit the liberal religious and moral 
tradition, begun by Whichcote and his disciples, into the eighteenth 
century. 
Whicbcote influenced the third Earl or Shaftesbury, but it is 
not easy to determine the extent of this inf.'luence. 2 It is 
signi:t'icant that the first publication of Shaftesbury was a volume of 
Wbicbcote's sermons. 3 According to Shaftesbury's preface to this 
volume be was generally impressed by Whichcote's moral and religious 
outlook. He considers Whicbcote as a philosopher of good-nature as 
well as a common opponent with himself against Hobbes. 4 Maurice's 
designation of Shaftesbury as a "philosopher of sunshine" is suggestive, 
for there can be little doubt that he was impressed with the kind 
disposition of Whicbcote together with the emphasis in his writings 
upon natural "sympathy" toward virtue and benevolence. 5 
1Ibid., pp.12~f •. Austin, op. cit., p.70, observes that the 
Cambridge Platonists have been considered the founders of an "intell-
ectual" school in English ethics which extends from them through 
Clarke, Wollaston, Balguy and Price, to Reid and Stewart of the 
Scottish School and, rinally, to Martineau and others. 
2whichcote' s int'luence upon the "common sense" school or English 
ethicists may be traced through Shaftesbury, who was under a more 
direct inf.~luence of the Cambridge Platonists. Butler is an outstanding 
representative of the same ethical school. Cf. Stephen, o~. cit., II,15. 
3see Supra, Cb.I. 
4select Discourses, ~16~8), preface. Cf. Characteristics, l1723), 
II, so, 110, 311rr. passim. In these passages Sha~tesbury·attacks 
Hobbes. 
5Moral and Metaphysical Philosophy, II, 449ff. 
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Shaftesbury fixes his attention mainly upon man as a member of 
a good society and not upon theological subjects. He feels that 
religion of a proper sort plays an important part in turthering the 
realisation of his social ideal. According to Shaftesbury there are 
two affections which make us candidates for happiness or virtue. 
They are the "natural" or "public" affections, and the "self" or 
"private" affections, and when the two sets do not combine in 
comfortable alliance, this is because their subject has not under-
stood the meaning of good as it attains to rational beings. The 
balance between public and private affection is arrived at by "right 
reason". The morally good is beautifUl, and the morally bad is 
ugly and this awareness is immediate to our minds. The heart of 
man must be involved in a decision and it knows the "difference" 
between beauty and ugliness. 
involved in moral decisions. 1 
All the higher faculties of man are 
Whichcote' s sermons throw much light upon the thought of 
Shaftesbury and the "moral sense" school of ethicists. Whichcote 
distinguishes clearly between affections as such and the role of 
reason. He is more careful than Shaftesbury to reserve the office 
of making judgments in moral matters to reason. In Whichcote's 
analysis of moral action, it is reason that deliberates and the 
1characteristics, l1732), Vol.II, Bk.I, Pt.II, Sect.I; . 
Bk.II, Pt.I, Sect.I; Pt.II, Sect.I passim. Cf. Selby-Bigge, 
British Moralists, I, pp.4-65; De Pauley, Candle of the Lord, 
pp.18-20. 
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affections follow reason's decision.1 
Shaftesbury's divergence from Whichcote is more extreme than 
appears from a first comparison. However, it is not in psychological 
analysis but in theological principle that the real :difference lies -
in the question of the relation of morality and religion. To 
Whichcote morality and religion are interdependent. Shaftesbury's 
conclusion is favourable on the whole to religion, by which be means 
communion with Goa, he maintains that it is of value primarily because 
it helps to sustain the moral stability of the community. On the 
whole Shaftesbury seems to attempt to separate what Whichcote has 
conjoined since for Shaftesbury morality and religion are not 
necessarily united. According to Shaftesbury, if he must choose 
between religion and morality, he would take morality. 
"If we are told a Man is religious; we still ask 'What 
are his morals?' But if we hear at first that be has honest 
moral Principles, and is a Man of natural Justice and good 
Temper, we seldom think of the other Question, Whether he be 
religious and devout?"2 
Shaftesbury's influence can be seen in Alexander Pope's poetry 
1cuaworth's moral psychology is closer to Shaftesbury's than 
Whichcote 's, see Supra, Ch. IX. Cf. De Pauley, op. cit. , :PP• 20-229 
Whicbcote, Works, II, 395, for Whichcote's view of the beauty of 
the good life. 
2"An Inquiry Concerning Virtue", Characteristics l1723), Vol. II, 
Bk.I, Pt.I, Sect.I, p.6; Cf. De Pauley, op. cit., ~p~22ff. ~or an 
account of Shaftesbury's notion of the value of religious belief to 
the good life, see Shaftesbury,~·, Pt.III, Sect.III{ pp.52-76 
passim. For a comparison of Whichcote and Shaftesbury a view 
concerning the nature of happiness here and hereafter, see De Pauley, 
op. cit., pp.23-26; Cf. Shaftesbury, "The Moralists", op. cit., Pt.II, 
Sect.I, pp.221ff.-245 passim. 
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and in Butler's theology. Moat British ethical writers since his 
time are related to him either by sympathy or opposition. He was 
profoundly influenced by Whichcote and disciples and for all his 
sceptical tendencies, which prevented him from being a true disciple 
to the school, their spirit permeates his pages. 1 In spite of his 
being Locke's pupil, he bas more in common, morally speaking, with 
Whichcote than with Locke. 2 In a real sense, Shaftesbury is a 
bridge between Whichcote's thought, especially bis moral theory, 
and the future British moralists. 
The thought of Butler is in many ways a continuation of 
Shaftesbury's thought. 3 But there are ways in which Butler is 
Wbicbcote's successor more than Clarke or Shaftesbury. This is 
particularly true of Butler's views concerning the relation of nature 
and grace and morality and religion. 4 Butler in his age as Whichcote 
1stephen, op. cit., II, 24; ct·. Oman, op. cit., pp.99ff. 
2Maurice, op. cit., II, 449. Cf. Austin, op. cit., pp.81-82; 
Laird, Hobbes, p.283; Willey, op. cit., pp.61-75; Martineau, op. cit., 
II, 448-473; Whichcote, Select Aphorisms, (1822), p.22. Cassirer 
who stresses the influence of the Cambridge Platonists not only upon 
British, but also upon German rationalism and aesthetics, conceives 
this influence as being transmitted mainly by Shaftesbury, see 
op. cit., pp.160ff. 
3:For an account of their agreements and differences, see Stephen, 
op. cit., II, pp.16, 28, 46f. 
4According to Scott, there is a close connection between Cudworth, 
Clarke end Butler, see An Introduction to Cudworth's Treatise Concerning 
Eternal end Immutable Morality, pp.59-61. Whichcote certainly belongs 
to the aame--nioral and religious tradition and is in many ways the 
founder of it. 
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in his, had the serious intention of developing an apology for 
Christianity.
1 
The agreement between Whichcote and Butler may be 
explained in part by the common source of their inspiration and their 
similar apologetic intention, while their differences appear to stem 
from the different circumstances giving rise to their systems as 
well as by the intervening development of t bought. 
The main thesis of the Analogl is summed up in Butler's 
quotation from Origen, that "he who believes the Scripture to have 
proceeded from him who is the Author of Nature, may well expect to 
find the same sort of difficUlties in it, as are found in the 
constitution of nature". 2 Thus Butler is concerned with the God 
of Revelation as being identical with the God of Nature in the same 
way in which Whichcote speaks of the same God as Creator and Redeemer -
"the God 01· Nature is the Giver of Grace". 3 But whereas Whichcote 
is conrident that God may be known in both instances as moral 
perfection and the highest Intelligence, Butler attempts to show that 
Nature and Revelation are both baffling and that as such they appear 
to be the product of the same mind. Butler, then, finds a place 
4 for revelation, but only by showing it to be as perplexing as nature. 
Passing from Whichcote through Locke, Clarke and Shaftesbury to Butler, 
we move from an optimistic to a relatively pessimistic theory of the 
1cf. Willey, op. cit., pp.76f. 
2Quoted by Butler, Analogy l1764), p.v. 3 Supra, Cb.VI. 




world. Many of the self-evident truths of Whichcote have become 
for Butler probabilities only. 
Although in his theological views, Butler in many ways resembles 
Whichcote, it is in Butler's ethical thought that he resembles 
Whichcote most. As a matter of fact, Butler seems best known by 
his ethical views1 and it is in this area that he appears as a real 
successor of Whichcote. He raises the question as to the real 
nature 01· man. Like Whichcote he finds man to be the crown of 
creation. Butler discovers in man a reflective faculty which he 
call'3 conscience and this faculty t'or him as for Wbichcote is the 
2 final authority in all moral decisions, it is the "very voice of God". 
·As far as Butler's concepts of the nature and role of conscience, the 
subordination of passions and human moral responsibility are 
concerned, he appears to have been anticipated by Whichcote. But 
Butler bas obviously given reason a subordinate position to bis 
concept or conscience. It appears that the fUnction of reason as 
conceived by Wbichcote bas been given over to the "Faculty of 
3 Conscience" by Butler. 
4 
In bis view of a natural principle of benevolence in man , Butler 
reminds us of Whichcote and Shaftesbury. Butler conceives the 
11.Q!£., pp.76-94. 
2Butler, sermons, t1749), ~· i-iii, See esp. Ser. i, p.13. 
3Butler, works, (1836), II, Preface, p.xiv; ~· vi, p.80; 
Ser. ii, pp.33, 34 passim. 
4Butler, Sermons, t1749), ~· i, pp.6f. 
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the disposition to friendship, compassion and filial afrection as 
benevolence. And wh t erever his tendency is present, even in a very 
low degree, the possibility of growth in mutual helpfu.lness is preaent. 1 
Butler like Whichcote and Shaftesbury conceives the possession or this 
natural spirit of benevolence a responsibility to contribute to the 
"publick Good u. 2 
Conscience is enthroned by Butler above natural self-love and 
benevolence. He exalts conscience and thus illustrates the dogma 
of the common sense school or moralists. Butler remains, however, 
in a practical sense the deepest moralist of the century. But he 
attempts to absorb nature in God as revealed in conscience, instead 
of absorbing God in nature. Butler and Whichcote are agreed that 
each man is a law unto himself - a little kingdom in himself, with a 
constitution of divine origin. 3 In spite or Butler's concealment 
or- his religion as a moralist, it appears that he has succeeded in 
building morality upon a supernatural principle in the make-up of 
human nature. Thus for Butler no less than for Whichcote, religion 
and ethics are a unity. The reverence Butler expects us to pay to 
1rbid. , pp. 9ff. 
2rbid., p.10. Cf. Whichcote's reflections on the same subject, 
Supra, Chs. v, VII. However, ,Butl~r~ s views concerning '_'self-love" • 
have no parallel in Whicbcote s writings, see Butler, Ibid., pp.12f., 
Cf. Ser. xi, p.203. The closest Whichcote approaches Butler on this 
subject is when he asserts that immortality.is unnatural and self-
destructive The positive corollary to this would be very close to 
Butler's sp~eal to self-interest or "self-love". 
3stephen, op. cit., II, 54-56. 
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conscience is the kind that moat men will only accord to something 
other than themselves.1 w 
e conclude that on many fundamentals in 
religion and ethics, Butler and Whichcote are in essential accord, 
but that much of the self-confident intellectualism of Whichcote 
is absent from Butler's thought. 
Since Whichcote was just as anxious to assert the authority of 
Scripture concerning truths of after-revelation as the authority 
of reason concerning truths of first-inscription, be contributes to 
the Scripturalism as well as the Rationalism of the eighteenth 
century. By the middle of the eighteenth century, reaction against 
dogmatic theology was partly occasioned by a growing desire to 
base religious belief on Scripture alone; and to keep strictly to its 
literal teaching. It is obvious that this is a perversion of the 
original intention of men like Chillingworth and Whicbcote, by 
taking one side of their teaching and over-emphasising it. In the 
case of Chillingworth and Wbicbcote, the role of reason is emphasised 
even in the interpretation of Scripture. Whicbcote points out that 
"Determinations beyond Scripture have ••••• enlarged faith, but lessened 
Charity, and multiplied Divisions"2 , but in his writing, quotations 
lwilley, op. cit., pp.93f. Cf. Butler's epitaph lin Bristol 
Cathedral), cited by Willey, lJ?.!Q., p.76; c1·. Stephen, op. cit., I, 
281-307; II, 47-56; Oman, op. cit., pp.118-127; Butler, "Of the 
Nature of' Virtue", Dissertation, II in ~12&, tl 764), pp. 344-356. 
Butler, together with the Cambridge Platonists, conceived Hobbes aa 
his opponent, see Laird, op. cit., pp.283f. 
2whichcote, Aph. 981; Cf. Ibid. 1161. For a fuller discussion 
of the Cambridge Platonists upon Scripturalism in the eighteenth century 
see Powicke, op. cit. , pp. 206f:t'. Powicke is no doubt correct when J:ie 
asserts that Wbicbcote and his school would have been driven to similar 
conclusions to those of the Scripturalists if they had tried to work 
out their reading of the New Testament into a system. 
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from Scripture and the Platonists stand side by aide. Whichcote 
was not 8 "mere Scripturalist", this is the basis of much of 
Tuckney's dissatisfaction with Whichcote's views. Thus, by 
including the unquestioned authority of Scripture in his concept 
of reason Whichcote may be said to have contributed to the Scriptur-
alism of the following century, but the movement drifts far from his 
original intention. 
Our final concern in this chapter is with Whichcote's contri-
bution to subsequent Christian Platonism. In this tradition the 
work of Norris appears of great importance. 1 
Norris shows no acquaintance with Whichcote or Smith. He 
quotes from Cudworth once or twice, but there is nothing to prove 
his indebtedness to him, though Norris appears to have corresponded 
with Cudworth' s daughter. More was the one member of the school he 
corresponded with and greatly admired. Through his correspondence 
1Norris' basic agreement with the Cambridge Platonists was as 
follows: l1) Platonic love; {2) Reverence for reason; t3) The use 
of reason in the service of religion; t4) His dislike of Calvinism; 
t 5) His insistence upon the ethical side of religicn; l 6) His view 
that orthodoxy of judgment is necessary only in fundamentals; {7) His 
attachment to the Church of England; and l8) His general indifference 
to politics. Powicke, Ibid., pp.126-32. 
Concerning the work of Jobn Sergeant or Cambridge and Arthur 
Collier or Oxford, see Muirhead, The Platonic Tradition in Anglo-
Saxon Philosoph.y, pp.72f. Although there appears to be no direct 
relation between Berkeley and the Cambridge Platonists, his work 
entitled Siris, places him in the Christian Platonic tradition with 
them. All we can say is that Berkeley like the Cambridge Platonists 
is a great foe of scepticism, atheism and materialism, and in so far 
as he goes to Plato for his inspiration he uses a common source with 
the Cambridge men. Cf. Seth, op. cit., pp.123-128. 
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with More is seen his points of agreement with the Cambridge School. 
In his spirit of tolerance and his use of reason Norris resembles 
Whic hcote most. He is in essential agreement with Whichcote as to 
the basis and scope of religious toleration. Like Whichcote, Norris 
condemned Papists and Dissenters alike. Norris did not consider 
differences important enough to justify separation and at the same 
time he asserted that men should have the freedom to think freely 
unless they disturb the public. 1 But his tolerant spirit, as also 
Whicbcote's, is based upon his belief that religion is rational and 
that all things saving are evident to reason. Norris says: 
"Since our Religion is so Reasonable a Service, 'twill 
follow hence, in the first place, that there may be a due 
exercise and use of reason in Divine matters; and that what-
soever is apparently (i.e. clearly) contrary to Reason ought 
not to be observed as of Di vine Authority, not to be accounted 
as any part of the Christian Religion ••••• 'Twill follow, 
secondly, that no man ought to be Persecuted, or have external 
violence done him for his Religion, supposing that by overt 
acts he gives no disturbance to the public. For, since God 
bas required nothing of us but what is agreea.ble to our Reason, 
why should man? 11 2 
This entire passage might well have been extracted from Whicbcote's 
writings. This appears to be explained by Norris' indebtedness to 
More. In 1684, Norris confessed that he had read all More's works -
t bus More was one medium through which Plato's influence reached 
lrbid., pp.131f. 




It is obvious that the version of Platonism absorbed in 
Norris' writings is that set forth by the Christian Platonists of 
Cambridge under the leadership of Whichcote. 
This consideration of the thought of Norris as a Christian 
Platonist is sufficient for our purpose, and we may pass at once to 
the t bought of' S. T. Coleridge. At Jesus College, Cambrieg e, in 
1791, Coleridge encountered Platonic philosophy. It was revived 
by Thomas Taylor at the time of Coleridge's sojourn there. Coleridge 
became acquainted with the writings of Whichcote and his disciples 
and found an affinity in their writings with what he had learned from 
Plato and Plotinus and this helped to deepen his mystic strain. 2 
1IQ.iQ.., pp.126f. Lovejoy's essay in which he compares the 
thought of Cudworth, Norris and Collier with the so-called Neo-
Kantians, i.e., T.H. Green, J. Royce, F.H. Bradley and others, is 
interesting. He dares to suggest that Cudworth anticipated Kant and 
much of the material which they claim to have received from Kant might 
well have been derived from the English idealists of the seventeenth 
century. See o. Lovejoy, "Kant and the English Platonists", ~says 
Philosophical and Psychological in Honour of William James, pp.265-302. 
A similar position is taken by James Mackintosh, Discourse on the 
Progress of Ethical Philosophy, p.142. The same position is implied 
in Muirhead's Platonic Tradition in Anglo-Saxon Philosop~. The 
work begins with the Cambridge Platonists and ends with American 
idealism, i.e. Royce. Muirhead dares to refer to Cudworth as the 
founder of British Idealism, see Ibid., p.35. This tendency to imply 
the influence of the Cambridge Platonists upon Neo-Kantianism and even 
upon Kant himself bas been convincingly criticised by Austin, op. cit., 
pp.83f.; Scott, op. cit., pp.62ff.; Martinea~, op, cit., II, ~p.396ff. 
The evidence is practically balanced on both sides. However, since 
Whichcote was not a systematic philosopher, the problem does not 
deserve further consideration. Whichcote is involved only indirectly 
in so far as he contributes to the idealism of Cudworth. 
2Muirhead, Coleridge as Philosopher, pp.38f., 97. 
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The distinction between Understanding and Reason was applied by 
him to all subjects of philosophical enquiry. Plato and the 
Cambridge Platonista greatly influenced him though Kant confirmed 
and gave more definite form to his distinction between discursive 
reason and the intuitive exercise of the faculty. 1 Seth observes 
that even though Coleridge derived his distinction between Reason 
and Understanding from Kant, his debt to Kant seems to include 
primarily a means of stating scientifically convictions previously 
attained. Further, as he applies Kant's theory be does not 
distinguish clearly between the speculative and practical reason, it 
is, however, the latter rather than the former that he regards as 
the organ of spiritual vision. God, the soul, and. eternal truths 
are for Coleridge the objects of reason and are themselves reason. 
Practical reason becomes synonymous with faith - fidelity to our 
being so far as such being is not and cannot become an object of 
2 
the senses. 
According to Coleridge, knowing in terms of togetherness is what 
is meant by reason in religion and ethics. Reason is the organ of 
the supersensuous while Understanding is the faculty by which we 
generalise and arrange the phenomena of perception. Reason is the 
law of the whole considered as one, Understanding is the science of 
phenomena. Reason seeks ultimate ends, Understanding studies means. 
1rbid., pp.65ff., 83, 95, 97, 113ff., 116ff., 234. 
2seth, op. cit., pp.320-27. Cf. ~oleridge! Aids t~ Refle~tion, 
Aphorisms, x,II,VII. Though Coleridge s t~o m~in doctrin~s, vi~. the 
distinction between Imagination and Fancy in BiograBhia Literaria and 
between Reason and Understanding in Aid~ t~ Re~ection are interrelated, 
we are only concerned with the latter distinction here. 
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Reason is the source and substance of truth above sense; Understanding 
judges according to sense. 
Reason is the eye of the spirit, the 
faculty whereby spiritual reality is spiritually discerned; Under-
standing is the mind of the flesh. Understanding is necessarily 
used for measurement, analysis, classification and the other 
processes Of natural science, and it controls our lives on the 
practical routine level. It begins to err when it encroaches on the 
sphere where Reason alone is valid, that is, when it pretends to 
erect its limited theories into absolute laws, mistaking a technique 
of experiment or method of classification for an exhaustive account 
of reality. This happened in the eighteenth century in the "godless 
revolution" of materialism, determinism, atheism and utilitarianism. 1 
Coleridge uses the certainties of Plato, of Christianity and 
German idealism (together with his own insights) to op~ose the 
eighteenth century tradition, just as Whichcote and his disciples use 
1Willey, Nineteenth Century Studies, pp.28f. Cf. Seth, op. cit., 
pp.320f.; Whewell, Lectures on the History of Moral Philosophy, p.122. 
According to Whewell, Coleridge's distinction in kind between Reason 
and Understanding is untenable. He asserts that the verb to reason is 
always employed to designate the discursive or ratiocinative operations 
of the mind while the verb to understand implies a fixed contemplation. 
Thus Coleridge's view is neither good English nor good philosophy, 
for Coleridge describes the understanding as the faculty which judges 
according to sense obtaining truth by generalising from experience·, 
while he conceives Reason as observing Truth by intuition. Cf. Whewell, 
Ibid., pp.119-130; Coleridge, op. cit., Aphorism VIII. It seems fair 
to conclude that however conrusing Coleridge's language may be, his 
intention is clear. He desires to purify the term Reason as applied 
to the supreme spiritual and moral faculty of man. Thus in intention 
he is perhaps closer to Whichcote than to any other member of the 
Cambridge Platonist school. 
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Platonism and Christianity against Hobbes. Coleridge sought to 
combine the Platonic theory of the world and a voluntaristic theory 
of being and of knowledge, largely Kantian, with a psychology 
essentially his own. By shifting the emphasis from God as Being or 
Substance to God as Will, he was able to vindicate the practical 
nature of religion, which was later to become the keynote of the 
treatment of it by British and American idealists, i.e. F. H. Bradley .• 
Josiah Royce, and to identify faith and fidelity with conscience and 
the indications of the will of God upon earth as rationally inter-
preted, instead or with belief in any system or doctrine. In a 
real sense, both Plato and Kant were his mastera. 1 
For Coleridge as for Whichcote, theology and ethics belong to 
the sphere of reason. Reason according to Coleridge discerns the 
necessary laws and postulates of the moral life, for it includes the 
conscience or moral sense, which is the chief witness of spiritual 
realities. By means of this distinction, Coleridge is able, at 
once, to attack the so-called "rationalists" {a word, he thinks, has 
been debased in meaning) and to refer approvingly to the "rational 
theologians" of the seventeenth century. Their Reason according to 
Coleridge was Reason indeed, for it was a raculty independent of 
sense, and linked with the Will; in the eighteenth century "raison" 
1Muirhead, op. cit., pp.254f.; Cf. Rigg, Modern Anglican 
Theologz, ( 1859), pp. 8-32. 
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had invaded regions beyond its competence. 1 
Coleridge seems to 
deserve the position of a reviver of many of the same insights in the 
nineteenth century which were revived by Whichcote in the seventeenth. 
The insights were eclipsed during the Age of Reason and thus 
Coleridge's significance in tracing the subsequent influence of 
Whichcote and his school is the · t 2 more impor ant. 
From Coleridge we may pass t F o • D. Maurice. In a statement 
by Maurice we perceive, at once, the contribution of Coleridge to 
the forward advance o:t' Christian Platonism and the trend of 
Maurice's own t bought. Maurice gives Coleridge credit for "the 
power of perceiving that by the very law of Reason the knowledge of 
God must be 'given' to it; that the· moment it attempts to create its 
Maker, it denies itself ••••• u3 Maurice constantly protested against 
being identified with any party. He stood in a relation to the 
parties of the Church of bis day in a position analogous to that of 
the Cambridge Platonists in relation to the Laudians, Puritans and 
1willey, op. cit., pp.33f. It is of interest that Coleridge 
chose to call his insights in Aids to Reflection "aphorisms", the very 
term made famous by Whicbcote in the seventeenth century. This implies 
literary as well as thought affinity between them.. One wonders if in 
fact Coleridge conceived this term by a study of Whichcote's writings. 
2cf. Muirhead, The Platonic Tradition, p.125. ·Muirhead calls 
Coleridge the reviver of the Platonic tradition and the founder of 
nineteenth century Idealism in England. Earlier in the same work 
tp.35) he claims for Cudworth the position of the real founder of 
British Idealism. If this observation is correct, the relation between 
Cudworth and Coleridge is obvious. This would mean also that the 
relation between Whichcote and Coleridge is unquestioned since that 
which, idealistically speaking, is explicit in Cudwortb's writings is 
implicit in Whicbcote's. 
3The Kingdom of Christ, l 1883), I, xxv. 
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. 1 
Sectaries. Maurice, by virtue of his affinity with his master, 
Coleridge, was 8 Platonist as opposed to an Aristotelian and has 
been regarded by his opponents as a Neo-Platonist. 2 He was kept 
from a strictly mystical view by his strong conviction ·of the 
necessity of an historical element in theology. 3 This position 
is akin to the Cambridge Platonists, for Whichcote insisted on the 
fact of the Incarnation and More, the most mystical member of the 
school, defends the Incarnation against its subordination in early 
Quakerism. 
Dr. c. E. Raven refers to Maurice as one of the most important 
and prophetic English Christiana in the nineteenth century. He 
lived and thought against an.eternal background and all hie thought 
and experience was conditioned by his conviction of the universality 
of Christ and of the unity of all men. His faith is vindicated by 
social action and noteworthy philanthropy. He was ·haunted by a 
desire for unity in Church and State all his days. While he appeared 
to those who liked logical statements of dogma as heretical, yet as a 
prophet bis work lives. 4 Maurice was deprived of his chair at King's 
1Leslie Stephen's art. in D.N.B., Vol.XIII, pp.104f. 
2i<igg, op. cit. , pp. 115-214. Cf. Candlish, "Professor Maurice 
and His Writings", L. Q. R. , Vol. III, No. VI, ( 1855), PP• 393-436; 
Sanders, Coleridge and the Broad Church Movement, pp.14f. 
3Cf. Raven, Natural Religion and Christian ~heolo~, II, 214. 
See also A.:M. Ramsey, F.D. Maurice and the conflicts of Modern TheologY, 
pp.58-71. 
4rbid., p.213. This tribute to Maurice might almost be applied 
to Whic hcote as it stands. 
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College, London, nominally on theological grounds but actually 
because of his Christian Socialism. 1 It appears that it was the 
social implications of his theology that led to his dismissal. He 
maintained the Johannine view of eternal life, that is, he conceived 
judgment as a process worldng here and now and immortality in 
relationship rather than duration. 2 As a corollary he conceived 
salvation as beginning in the present life and Christian social 
action as a duty. 
A close observation of the life and thought of Maurice reminds 
us of Whichcote: his moderate theological position, desire for 
toleration in Church and State, Platonic sympathies, deep spirituality, 
social consciousness, Johannine view of salvation and eternal life 
and "dynamic" application of' the doctrine of the atonement in the 
experience or mankind. Especially in his zeal for Christian social 
action Maurice appears to carry forward the implications of 
Whicbcote 's life and thought. This notion of justifying faith 
by works is a mark of Cambridge Platonism. Even Henry More, the 
most introverted and mystical member of the school, extended a 
helping band to the "poor and needy" who sought him out in his 
academic retreat. For Maurice, as for John Smith, Whicbcote's 
closest disciple, theology is a "divine life" rather than a "divine 
1Ibid. , P• 2. 
2Ibid., pp.187f. Cf. Jn. 3:19, 17. 
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science 11 • 1 Inge says: 
"There was at camb id 
Platonists, not ver u r. ge a hundred years ago, a society of 
~'. D. Maurice came ;nd~li~~ t~e group gathered around Whichcote. 
them was led to stud Crl ~ influence of these men, and through Y o eridge." 
He continues: 
"Mauri · 
0 ce i~ per~aps at his best as an interpreter of St. ~ ru:ai~o~gh he is chiefly remembered as the leader of a Christian 
.oci is mov~ment. These interests led him back from the relig-
ious ~nd mystical Platonism which had mainly interested the 
Ca.m?r7dge gr~up in the seventeenth century, to the practical and 
pol1 ti cal philosophy of Plato himself ••••. 112 
In some ways Bishop Westcott may be considered a follower of 
Maurice. Westcott had a natural sympathy for Johannine theology, 
1
smi th, "Of Divine Knowledge", op. cit. , p.1. Cf. Maurice, 
Moral and Metaphysical Philosoptm, II, 350; The Kingdom of Christ, 
II, 6-8, 193ff.; Raven, Christian Socialism, 1848-1854, pp.78-82. 
~Inge, The Platonic Tradition in England, pp.96f. It is obvious 
I believe, that even the social consciousness and action of Maurice is 
present in Whichcote's life and thought though not in the same degree. 
Inge numbers Wordsworth, Shelley, Coleridge and Rusldn among what he 
calls the "personal Platonists". Willey, op. cit., pp.53:t'., considers 
Thomas Arnold as a successor of Whichcote and one who echoed in his 
whole life the exclamation of Wbichcote: "Give me a religion that 
doth attain real e:rfects". Arnold stands in a succession which descends 
from Hooker, through the Cambridge Platonists to Coleridge, and leads 
through Maurice to William Temple. Cf. Stanley's~ of Arnold, l1835) 
II, 13, cited by Willey, Ibid., p.53. In Arnold's concept of" the "end" 
of the Church as that 01· "putting down of moral evil" and its "nature", 
a loving society of all Christians, he reflected in his l i1'e and 
thought the spirit of Whichcote. Matthew Arnold, according to Willey, 
is akin in spirit to the same succession as his father, Thomas Arnold. 
Matthew Arnold, in ract, was trying to do for the nineteenth cen"bJ.ry 
what Whichcote attempted to do in the seventeenth, viz. "to preserve 
a spirit of piety and rationa~ religioz;" in oprrosi tion ~o the "f~natic 
enthusiasm and senseless canting then in vogue. Cf. Willey, Ibid., 
pp.266f. It is understandable that Matthew Arnold should have written 
an introduction to a work edited by W. M. Metca11·e, entitled The 
Cambridge Platonists, t 1885 ). 
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and wrote a well-known commentary on the 
Fourth Gospel. But what 
concerns us most is Westcott's collected 
volume of essays called 
Religious Thought in the West. 
This work is described by Inge as 
"an excellent treatise on orthodox Christian Platonism". 1 It begins 
with the myths of Plato and ends with an essay on Whichcote. After 
one reads this work there can be little doubt concerning Westcott's 
relation to Whichcote, for they clearly stand in the same stream of 
Christian Platonism. 2 
In Westcott's book, The Historic Faith, his view of eternal life 
is Johannine recalling similar statements in the writings of Whichcote. 
Whichcote considers the future life different only in degree from 
the present. Eternal life is for Whichcote a "quality" o:r life 
beginning with the first stages of salvation and progressing henceforth 
so that the life hereafter is simply "more of the same thing". 
Wes.tcott says: 
"Eternal life then is that knowledge of God which is 
communion with Him; it 'is' not something fUture but absolute; 
it is in realisation: it answers to a divine fellowship which 
issues in perfect unity ••••• Eternal life is not something fUture: 
it 'is', it is now. It lies in .a relation to God through Christ. 
The manif'estation 01· the life is con:rined and veiled by the 
circumstances of our present condition, but the life is actua~. 
It a oes not depend !'or its essence upon any external change." 
1rnge, ~·, pp.97f. 
2cr. Westcott, Religious Thought in the West, p.357 passim. 
3cited by Inge, op. cit., pp.103f. Inge commen~s that ~his . 
language about eternal lit'e, as a higher plane of ex~stence :-nto which 
we may pass here and now, is so m~ch the_ hall-mark of Platonism that 
it is needless to expatiate upon it. Ibid.' p.10~. 
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Archbishop William Temple, it seems to me, deserves brief 
attention as standing in the Christian Platonic succession with 
Whichcote. When Temple asserts that the God who reveals Himself in 
the most exceptional occurrences, is revealed as the ultimate Lord 
of a+l occurrences, we are reminded of Whichcote's doctrine of 
revelation. 1 Temple says: 
"Unless all existence is a medium of revel at ion, no 
particular revelation is poasible ••••• Either all occurrences 
are in some degree revelation of God, or else there is no 
such revelation at all; for the conditions of the possibility 
of any revelation require that there should be nothing which 
is not revelation. Only if God is revealed in the rising of 
the sun in the sky can He §e revealed in the rising of the 
son of man from the a ead." 
Temple's general assertion that God reveals Himself in nature 
but that the main field of revelation must always be in the history 
of men3 reminds us of Whichcote's notion that the "reason of man is 
the candle of the Lord" as well as his view of providential history. 
Further Temple reminds us of Whichcote .when he insists that "faith 
is not the holding of correct doctrines, but personal fellowship 
with God. 4 
As we pass. on to Dean Inge, the name of Charles Bigg deserves 
1Ct'. Temple, Nature, Man and_.QQQ., pp.304f., 314. See Supra, Ch.VI. 
2Ibid. , p. 306. 
3Ibid. , p. 305; Cf. Supra, Chs. IV-;-VI. 
4Ibid., pp.321f. Temple places himselr_in.th? Christian 
Pl t ~radition by his work Plato and Christianity. It ~ppears 
baionicthat he stands in the same tradition with the Cambridge 
~l!t~~~sts and receives his inspiration from a common source. 
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to be mentionea. 1 
Inge's own affinity with Christian Platonism 
which flows through Whichcote, his disciples and successors is 
obvious. Inge's tolerant spir·t · · . 
l is evident in his quotation from 
Ignatius as follows: "Christ Himself levelled almost all barriers 
by ignoring them". 2 
Inge praises Christian Platonic thought, some-
times referred to by him as "Johannine" for the following reasons: 
first, in it the centre of gravity shifts from authority to experience3 , 
and secondly, it is a faith which need not be afraid of scientific 
progress. This school has no need of the dualism of the natural and 
supernatural which is wholly unacceptable to science. 4 
Inge conceives the Platonic tradition in the Church as an 
influence for good in its moral and spiritual life. All his commit-
ment to this type of Christianity is unwavering. 5 He commends 
highly the works of Whichcote, Smith, Cudworth and Culverwel, and is 
1
Inge says, op. cit., p.104, that Bigg belongs to the Christian 
Platonic tradition and in his Bampton Lectures on the Alexandrian 
Fathers he did much to awake the public interest in this type of 
theology. His sermons and addresses show that his personal religion 
belonged to the same type as that of Bishop Westcott. 
2Inge, Ibid. 3Ibid., pp.113f. 
4Ibid., pp.115f. This seems to be the main point at which Dr. 
C.E. RBVeii aligns himself with the Christian Platonic tradition, i.e. 
early Logos-theology, the Cambridge Platon~s~s and othe:s •. His 
volume "Science and Religion", Natural Religion and ChrlStian Theology, 
Vol.I, is a noteworthy attempt to prove that there is no conflict 
between nature and grace. Here he devotes a chapter to Cudworth and 
kindred minds who had a constructive influence upon modern scientific 
advance. Cf. Supra, Ch.IX. For Raven as for Whichcote the God of 
Nature is the Giver of Grace. 
5Ibid. , pp.116f. 
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convinced that anyone who read 
s the works of the first two named will 
"gain a lasting benefit in the deepening of his spiritual life and 
the heightening of his fai th".1 Inge ,
8 
i t d ti 
n ro uc on to his 1930 
edition of Whichcote's ARhorisms is instructive. What Inge says in 
this introduction indicates, at once, his indebtedness to Whichcote 
and his high estimation of the value of his thought for modern 
readers. Inge traces for us the influence of tbe Cambridge 
Platonists as follows: 
says: 
"The influence of the Cambridge school did not die with 
them. _Althou~h.the 18th Century was very unfavourable to 
Pla~onic mysticism, William Law ••••• was a kindred spirit ••••• 
A lit~le late7, no one can doubt that Coleridge and Wordsworth 
were in the line of succession from the Platonista of the 
Renaissance, nor that Maurice and Westcott ••••• were of the 
same brotherhood."2 
Concerning the relevance of their thought for the present, Inge 
"I believe our age has much to learn from this Cambridge 
group ••••• This type 01· Churcbrnanship may, I think, be a recon-
ciling Principle between Catholics and Protestants, going back 
to the Alexandrian and Cappadocian Fathers, and further still 
to St. Paul and St. John, is catholic without being Latin ••••• 
It may also be a vitalising princiEle, for we are in need of a 
spiritual and idealistic revival." 
1christian Mysticism, p.287. 
2whichcote, Aphorisms {1930), Intro. by Inge, pp.ixf. 
3rbid., p.x. Cf. Christian Mysticism, Loe. cit.; The Philosop]lY 
of Plotinus, II, 227f. By comparison Inge appears more mystical than 
Whichcote though they have much in common. Inge's mysticism like Which-
cote' s is a "practical" mysticism. Raven considers W.R. Inge as a rep-
resentative of British "modernism". Raven, op. cit., II, 6f. It would 
appear, then, that the roots of.this modern~am might reach back to 
Whichcote and bis disciples. Willey, Olh cit. , PP• 266f. calla Matt hew 
Arnold the "founder" of English modernism but insists that Arnold gets 
his inspiration from the Cambridge Platonists. 
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Taking all the facts into account, Dr. c. E. Raven appears to be 
the most recent exponent of the total view of Whichcote and bis school. 
It is important that we should quote a statement from him which 
significantly designates Whichcote, his disciples and immediate success-
ors as the fomiders of British "liberalism". Raven says: 
"In Britain theological liberalism derives not from the 
'enlightenment' of the eighteenth century, from Voltaire and his 
disciples, but from an older and more august ancestry, the 
Cambridge Platonists or 'Latitude-men' of the seventeenth cen-
tury, who broke away from the Calvinism of the Puritans and the 
Catholicism of Archbishop Laud and appealed to the Fourth Gospel 
and the Greek theologians of Alexandria on behalf of a reasonable 
faith. s. T. Coleridge, Thomas Erskine or Linlatben, F. D. 
Maurice and the liberal or broad-church movement in England and 
Scotland carried on this tradition which has always been independi 
ent of Continental liberalism, even when it has owed much to it." 
It appears fair ~o conclude that the spirit of Whichcote, one of 
the foremost rational theologians of his day, whom Shaftesbury 
described as "a philosopher of good-nature", lives to this day in 
British modernism and liberalism. His spirit may be said to have 
its effect wherever there is liberty of comprehension of religious 
lmowledge and where religion has "real efrects" being, conceived as 
a "di vine life" rather than merely a "di vine science"• 
1Raven, op. cit., p.6. 
CHAPTER ELEVEN 
EPILEGOMENA 
In conclusion we shall consider Whichcote's lasting contribution 
to theology: the preservation and development of the characteristic 
Greek and Fla.tonic ideas which figured largely in the formulation 
of early Christian theology and which have been so seriously mia-
1 
understood by Nee-Orthodox theologians. Inge and Raven, I believe, 
are right in insisting upon the permanent value of this element in 
Christian thinking. 2 Raven believes Neo-Orthodoxy to be in error 
both historically and theologically in contrasting Hebrew and Greek 
and disregarding the latter. 3 Whichcote rinds a complementary 
relationship between these strands and transmits the best of both. 
Dr. H. H. Farmer calls our attention to the criticisms which any 
Christian philosopher may expect. He is exposed to criticism from 
two flanks: on the one hand, he is attacked by dogmatic theologians 
who question his use and interpretation of some Christian dogma, and 
even may assert that he has surrendered its essential import 
1Here we have in mind not only Karl Barth but Reinhold Niebuhr 
and his colleagues. Cf. Raven, Natural Science and Christian Theology, 
II, 82ff. See also, L.H. DeWolf, The Religious Revolt Against Reason. 
This is an invaluable treatment or the role of reason in the compre-
hension of religious knowledge as viewed in the light of present 
theological discussion. It would appear that more objective validity 
should be ascribed to DeWolf's examination of this problem in the 
present context {viz., Whichcote's thought) than to that of either Inge 
or Raven since DeWolf's position is farther from Whichcote and closer 
to Neo-Orthodoxy. 
2cf. Inge, The Platonic Tradition, Preface. 
~aven, The Theological Basis of Pacifism, pp.1-18. 
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altogether, on the other hand, he exposes himself to attacks from 
philosophers, who with a different set of presuppositions, will be 
1 quick to discern the insu:rriciencies of' his argument. Whichcote 
has always been under attack from these two flanks. For instance, 
Tuckney questioned the authenticity of his theology and Locke built 
his epistemology on the ruins or Whichcote's concept of a priori. 
One main reason, it seems to me, why Whichcote's thought has not 
received the treatment it deserves either by his contemporaries or 
successors, is that neither philosophers of the first rank nor 
orthodox theologians have been willing to consider his thought as 
valid. Thus, it is our purpose to bring to focus the real merit of 
his thought in the light of this study. In this chapter we pres~nt 
a critical examination of three notions central to Whichcote's 
message as a rational theologian. They are: (1) The harmony of 
faith and reason; l2) The inseparability of religion and morality; 
and (3) Christian tolerance. 
Whichcote's attempt to harmonise faith and reason is a signifi-
cant milestone in the history of religious thought. For him, reason 
is above rationalism: it includes intellectual effort, but it is 
2 mainly an inner experience or the whole man acting in harmony. But 
he has no illusions concerning man's excellency or in:t'allibili ty; on 
the contrary, he insists on the frequent degeneracy of reason as well 
1Farmer, Revelation and Religion, p.18. 
2 Inge, Ibid.' pp.4Y, 65. 
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as will. Yet he is far from any assertion of total depravity or 
the complete helplessness or man's judgment, and he is eager to 
urge the use of whatever degree of reason man possesses or still 
retains. Although he exalts the power of reason, he does not show 
the slightest tendency towards naturalism. Reason is for him the 
power of the human mind, but it is not merely a natura.l power, it is 
also in some sense supernatural; it is a divine revelation, not 
simply the means by which man reaches t·orward to the knowledge or God; 
reason is also the means by which God comes down into the life of 
man; it is a direct seizure by the mind of the truth of certain 
supreme principles; it is not merely a discursive, but also an 
intuitive, faculty; its intuitions have authority more final than 
the arguments of the discursive reason and need no experimental 
verification; it is the gift of God and His very voice1 ; it 
discovers the natural and receives the supernatural: that is, it 
passively receives revealed truth, but it actively assimilates and 
transmits this truth. The reason of man is the candle of the Lord, 
lighted by God and lighting unto God. 
Involved in what Whichcote bas to say concerning reason are 
his doctrines or God and man: God is man's Creator and Redeemer: 
man is made in the image of God. The theological importance of 
Whichcote' s concept 01· reason is increased in the light o:e Augustine's 
doctrine of illumination. He illustrates bis view by references to 
1i.amprecht, "Innate Ideas", P.R. , Vol. XX.XV, ( 1~26), pp. 560ff. 
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Platonic and Stoic philosophy. But it is in Jewish Wisdom 
Literature, and especially as it is reflected in the Fourth Gospel, 
that he rinds his sure position. John unites believing and 
knowing, and attributes a saving significance to knowledge. Thus 
1'or all his praise of the philosophers, Whichcote has not purchased 
his synthesis between faith and reason by the subordination of 
scriptural authority. In the development or his concept or reason 
he has used what has appeared to him to be good and true rrom 
Platonism, Stoicism and Renaissance Humanism, but throughout his 
treatment of the subject he stands securely within the Christian 
camp. Apart from the actual importance of his notion of reason in 
contemporary discussion, he teaches us how to recognise and accept 
truths from all quarters and use them t•or the enrichment of our 
Christian faith. 1 
The weakness in Whichcote's intellectualism appears to be in 
the fact that it makes too much sense. Without hesitation he 
attempts to explain the unexplainable and many or his conclusions 
will not stand the test of critical examination. His confidence in 
the rationality of religion leads in some instances to an over-
simplification or many perplexing problems. His treatment of the 
problem of evil and his reflections on atheism are good examples. 
1westcott, The History of Religious Thought in the West, p.379. 
H.H. ~armer points out that personality is inconceivable apart from 
rationality or rationality apart rrom personality. If we mean by 
reason man's whole personality considered as functioning selr-
consciously in its highest awareness of the world, then it is by reason 
alone that man is able to become aware or God's approach to the soul, 
that is, of' revelation. See The World and God, p. 87. 
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With due appreciation for his balanced position concerning the 
harmony of faith and reason, it appears that his intellectualism led 
him to ignore or evade many serious problems in theology. This 
insufriciency was apparently discerned by Cudworth who struggled 
honestly to give due consideration to many problems envisaged by 
Whichcote but which were inadequately treated by him. There are 
occasions when one wonders if Whichcote was unaware of the fUll 
implications of some questions raised in his writings. In such 
instances there seems to be no other wortby explanation for his 
naive confidence in the selr-evident nature of his rather superficial 
conclusions. One wonders if he was, in fact, misled by his con-
fidence in reason. He often appears more willing to contradict 
himself than to admit in a forthright manner the necessity "to believe 
where we cannot prove". It is essentially this tendency toward an 
over-emphasis upon the role of reason and a failure to give this 
an ample counter-balance with the claims of revelation that places 
Whichcote closer to the Age of Reason than any of his disciples. His 
purpose is sound, namely, to overcome religious fanaticism by a 
rational faith, but without knowing it, he passes on the instrument 
with which opponents of Christianity were soon to undermine it. 
Whereas Whichcote was a Christian apologist employing reason to 
develop a Christian philosophy, many who admired his rationalism 
preferred to use it to construct a religion of reason which ceased to 
be Christian. 
Notwithstanding the many criticisms which may be offered against 
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Whichcote's intellectualism there remains much in his reflections .·of 
great value. This is especially true in view of the outstanding 
revolt against reason in religious circles for the last twenty-five 
years. It is seen in the revival of the thought of Kierkegaard, and 
the general "existentialist" approach to biblical and theological 
studies; it is characteristic of the "crisis" theology of Barth and 
explains ma.ny of the inconsistencies in the thought of Brunner1 ; it 
is anti-intellectualism characteristic of the systems of Henri 
2 
Bergson and William James. 
With this trend toward irrationalism in mind, we may appreciate 
more fully Whichcote's contribution. He attacks logical as well as 
theological dogmatics, and suggests that if we wish to penetrate 
to the very source of religious certainty, we must diligently avoid 
both extreme judgments.3 Whichcote observes that religion contains 
supra-rational lmowledge, but there is nothing ~n it irrational. He 
adds that since reason in man is the candle of the Lord, it is the 
medium of revelation and, therefore, when God declares His mind and 
1itaven, op. cit., pp.52f., 18ff.; Cf. Hodgson, The Doctrine of 
the Trinity, p.65. 
2Both James and Bergson turn from conception to perception as the 
basis of their thought, see,James, The Pluralistic Universe, p.240. 
To a great extent the revival of Pascal may be explained by the present 
revolt against reason. Pascal's "reasons of the heart" may be mis-
appropriated easily by anti-intellect~alists. Cf. F.R. Tennant,~ 
Nature of Belief, p. 24; Pa seal, Pense es, (Stewart), "Apology", Pens. 
626-630. 
3whichcote's position is a challenge to logical positivism as well 
as irrational supernaturalism. 
422. 
will to us, He does so by an appeal to our reason. It is thus that 
Whichcote points us to "sober piety and rational religion" and this 
is of great contemporary importance as Inge observes: 
"His robust faith in the rationality of being a Christian 
is extremely stimulating in our day, when sentimentality, 
emotionalism, and sheer superstition are conspiring to eject 
Reason from her throne.n1 
For Whichcote, religion is the rational basis of ethics. 
Whether he speaks of religion of first-inscription or religion of 
after-revelation, morality is central. His purpose is distinctly 
2 
religious, and therefore, morality is conceived as a part of religion. 
In his over-all view of revelation, the moral principles of religion 
are disclosed either by the light of creation or by biblical revel-
at ion. For the Christian moral responsibility is revealed in nature 
and by grace. Further, he unites reason and morality in the interest 
of religion. He tells us that without knowledge the heart cannot 
be good; that knowledge without obedience is not virtue but that 
there is no virtue without knowledge. Religion is the standard by 
which reason and morality are to be judged and it is in the interest 
of true piety that they are to be employed. 
The union Whichcote proposes between religion and morality is 
praiseworthy, but we may legitimately ask if he were too optimistic 
concerning man's natural goodness. Like most Platonists and 
1Whichcote, Aphorisms, l1930), Inge's Preface, p.ix. Raven's 
defence of reason is stated, op. cit., p.53. 
2Austin., The Ethics of the Cambridge Platonists, pp. 43ff. 
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especially those influenced by the Renaissance, he appears to over-
rate man's sympathy for the good and under-estimate the fact of sin 
and the power of evil. We cannot accuse Whichcote of ignoring these 
forces - he does describe man as fallen. However, a greater stress 
upon the tragedy of evil in human experience and upon the way in 
which we· are enabled to overcome it by strength rrom beyond ourselves, 
by the Grace of God, seems desirable. But against the background 
of the general moral indifference of his age, the separation of 
religion and morality, faith and works, by some Puritans and 
Sectaries, Whichcote's social consciousness is remarkable in insight 
and courage. His combination of salvation by faith and works is one 
of the most substantial contributions he bequeathed to theology ~nd 
ethics. Thus if he appears to lean too far in the direction of 
inherent righteousness and justification by works it is reasonable 
to assume that he does so because it is necessary to about in order 
to be heard. 
Whichcote reminds us that it is better to live up to the moral 
principles that are known to all men than in the name of a new 
liberty in Christ claim eternal salvation, not by virtue of our moral 
efforts, but in spite of our immorality. By placing the moral part 
of religion among things "necessary for salvation" Whichcote calla 
us to a serious concern for sobriety, equity and true piety. His 
message is vital for those who are socially conscious but only against 
a background of humanitarianism. Whichcote refuses to contrast 
nature and grace and his doctrine of salvation includes not only 
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additions to nature, but he asserts that by grace the natural moral 
faculties are restored and heightened. Man is the crown of the 
creation, but he is also a fallen creature and totally depraved, in 
the sense that there is a sinful perversion running through his whole 
being including his reason. God is good, but He is also just; God 
Thus Whichcote's doctrines of God and as Saviour is also Judge. 
man, or sin and salvation, of sanctification and last things are a 
unity. 
We might in a general way consider Whichcote as a representative 
of the Johannine view of Christian Ethics. According to this view 
history is the story or God's mighty deeds and man's responses to 
them. :Man lives somewhat less "between the times" and more in tbe 
di vine "Now". The eschatological f\lture has become for him less the 
action of God before time and less the life with God after time, and 
more the presence of God in time. Eternal life is a quality of 
existence in the here and now. 1 Westcott, himself a Johannine 
scholar, has made Whichcote~s contribution to Christian morality clear 
and has pointed out the relevance of his message to Christian moral 
responsibility for all time. Westcott says: 
"Anyone who bas :followed this outline of Whichcote's 
teaching [Westcott's own essay] ••••• will, I think, have been 
struck by its modern type. It represents much that is most 
generous and noblest in the modern divinity of today. It 
rightly affirms in the name of Christianity much that is said 
to be in antagonism with it. It brings faith into harmony with 
moral law, both in its object and in its issues. It enables 
1H. R. Niebuhr, Christ and Culture, pp.192-228. 
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us to understand how all that we can learn of the true, the 
beautiful, the good, the holy, through observation and thought 
and revelation, is contributory to the right fulfilment of the 
duties of life. 11 1 
The significance 01' Whichcote' s concept of Christian tolerance 
is not to be overlooked. He observes that in the last analysis 
the basis of agreement between Christians is something which it is 
impossible to define in a series of statements. A theological 
statement is necessary only to guard from distortion what is essential 
to our "being in Christ". This is not to cut short the process of 
theological synthesis by accepting an easy common factor. It is to 
secure the conditions under which alone real progress in the task 
of theological synthesis can be made. It is only when varying 
insights are held in some sense within the unity of the common life 
of the church that their contact is fruit:t"ul of new and rich 
insights. The attempt to find a basis of Christian unity in a 
completely articulated theological system is part of the essence of 
sectarianism. 2 Thus Whichcote tells us that as long as we are agreed 
on fundamentals, incidentals may be a means to our mutual enrichment. 
One of the most striking things about Whichcote's view of 
Christian tolerance is that it is so modern and fits so neatly into 
the framework of all constructive thought of the present ecumenical 
1westcott, op. cit., p.393. It is Westcott's opinion that even 
where Whichcote has not developed his principles, they are sound. 
Thus his principles do not require modification but wider application, 
see, Ibid., p.394. 
2cf. Newbigin, Reunion, pp.184fr.; Hugh Martin, Christian 
Reunion, pp.42rf. 
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a iscussion. Yet one wonders what Wbichcote would have said if he 
were faced with all the recognised denominations of our time. His 
course was clear since he was mainly speaking of tolerance among 
parties within the Church of England, but he was notoriously intoler-
ant to the non-conformist sects and the Roman Catholics. In a 
situation in which the Established Church was supreme, his intolerance 
was quite marked. 1 One asks, what would his attitude have been if 
he were con1·ronted by any number o!' independent, organised, ecclesi-
astical systems? He accepted without question the historic 
episcopate as essential to the well-being of the Church. In our 
time, this belief is one of the greatest hindrances to Church union. 
It' Whichcote were faced with a situation where many or even the 
majority of Protestant denominations were non-episcopal, one wonders 
if his·~rinciples of toleration, as generous as they are, would be 
ample for our present needs. But allowing for these shortcomings, 
in which Wbichcote is limited by his age, we observe much in his 
message of reconciliation of permanent worth. His views that we 
should magnify our agreements and minimise our differences, that we 
should seek unity in diversity by agreeing to differ on non-
essentials, that "all things saving" are clear to all who sincerely 
seek the truth, that all inter-faith discussions should be reasonable 
~According to Leslie Paul, Whichcote and his disciples were 
latitudinarian in religion, but in the philosophical field they were 
far from latitudinarianism. They stood firmly against moral relativ-
ism: they taught an absolute moral law which they said was as demonstr-
able as arithmetic, see The English Philosophers, p.94. 
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and in the spirit of love according to the Scripture, and that in 
spite of our differences all true Christians may find sufficient 
ground for communion, are invaluable for our ecumenical discussion. 
The significance of the life and thought of Whichcote cannot 
be fully estimated. From the available accounts of his influence 
upon bis contemporaries and successors, be was one of the foremost 
preachers and theologians of seventeenth century England. We have 
seen that he stands, by virtue of his rational theology and ethical 
theory, among a noble succession o:f thinkers, both philosophical and 
theological, before his time, and that by virtue of bis assimilation 
and transmission of thought by teaching, preaching and personal. 
influence, be lives on in the thought and action of those who have. 
been apostles of freedom in moral and religious thought. 
Wbicbcote and bis disciples entered directly into the formation 
of modern philosophical and t beological thought, and thus their 
influence in an altered form persists to this day. This school, 
with Whichcote as its leader, forms what Cassirer calls "a sort of 
connecting-link between minds and epochs". Cassirer also conceives 
this school as being "one of the piers of that bridge linking the 
Italian Renaissance with Germen humanism in the eighteenth century11 • 1 
Whether we concede Cassirer bis point or not, we would contend, on what 
I believe to be sat·er ground, that Wbichcote 's c ontri but ion to British 
moral and religious thought down to the present is unquestioned. 
1cassirer, The Platonic Renaissance in England, ~Eng. tr.), p.201. 
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Further, the "sweet temper" or his good-natured personality, his 
benevolent spirit, his concern for justice and his deep spirituality 
has an abiding significance. 1 
In spite of all the criticisms of Whichcote's rational theology, 
it seems !'air to conclude that in no period in the history of thought 
has there been mani1 .. est a more pert·ect alliance between Christianity 
and Platonism, faith and reason, religion and morality, nature and 
grace, than in the thought of Whichcote. This meeting of philosophy 
and theology was not a shallow synthesis, but a union of truth from 
all spheres with the best in biblical thought and Christian history 
as the norm. In Whichcote's thought the God of Creation and Redemp-
tion are one, and Jesus Christ is the Saviour for our justification 
and the Example of our sanctification. Those who have difficulty in 
reconciling the apparent contradictions above will do well to read 
Whichcote and :t'ind in his writings a philosophy which embraces "all 
time and all existence" and a religion which permeates the whole life 
of the total man. 
1After approximately three hundred yea.rs the personal influence 
·of Whichcote is still evident in the University of Cambridge and he is 
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